A visit to Halden
Topic: Museums
A couple of weeks ago visited Halden and Fredriksten fortress, partially acting as an expert on the events of 1718. This was (I think) my fifth visit. Among other things I got the opportunity to follow in Bengt Wilhelm Carlberg's footsteps down the very steep hill he and his small group of soldiers brought the dead king. I manages to get down without falling, partly because of the many trees growing there nowadays. If Carlberg went down where I did it's certainly very understandable that the body fell off the stretcher on the way down. 

The museum exhibition was not very large, but nice. For some not quite obvious reason they focused on the "canister scenario", one of the most unlikely theories. It's strange that such basic things still have not been quite cleared up despite the fact that serious research started as far as in the 1840's. 

I will visit Halden two more times this autumn, the final one being a conference 10-12 December. Maybe I will then get a chance to explain why the canister theory is quite unreasonable. 

A very peculiar book
Topic: Literature
I have previously on a couple of occasions mentioned the upcoming Karl XII : kungamord (Charles XII : regicide) by Cecilia Nordenkull. It has now been published. I don't exaggerate when saying unequivocally that it's the most weird book on this subject that I have ever encountered. 

Her theory goes like this: Frederick of Hesse had been plotting against Charles XII for many years. In October 1718 he managed to convince Charles to visit Armfeldt's army outside Trondheim. When the King was well on his way Frederick made for Stockholm as quickly as he could, launched a coup and took power together with his wife, the King's sister. On carrying out this coup they claimed that the King had been killed (their plan was to have him assassinated during the journey to Armfeldt). It all went well and and even an envoy from the Czar arrived to congratulate them on their accession to the throne. 

Meanwhile, the King had managed to avoid all traps and returned to his army in late October. Frederick, who also was back, found himself in a bit of difficult situation. First of all he needed to make sure that Charles didn't find out that he had been deposed. Secondly, he had to convince Charles to go "deep undercover" - Fredrick could not risk having someone finding out that Charles wasn't dead. Thirdly, he needed to kill Charles. 

Then about a month passed, Charles never realized that he had been deposed and none other than the conspirators found out that the King was still alive. Now came the time to kill him, but how?

Well, Fredrick came up with a very complicated plan. He set up a battery across the river (some 700 meters from the Swedish trenches), borrowed some British officers and soldiers from admiral Norris, added a few trusted Germans and waited.

On the evening of 30 November the opportunity presented itself. The King had arrived at a gathering point behind the Swedish trenches, There he was approached by a young officer who had been ordered to carry a lamp. This young officer did not know the purpose, but when he reached Charles he gave a signal with his lamp. The battery across the river fired canister and Charles and the young officer were hit by many balls. Both men were killed on the spot.

Some of the conspirators now sprang into action. They carried the King tightly wrapped in his own coat to the trenches without being discovered and then put the King on top of the outer wall. Just as they were finished Lt. Carlberg appeared. He saw the King and joined the group of men. After some time one of the conspirators exclaimed: "The King has been hit!" and then everything proceeded as told in Carlberg's testimony. 

So what's the evidence Nordenkull cites. Well, first of all a famous painting by Gustaf Cederström - dated 1897! It's not clear how Nordenkull thinks that Cederström knew the correct circumstances...

Another piece of evidence is a newspaper article from Stamford Mercury, which describes the visit by a representative for the Czar to Stockholm. Unfortunately for Nordenkull the relevant page has been mislabeled during scanning. It's quite obviously from November 1720, not November 1718. 

What I have described above is just the tip of the iceberg. It's an amazing book - for all the wrong reasons. Even more amazing is that the author has been invited to a seminar in Halden -  https://ostfoldmuseene.no/hendelse/historieseminar-1718/

Another book
Topic: Literature

Another book on the same subject is Cecilia Nordenkull's Karl XII : kungamord (Charles XII : murdering a King). It will apparently be released in late September, but the main culprit has already been identified, Unsurprisingly it's Frederick of Hesse, the King's brother-in-law and the standard villain in most murder scenarios. Presumably this means that Sicre is cast in the role of the assassin.

Another new book is Svensk sjömakt under 500 år (Swedish naval power during 500 years). This one volume history of the Swedish navy is obviously neither detailed nor particularly revolutionizing. When it comes to the GNW some of the most familiar arguments are made, such as "the Swedish army had been built for defensive purposes, not for war outside the empire" and "the navy should have had more vessels suitable for the war against Russia". 

