Whether you subscribe to just-war theory
or not, the Gulf War was a moral victoy for America. Using
the just-war theory outlined by Michael Walzer's Just
and Unjust Wars, the American-led coalition against Saddam
Hussein's forces not only prove his actions as unjustified,
but also legitimizes the response by the United Nations' coalition
force.
Just-war theory, broken into its two main categories,
tries to dictate the justification for going to war and, once
engaged, the conduct of the combatants involved. Although
closely related, these two categories are treated as discrete
considerations. A questionable cause does not qualify questionable
conduct. Applied to the Gulf War, both considerations were
ignored by the Iraqi government as well as the Iraqi soldiers.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a textbook example of
aggression, according to the very definition given in just-war
theory. Once Iraq invaded, the coalition made enough attempts
to settle the matter without resorting to war thus satisfying
the "last resort" requirement. After diplomatic
efforts failed, the coalition received permission from the
competent authority of the United Nations to use force against
the Iraqi army. Finally, to add to the numerous reasons that
the Gulf War was just, humanitarian intervention was necessary
as a result of the atrocities performed against the Kuwaiti
civilians.
After the war started, the concentration shifted from
justification for war to justice during war. Here, too, Iraq
failed to adhere to just-war principles. Iraq's treatment
of prisoners of war stood in stark contrast to that of the
coalition. The coalition also followed the requirements of
just-war behavior which allows the killing of combatants despite
the circumstances which brought them to bear. Finally, the
coalition did not participate in individual assassination
nor nuclear war, the latter of which would violate the exclusion
of non-combatants from hostilities. At every opportunity,
the coalition followed the requirements for a just war before
and during the Persian Gulf War.
Jus Ad Bellum
The just-war theory as described in Walzer is not a checklist
of items that, when completed, gives the authorization for
war. Morality for waging war is on a sliding scale rather
that a definite point of decision. Because of the ambiguity
of when a war is just depends on who is making that decision,
just-war theory tries to qualify the situation using the circumstances
leading up to armed conflict. During the Gulf War, the coalition
fulfilled many of the just-war qualifiers which slid the scale
in favor of a just war. Aggression, last resort, competent
authority, and humanitarian intervention were among the justification
factors used by the coalition.
Aggression On August 2, 1990, the Iraqi army crossed two
lines. The first line was the border separating the two sovereign
countries of Iraq and Kuwait. Internationally recognized as
a legitimate state since 1961, Kuwait was overrun by the large
Iraqi military. The second line was the biggest qualifier
for a just war against Iraq: Aggression. Using the legalist
paradigm, Walzer views aggression as the largest, if only,
justification for war. In performing this act of aggression,
Iraq unleashed the floodgates of war which Walzer describes
as the crime of war (Walzer 1977). Because of Iraqi aggression
against Kuwait, the international coalition was morally forced
to wage war.
Of all the arguments for the war against Iraq, stopping
aggression was the strongest platform. Even though oil was
a central issue, the coalition required Iraq to give back
the property, land, and people seized in the invasion. To
ignore the Iraqi invasion would be to reward "naked aggression"
(Blonston 1991).
Last Resort
After the initial invasion, diplomatic efforts were made
to avoid fighting. For six months, every opportunity was given
to Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait and avoid a war. Yet some
critics claim that another major point in just-war theory
was not met. According to the theory, not only must a war
be a response to aggression, but also be a last resort. But
Walzer points out that the concept of last resort would nullify
any war as just. There can never be a true end to attempts
to avoid war. In practice, a point is reached when it is decided
that all reasonable attempts have been made to avoid conflict.
But here lies the problem. Who makes that decision? Once it
is made, there will always be those who question if all possibilities
had been explored. The Gulf war raised many such arguments.
Even General Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
expressed his desire for more time to allow the blockade around
Iraq to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. But with the prospect
of a fortified country such as Iraq holding out for possibly
years until the blockade finally worked, the coalition decided
that the only answer was to remove Iraq from Kuwait by force.
Iraq was given every reasonable opportunity to leave but chose
to remain in Kuwait. The coalition, therefore, fulfilled the
just-war requirement of last resort and hostilities were soon
to follow.
