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Life After Death
Myths that explain the origin of death have been
found among many cultures. Clearly, reflection on
death and on life after death belongs to the oldest
layers of religion. Yet because of the oral nature of
these myths, their approach to the problem of
death is relatively unsophisticated. A steady
progress became possible only after the Greek invention
of simplified writing. This process has continued
through the twentieth century, and philosophy
and theology, directly or indirectly, have
exerted the most important influences on religious
thinking about life after death.
The terms soul and otherworld have not always
carried the same meanings during the course
of history. “Primitive” conceptions of the soul were
usually of two types: the so-called free-soul, which
represents the individual personality but which becomes
inactive when the body is active, and thus
represents the person after death; and the bodysoul,
which endows the body with life and consciousness,
and which perishes with the body. This
dualistic conception of the soul changes when
small “primitive” peoples become more differentiated.
In these cases, the free-soul starts to acquire
the qualities of the body-soul. The process is well
documented in ancient Greece, where, after
Homer, the free-soul (psyche), started to incorporate
the thymos, the most important of these bodysouls.
As for the underworld, modern people are
so used to thinking in terms of heaven and hell
that they must be careful not to retroject them into
earlier civilizations. Like ideas about the soul, conceptions
of life after death have a history too.
Ancient Israel and ancient Greece
Even a cursory look at the Old Testament reveals
that it has little to say about either soul or afterlife.
In fact, ancient Hebrew does not even have a term
equivalent to the modern English word soul. The
closest equivalent is nephesh, which can be translated
“life” or “life-force,” but which can also signify
the seat of emotions. Yet this term never refers
to the “soul” of the dead, nor is it ever contrasted
with the body. Israelite anthropology was strictly
unitarian and remained so until influenced by the
Greeks after Alexander the Great (356–323 B.C.E.).
The grave must have played an important role in
ancient Hebrew culture, since “to go down into
the grave” (Gen. 37:35) is equivalent to “to go
down into Sheol” (King James, Ps. 16:10). Sheol
was a place located beneath the Earth, filled with
worms and impossible to escape from, where the
shadow-like deceased were supposed to continue
their earthly existence. However, the scarcity of
references to Sheol suggests that ideas about life
after death were vague and played little role in the
imagination of the early Israelites.
Ancient Greece presents a different situation.
In Homer (c. 800 B.C.E.), who constitutes the earlist
Greek source, the soul (psyche) does not yet have
any connection with the emotions of living people.
Yet in contrast with ancient Israel, the Greek notion
of soul does represent people after their
deaths. The soul goes straight to the underworld,
Hades, an area located under the Earth, but also in
the west; the soul can reach this “mirthless place”
only by crossing the river Styx. The Greek picture
of the underworld is bleak and sombre, causing
the dead Achilles to remark: “do not try to make
light of death to me; I would sooner be bound to
the soil in the hire of another man, a man without
lot and without much to live on, than be ruler over
all the perished dead” (Iliad 11.489–491).
This traditional picture became radically nuanced
in southern Italy during the fifth century
B.C.E by Pythagoras (c. 570–495 B.C.E.) and the Orphics.
The former is seen by many as the inventor
of Western notions of reincarnation and celestial
immortality. Unfortunately, information about the
origin of ideas about reincarnation is scarce. It may
well be that Pythagoras developed the idea in order
to give his aristocratic followers new status in a
time when the aristocracy was under stress. In any
case, his new vision presupposed the idea of the
immortality of the soul, an idea popularized by
Plato (428–347 B.C.E.). Belief in celestial immortality
became more evident around 432 B.C.E., when an
official war monument pronounced the souls of
fallen Athenians to have been received by the
aith'r (upper air), but their bodies by the Earth.
Shortly after Pythagoras, the Orphics, an intellectual
movement named after the mythical poet Orpheus,
introduced ideas about an attractive afterlife in the
shape of a “symposium of the pure,” where sinners
had to wallow in the mud in a kind of hell.
The contours of the Christian distinction between
heaven and hell, then, first became visible in the
fifth century B.C.E. This did not mean that the older
ideas disappeared. On the contrary, belief in a life
after death remained limited to a small group of intellectuals;
most ordinary Greeks did not seem to
have expected much of an afterlife. “After death
every man is earth and shadow: nothing goes to
nothing,” states a character in Euripides’ play Meleagros,
and it is this attitude that predominantly
survived into the Roman and Byzantine periods,
even among Christians.
A startling new conception of the afterlife developed
after Alexander the Great spread Greek
civilization into the Mediterranean world in the last
decades of the fourth century B.C.E. Before this
time, the Greeks had denied the possibility of resurrection,
but the publication of the Aramaic fragments
of Enoch in 1976 show that among an as yet
unidentified group of Jews the belief in resurrection,
which is absent in the Old Testament, had become
apparent already in the early second century
B.C.E., although it was not until the Maccabean revolt
that it became widely popular. Moreover, the
same book of Enoch mentions heaven and hell. It
seems likely that intellectual Jews had made contact
with Greeks, probably in Alexandria, and had
received information about Orphic views of the
afterlife.
