On 8 May 1706 Henrik Falkenberg, deputy president of the Göta appellate court, wrote to Adam Ludvig Lewenhaupt who was in Stockholm on official business. It was, Falkenberg wrote, a great joy to hear that Charles XII had rewarded a member of an old family by promoting L. to Lieutenant General. Perhaps Lewenhaupt's successes in Courland would teach the King the difference between men from old and distinguished families and those who despite very few real accomplishments had risen (or perhaps rather brought up) from the dirt. Hopefully this would lead to changes and and more appreciation for the former category. Falkenberg (from an old German noble family) was particulary pleased that his son Melker (a captain in Lewenhaupt's regiment) had taken part in the campaigns and in some small way contributed to the successes. 

Melker Falkenberg would eventually become colonel of Västmanland's regiment and fell at Moss in 1716. This particulary branch of the family (Falkenberg af Bålby) still exists today. 

Source: Riksarkivet, E 4645 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 5:24 PM CET

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On 17 August 1701 a Polish messenger arrived in the Swedish headquarters at Bixten (today Biksti in Latvia). Gustaf Adlerfelt calls him "the starosta Potocki, a son of the Crown Hetman" and states that he came on behalf of Cardinal Radziejowski, who wanted to tell Charles XII that it was not a very good idea to insist upon the removal of King Augustus. The Poles did not like this at all, according to Radziejowski. If Charles however would drop this proposal the Cardinal and the Republic would be ready to work for peace and were prepared to offer satisfaction. 

Later historians have had very little to add. Carl von Rosen in 1935 simply followed Nordberg (whose account is very similar to Adlerfelt's) and Gustaf Jonasson did the same in 1960. According to Jonasson the starosta was called Józef Potocki, a name he likely got from Nordberg's index. 

The Grand Crown Hetman in 1701 was Stanisław Jan Jabłonowski, so the messenger was rather a son of Field Hetman Feliks Kazimierz Potocki. Hetman Potocki had several sons: Michał, Józef Felicjan, Stanisław and Jerzy. Circumstantial evidence would seem to suggest that Nordberg likely got the name Józef from more famous Voivode of Kiev, later a close ally of the Swedes and that the messenger was in fact Michał, starosta of Krasnystaw since 1686 and one of the most "difficult" Polish leaders the Swedes faced during the Great Northern War. In 1702-1703 he repeatedly tricked the Swedes (most notably the cunning Magnus Stenbock), but eventually regained the favor of Charles XII and fought at Kalisz in 1706 (where his units rapidly fled). When Augustus returned to Poland in 1709 Michał Potocki left the Swedish side and then soon enough broke with Augustus again, joining Jan Grudziński's raid into Poland in 1712.  A few years later he fought the Saxons as member of the Tarnogrod Confederation. When Augustus died in 1733 Michał Potocki followed the example of many of his old Swedish and Polish comrades in arms and joined Stanisław Leszczyński's side once more. Eventually unsuccessful this time as well he reconciled with the victorious Augustus III. He died in 1749 and was buried in Sędziszów Małopolski.  

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 8:26 PM CET

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About two years ago I wrote about the apparent friendship between Carl Magnus Stuart and Wolmar Anton von Schlippenbach, the commander of the army in Livonia. In a letter dated 4 October 1701 Stuart advised Schlippenbach to remain at his post and assured him that he was just as unhappy about the King's decision to abandon the plan to move against the Russians after the Saxons had been driven away from Riga. Another slightly misplaced document further confirms their relationship. 

On 19 June 1701 Stuart wrote to his friend from the camp at Terrafer (Tõravere), expressing gratitude for the many letters Schlippenbach had sent him. Stuart had not had the opportunity to reply to them before, so he also wanted to express his happiness on hearing about Schlippenbach's many successful raids during the preceding year and during the winter. These had proved to Charles XII that Stuart's high opinion of Schlippenbach was fully justified. The King was now marching towards Düna with 24,000 men and would leave 6,000 at the Russian border. This force would hopefully be able to protect Livonia, so that something considerable could be achieved during the autumn. 

Riksarkivet, M 1414 (letters to Schlippenbach from Stuart during 1702).  

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 7:20 PM CET

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The news about the meeting at Jurburg reached Riga in early April. On the 9th Governor General Dahlbergh wrote to Major General Horn in Narva, telling him that the meeting had been followed by an advance by the Swedish army, apparently towards Warsaw. Dahlbergh prayed that the enterprise would end well, noting that it had been reported from Poland that Great Crown Hetman Jabłonowski had died - "we have lost a man of good intentions."

Two days earlier Dahlbergh had informed the Chancery in Stockholm. Jabłonowski had, he said, on a number of occasions made considerable efforts for the common good.

