Another book on the same subject is Cecilia Nordenkull's Karl XII : kungamord (Charles XII : murdering a King). It will apparently be released in late September, but the main culprit has already been identified, Unsurprisingly it's Frederick of Hesse, the King's brother-in-law and the standard villain in most murder scenarios. Presumably this means that Sicre is cast in the role of the assassin.
Another new book is Svensk sjömakt under 500 år (Swedish naval power during 500 years). This one volume history of the Swedish navy is obviously neither detailed nor particularly revolutionizing. When it comes to the GNW some of the most familiar arguments are made, such as "the Swedish army had been built for defensive purposes, not for war outside the empire" and "the navy should have had more vessels suitable for the war against Russia".
The first of these two suggestions would most probably have run into severe supply problems quite soon if it had been acted upon. Onni Korkiakangas, who in the early 1970's investigated the supply situation in 1700-1701, suggested that an important reason behind the decision to move the war into Poland-Lithuania was the impossibility of supplying a large army in the Baltic provinces. I also very much doubt that the Swedish army would have been able to successfully defend the borders from Riga to northeastern Ingria (should be about 900 km) from both Saxons and Russians when the enemies at any given time could choose their point of attack.
The other argument is not much better. Sweden had not fought a war against Russia for 40 years and the relations appeared quite good. So, with many needs elsewhere - why build and maintain a significant naval force on Ladoga and Peipus for years (if not decades) when a new war with Denmark appeared much more likely?