In the first part I told the story of how Carl Gustaf Skytte in October 1700 requested new uniforms for his regiment and the subsequent delays. It so turns out that there was an additional twist:

Skytte's regiment had two different stations, Dorpat and Pernau. The commander at Pernau Lt. Col. Gustaf von Schwengeln was slightly quicker than Skytte and sent his list to Dahlbergh on 19 October 1700 (LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 339, p. 19). As noted in part one Skytte requested blue coats, red breeches and red stockings for the entire regiment, while Schwengeln asked for blue and yellow (!) for his battalion. From Dahlbergh's letters to the manufacturer it looks like he simply disregarded Schwengeln's list and instructed them to send what Skytte had requested. 

Some fragments of the replies from the manufacturer remains, most notably a letter from Hans Ekman dated Stockholm 7 June 1701(LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 306, p. 257 ff.) In the letter Ekman refers to lack of payment for earlier orders and states that unless this is remedied the collapse of the company will follow. 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 12:01 AM CET

Updated: Sunday, 1 February 2015 7:07 PM CET

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The modern Swedish standard work when it comes to uniforms during the GNW is undoubtedly Höglund & Sallnäs Stora nordiska kriget 1700-1721 : fanor och uniformer (2000), published in English as The Great Northern War 1700-1721 : colours and uniforms. Uniforms and colours is generally a subject I stay away from, but in this particular case I came upon a few items which should not be available elsewhere.

The story starts with an item I found in LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 288 (p. 78). It's a specification dated 21 October 1700, signed by Col. Carl Gustaf Skytte. It states what type of cloth his regiment needs for new uniforms. According the Höglund & Sallnäs the regiment was dressed in blue and yellow both in the late 1690's and in 1705 - yet in this document Skytte requests cloth for blue coats with red lining, red breeches and red stockings. So what's the story here?

Well, the specification was sent by Skytte to Governor General Dahlbergh in Riga as well as to the manufacturer in Stockholm (the heirs of Jacob Lagerstedt or "Barnängen") and Dahlbergh also forwarded it at about the same time - Dahlbergh's letter to the Lagerstedt heirs is dated 25 October 1700 (LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 72, p. 575). Then nothing seems to have happened for quite some time. On 28 March 1701 Dahlbergh reminded the Lagerstedt heirs about the specifications he had sent in October and requested information about the how far the work had progressed. (LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 73, p. 234 f.) A month later he sent a new letter, this time more urgent (Ibid., p. 322) and finally on 15 May (Ibid., p. 397) an angry letter demanding a definite clarification of the situation. 

Not even this seems to have yielded an immediate response, as it was not until 25 June that Dahlbergh could inform the King about the situation (Ibid., p. 559 f.). The firm had finally simply told Dahlbergh that nothing could be done until they had been paid for previous orders. The situation was very difficult, Dahlbergh said, and if the regiments did not receive new uniforms before winter they would suffer badly. On 9 October 1701 the King wrote to Dahlbergh, telling him that he had received information that cloth would be sent from Sweden as soon as possible (LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 150, p. 810 f.). The wheels of the Swedish bureacracy turned slowly...

On 1 December 1701 Skytte took the matter into his own hands, writing directly to Charles XII (Riksarkivet, M 753). The soldiers of his regiment were now, he wrote, more or less incapable of serving due to their poor clothing. They had received nothing new since 1696/97 and were now "naked". The King, who at this point had reached Courland, replied on 2 January 1702. As far as he recalled material had been sent from Stockholm to Riga so Skytte should send his request to Dahlbergh. So the story continues...

On 19 February 1702 Skytte wrote to Paul von Strokirch, an official in Riga, telling him that the regiment was simply unable to perform its duties until new uniforms arrived (EAA 278.1.XX-12c, p. 140 f.) On 3 April he again wrote Strokirch, wanting to know when new uniforms would arrive in Riga (Ibid., p. 146). Unless something happened very soon Skytte would, he wrote, have to send a courier to the King with information about the situation. On 11 April he again brought the issue to Strkirch's attention (Ibid., p. 151 f.). Same thing on 20 April (Ibid., p. 152). Finally, on 29 April 1702 Skytte again wrote to Strokirch, thanking him for the information about the arrival of uniforms and pointing out the King's decision in January. But the matter was not settled yet. On 7 May 1702 Skytte again wrote to Strokirch, thanking him for his advice to bring the matter to the attention of Governor Frölich (Ibid., p. 159). This he must have done immediately as Frölich on 10 May asked Skytte for a specification and promised to find out what was available (LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 74, p. 481 f.) On 17 May the issue had anvanced to a point where Skytte expected to soon get what he needed (EAA 278.1.XX-12c, p. 163 f.). On the 21st Frölich wrote to Skytte, telling him that if the regimental quartermaster came to Riga he would get the new uniforms (LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 74, p. 528). This was likely done shortly afterwards as on the 26th Skytte reported that he was in the process of sending the regimental quartermaster to Riga (EAA 278.1.XX-12c, p. 165 f.)