The first of these two suggestions would most probably have run into severe supply problems quite soon if it had been acted upon. Onni Korkiakangas, who in the early 1970's investigated the supply situation in 1700-1701, suggested that an important reason behind the decision to move the war into Poland-Lithuania was the impossibility of supplying a large army in the Baltic provinces. I also very much doubt that the Swedish army would have been able to successfully defend the borders from Riga to northeastern Ingria (should be about 900 km) from both Saxons and Russians when the enemies at any given time could choose their point of attack. 

The other argument is not much better. Sweden had not fought a war against Russia for 40 years and the relations appeared quite good. So, with many needs elsewhere - why build and maintain a significant naval force on Ladoga and Peipus for years (if not decades) when a new war with Denmark appeared much more likely? 

The unknown bullet
Topic: Literature

Rolf Uppström's new book Den okända kulan (The unknown bullet) has now been published. It's basically a slightly revised and updated version of his 1994 thesis. I can quite uneqivocally say that I am very unimpressed. Some examples:

Uppström has discovered that the statement written by three high officials (who had no medical or military training) after they had opened the King's coffin in 1746 has been published in two slightly different versions. It is very well known that three copies were made and that at least two have been preserved. So has Uppström checked them? No...

Uppström, who is an historian and a teacher, also takes it upon himself to question the shooting tests made by Dr Beat Kneubuehl and Dr Michael Thali, suggesting that these two forensic experts did not know what the inside of a human head looks like...

Another curious item is Uppström's suggestion that the trenches may have been placed futher away than previously thought, in his opinion making a Norwegian bullet less likely. Ballistically this is just hogwash. Old and modern tests have repeatedly shown that a lead ball could very easily kill a man at 210 meters - if it hit. It was of course impossible for the Norwegians to see the King's head, but they fired towards the area where they heard the Swedes working.

The top prize must however go to the assassination theory Uppström presents. According to him the murderer fired from a position between the parallell and the line that was started the same evening. From the available sources it is quite clear that the new trench was dug by using "sape volante". This means that the soldiers were digging side by side all along the line, the closest of them likely not more than 5-6 meters from the King's position - with no wall in between. The night was dark, but Carlberg states that the closest of the soldiers may have been able to see the King. It's also reasonable to believe that he mostly looked towards them and the fortress beyond. So how would an assassin remain undiscovered as he was making his way to this position? How would the shot not be heard and the muzzle flash not be seen? How would he get away without being noticed by the soldiers? Seriously?

The most interesting chapter is the description of the still unsuccessful attempt to gain permission for a new opening the coffin. I was immensly critical of it already from the beginning (in 2008) and nothing in Uppström's description causes me to reconsider. It seems to me that some of the tests are quite pointless, like finding out the King's dental health and others could just as well be made without opening the coffin, at least initially (A preliminary dynamic finite element simulation of the injuries, which they wanted to do, could surely be made using a computerized generic human skull?). Why not for example start looking for a suitable open field far from all artificial lightning and build the key parts of the trench system, hire some reenactors and test the possible assassination scenarios under realistic conditions? I realize that this is not as exciting as opening the coffin before rolling TV cameras and putting the King's body through various new tests, but why not start with the fundamental stuff if one is inclined to question most of what has been done before?

The most logical solution?
Topic: Literature

As we are closing in on 30 November there will inevitably be new articles about the King's death. The latest issue of the historical magazine Populär historia 2018:9 boldly leads the way. The editor asked Peter Englund to write about the present state of research. 

Englund, who has never been a friend of the assassination theory, dismisses it quickly, He then goes on to deal with the other two - Norwegian musket ball and Norwegian case or canister shot. Englund declares that the most simple and most logical is the one presented by the engineer Svante Ståhl in 2005. According to Ståhl the King was hit by a small iron ball shot from the fortress Overberget some 600 meters away. It was previously assumed that there wasn't sufficiently small iron balls (18-20 mm) for this scenario to be possible, but Ståhl hade come in contact with the Norwegian officer and artillery expert Odd T. Fjeld, who in the 1990's had discovered that there were. Or had he?

Ståhls reasoning is based on an interpretation of a certain passage in one of the ammuntion records for the fortress. I focused on the weight "lod" and the meaning of "lödig". When it came to ammunition for muskets "lödig" in Denmark-Norway undoubtedly had to do with parts of a pund, i.e. a "10-lödig" lead ball weighed 1/10 of a pund, but did it mean the same when used about iron balls in canister and case shot?