Sources:

LVVA, fond 7349, op. 1, vol.  74

Riksarkivet, Kanslikollegium E VII : 5

. 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 8:51 PM CET

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In the afternoon Piper held another meeting, undoubtedly of more lasting consequences. The Grand Treasurer of Lithuania Benedykt Sapieha, his ally Kazimierz Michał Pac and one of his sons along with one of Hetman Sapieha's sons met with Piper, Josias Cederhielm and Georg Wachschlager, the Swedish envoy in Warsaw. After some initial pleasantries the Grand Treasurer expressed his gratitude for the assistance given to his family by Charles XII. Pac pointed out that his actions had resulted in breaking up of the recent diet in Warsaw. Piper assured him that Charles XII was well aware of it and would remember Pac's effort. Piper then asked Sapieha to list the issues he wanted to have discussed and clarified. They were:

1. What were the King's intentions? 

2. That Sapieha and the magnates he had consulted wanted a good relationship beween Sweden and the Republic. 

3. That they wanted a such a close relationship between Sweden and the Republic that the interests of the two countries would be firmly united.

4. That a suitable method for bringing this into fruition would be found. 

Benedykt Sapieha then asked: Did Charles XII still insist on having King Augustus removed from the throne? Yes, Piper replied, Charles could not change his mind on that point as he viewed the dethronisation as the only method of bringing security to Sweden as well as to the Republic. Sapieha agreed and stated the most Poles shared this view, but they had not had the resources to act. There was also uncertainty about the Swedish intentions. Some believed that Charles wanted to make large conquests from the Republic. It was, Sapieha emphasized, absolutely vital for Charles to make a firm statement about his aims. Piper replied that these were well-known and the King was a man of his word. It was unnecessary to have doubts on this point. Charles XII wanted to have Augustus removed because this was the only way to bring Sweden and the Republic together in an alliance for mutual benefit. The King's program was:

1. The removal of King Augustus

2. The election of a new Polish king with whom a good friendship could be entertained.

3. The full restitution of the Sapieha family.

The first two had long been the King's position, but the third was new. Charles XII had realized, Piper said, that he and the Sapieha family had a common interest. The Sapiehas had proved their friendship and deserved Swedish support. While Piper explained this, the Grand Treasurer got tears in his eyes and said that the Sapiehas would for the rest of their lives remain faithful to Charles. The Republic was, he assured Piper, well pleased with the King's declaration of his intentions.

(To be continued...)

Source: Riksarkivet, Diplomatica, Polonica, vol. 310

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 8:08 PM CET

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On 24 March 1702 Carl Piper, head of the Field Chancery, held a couple of important meetings in Jurburg (Jurbarkas) on the right bank of the river Neman. He first held talks with Mikołaj Franciszek Ogiński, Court Treasurer of Lithuania. Oginski claimed that he had been sent by Prince Jakub Ludwik Sobieski with an important mission. Oginski wanted the Swedish forces to continue advancing towards Warsaw in order to force King Augustus to flee. The whole army would not be needed, Oginski suggested. 3,000-4,000 would be entirely sufficient. It would also be advisable to have some units march on Vilnius. The most important part of his mission from Prince Jakub did however concern the Cossacks and Tatars. They would be able to give Sweden assistance in the war with Russia. Oginski possessed, he claimed, estates near the border to the Cossacks and they had told him of their fear of Russia and how the Czar already had begun to limit their rights. The Cossacks had informed both Cardinal Radziejowski and Prince Jakub of their need for foreign support and they had thought it best to contact Charles XII. 

Piper replied that it seemed risky to make contact with the Cossacks, who had "neither head nor firm decisions" - Mazepa had been arrested by the Czar and had no deputy. Oginski said that the arrest of Mazepa had caused a lot of irritation among the Cossacks, but there were 15 colonels who corresponded with each other about the important decisions. 

Help could also be obtained from the Tatars if they received money. But, the Swedes replied, the Tatars were allied with the Ottoman Empire. Could they really go to war wíth Russia without his permission? Oginski did not give a clear reply to this, but said that the Ottomans were less than happy with the Russians and the Tatars feared that the Czar had designs on their land. 

Piper promised that he would bring the matter to the King's attention and praised Oginski's devotion. Oginski assured Piper that he had taken no part in his brother's rebellion - they had always been in disagreement. The Court Treasurer said that he would send a message through his son in Vilnius and recommend Grzegorz Antoni to make peace with the Sapiehas. 

Source: Riksarkivet, Diplomatica, Polonica, vol. 310. 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 7:46 PM CET

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Örjan Martinsson has recently in his blog published a number of short essay on drawings and paintings of GNW war battles and the possibility of using them as sources for uniforms and colours. On 24 January 1702 Governor General Dahlbergh wrote a letter to the Chancery College, outlining the work he had managed to do in regard to illustrating the battles of Charles XII. In the letter Dahlbergh emphasized that these drawings should be seen as a continuation of the ones he had previously made for the military history of Charles X Gustavus and Charles XI. The list goes as follows:

1. A geographical drawing of the town of Riga with surroundings and the events from the beginning of the war.

2. Two prospects of the town of Riga and the events.

3. A drawing of the bombardment and the assault on Dünamünde.

4. A scenographic drawing of the crossing of the Düna and the great victory.

5. An ichnographic drawing of the fortress of Narva and the Russian siege.

6. A perspective drawing of Narva and the Swedish assault on the Russian camp.

7. A prospect of Mitau.

Would the Chancery please look at these drawings and determine if they were suited for illustrating a future history of the war? If others were able to produce better works, Dahlbergh would be happy to take a step back. His only wish was to show devotion to his dear Fatherland.

