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Pantheism
Derived from the Greek words pan (all) and theos
(God), thus meaning “all is God,” pantheism is the
view that the universe or nature as a whole is divine.
In relation to rival views, pantheism is defined
as the doctrine that God is neither externally
transcendent to the world, as in classical theism,
nor immanently present within the world, as in panentheism,
but rather is identical with the world.
As a religious position, pantheism holds that
nature is imbued with value and worthy of respect,
reverence, and awe. As a philosophical position,
pantheism is the belief in an all-inclusive unity,
variously formulated. Historically, the nature of the
unity has been defined quite differently in Plotinus’s
“One,” Baruch Spinoza’s “Substance,” Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s “Geist,” and Charles
Hartshorne’s “All-Inclusive Totality.” Due to ambiguities
in the chief analogies used by philosophers
(whole-part; mind-body) the line between pantheistic
and panentheistic positions is often difficult to
draw. In general, pantheism represents an alternative
to the classical theistic notion of God in Western
philosophy and theology, and has close counterparts
in Taoism, Advaita Vedanta, and certain
schools of Buddhism. It is also the ism closest in
spirit to Native American religions.
Types of pantheism
Two broad types of pantheism may be distinguished:
monistic pantheism and pluralistic pantheism.
Examples of monistic pantheism are classical
Spinozistic pantheism, which devalued the
importance of dynamic and pluralistic categories,
and Hindu forms of pantheism, which have relegated
change and pluralism to the realm of the illusory
and phenomenal. In addition, the romantic
and idealistic types of pantheism that flourished in
nineteenth-century England and America were
generally monistic.
The pluralistic type of pantheism is found in
William James’s A Pluralistic Universe (1908) as a
hypothesis that supersedes his earlier “piecemeal
supernaturalism” in The Varieties of Religious Experience
(1902). James’s conception emphasizes the
full reality of insistent particulars, embedded in a
complex web of conjunctive and disjunctive relations
in which manyness is as real as oneness. Religiously,
pluralistic pantheism affirms that evil is
genuine, the divine is finite, and salvation, in any
sense, is an open question. Further exemplifications
of pluralistic pantheism are found in a series
of late twentieth-century movements, including
James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis that the earth
behaves like a single entity, the deep ecology
movement, the feminist spirituality movement, and
the New Age movement. In 1990 American historian
Catherine Albanese, canvassing diverse forms
of pantheistic piety since the early republic, considered
nature religion in America “alive and well,
growing daily, and probably a strong suit for the
century to come” (p. 198).
Challenges to pantheism
The chief challenge to pantheism, according to
critics, is the difficulty of deriving a warrant for the
criteria of human good. How is one to establish
any priority in the ordering of values and commitments
if nature as a whole is considered divine
and known to contain evil as well as good, destruction
as much as creation? In light of this concern,
John Cobb and other process theologians
recommend a fundamental distinction between
creativity as the ultimate reality and God as the ultimate
actuality. In this way, the divine character is
identified only with the good. Other theologians,
like David Tracy, view such a metaphysical distinction
as dubious and point out that the denial of
any identity between ultimate reality and the divine
may foster the view that ultimate reality is not
finally to be trusted as radically relational and selfmanifesting
(Tracy, p. 139). The pantheistic model
is capable of countering both of these concerns.
On the first point, pantheism underscores the blunt
fact that the rain falls on the just and the unjust
alike, whatever model of the divine one holds.
Critics of pantheism observe that human efforts toward
compassion and justice are frequently not reinforced
by ultimate reality. Nature is often indifferent
to human desires and deaf to moral
urgencies. Pantheists say this is indicative of the remorselessness
of things, not of the superiority of
either the theistic or the panentheistic model. In
the second place, by collapsing the distinction between
creativity and the divine, pluralistic pantheism
does identify the religious ultimate with the
metaphysical ultimate, but this identification may
or may not entail the further (Christian) specification
of ultimate reality as radically relational and
self-manifesting. Due to its extreme generality, the
pantheistic model is susceptible to multiple specifications
of various kinds, on lesser levels of generality
as found within the more concrete symbols
and images of the world’s religious traditions.
For secularist critics, the most significant objection
to pluralistic pantheism is the semantic
question. Why call it “God” or divine? According to
nineteenth-century German philosopher Arthur
Schopenhauer, calling nature or the universe God
does not explain anything, but only serves “to enrich
our language with a superfluous synonym for
the word ‘world’” (p. 40). Pantheists are apt to concede
this point but to urge attentiveness to nature’s
terrible beauty all the same. In the words of the
early twentieth-century American poet Harriet
Monroe, “Call the Force God and worship it at a
million shrines, and it is no less sublime; call it Nature,
and worship it in scientific gropings and discoveries,
and it is no less divine. It goes its own
way, asking no homage, answering no questions”
(p. 454). Recoiling from anthropomorphic mythmaking,
modern pantheists like Monroe express
astonishment over the way religious creeds impose
a name and person-like traits upon the creative
force animating the universe. Avoidance of personalistic
imagery and preference for vague talk of
a “force” in nature is characteristic of contemporary
pantheism.
Science and religion
Without using the term pantheism, many people
who are not traditionally religious acknowledge
the feeling that nature is sacred. While panentheism
is a theological construction, pantheism probably
has more grass roots appeal among ordinary
people, artists, and scientists. As the most important
challenge that the sciences pose to traditional
religion is their skepticism about the existence of
“another world” not of human making or open to
human inquiry, supernaturalism is less and less an
option among scientifically educated populations.
In the engagement of science and religion issues,
the relevant religious alternatives tend to reduce either
to pantheism or to panentheism. Astrophysicist
Carl Sagan spoke for those who prefer a straightforward
pantheistic orientation over what they regard
as the equivocations of panentheism: “A religion,
old or new, that stressed the magnificence of
the universe as revealed by modern science, might
be able to draw forth reserves of reverence and
awe untapped by the conventional faiths. Sooner
or later, such a religion will emerge” (p. 52).
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