If this was the end (and it appears to have been) it took Skytte almost two years to get new uniforms for his regiment. It says, I think, something about the Swedish bureaucracy but even more about the financial difficulties caused by the war and how they very soon started to cause major problems. 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 7:22 PM CET

Updated: Sunday, 25 January 2015 11:17 PM CET

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Last week I gave a rough estimate of the number of documents for each month. This time I am going to take this one step further, starting with 1700:

January:  69 letters and other documents

February:  63

March: 92

April: 102

May: 131

June: 136

July: 90

August: 50

September: 58

October: 75

November: 94

December: 112

It should of course be remembered that several volumes remain and that this list only concerns incoming correspondence. However, despite losses I believe it does indicate a few things. Notable is first the increased volume after the Saxon attack on Riga and the subsequent arrival of Vellingk's relief army and later the decrease after Vellingk's retreat. The landing of the main army in October and the focus on Livonia after the battle of Narva also manifests itself. It should be noted that the archive of the Livonian Governor General appears to contain very little about the battle of Narva itself, but much regarding the subsequent efforts to keep the army supplied during the winter. Now 1701: 

January:  115

February: 129

March: 148

April: 121

May: 161

June: 182

July: 152

August: 122

September: 216

October: 182

November: 218

December: 233 

I think this is also fairly indicative of developments - many letters during the period leading up to the Düna crossing in early July, a brief interlude and then an increase as King's army moved further away and Russian forces began attacking eastern Livonia.  

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 10:04 PM CET

Updated: Sunday, 18 January 2015 10:04 PM CET

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My attempt to create an index for the many GNW volumes in the archive of the Livonian Governor General continues. The database now contains about 13,000 entries. Of the letters and other documents about 800 are dated in Dorpat, about 350 in Narva, close to 600 in Reval, almost 1,500 in Pernau and about 800 in Mitau. The most prolific writers are Colonel Gustaf Ernst Albedyhl (750 letters), Major General Schlippenbach (600) and Colonel Carl Gustaf Skytte (about 400). A chronological list would look something like this:

1700: 1,100 documents

1701: 2,000 

1702: 1,600

1703: 850

1704: 1,600

1705: 850

1706: 870

1707: 1,000

1708: 1,300

1709: 500 

The remaining consists mainly of undated items or documents older than 1700.  

It's worth noting (again) that the database at present covers incoming correspondence from civilian and military officials and some other volumes, but not the very large series of letters from various suppliants or the letterbooks of outgoing correspondence. The rather confused state of the archive is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that I have thus far found letters from Gustaf Ernst Albedyhl in 16 different volumes (!). 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 10:22 PM CET

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The presence of Saxon troops in the vicinity of Riga becomes more apparent in Dahlbergh's correspondence when 1699 becomes 1700. On 29 January he wrote to De la Gardie in Reval, informing him that rumours were saying that the Saxons had been transferred to the King of Denmark, i.e. would be used for some kind of diversion after a Danish attack on the Duke of Holstein. There was not much cavalry in Livonia, Dahlbergh wrote, but the small force available had been sent to the shores of the Daugava. Dahlbergh would be much obliged if de la la Gardie put the cavalry companies in Estonia on alert. 

Two days later Dahlbergh sent a long report to Charles XII. There were no firm information yet, he wrote. One set of rumours suggested that the Saxons had been given to the King of Denmark and would be picked up by Danish ships for use in Holstein. However, Dahlbergh believed that this could well be an attempt to convince him that there was no danger to Riga. As the fortress Dünamünde was very weak he had sent an additional 360 men with 8 guns in order to discourage the Saxons, but as he did not dare to weaken the garrison at Riga Dahlbergh had ordered them to sneak back the same evening. Dahlbergh also told the King that a merchant in Riga had received word from Lithuania that Hetman Sapieha had told his people to abstain from transporting goods to Riga. The Governor General also pointed out that he had on two occasions appealed for the strengthening of Riga's defences.

