I have received many requests
for interviews, which I have had to decline for various reasons. In this
interview, I have tried to address most of the questions posed to me, though
not necessarily in the same way. You are free to publish, use and circulate
the interview, but must insist that I not be quoted out of context in what
is undoubtedly a very complex and rapidly unfolding situation. I would
also appreciate being informed of how and where the interview may be used.
Thank you and best wishes,
jomo
Q: What's going on?
J: Basically, many informed
observers seem to think that Dr Mahathir decided Anwar could no longer
be trusted to protect Dr Mahathir's interests anymore, especially after
Dr Mahathir is no longer PM.
Q: Why do you say that?
J: Dr Mahathir was certainly
not too pleased with various things Anwar did from mid-1997. When Dr Mahathir
went away for two months, Anwar gave the impression that he was going to
be tougher on corruption. Then after Dr Mahathir took over economic policy
after his return, the foreign media began mocking his conspiratorial analysis,
generally running him down and promoting the idea of an early Anwar succession.
From the end of the year, Anwar seemed to take over economic policy, cutting
government spending, raising interest rates and tightening liquidity, which
arguably exacerbated the crisis and took the economy into recession in
1998, especially after the Kongsi Raya holiday reprieve.
But I think the straw which
broke the camel's back came around late May or in June, with developments
in Indonesia and the subsequent adoption of the reformasi slogan and the
anti-KKN (corruption, cronyism, nepotism) campaign by the UMNO Youth leadership
then, who were close to Anwar. I don't think Dr Mahathir minded attacking
korupsi and kronisme, but nepotisme came too close to the bone. Several
months earlier, PRM president Dr Syed Husin Ali and a couple of associates
had asked the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) to investigate how Dr Mahathir's
three sons had gained stock in over two hundred companies by late 1994.
Soeharto's resignation on 21 May and the continued attacks on the ex-president
who had only recently joined the ranks of Forbes magazine's richest men
in the world - after the Sultan of Brunei and Bill Gates – must have upset
Dr Mahathir even though there are important differences between the two.
Q: But the charges against
Anwar were raised earlier at the 1997 UMNO general assembly?
J: I am not sure; many believe
that some of Anwar's enemies had hatched up the 'plot' to finish off Anwar
politically before that, but Dr Mahathir still felt Anwar was the Prime
Minister's least problematic option then, and was not yet willing to go
along with them at that point.
Q: So you agree with those
in Dr Mahathir's camp that Anwar was going for number one?
J: Perhaps. I don't know,
but if Anwar's camp was making a bid, it was naïve, ill-considered
and bound to fail. As I said earlier, Dr Mahathir is not Soeharto. He will
go with his boots on. I don't believe that he was about to quit, to give
way to Anwar. Besides wanting to cling on to power for all the usual reasons,
I think Dr Mahathir honestly believes that he is the best thing Malaysia
has ever had and could hope for, and many would agree with him.
Q: If Anwar was not going
for number one, what was happening?
J: There were Anwar's critical
Johor speech, the unevenly attended Pemuda economic convention a couple
of weeks before the late June general assembly and Zahid's speech at the
UMNO Youth assembly itself. Anwar's assembly speech did not criticise Mahathir
at all, and in fact announced a U-turn from his December 1997 economic
policy, by increasing government spending and liquidity and trying to lower
interest rates, almost as if in response to Daim's and Dr Mahathir's earlier
criticisms.
Others Anwar had consulted
had voiced similar concerns as well. Maybe he was keeping his cards very
close to his chest, but Anwar did not respond positively, for example,
to those who called for him to 'lead us out of this darkness' and even
went out of his way to explain Mahathir's concerns.
There is little evidence
of any serious effort by Anwar's camp to mobilise forces and resources
to actually try to oust Dr Mahathir. Pointed criticism of nepotism, yes,
but a effective plan or strategy to oust Mahathir, unlikely. And if there
was one, it was terribly amateurish and bound to fail. But whatever it
was, it was enough to convince Dr Mahathir that Anwar was out to replace
him.
Q: How did Dr Mahathir respond?
J: Dr Mahathir was very
cool. I saw him smiling proudly at the St Petersburg Orchestra's concert
at the Petronas Philharmonic Concert Hall the night before he delivered
his devastating rounding-up speech and released the partial lists of tender,
contract and privatisation beneficiaries from the Economic Planning Unit
(EPU) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), all
of which reflected sound preparation.
Q: And then?
J: Although it was later
evident that a purge of Anwar's camp had begun, beginning with the media,
I thought that Dr Mahathir had Anwar exactly where Dr Mahathir wanted Anwar
- weakened, compliant and constrained from mounting an effective challenge.
I wrongly thought Dr Mahathir would prefer the safety of such an arrangement
rather than risk an Anwar challenge by sacking him or forcing him to resign.
Q: So why the subsequent
turn of events?
J: Probably, in their calculations,
Anwar's only real strength is his popularity based on his personal charisma
and moral standing. There is nothing much one can do about his charisma,
hence the need to destroy his reputation. Given the reputations of many
ministers in this country, straightforward adultery or something in that
league would not be good, or rather, bad enough to damage Anwar irreparably.
Thus, the need for something
truly scurrilous or scandalous in the form of the sodomy allegations given
the presumed homophobia in our society. At first, in the earlier version
which came out with the surat layang at the 1997 assembly, the allegations
seemed plausible.
But as Anwar covered himself,
by the time the book came out, the charges against Anwar had begun to overload.
