This is my analysis as to what took place during the period 18-20 May 1967. The general scenario is related in the book, 4th Infantry Division, Vietnam on pages 96-100.

        For a few days prior to 18 May 1967, we had been restricted from firing artillery unless we had people in contact. We were not allowed to recon by fire. I had told all my FO's that if they told me that they were in contact, I would give them all the artillery they needed.
        The 1/8 Infantry Battalion and A Btry 6/29th Artillery were part of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Divivision during operation "Francis Marion". The Infantry Battalion and A Battery 6/29th were located just west of Duc Co at Coordinate YA789239. They moved into this position on 13 May.1967.
        Early in the afternoon of 18 May 67, the FO told me and the FDO (LT Dugloz) that they were in contact. I authorized firing the artillery.
        A short while after the artillery began firing, I went with the Bn CO (LTC Gannon)
(Mustang)) in the C&C chopper and monitored the battle from the air. The FO had A 6/29th firing for him, while I had C 5/16th (CPT Meek) firing for me. Other units also assisted in fire support.
        An Infantry platoon (4th platoon, Company B) had got ambushed and were pinned down. I placed blocking fires to the west of the pinned down platoon. This went on for quite a while. Suddenly, Mustang tapped me on the shoulder and told me they (the platoon) wanted the artillery on top of them. I said "Are you sure that is what they want?". He said "YES, put it on top of them". I immediately made a correction for C 5/16th and fired many rounds of 155mm artillery on top of the platoon. LTC Gannon made the decision. I made the correction and ordered the firing.
        In the meantime, the Bn S-2, with personnel of the Bn formed a Company Minus and they were dropped in by chopper to try and find the platoon. At darkness, Mustang and I went back to the TOC. Around 9 PM, Mustang told the Company Minus to secure for the night, and told them to start at first light in the morning. We got the Company Minus coordinates and I got the hit data from C 5/16th. After checking the two plots, I can remember telling Mustang that if they went so mils in that direction, that they would find the platoon. I recall this vividly, because Mustang said that is artillery talk (mils), put it in infantry talk. I did, converting it to degrees. The Platoon was only 500-600 meters from the Company Minus. The Company Minus pushed out at first light and found the platoon shortly after they started. They found 8 people left alive. They had been stripped of their valuables etc.
        On 19 May 1967, we regrouped, and Mustang stayed on the ground with the troops that evening. We fired many DEFCONS & H&I's for the people on the ground that evening. The following morning, I took the C&C chopper with some replacements, into the area. Mustang called me on the way in, and told me not to shut it down, I was to take a passenger to the hospital. When they set the stretcher in the chopper, the Bn S-2 looked up at me and said "What the f---happened?". I told him I did not know. It seems like he had been sitting on his helmet, briefing his troops, when a large limb came down and landed on his head. Got hurt pretty bad. They had to evacuate him to the states for surgery. I asked him how it was where the platoon was. He told me he could not see how people got out of there alive. The artillery had cut everything to shreds.
        I went back to pick up Mustang, and we went back to the TOC. The infantry set up their perimeters and the artillery prepared their DEFCON's. About dusk, the sh-- hit the fan. On 20 May 1967, Mustang and I flew for 20 hours. The only time we were not in the air, was when we ran from one chopper to another chopper. There was always another one waiting with radio, food, etc.
        During the evening and early morning hours, A Btry 6/29th fired continuous fire. LT Dugloz (FDO) called me a couple of times. Once he told me his tubes were getting hot. I asked him if he could put his hands on them. He said "Barely". I told him they were not hot enough. What made it worse is that all the firing was "Danger Close". In one instance, I asked LT Schoeck, one of the FO's on the ground, if he was sure he wanted that correction. He said "Yes". I told him "get in your holes" (The next morning he showed me his back which had shrapnel burns through his clothes).
        Another time, LT Dugloz (the FDO) called me and told me he was running low on ammunition. I told him to call the S-4 (CPT Bill Borders). He told me the S-4 could not get any birds. I also called the S-4 and he told me he could not get any birds. I told him he better sh-- some birds. A few minutes later he called me and told me he had 4 birds on the way with some passengers. The 6/29th had gathered up cooks, mechanics and anyone else around and flew them into the fire base to help with the ammo, etc.
        During the period 18-23 May 1967, A Btry 6/29th fired 8300 rounds of 105 Artillery in support of the operation. C Btry 5/16 fired 1845 rounds of 155 mm artillery rounds. B 6/14th fired 1794 rounds of 8 inch and 690 rounds of 175 mm in support of the operation. In addition, 57 air sorties were utilized in this operation.
        On 23 May 1967, a decision was made to pull the 1/8 Infantry and A 6/29th from the field. All the preperations were made, control of the fire base was passed on, and we went to bed early for a change. Suddenly, we heard the thump-thunp of mortar rounds coming in. LT Dugloz said "Are those good guys, or bad guys?". We hustled out of our tent into the TOC. I called my counterpart, who had taken control and asked him if he was going to fire or should we fire. He told me he had a patrol out, but didn't know exactly where they were. I told him "You better fire, or I will". I gave the order to the Firing Battery to fire VT fuze with zero time setting and to fire at such and such an azimuth. LT Dugloz and I both saw the light from the mortars being fired. That woke up the patrol and the rest of the night passed without incident. The following morning the 1/8th Infantry Bn and A Btry 6/29th retired from the field. We became the palace guard for a short time in order to lick our wounds and get replacements.
        During this operation A 6/29th lost one man, SGT Leland Herbert Thompson (KIA 18 May 67). Others were wounded. The 1/8th Infantry had three Medal of Honor recipients during this period. Unfortunately all were posthumously.
        I hope I answered some of the questions people had. I think you might understand why some nights I wake up in the IA DRANG Valley.

Raymond A Harton, LTC, FA, Retired