Christian Debatorial Works | home
Miracles
In order to differentiate between the customary
way in which God acts and his special miraculous
action, theologians have traditionally distinguished
his providentia ordinaria from the providentia extraordinaria,
the latter being identified with miracles.
Since the dawning of modernity, miracles
have been widely understood to be “violations of
the laws of nature.” But so long as laws of nature
are taken to be universal inductive generalizations,
the notion of a violation of a law of nature is incoherent,
since such statements must take account of
everything that happens, so that exceptions to
them are impossible. Although this fact led some
Enlightenment philosophers to think that miracles
can thus be defined out of existence, it ought
rather to alert one to the defectiveness of the modern
definition. Natural laws have implicit ceteris
paribus conditions, so that a law states what is the
case under the assumption of certain ideal conditions.
If God brings about some event that a law of
nature fails to predict or describe, such an event
cannot be characterized as a violation of that law,
since the law is valid only on the assumption that
no supernatural factors come into play.
Miracles, then, are better defined as naturally
impossible events, that is to say, events that cannot
be produced by the natural causes (i.e., those described
by physics) operative at a certain time and
place. Whether an event is a miracle is thus relative
to a time and place. Of course, some events may
be absolutely miraculous in that they are at every
time and place beyond the productive capacity of
natural causes.
Possibility of miracles
What could conceivably transform an event that is
naturally impossible into a real historical event?
Clearly, the answer is the personal God of theism.
For if a transcendent, personal creator exists, then
this God could cause events in the universe that
could not be produced by causes within the universe.
Given a God who created the universe, who
conserves the world in being, and who is capable
of acting freely, miracles are evidently possible.
A widespread assumption persists that if historical
inquiry is to be feasible, then one must
adopt a sort of methodological naturalism as a fundamental
historiographical principle. This viewpoint
is a restatement of Ernst Troeltsch’s principle
of analogy, which states that the past does not differ
essentially from the present. Though events of
the past are, of course, not the same events as
those of the present, they must be the same in
kind if historical investigation is to be possible.
Troeltsch realized that any history written on this
principle will be skeptical with regard to the historicity
of miracles.
Theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg, however,
has persuasively argued that Troeltsch’s principle
of analogy cannot be legitimately employed to
banish from the realm of history all non-analogous
events. Properly defined, analogy means that in a
situation that is unclear, the facts ought to be understood
in terms of known experience; but
Troeltsch has elevated the principle to constrict all
past events to purely natural events. But that an
event bursts all analogies cannot be used to dispute
its historicity. Troeltsch’s formulation of the
principle of analogy destroys genuine historical
reasoning, since the historian must be open to the
uniqueness of the events of the past and cannot
exclude events a priori simply because they do not
conform to present experience. When myths, legends,
illusions, and the like are dismissed as unhistorical,
it is not because they are non-analogous,
but because they are analogous to present forms
of consciousness having no objective referent.
When an event is said to have occurred for which
no analogy exists, its reality cannot be automatically
dismissed; to do this one would require an
analogy to some known form of consciousness
lacking an objective referent that would suffice to
explain the situation. Pannenberg has thus upended
Troeltsch’s principle of analogy such that it
is not the want of an analogy that shows an event
to be unhistorical, but the presence of a positive
analogy to known thought forms that shows a purportedly
miraculous event to be unhistorical. In
this way, the lack of an analogy to present experience
says nothing for or against the historicity of
an event. Pannenberg’s formulation of the principle
preserves the analogous nature of the past to
the present or to the known, thus making the investigation
of history possible, without thereby
sacrificing the integrity of the past or distorting it.
Identification of miracles
The question remains whether the identification of
any event as a miracle is possible. On the one
hand, it might be argued that a convincing demonstration
that a purportedly miraculous event has
occurred would only succeed in forcing the revision
of natural law so as to accommodate the event
in question. But a natural law is not abolished because
of one exception; the anomaly must occur
repeatedly whenever the conditions for it are present.
If an event occurs that is anomalous and there
are reasons to believe that this event would not
occur again under similar circumstances, then the
law in question will not be abandoned.
On the other hand, it might be urged that if a
purportedly miraculous event were demonstrated
to have occurred, one should conclude that the
event occurred in accordance with unknown natural
laws. What serves to distinguish a genuine miracle
from a mere scientific anomaly? Here the religio-
historical context of the event becomes crucial.
A miracle without a context is inherently ambiguous.
But if a purported miracle occurs in a significant
religio-historical context, then the chances of
its being a genuine miracle are increased. For example,
if the miracles occur at a momentous time
and do not recur regularly in history, and if the
miracles are numerous and various, then the
chances of their being the result of some unknown
natural causes are reduced. Moreover, some miracles
(e.g., the resurrection of Jesus) so exceed what
is known of the productive capacity of natural
causes that they could only be reasonably attributed
to a supernatural cause. Thus, while it is difficult
to know in many cases whether a genuine
miracle has occurred, that does not imply pessimism
with respect to all cases.
|