THE THIRTY YEAR WAR

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1639-1640 AND THE BATTLE OF CHEMNITZ 1639.

In January the Elbe was crossed and the advance turned towards Erfurt to relieve this last swedish position in southern Germany. A number of smaller imperial or saxon corps were disrupted during the advance. Banér being ill sent a number of letters to the duke Bernhard of Weimar who now was in french service with his army that was in winterquarters in on the German border. Bernhard had proven to be as unreliable as he was ambitious. He gladly used his by France paid army to further his own interests. After two years on the defensive, bombarded by letters from Richelieu demanding and pleading for offensive actions, he had at last entered Germany by crossing the Rhine and defeated the imperials at Rheinfelden. He then beieged Breisach that held until the lack of supplies caused cannibalism among the defenders. After having eaten rats and cats or boiled leather the poor humans finally ate eachother including seven captured swedish soldiers. After Breisachs surrender Bernhard naturally found the notion of continued offensive utterly impractical and instead claimed that the captured land was his own. No letter from either Banér or Richelieu could make him move.
This was bad news since not only did the reinforcements from Bernhard fail to materialize. The imperial corps opposite Bernhard could now be used reinforce the enemy maneuvering against Banér! The offensive continued however. Erfurt was relieved and the army turned against southern Saxony. In February Zwickau and Chemnitz were seized and with them the important borderpasses into Bohemia. The next objective was Freiberg. A medieval city with an obsolete city wall in poor shape. Banér was convinced that it would be over quickly. But he was mistaken. The defenders were stronger than expected and were helped by the population. The siege was slow due to difficulty in digging trenches and approches in the frozen ground. The defenders often counterattacked and disturbed the work. Banérs army moved very quickly for its time but it came with a price. He did not bring any heavy siege artillery with him (these heavy guns were exteremely heavy, the barrels often weighed two tons, and demanded plenty of horses or oxen to bring along) . The guns he had a Freiberg were to weak to blow down the walls and create a breach. Banér demanded that the defenders surrendered or all would be killed. As was common the reply consisted of insults, but many of the insults were evidently directed at Banér personally. He became furious and demanded that the enemy commander, a brave man named von Haugwitz, prohibited the personal insults. Haugwitz refused.

Johan Banér

When Banér recieved word that enemy reinforcements were approaching he decided to try an assault. On the 18th of March 1000 men with ladders, tools, handgrenades and axes stormed towards the walls. The defenders waited until the swedes were on their way up the ladders before manning the parapets and unleashed volley after volley at point blanc range. Those who reached the parapet were quickly killed with rapier, axe and morning star. Over 500 men were lost in the failed assault. The wounded froze to death during the night at the base of the wall. Two days later the swedish army left the miserable "rats nest" as the furious and frustrated Banér called Freiberg. He was forced to meet two enemy forces marching on his army. With his usual ferocity he force marched his army until cavalrymen were seen falling of their horses until he met one of the enemy corps at Chemnitz on the 4th of april. Despite being exhausted the swedes managed to defeat the imperials in a series of confuced clashes in the close terrain among ponds and swamps. Many of the enemy fled before having seen action and the enemies wagon train was captured. The enemy commander, the saxon fieldmarshal Morzin, escaped but was imprisoned in Prague due to more than acceptable lack of ability.
In the early summer of 1639 the swedish army entered Bohemia. It was a land untouched by war for five years. On the 20th of may the swedes stood outside Prague. A complete turn of the wheel since the year before when the swedes stood squeezed against the baltic coasts. But the lack of siege guns made it impossible to do more than fire light rounds with symbolic meaning only. The enemy hid behind the walls where Banér couldnt get them. A hungarian force that showed up to relieve Prague showed plenty more bravery than intellegence when they in old feudal style charged the swedes with lances, plumes and feathers. The scarred veterans of Banérs army massacred them without any effort. After the "battle" the swedes marshed away.
In the warm summer Banér started to feel frustration. Without siege guns he couldnt seize the strongpoints and thus he could not excercise any occupation of Bohemia except exactly were the army was. The Bohemians who to part were protestants were not very enthusiastic about the swedes and offered little help. Banér decided that if he couldnt use Bohemia neither should the emperor. A fire storm was unleashed on the country. Swedish corps crisscrossed Bohemia looting and burning. Some broke into Mähren, Schlesia and Saxony as well. Before the war the flourishing Bohemia had 738 towns, 34 000 villages and 3 000 000 inhabitants. When it ended 230 towns, 6000 villages and 800 000 inhabitants remained. The word "swede" became synonymous with bandit, robber, thief and murderer. Even until this century the south german and chzech children has heard rhymes like "Bet kindchen, bet. Morgen kommt der schwed" or the mothers have scared them with Axel Oxenstierna. The time of the war became known as the "time of the swedes".