Fjeld and Ståhl was sure it did, so Ståhl presented the following solution:

1. Danish-Norwegian case shot contained "20-25 or more wrought iron balls".

2. The case shot weighed about the same as the standard cannonball for a certain caliber.

3. The King was hit by a small iron ball fired from either an 6-pounder or an 18-pounder. 

4.This small wrought iron ball had a diameter of 20 mm and weighed about 32 grams. 

Englund deemed this the simplest and most logical solution. I'd say it is not, as there is a glaring weakness. Point 1 is correct, point 2 as well. Point 3 - OK, that's a theory. But no 4? A case shot for a 6-pounder should weigh about 3 kg and one for an 18-punder about 9 kg, but 25 iron balls at 32 grams à piece only weighs 800 grams!

So as no 1 and no 2 is correct, no 4 must be completely mistaken. Each iron ball in a case shot for a 6-pounder must weigh about 120 grams and in a case shot for an 18-punder about 360 grams - otherwise no 1 is incorrect (and it isn't). 

So Ståhl's theory iis not the simplest and most logical - it is in fact the most illogical and the most unlikely. 

New books
Topic: Literature
As autumn approaches the events in memory of 1718 come with greater frequency. The same appears to be true about new books. There will be a new edition of Bengt Liljegren's biography of Charles XII. This time it will be called Krigarkungen (The Warrior King). It has been updated to some extent and I have also done the fact checking - although it remains to be seen exactly how this will show in the published work. The author and I have a very different view of Charles...

Rolf Uppström, who in 1994 published a thesis called Mysteriet Karl XII:s död is also back, now with Den okända kulan (The unknown bullet). I don't know anything about it, but I assume that he will continue to advocate that the King was murdered.

The same publisher is behind Allt om Karl den tolfte (Everything about Charles XII). Pretty presumptous title to say the least...

And then there is this. 276 pages of which half is footnotes. The author has discovered that Charles was murdered and his reputation tarnished by his enemies (I presume). All sources in the public domain, it says. Well, I think there will good reason to write about this book later on... The twitter account connected to the book makes some pretty astonishing claims

Vacation
Topic: Miscellaneous
I have been a bit slow to update recently, but I'll be back around 10 August with something new. 

Ulf Sundberg's dissertation : part 3
Topic: Literature

In the previous entry I started to look at the case of Menzen manor, which fell in early August 1702. A glaring weakness is Sundberg's failure to use Baltic archives. I took a quick look in my index of incoming letters and found 120 items dated August 1702 and of them 33 are earlier than the 10th. Of particular interest is the volume EAA.278.1.XX-18, which contains letters from Lt. Col. H. J. Brandt, sent from Wolmar in late July and early August. Brandt had passed Menzen on his way to Wolmar from Marienburg, so he knew the area quite well.

On 4 August Brandt wrote to Frölich about recent events and enclosed a couple of reports he had received. One of these, sent by a certain Berch on 3 August, mentions that Lt. Col. Yxkull at Menzen had sent a scouting party under the command of captain Knoblauch, which had encountered a small Russian force which it had defeated. On 8 August Brandt reported that according to rumours the enemy had appeared before Menzen two days earlier. There were no reports of subsequent events. Brandt had sent out a detachment of 60 men under the command of major Laurentzen and hoped to have more news when it returned. Next is a short note from the bailiff Ringenheim, dated 7 August, in which he reports that Menzen is holding.

The next letter from Brandt is dated 11 August. It is accompanied by one report from Ringenheim and one from major Laurentzen. Ringenheim writes that Menzen had been burnt on Thursday (the 7th). He did not know if Yxkull had been killed or captured. Another detailed account of events in early August is found in a letter from the clergyman Andreas Neudahl, dated 15 August (EAA.278.1.XX-19)

Among outgoing letters from Governor Frölich (LVVA, Fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 74) several mention Menzen (to de la Gardie, to Strokirch and to Schlippenbach 11 August )

Another source Sundberg has overlooked(?) is Christian Kelch's Liefländische Historia, in which Menzen is mentioned briefly on page 288 in volume 2. 

Even more glaring is Sundberg's failure to use Russian sources. He could for example have started with Heldur Palli's Mèdu dvumja bojami za Narvu (1966), which discusses Menzen on pages 188-189. 

 

Ulf Sundberg's dissertation : part 2
Topic: Literature

 After careful consideration I have decided to continue my analysis of Sundberg's dissertation Swedish defensive fortress warfare in the Great Northern War : 1702-1710. I will continue with  the sources and the literature.