The actions by Dahlbergh are also traceable in the orders he sent to various commanders. On the 27th of January he wrote to Major Haij at Kokenhusen, telling him to keep his eyes open. To von Ceumern, the leaseholder of Bersohn and Lubahn, Dahlbergh wrote that he was grateful for the information received, i.e. that once the Saxon troops advanced the local peasants would stop obeying the Swedes. Dahlbergh would be very grateful if Ceumern could  obtain accurate information about the Saxons. On the 29th Dahlbergh wrote to Col. Skytte in Dorpat, telling him that Saxon units were gathering near the border, but it was still unclear what their intentions were.

Sources:

LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 52, Letterbook for 1700 (in German)

LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 72, Letterbook for 1700 (in Swedish) 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 10:21 PM CET

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Some days ago my attention was drawn to the article (or rather part of an article) in Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon (Swedish Biographical Dictionary) which covers Carl Gustaf Skytte and the Skytte family. About Skytte's career during the first half of GNW the following is stated:

"1697 utnämndes S till kommendant i Dorpat och överste för ett värvat livländskt infanteriregemente. S blev ansvarig för förstärkningen av fästningen i Dorpat, som han framgångsrikt försvarade mot ryska angrepp. 1703 lyckades S besegra en överlägsen rysk styrka vid Wimarski, men följande år blev Dorpat belägrat av ryska trupper. S tvingades efter ett hjältemodigt försvar att kapitulera, och trots löfte om fritt uttåg fördes han till Reval och kvar-hölls en längre tid i rysk fångenskap. Han frigavs och blev 1706 utnämnd till generalmajor i infanteriet och fortsatte att delta i försvaret av Baltikum. Han var 1708 förlagd till Kurland och sändes följande år med sitt regemente till Litauen." 

The most interesting part here concerns the Russian attack on Dorpat 1704, which roughly translates as "Skytte was forced to surrender after a heroic defense. Despite promises of free passage he was brought to Reval and kept as a Russian prisoner for a long time. He was released and was in 1706 appointed Major General and continued to take part in the defense of the Baltic provinces."

Now, Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon is generally considered to be the most important Swedish reference work of its kind. It has been published since the late 1910's and the articles have over the years been written by some of the foremost experts we have (and have had). The part about Skytte is, particularly in light of this, absolutely awful. For starters - how could Skytte possibly have been a Russian prisoner of war in Reval in 1704?? The town wasn't captured by them until 1710... What makes things even worse is that Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon works out of the Riksarkivet building in Stockholm - with literally hundreds of Skytte letters right under their feet (to Schlippenbach, to Charles XII, to Governor Generals Dahlbergh and Frölich and so on). In fact, not even this would have been necessary - Skytte's so called "journal" of the siege was printed in 1916 and it contains sufficient information for avoiding such a mistake.

As for Skytte's "heroic defense" there were obviously other opinions (as I have mentioned before), but such opinions are symptomatic of what happens when too much weight is given to works which are based only on the writings of one side  - in this case Skytte himself.

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 9:32 PM CET

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The archive of the Livonian Governor General contains a lot of material concerning the surprise Saxon attack in February 1700. Let's start from the very beginning:

On 11 january 1699 Governor General Dahlbergh informed Charles XII that some units from "The Royal Polish Army" had been quartered at Birzai, close to the Courland border. In order to find out more about this Dahlbergh had sent an officer to the area. A month later the Governor General reported that Lt. General Flemming had visited Riga for the purpose of buying various items for his regiment of dragoons. However, Dahlbergh remarked, Flemming appeared to be a better statesman than soldier and had a gift for "intrigues". 

Another indication can be found in a letter from Dahlbergh to the commander at Kokenhusen major Haij, dated 9 May 1699. Haij had apprently reported troop movements in Courland. The matter did not appear to be cause for concern, Dahlbergh replied, but it would do no harm if Haij very discreetly made inquiries. However, no spy should be sent.