Competent Authority
By what authority did the coalition use to wage war against
Iraq? Many critics in the early stages of the war asked this
question which was soon answered. Once Congress backed President
Bush, competent authority was fulfilled because the ruling
body, representing the American nation, provided the authority
to wage war against another sovereign country. But opponents
still argued that proper authority does not reside in the
country that simply agrees as a whole to fight. If the competent
authority that authorized the Gulf War was the American Congress,
then the United States could be accused of aggression or intervention.
But there was a higher power. As much as the world would like
to believe that the Gulf War was the United States against
Iraq, that was not the case. While it is true that America
was the leader during the crisis, the entire coalition effort
was sanctioned by the United Nations. This body of leaders,
an international assembly of representatives, provided the
competent authority to wage war against Iraq. Any more justification
than that, if possible, would be hard to come by. Regardless,
there was more.
Humanitarian Intervention
Along with aggression, the Iraqis were guilty of atrocities
in Kuwait. While these acts fall under jus in bello
(justice in war), the fact that the atrocities were performed
on the civilian population qualifies another justification
for just war: humanitarian intervention. According to just-war
theory, an ally of a country is justified to intervene in
a crisis when conditions exist that are morally and ethically
inexcusable. Here again is the problem of judgment on the
part of the intervening power. But on the broad scale of the
Kuwaiti invasion, the coalition's use of force was a humanitarian
intervention because no one could argue that the systematic
slaughter of civilian Kuwaitis was anything but evil.
The factors listed above point towards a just war in the
Gulf. Opponents on both sides of the war tried to use the
theory in favor of their beliefs. Final determination depends
on which argument is stronger using the same theory. Much
of the accusations centered around President Bush's hypocrisy
in sending troops in defense of Kuwait. If Bush was standing
on a moral platform and committed troops on principle alone,
why did he withhold 2100 Marines off the coast of Liberia
in 1990 when civilians were being slaughtered by rebels? Why
did he send Scowcroft to China to recommend continued trade
advantages even after the massacre of students in Tiananmen
Square? Why did he send the secretary of state to Moscow and
continue to deal with Gorbachev even after bloody repression
in the Baltics (Broder 1991)? These are tough questions that
point to just one answer. The United States, or any world
power, could find a war to fight at any time that would qualify
under the just-war theory. So who decides to commit military
power and under what conditions? The answer is simply that
the government decides which just wars are in the best interest
for their countries to fight. No one should pretend that America's
national interest for protecting access to the Persian Gulf
because of oil was not a major factor in this war. Even President
Bush admitted that fact. To act as the "principle police"
for the world would drain American resources, most importantly
of which would be American lives. Little justification could
be found to intervene on such a large scale if the projected
outcome did not yield a reward for the victors. During the
Gulf War, not only was the justification a just one as accepted
by the collective conscience of the United Nations, but American
interest was also at stake. To pretend otherwise would be
the ultimate hypocrisy.
Jus in Bello
As stated earlier, the conduct of combatants in war is
a separate issue than the justification for the war. The coalition
and Iraq were on different sides of both issues. The coalition
was justified in fighting the Gulf War and Iraq's actions
broke the tenants of just war. During the fighting, coalition
forces adhered to just-war rules as well as international
laws. On the other hand, Iraq broke most of the rules set
down by the just-war theory.
POWs
Because of the lop-sided victory of the coalition, the
U.S. dealt more with prisoners than did Iraq. Despite the
fact that coalition forces had more opportunity to abuse prisoners,
only Iraq found it necessary to violate prisoners' rights.
Legally, according to the Geneva Convention, a prisoner of
war has rights and is to be treated as a non-combatant. This
treatment does not advocate torturing prisoners. The coalition
did not do it, not because the average Iraqi soldier held
little military information, but because it is morally wrong.