Case 1: Menzen 1702

As Menzen was an ordinary manor it's not even obvious why it has been included in the study. Surely it was neither built nor manned as part of a defensive system established in Livonia?

As for the appearance and size of Menzen Sundberg has basically nothing to say and is forced to use a drawing of an entirely different manor. Could he have improved on this by using Baltic archives? I would think that's very likely. A simple google search turned up an excavation report from 2008 with a contemporary map showing the manor close to a small lake (which is not mentioned by Sundberg).

Sundberg then goes on to speak about sources and previous research. He mentions a couple of brief late 19th century works by Otto Sjögren, who primarily worked on the Schlippenbach archive which more or less by chance had ended up in Stockholm. Sundberg also notes the so called diary of Czar Peter and a mysterious report mentioned by Adam Lewenhaupt's Karl XII:s officerare.

Is this really all there is of previous research? Obviously not. What first comes to mind is Carl von Rosen's Bidrag..., published in the 1930's. The second volume deals with the war in Courland, Livonia and Ingria during the first few years and Rosen mentions Menzen. Another even more obvious work is Heldur Palli's Mezjdu dvumja bojami za Narvu (1966), which would have given Sundberg an idea of what Baltic archives hold. 

Sundberg notes that a letter from the Swedish commander is incorrectly dated and how this mistake through Sjögren has found its way into other works. If Sundberg had used Rosen or Palli he would have found chronologically more accurate versions, so it could be argued that his ability to correct the record is solely based on the fact that he has failed to use certain previous works.

An additional note: 

Just before Sundberg starts the discussion of various sieges during the GNW he lists on page 131 the strength of Swedish garrisons in 1699. In footnote 425 he has a long explanation of a presumed problem concerning the exact date Carl Gustaf Frölich was put in charge of Soop's regiment. The solution is very simple. If Sundberg had looked in Riksregistraturet (available online) he would have found that Frölich was appointed on 10 March 1700 (not 1701) because Soop had died and that the appointment was for both the governorship and the regiment. So the footnote is quite unnecessary - everything is quite clear if one uses the logical sources.

 To be continued...

 

A new dissertation

Some weeks ago Ulf Sundberg's dissertation Swedish defensive fortress warfare in the Great Northern War 1702-1710 was published. A lot can be said of this work, but I will focus on one point:

Sources

Sundberg starts by emphasizing the importance of Karolinska krigares dagböcker and Historiska handlingar and then goes on to state that the most important published Russian source is the so called diary of the Czar, which Sundberg has used in a edition from 1773. In my opinion that's a remarkable statement given the existence of Pisma i bumagi, literally thousands of pages of letters from and to the Czar. 

As for the Baltic archives Sundberg states that the "General Governor's archive in Tartu [Estonian: Riigi Keskarhiiv, Swedish "Estlands centralarkiv i Tartu"] is worth mentioning, because "it has several documents from commanding officers in Swedish Livonia". But Sundberg didn't use these documents as Fredrik Arfwidsson did so in the 1930's. Well, "several documents" is a bit of an understatement. I have up til now registered about 15,000 incoming letters (most of them from the period in question) and then there is an enormous amount of copies of outgoing correspondence. I would argue that it is not possible to write about Livonia during the GNW without using the archive of the Governor General (which apparently unbeknownst to Sundberg became divided between Tartu and Riga after World War 2). As for Tartu the Archive haven't been called "Riigi Keskarhiiv" for a very long time. The wording suggests to me that Sundberg hasn't really made an effort to check what the archive contains and certainly isn't aware that the part preserved in Riga was microfilmed in the 1990's - and the films available in Stockholm.

Another part of Sundberg's work should depend on Danish sources, but he says that he abstained from using Danish archives because he presumed that Bidrag til den store nordiske krigs historie had used everything that wasn't difficult to find...

Sundberg has also left Russian archives aside because of language difficulties. Even if that is to be considered understandable, it's rather unfortunate when the topic of the dissertation so clearly focuses on events involving Russian forces. So if not archives - how about Russian literature? Surely in this day and age it would not only have been possible to consult the most relevant works, but also to have the key parts translated?

Sundberg's bibliography has a few notable omissions, for example Carl von Rosen's Bidrag till kännedom. I also miss the series "Skrivelser till Konungen", which I would think is pretty central for any work on the GNW.