More worrying signs started to appear towards the end of 1699. On 27 December wrote to Charles XII, telling him that seven Saxon regiments were quartered on the other side of Mitau, while one regiment was at Polangen. A lot of rumors were going around, but Dahlbergh was making preparations for an outbreak of hostilities following a "rupture" in Holstein.

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 10:11 PM CET

Updated: Sunday, 21 December 2014 10:12 PM CET

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On 26 February 1703 Colonel Joachim Cronman, commander of Neumünde (Dünamünde) fortress wrote to Governor Frölich in Riga about a problem. Old flour which had arrived from Mitau in March 1702 was still in storage and some of it was beginning to taste "terribly". Cronman was thinking about distributing the sacks that appeared to be OK among his own soldiers and then mixing the rest in the flour which was given to the Russian prisoners. 

In his reply to Cronman's suggestion Frölich seems to have disregarded the idea and instead concluded that this showed how urgent it was to complete the bakery at Neumünde. If for some reason some flour was unsuitable for baking bread it could be used for producing snaps.

Frölich was (as I have noted before) a man with many ideas. The following year he started a great baking experiment at Neumünde, in the course of which he took it upon himself to teach the bakers of Riga their profession.  

Sources:

Uppsala University Library, Riga-Tartu collection, Box 3, Joachim Cronman to Carl Gustaf Frölich 26 February 1703 

LVVA, Fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 75, Carl Gustaf Frölich to Joachim Cronman 28 February 1703 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 9:31 PM CET

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In LVVA, fond 7349, op. 2, vol. 73-76 is preserved  a considerable amount of material concerning the Swedish embassy to Moscow in 1674. Among the more odd items is a fragment of a letter book (June-July 1673) which once belonged to Gustaf Oxenstierna, the leader of the Swedish delegation. It contains information about the preparations for the journey, for instance the hiring of a translator and the purchase of presents. In vol. 76 there is a specification of how many horses and wagons the delegation needed. Count Oxenstierna should have 20 wagons, while his two colleagues would have to do with 15. The total number required was 169 - along with 148 horses (for riding). A curious item in the same volume is an unsigned and undated diatribe against the Russians, "this barbaric nation which does not care for reason or agreements". 

The volumes also contains a number of letters from Gustaf Oxenstierna and other members of the delegation to Governor General Tott and Governor Fersen in Riga. Some of the letters are coded, but luckily there is a key in vol. 74.

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 11:05 PM CET

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On 16 February 1700 (Old Style) Erik Dahlbergh wrote to Colonel Carl Gustaf Skytte in Dorpat and Governor Otto Vellingk in Narva to inform them of the Saxon attack on Riga. The two letters were mostly identical, but in the one sent to Vellingk Dahlbergh added that the attack had not been preceded by any sort of declaration. Because of this, the Governor General stated, it was difficult to interpret the situation. Were these Saxon troops in fact in the service of the Danes or did they represent a new enemy? The letter did not reach Vellingk for quite some time as he was away inspecting the border with Russia, but on 9 March he was back in Narva. Several couriers were on there way to Sweden, Vellingk wrote. The mobilization of the Finnish regiments had also started due to an order by Governor General de la Gardie in Reval, but Vellingk himself had not dared to take similar action without orders from the King. He was also under the impression that the Saxons were not planning a direct attack on Riga, but simply wanted to collect provisions in Livonia after consuming those that could be found in Courland. Vellingk was expecting the King's orders any day and hoped these would permit an attack across the river into Courland. In the Governor's opinion such a development would be welcomed by the Polish Republic as a means of getting rid of the unwanted Saxons. 

About the situation on the Russian side Vellingk stated that there had been a lot of rumours about an attack, but this was just reports by nervous merchants. Even the Swedish representative Thomas Herbers in Pskov had been struck by this fear, Vellingk stated. However, Vellingk continued, he did not himself believe these reports as it was well known that the Czar would not undertake anything while his negotations with the Ottoman Empire were continuing. News from Moscow further suggested that the Czar was busy with his fleet and such preparations indicated that he did not plan to start a new war.

Sources:

LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 72, pp. 70-74, Erik Dahlbergh to Otto Vellingk, Riga 16 February 1700 

Uppsala University Library, Dorpat-Riga collection, Box 1, Otto Vellingk to Erik Dahlbergh, Narva 9 March 1700

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 9:58 PM CET

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