Yet the treatment of coalition POWs in the hands of the Iraqi
interrogators was violent and painful. Conversely, the thousands
of Iraqis who surrendered were fed, clothed, detained humanely,
and protected from the hostilities. Coalition prisoners were
used as human shields by detaining them at potential bombing
sites. Saddam Hussein tried to justify this policy, which
is forbidden by the Geneva Convention, by claiming that Western
countries had jailed Iraqi students as a security measure
(Associated Press 1991). Even if that claim was true, those
students were not in danger of being bombed. Contrary to Iraqi
beliefs, a violation of the Geneva Convention does not justify
a similar violation. Two wrongs do not make a right. If it
did, coalition forces had justification enough to commit heinous
crimes against Iraqi prisoners. The fact is, American forces
did not.
Conscripted Soldiers
The United States has been criticized for fighting Iraqi
soldiers who for the most part were conscripted into service.
Walzer questions whether it is morally correct to kill an
enemy who is being forced to fight. The argument fails because
there is no alternative. Even Walzer admits that service in
the defense of your country is a type of coercion by the populous
(Walzer 1977). Where some might view the killing of a conscripted
soldier as morally questionable, being killed by that soldier
for the sake of sympathy for his plight is ludicrous. On the
battlefield, the strongest motivation is survival. The question
of how the enemy came to join in the mix is a moot point when
rounds are coming down range. Walzer touches on this point
by discussing the moral equality of soldiers on the battlefield.
Even though the average Iraqi soldier was fighting against
his will in the desert, by no means did the average American
Marine private relish the thought of combat against even a
weak enemy. What got each soldier on either side to the battlefield,
once there, is irrelevant. Once the decision to engage in
battle has been made, the individual fighters have the same
goal: kill the enemy before he kills you. No crime is committed
on either side because during war, that is the accepted attitude.
Consequently, whether the Iraqi soldiers were conscripted
or not, they were the enemy. What occurred to get them onto
the battlefield was an internal affair of the Iraqi state.
Fleeing Soldiers
Together with the surrendering soldier and the fighting
soldier, one other type was given much attention during the
end of the Gulf War: the fleeing soldier. A large moral question
mark hung over the road known as the "Highway of Death."
After realizing their eminent defeat, the remains of the Iraqi
army tried to flee back to Iraq with their stolen booty. Every
vehicle that could be found was loaded with riches from Kuwait.
As the convoy fled northward, coalition air forces found them
and went to work. Disabling the first vehicle in order to
stop the entire convoy, the overloaded vehicles scattered
into the desert. Most vehicles became bogged down in the sand
which gave the planes a large area of stationary targets.
After repeated attacks, the coalition forces destroyed the
convoy, preventing their northward escape.
Walzer points out that while a surrendering soldier is
not to be killed, a fleeing one is a legitimate target (Walzer
1977). Walzer then questions the reasoning of this fact because
the basic theory behind killing a fleeing soldier is to prevent
him from returning to the fight. It ends up soldiers who fled
did return to fight, rather slaughter, during the Kurdish
rebellion after the war. But Walzer sees that as an internal
issue and therefore because the soldiers were not going to
return as combatants against coalition forces, killing them
was not morally correct. The facts are that a state of war
still existed and during a time of war, the killing of enemy
soldiers, even if in retreat, is an acceptable act. While
the atrocities they committed as an occupying force in Kuwait
would seem to warrant the destruction of the convoy, that
mentality falls too close to raw revenge. As distasteful and
horrendous as the Iraqi conduct in Kuwait was, destroying
their convoy as they fled solely for revenge would not hold
up under jus in bello (Justice in War). But not only
were they legitimate targets, they were also thieves. They
had plundered Kuwait and were attempting to return with the
ill-gotten booty. As part of just-war theory, the legalist
paradigm states that aggression justifies two kinds of violent
response: a war of self-defense by the victim and a war of
law enforcement by the victim and any other member of international
society (Walzer, p.62). Because the war was still in effect
at the time and just-war theory dictates that a member of
international society can respond violently when enforcing
laws, the "Highway of Death" was a just act in a
just war.