Some of the preparations for these drawings can be followed in Dahlbergh's correspondence, mot notably in the letters from Henning Rudolf Horn in Narva (which I believe I have written about earlier). These shows that Dahlbergh was very adamant about getting accurate sources for his own works, i.e. had drawings made by officers who had been present in Narva during the siege.

Source: Riksarkivet, Kanslikollegium E VII: 5-6 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 8:39 PM CET

Updated: Monday, 14 November 2016 9:34 AM CET

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In his analysis of the Errastfer defeat the major general hinted that certain people were responsible for delaying his expected reinforcements. Who were they? One of Governor General Dahlbergh's letters gives a hint. On 4 February 1702 he wrote to Gustaf Adolf Strömfelt, saying that Schlippenbach in rather shocking terms had accused him of delaying the rasing of militia cavalry units from the small towns in Livonia. Dahlbergh found Schlippenbachs expressions most offensive, but was prepared to drop the matter if Strömfelt made the situation clear to the major general. If the latter was not prepared to let the matter rest it would be best to let the King decide. The following day Dahlbergh wrote to Strömfelt's colleague Mikael von Strokirch, telling him to use a planned visit to Schlippenbach's headquarters for persuading the major general to make better arrangements.

The King had already reached a similar conclusion. On 16 January he had written to Strokirch and Strömfelt, ordering them to go to Schlippenbach and discuss how the Livonian army was to be supplied. On 18 February Strömfelt sent a report to Dahlbergh. According to this it had soon become clear to the participants that Livonia could not provide everything the soldiers needed. The discussions had ended with the decision to send a formal appeal to King, asking him for support from Stockholm as well as from Finland. They were reluctant to ask for more recruits from Livonia leaseholders and officials as it could cause further supply problems, so the recommendation was requests for horses, wagons, clothes and shoes rather than for more men. As for the militia from Estonia they were rather troubled by the costs and suggested it would be more useful if these units were used as a recruiting pool for other regiments, thereby bringing the raw recruits into already well disciplined and well trained units. 

On the same day Strokirch, Strömfelt and Schlippenbach also sent a joint report to Charles XII. The King replied on 10 April, categorically dismissing the suggestion to make changes to the militia units. He also turned down the proposal to bring supplies from Finland as these must go to Cronhjort's army. As for the supplies in Livonia the King rejected the suggested construction of depots. It would be better if the supplies were kept at the various estates where they were produced, thereby limiting the risks for massive losses if the enemy attacked. To permanently keep 1,000 horses by the army (another proposal) just for bringing forward supplies was simply impossible and could not be accepted.

Sources:

LVVA, Fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 74

Riksarkivet, Livonica II, vol. 126 

Riksarkivet, Riksregistraturet

Riksarkivet, Gustaf Adolf Strömfelts arkiv, vol. 4 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 7:31 PM CET

Updated: Sunday, 6 November 2016 8:48 PM CET

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In 1719 Wolmar Anton von Schlippenbach, by then in the service of Czar Peter, claimed that he upon receiving his promotion to Major General in 1701 had replied to Charles XII: "Thank you, but I would have preferred 7,000- 8,000 soldiers". This is (naturally) quite untrue. On 2 October 1701 Schlippenbach acknowledged the arrival of his promotion and expressed his gratitude. There was nothing he would rather do for the rest of his life, Schlippenbach wrote, than serve the King and try his outmost to please him. 

The closest to this dramatic (but apparently untrue) warning can be found in Schlippenbach's letter dated 6 September. After relating the recent fairly successful skirmishes he points out the enemy's numerical superiority and his own army's weakness, asking for instructions and reinforcements. Upon receiving this dispatch in Grobin on 16 September Charles XII immediately acted accordingly, sending the regiments of Fritz Wachtmeister and Erik Stenbock as well as 300 men from Albedyhl's dragoons and another 50 dragoons just arrived at Reval. The King also ordered Governor General Dahlbergh to send 937 from the garrison at Riga and nearby post. Charles had carefully looked at Dahlbergh's dispositions and decided that the post at Kobron could be brought down from 190 men to 30. By making similar savings elsewhere (6 men here, 42 there, 24 here, 18 there etc.) he managed to scrape together almost 1,000 infantry, which together with the other reinforcements more or less doubled the size of Schlippenbach's force. Charles realized that this may still prove to be insufficient and gave Schlippenbach full control of corps in Livonia. If the newly appointed major general believed the situation forced him to retreat there was no need to ask for permission first - Schlippenbach had every right to conduct the campaign as he saw fit. Advance or retreat, it was Schlippenbach's call to make. Similar instructions were issued to Cronhjort in Ingria, a fact which rather disproves the old myth that Charles was reluctant to delegate.

Sources:

Riksarkivet, Skrivelser till Konungen. Karl XII, vol 23-24

Riksarkivet, Riksregistraturet 

Ustryalov, N., Istoriya Tsarstvovaniya Petra Velikago. Tom 4 Chast 2. - Saint Petersburg, 1863

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 8:00 PM MEST

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