Much of this was due to the inability of the commanders to control their armies. The soldiers were mostly in it for profit and following the armis of both sides were large band of marauders, former soldiers and deserters who cared little for the commanders goals or plans. When the supply situation failed in an army more joined these bands and if the army had success they joined the units again. At times the commanders felt an urge to seek out and destroy the wandering maurauders without the proper papers, but the problem was impossible to deal effectively with. The terror unleashed over Bohemia was more than this howver. It was an official policy of denying the enemy his supply base. This combined terror of planned destruction and random looting has left lasting memories in these parts of Germany. The massacring of the population that occured from time to time was never a part of a policy however. That didnt occur until the illuminated and developed 20th century. The destruction was more like what happens when a giant, grey in arms, wanders about not caring to much were he sets his feet. At times the giant becomes angered and starts to stomp and kick vigourosly just because he feels like it. This not only destroyed the enemies supply base but also increased political pressure on the emperor. That the civilians suffered was just an unavoidabe consequense. Not a goal in itself.
The new emperor, Ferdinand III, who had taken over when his father, Ferdinand II, died two years earlier was gifted where his father had been fanatical. He was genuinly agonized by the terror that fell over his lands. He lacked the means to defeat Banér for a long time, a large scale raid into Livland led by an english colonel named Booth had failed to distract Banér. His peaceofferings were turned down by the swedes. They wernt enough. By tapping the last recources the emperor managed to raise yet a new army of 30 000 men. The incompetent Gallas was fired to increase the odds of a victory and the command was given to the italian veteran Piccolomini. The new imperial commander maneuvered catiously and when the logistical supplies were exhausted in Bohemia Banér pulled out in the late winter of 1640. When he crossed the Elbe 2000 wagons of grain were poured into the river. Banér coudnt bring it with him and neither Piccolomini and the starving population were to have it if he couldnt. Looking for new foraging opportunitys the swedes marsched west, then north. The big wheel seemed to be about to complete another turn. South, then north and then south and north again. Piccolomini followed, content that the swedes left without a fight.
Banér, ill in fever again, tried to get the french and their lethargic allies to move. The swedes hadnt seen anything of them during their campaign in the enemies heartlands. Duke Bernard had died of typhoid during the winter at the age of 35 but considerable part of the Rhineland was still under control of his men. The one who managed to enlist this bunch of unruly wardogs had gained 10 000 experienced mercenaries who had made war the lifestyle. The Bernadines, as they beacme known as, didnt care for whom they fought, where or why. All parties tried to purchase their help. Even Prague came with offers. In the end it was Paris that with the help of a rain of bribes, promises of pensions, eightfolded inceases in wages, managed to tie the infamous and unreliable army to their forces. In the last days of 1639 the french, with the Bernadines, had finally started to move into Germany. The timing was excellent.
Earlier the french had had their hands full with the spanish but these had suffered a series of serious setbacks lately. The dutch had requonquered the fortress Breda and the fall of Breisach to Bernard the year before meant that the spanish were unable to reinforce the dutch front by land since the spanish road along the Rhine had been cut. It became even worse when the dutch navy crushed the spanish fleet outside Dover in a battle that was as disastrous as the destruction of the great armada 50 years earlier. In Spain itself civil unrest was ripe and rumors of impending revolutions were common. Spain could not assist the emperor. Banér had managed to point the very suitable opportunity for uniting their armeis and defeating the emperor out to the french.
The sight of the french reinforced by the Bernadines moving to unite with the swedes sent shivers through the german princes. Two of them, the opportunist count Georg of Lueneburg and the countess Amalia Elisabeth of Hessen both abandoned their long tradition of neutral meandering and joined with the enemies of the emperor. On the sixth of May 1640 the armies united outside the town Erfurt in central Germany. After the usual diplomatic excessive mutual praising and selfadmiration of the time, the new army consisted of 32 000 men. Now, if ever, the enemy was to be defeated. Piccolominis army had shrunk to 10 000 men. For the first time since Nördlingen six years earlier the swedes and their allies outnumbered the enemy. At the end of 1637 a final imperial victory seemed inavoidable but now a large allied army stood in central Germany. The wheel kept on turning and there seemed to no end to the war. The emperor couldt hope for any help from Spain either. The string of defeats had continued and the armada sent to recapture Brasil from the dutch had been destroyed outside Recife in a four day battle. Finally the portugese had rebelled and the duke of Briganza proclaimed himself as king of Portugal. No, the spain could not assist the emperor. Spain was slowly sinking from Europes leading nation into a second rate nation due to an uneducated, parastic aristocracy, a state deep in debt and a withering industry and a weak agriculture. The leadership did not react but closed their eyes and let it happen.