Although several groups of Jewish intellectuals,
such as the Sadducees, the Essenes, and the
community of Qumran (that has given us the Dead
Sea Scrolls) continued to reject resurrection, others
like the Pharisees enthusiastically took up the idea.
However, the resurrection was not exported outside
the Jewish world until the appearance of Jesus
of Nazareth, although Jesus himself did not believe
in the restoration of the former body, since the resurrected
would be “like angels” (Matt. 22:23–33).
The caution of Jesus was soon abandoned by his
followers. In fact, Christian apologists and theologians
spent an enormous amount of energy explaining
and defending the resurrection, beginning
with Paul’s words: “For if the dead rise not, then is
Christ not raised. And if Christ be not raised, your
faith is vain” (1 Cor. 15:16–17). Indeed, all four
gospels reach their dramatic climax with reports of
Jesus’ resurrection. Paul seems also to have been
the first to present Jesus’ resurrection as the beginning
of the collective eschatological resurrection,
whereas in traditional Jewish thought individual
resurrection, as in the case of Jesus, had been typical
only of martyrs, such as the Maccabees. This
intellectual Christian effort becomes more understandable
against the backdrop of Greek skepticism
regarding the afterlife, a skepticism that was
shared by the Romans, who had virtually no idea
of an afterlife and, correspondingly, lacked an idea
of an immortal soul.
The early Christian era and the Middle Ages
Early Christian ideas regarding life after death received
great stimulus through the Roman persecutions.
Whereas the New Testament had been reticent
about the actual nature of the afterlife, it now
became necessary to develop a picture that would
help martyrs persist in their faith. Reports of executions
of Christians during this time show the
gradual appearance of new views of the afterlife,
not surprisingly beginning in North Africa where
funerary attention was more prominent than elsewhere
in the Roman empire. Inspired by the Jewish
idea of paradise as the place for the deceased,
as well as by the great parks of contemporary local
grandees, there arises an idea of heaven as an attractive
landscape with a mild climate and plenty
of light, where the deceased walk around in the
body. Their main activity consists in praising God.
This theocentric view of heaven would dominate
until the Enlightenment. Hell, on the other hand, is
little mentioned in the Christian literature of the
first centuries C.E. Early Christian theologians were
primarily interested in salvation, not damnation.
At the same time, the Jewish heritage of Christianity
meant that a marked body-soul opposition
was introduced relatively late in the second century
by Christian intellectuals, such as Justin (c.
100–165) and Tatian (late second century), who
were heavily influenced by Greek philosophy.
They tapped Greek concepts of the immortal soul
in order to bolster their arguments for the resurrection,
albeit with a number of modifications,
such as different fates for sinners and saved. Speculation
about the soul, fed by Stoic and Aristotelian
views, occasionally appears in the writings of later
Church fathers like Origen (c. 185–254) or Augustine
of Hippo (354–430), but they did not much influence
ideas about life after death.
It is only in the early Middle Ages that a major
change in attitude towards the afterlife appears.
Christianity’s growth from a minority into a majority,
coupled with Augustine’s stress on sin, led to
an emphasis on hell rather than heaven in medieval
views of life after death. Whereas Origen
had argued for the temporary nature of hell, theologians
like Augustine and Gregory the Great (c.
540–604) started to paint the penalties of hell in the
most shrill of colors. The latter was more concrete
than the former and thought that the penalties of
hell started immediately after death, unlike Augustine
and the early Church Fathers, who most often
let them begin after the Last Judgment.
In the twelfth century, ideas about life after
death became more differentiated. The Church introduced
Purgatory as a third place for the dead,
where they could be purified from their sins before
they go to heaven. Strangely enough, the intellectual
milieu where Purgatory was invented is still
uncertain, but there are indications of a Cistercian
origin, fueled by the need to counter the eschatology
of the Cathars who had made salvation much
easier than normative Christianity. Although the tripartite
division of life after death was never accepted
by Greek-Orthodox Christianity, it was promoted
by scholastic theologians like Thomas
Aquinas (c. 1225–1274). They did not agreed on all
details, and disagreed in particular on the moment
when the elect would attain full beatitude and the
precise relationship between body and soul. Nonetheless,
this general picture of the afterlife did not
change significantly until the Reformation.
The Reformation and the Enlightenment
With the arrival of Martin Luther (1483–1546) and
John Calvin (1509–1564) on the theological scene
in the sixteenth century, God returned to center
stage. The Reformation rejected Purgatory and,
like post-Tridentine Catholic theologians, concentrated
on the encounter with God in the hereafter.
Until the eighteenth century, Western Christianity
was united in seeing heaven as the place for the
elect, where life was perfected by existing with
God, without decay, but also without everything
that characterizes human life, such as sex, illness,
and family. The idea of hell, on the other hand,
was increasingly questioned, especially after the
reprinting of Origen’s works during the Renaissance
and after a rise in sensitivity towards the suffering
of others.
During the Enlightenment, both Christians and
adherents of natural religion could still agree on
the idea of the immortal soul, but for the first time
in Western history materialists and atheists could
publicly, if guardedly, pronounce their views.