Assassination
Some acts lose meaning during a war. The assassination
of international leaders is one such case. Many people questioned
before during and after the war if the coalition should have
ensured Saddam Hussein's premature death. Under a 1981 Executive
Order, the U.S. government is forbidden to participate in
assassination. But during wartime, international law recognizes
military commanders as legitimate targets. During the Gulf
War, the assassination of Saddam Hussein was never revealed
as an official goal but every location where he should have
been was bombed. Most military analysts believed that if Hussein
was killed, the war would have ended instantly, (Beyer 1991).
It was easy for the American public to accept the effort because
the leader in question was the enemy's. Less savory would
be the thought of Iraqi bombers dumping ordnance on the White
House, claiming it was a just act of war. The difference was
that Hussein was located within the physical limits of the
war. President Bush was not. So if Hussein was killed in a
bombing raid while in Baghdad, no moral question is raised.
Similarly, if President Bush was killed in a bombing raid
while visiting Al Jubial, no moral rule would be broken. But
what if the leaders are removed from the area of hostilities?
Are they fair game? International law says they are. Therefore,
the idea of assassination being morally wrong loses all meaning
during war because the political leaders are legitimate targets.
The moral equivalency of the "assassin" is the same
as that of the coalition soldier fighting in the desert. It
is the dysfunctional agreement during war: both sides try
to kill the other side's forces, including the leaders.
Gas and Nuclear weapons
Two of the liveliest moral debates during the Gulf War
involved weaponry used. The coalition wondered if Hussein
would use gas warfare and Iraq wondered if President Bush
would use nuclear bombs. Fortunately neither were used even
though some suspect limited gas attacks were made. President
Bush animatedly declared that if coalition troops were gassed,
the strongest retaliation would be used. There was little
doubt what he meant by "strongest retaliation" and
the threat worked. In his autobiography, General Powell stated
that he was asked to draw up plans for the use of nuclear
weapons against Iraq (Associated Press 1995). After the war,
military planners admitted that nuclear bombs would not have
been used even if large-scale gas attacks killed coalition
troops. Instead, large dams were targeted which, once destroyed,
would flood Baghdad. Whether nuclear bombs or flooding were
to be used, either one breaks the most basic rule of war:
non-combatants are not legitimate targets. As horrendous as
gas attacks would have been, retaliating by mass killing of
the Iraqi civilian population would not have been acceptable.
Just as Saddam Hussein's presence in the war zone qualified
him for justifiable death, so did the coalition troops' presence.
If the unlikely situation of gathering only Iraqi troops together
and destroying them using nuclear bombs or flooding, then
those means would then be justified.
Conclusion
By using the two categories that comprise the just-war
theory, the Gulf War against Iraq has shown to be a just war.
Not only for the reason the coalition fought Iraq, but just
by the means that the hostilities were performed. Iraq resorted
to aggression and did not expect the world-wide response that
it received. Even after numerous offers to settle the matter
peacefully, Saddam Hussein made it clear that he was not going
to withdraw. Once this was clear, the United Nations, the
competent authority, understood that diplomatic means were
futile. To repel the aggression and put an end to the human
slaughter of Kuwaiti civilians, the American-led coalition
was authorized and justified to wage war against Iraq.
After the commitment to war was made, the opposing sides
had a responsibility to respect the laws governing warfare.
The coalition fought justly and succeeded. Iraq did neither.
Their treatment of prisoners of war shows that following the
rules was not a concern during war. And while it is morally
wrong to force a soldier to fight, as the Iraqis did, there
is no moral dilemma in killing that conscripted soldier during
battle, as the coalition did. Nor is it immoral to kill fleeing
soldiers whether they are going to join the fight again or
not. Finally, assassination, while illegal during peacetime,
loses meaning during war. Therefore, no moral questions arise
when no problem exists. But when there is a problem, such
as massive civilian casualties, weapons of mass destruction
such as gas and nuclear weapons must be banned. Fortunately
for all of the soldiers involved, the Gulf War crisis did
not require the decision for retaliation to be made.
Thus, the Gulf War, a justified and moral victory for
the American-led coalition, proved once again that even against
an enemy who fails to abide by the rules of war, a moral force
can overcome an immoral enemy.