A political pamphlett "Dissertatio de ratione status in imperio Romano-Germanico" became an even more dangerous event than the enemies joining of forces. It became widespread and clearly told how the Hapsburgers had misused their throne and pointed out the constitutional weakness of the empire. It had an enourmus impact in Germany and increasing numbers voiced their opinion for a compromise with the enemy. In an attempt to rally support for his cause the emperor decided to summon to a meeting with the german reichstag.
In the mean time the war went on. Banérs army of 32 000 left Erfurt on the seventh of May. Piccolomini was the be beaten soundly. Problems arose immidietly however. Banér being used to run the army after his own head found that the army consisted of five contingents (swedes, french, lueneburgers, the hessians and the always complaining bernadines) with radically different goals with the operations and these now had to be coordinated. That was partly why the war was so hard to end. With so many participants that all wanted their share the number of variables was staggering. A miniature version of this phenomena soon started to effect Banérs command.
The choleric and illtempered Banér was despite his military genious not very well suited to the role of diplomat. He wanted to go southeast into the German heartlands to defeat the enemy once and for all and above all to drain the enemies supplybase dry. The hessians on the other hand preferred to split the army so that they with the french could make war on the spanish in Holland. The lueneburgers were terrified of that since it meant that tens of thousands of swedes would turn north into Lueneburg for supplies if the army became weaker. The french did not like to stray to far from the Rhine with its important borderareas. Add to that that they had signed a secret treaty with the bavarians, the enemy!, and preffered not to go into Bavaria. The bernadines didnt care for any alternative, as long as loot and pay and good quarters were available they could go anywhere. So they supported the one promising them the most of these neccecities.
The result was an endless series of staffmeetings where it was argued, quarreled and discussed while the furious and frustrated Banér swore and threw his arms in the air in dispair in impotent rage. As if it wasnt hard enough to get the quarrelsome generals to pull in the same direction the army was harassed by wigwearing envoyes from different governments as well, who pulled invisible strings and suggested how the campaign really should be conducted. Banérs army that earlier had resambled a scrawny and starved but fierce and dangerous wolf had been transformed into a humungus prehistoric beast that carried an impressive array of fangs but moved with great difficulty only, lazily beating its tail. Piccolomini was also a better general than Gallas, that may not say so much considering Gallas geuine incompetence, but he was good enough to make all hope of fast and easy victories disappear. The imperials and leaugers had been reinforced by a bavarian corps but still maneuvered with caution. As soon as Banér came within striking distance he entrenched and all movement ceased. A new hungerwar started. The armies moved some distance to try and find better postions but remained roughly around Saalfeld. The imperials well entrenched and Banér continusly trying to lure them into a battle on the field it became a summer of skirmishes and starvation. A miserable war to the soldiers. Considering that both armies combined consisted of 130 000 people including accompanying civilans (half that number!) and the war was conducted in an area well depleted since former campaigns it was hard, if not impossible, to find logistical support.
The officers used their own money to pay for the support of the troops but little was gained. Even gold lost its value since there was nothing to buy. The higher command complained that there was no wine to be found so they had to settle with water! Maybe the excessive drinking ceased for some time at least. The summer was wet and cold that made roads disappear into mud and disease increase. The harvest matured slowly to the commanders frustration and starvation was intense. Without food, in constantly wet clothes struggling in mud to the ancles the epidemics took thousands of soldiers while thousands of others deserted. Banérs own wife died and while he grieved and wept heavily he did not grieve long. Two weeks later he started courting and married a sixteen old noble girl in September. To his disappointment (his sexual urges were great) she did not acompany the army. The spirit in the army plummeted and mutiny was feared. At Chemnitz Västgöta cavalry that garrisoned the town with 300 men had been attacked by the duke Edvard of Braganza wth 8000 men and after five days of continous action repelling the assaults the soldiers spirits were so low that surrender was inavoidable. The defenders were sent north to Pommerania. Their commander Printz was discharged and the men brought home to Sweden. Pritz made a comeback as governor of the swedish colony in north america later however.
The bernadines rebelled but were subdued with more money while the hessians and lueneburgers were so close to home that in June only a third remained. The rest had deserted. Guardduty became a serious problem with so few remaining. When imperial forces started to threaten their homelands even the officers left to look after their homes and soon many companies had a fiscal existance only. In many cases the only thing that remained was the color left behind. When the autumn approached and the rainy summer turned into a windy and even more rainy season the opponents stood 200 km from their starting positions. Neither had achieved anything. The big wheel had kept on turning, the armies had been suffered heavily from attrition and a considerabe part lay in shallow graves. It had been a senseless waste of human life and Banér knew it. Sad and tired he wrote that the campaign of 1640 was the worst he had seen. The army moved to the northwest to winterquarters were Banér and his generals lost themselves in orgies of food and wine.