They went too far for the majority, but in varying
ways philosophers like Thomas Hobbes
(1588–1679), John Locke (1637–1704), Denis
Diderot (1713–1787), and Voltaire (1694–1778)
now openly brought belief in eternal punishment
into discredit. David Hume (1711–1776) could
even claim, not without exaggeration, that the
damnation of one man was an infinitely greater
evil than the subversion of millions of kingdoms.
It seems safe to say that ever since this time the
traditional picture of hell has remained unacceptable
to enlightened classes.
The picture of a static, theocentric heaven
could also no longer satisfy an age more interested
in man than God. Starting with Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibnitz (1646–1716), but especially in the work of
Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772), ideas about life
in heaven became adapted to the anthropocentric
needs of the time. Swedenborg promoted a view
of heaven that was not so different from life on
Earth. According to Swedenborg, the souls of the
deceased entered a spirit world where human frailties
were clearly visible. Only after perfecting
their spiritual outlook could souls move on to
heaven, where they became angels. Here, life on
Earth was continued but in a more attractive setting
of parks and palaces. Eating, drinking, and sexuality
remained vital needs, friends and family could
be met, and progress meant that men and women
became more and more like “noble savages.” Condemnations
to eternal torment or a Last Judgement
had no place in this vision. Such a stress on heaven
in the era of the Enlightenment may be surprising,
but in fact in Germany in the 1750s alone more
than fifty treatises appeared discussing the problem
of immortality. Evidently, growing scepticism
led to deepened interest in defending immortality.
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries
Swedenborg’s view coincided, and was probably
part of, the Romantic interest in love between man
and wife, and this interest was shared by Protestants
and Catholics alike. Although Swedenborg
was viciously attacked, even by Immanual Kant
(1724–1804), he was triumphant, especially in
America. The Transcendentalists became much enamored
of Swedenborg’s thought, and their influence
was felt in America and Europe. The Unitarians
in England, in particular, embraced the new
insights against the more traditional views of the established
churches. They began stressing that
heaven consisted in “enjoying God through accordance
with his attributes, multiplying its bounds
and sympathies with excellent beings, putting forth
noble powers and ministering, in union with the
enlightened and holy, to the happiness and virtue
of the universe” (Channing, pp. 225–226). Moreover,
after Charles Darwin (1809–1882), this enjoyment
was seen as the end of a long evolution. Immortality
became a possibility rather than a reality.
Similar conceptions of the afterlife were widely promoted
in Germany as well. Naturally, even heaven
could not escape the lure of Victorian “Muscular
Christianity”: “Want and pain, toil and trial, cannot
be wholely banished out of my Heaven,” wrote the
brother of Cardinal Newman (Newman, p 34).
The heyday of Unitarian theology coexisted
with the birth of spiritualism (1848). This movement
would be the last attempt at proving scientifically
the existence of the hereafter by means of
controlled experiments. Yet the success of spiritualism
would be short–lived; it was soon discredited
by the frauds of its adherents and the trivialities of
its results. Still, during its heyday, especially in
America and England, its picture of heaven conformed
closely to that developed by Swedenborg.
Moreover, its rejection of hell, sin, and guilt was
widely shared by liberal theologians everywhere.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the general
picture of life after death had assumed the
contours of what would be the rule for most of the
twentieth century. Hell was no longer the subject
of serious theological discussion and eventually
disappeared even from folk belief, except perhaps
for that of the most conservative Christians. In the
wake of its demise and with the rise of a more materialistic
view of the person, the idea of an immortal
soul lost wide acceptance. Many people still
believe in heaven, but it is no longer the subject of
serious intellectual debate. Leading theologians,
such as Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971) and Paul
Tillich (1886–1965), even pronounced their hesitations
about eternal life. Admittedly, systematic theologians
have not given up presenting new eschatological
designs, but none has found success in
the last decades of the twentieth century. Not surprisingly,
mainline churches have stopped worrying
about the afterlife, since their members are too
much concerned with this life. It seems that the
world of theology, of rational reflection on life
after death, is no longer influential among common
believers.
Relection on life after death has not broken
down completely, however. Among adherents of
the so-called New Age there is a new interest in
the soul, which is considered to be a part of the
Higher Self, the New Age notion of an interface between
the Universal Mind, or God, and the individual
personality. It is the soul that continuously
creates new lives and chooses its present incarnation.
In other words, there no longer is a definite
“Beyond” as the final resting point, but the soul is
perpetually en route towards its spiritual perfection
via reincarnation.
Finally, life after death has come once again to
the fore in discussions of so-called near-death experiences,
as first collected in the 1970s by Raymond
Moody, an American philosopher turned
psychiatrist. In these experiences, which relate a
visit to the hereafter, the idea of a life after death
seems to reflect widely ruling modern ideas: the
dead go to heaven, but God is no longer there; the
soul is not mentioned, and neither is hell or judgement.
Scholarly discussions concentrate on the nature
of these experiences, the age of those who
have these visions, and the medical circumstances
allowing such visions. Yet serious scholars no
longer discuss these visions as testimonies of a
postmortem existence. It seems that after a 2,500-
year discussion, the problem of life after death has
largely been abandoned.
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