They eventually made so many allegations, probably making them up as they
went along, in the hope that most people would believe at least some of
them, and at least a few of them would stick and do the necessary damage.
Q: So has it worked?
J: Partly perhaps, but certainly
not as intended. They have been their own worst enemies. Their flagrant
disregard for at least nominally complying with accepted procedure has
shocked even those usually blissfully insensitive to such matters. With
the benefit of hindsight, some now argue that Dr Mahathir should instead
have first charged Anwar, then eased him out of government and the party.
Whatever the reasons for
the particular sequence adopted, it backfired.
Q: What do you mean by backfiring?
J: As what happened began
to sink in, popular support for Anwar quickly picked up. Yet, besides those
completely committed to Anwar and those who reject everything Dr Mahathir
claims, there are many who might have been more receptive to Dr Mahathir's
claims if not for the manner in which he, the police and the prosecutors
have conducted themselves. The arrests of those closest to Anwar in UMNO
as well as ABIM and related leaders under the Internal Security Act have
reminded everyone what Anwar's dismissal is all about, i.e. not sex, but
power. Just look at the Inspector General of Police's press conference,
where he unwittingly managed to convince those present that Malaysia becoming
a police state. Or former Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar's Jakarta visit,
where he managed to insult and antagonise almost everyone there. Or Dr
Mahathir's claim that Anwar may have deliberately injured himself in the
left eye to gain public sympathy.
Q: So what are the changes
you see?
J: There seems to be an
irreversible sea change going on in Malay political culture. Most non-Malays
are watching quietly from the sidelines, partly because they see this as
an intra-Malay affair, and also because of the fear of violence, bearing
in mind the May 1969 riots in KL and the May 1998 events in Jakarta, particularly
traumatic for the ethnic Chinese. Their fear is that desperate politicians
may chose to play the ethnic card, the traditional card of first choice
in Malaysian politics.
Among Malays, even before
Anwar was sacked, you have quiet, but widespread sympathy for jailed DAP
Deputy Secretary General and Member of Parliament Lim Guan Eng. Not necessarily
support for the DAP, but tremendous unease at the great injustice involved
in jailing an opposition politician for championing the cause of an under-aged
girl who had been (statutorily) raped and her helpless grandmother, while
the man widely believed to be responsible toured the country to speak in
rallies supporting the Prime Minister.
Q: Where will all this go?
J: It's still difficult
to say. But Anwar's dismissal and its aftermath have only further undermined
Malay public confidence in the regime and the leader, greatly increasing
the number of Malays 'who can say no', opening up a new conjuncture in
Malaysian politics.
Anwar's forces have no choice
but to build a broad coalition with existing opposition forces in which
they hope to and should play a leading role. With limited and deteriorating
public confidence in the judicial system and process, the increasingly
shared belief is that only an electoral victory from their combined strength
can reverse Anwar's expected fate. That is still very much an uphill task.
But the unexpected developments
and accompanying effervescence are also forcing ordinary people to think
of alternatives, of reform, of new institutions for the creation and sustenance
of a more decent and just society rid of the dominance of political business,
money politics and related depravities. Beyond Mahathir versus Anwar, the
legitimacy of many official institutions and public faith in them, especially
among Malays, has been shaken as never before. But contrary to some pronouncements,
this is unlikely to descend into anarchy, but rather, is leading to greater
demands for democracy and accountability, though not necessarily in that
language or idiom.
While the reform movement
may fail, Malaysian politics and political culture will never be the same
again.
END
Jomo's Responses to Follow-up
Questions
Q: How important will the
economic situation be for electoral politics?
J: After Anwar's black-eye
appearance in court, I doubt an early election before the end of the year.
But March-April 1999 makes sense in light of the economic strategy now
in place. With Malaysia's high savings rate (40% in 1996, presumably slightly
less in recent circumstances), you don't need foreign capital inflows to
ensure a high investment rate and growth. Of course, with government spending
likely to lead recovery, the quality and productivity of these investments
will be problematic in the long term, but should still ensure growth in
the short term. Then, they can contrast some modest growth in the last
quarter, say, with 6.8% in the second quarter, which will be blamed on
Anwar.
Q: What do you think their
legal strategy is?
J: After further adverse
publicity for Anwar, mainly from the court proceedings over the coming
months, all they need is one sodomy conviction to stick in order to put
Anwar away - physically, morally and politically. Acquittal on other charges
as well as seemingly stern official action over the black eye will only
enhance credibility.
Q: What is the significance
of Zahid's statement?
J: With Zahid capitulating,
there will be no one of his stature (Zahid was UMNO Youth leader cum vice
president) to lead and organize Anwar's forces within UMNO and the Malay
community. Effective leadership will be crucial. With the heavy repression
against street demonstrations and the like, it will be difficult and probably
undesirable from the Anwar camp's point of view to sustain that kind of
momentum. After Anwar's last appearance, it seems that many of his more
gullible supporters fell prey to agents provocateurs who took them to the
PWTC and then ransacked the UMNO gallery (on a difficult to access upper
floor) after the crowd had gone off to Sri Perdana, falling into another
trap. On the Commonwealth Games special holiday, it appears that many showed
up for a demonstration called by such agents provocateurs not the nascent
opposition coalition which warned their followers not to go - where the
police were 'well-prepared' for them. Much will depend on the extent to
which Anwar's supporters succeed in mobilizing and organizing their grassroots
distinctly from PAS and the rest of the opposition, and in targeting and
isolating their enemies.
END
Sumber : Suaram