I received, from John Kaye,a copy of the e-mail that John Nelson, A Company 1/8th Inf sent to you. Subject: RE: Lt.Shannon (FO) 3-22-67 (dtd 15 Sep 99 09:38:26-0400)

        What Nelson said is basically true, although there are variations as I recall.

        The 1/8th Inf had inserted a LRRP team. They were scheduled to report in at a certain time each day. The Battalion S-2(Cpt Peterson) would go up in a chopper to receive the reports. This would insure that communications could be received (Line of Sight). The first couple of days, the LRRP team reported in as required. A day or so went by, with no report from the LRRP team. Ltc Lee, the Battalion Commander, had a decision to make. He made it and said "lets go find them".

        A Company was selected. A Company was commanded by Cpt.Sands, the Forward Observer was Lt.Shannon, the 1/sgt was 1/sgt McNerny. The same 1/sgt McNerny, Medal of Honor winner that we all now recognize, for his heroism under fire. Cpt. Sands was a "short timer". Did not have many days left to do in Vietnam. Lt. Shannon, the FO, had been previously injured in a vehicle accident shortly after we had arrived in Tuy Hoa.

        I have no other knowledge of how the decision was made to choose A Company 1/8th. In either case, the decision was made.

        The discrepancy noted in Nelson's e-mail is in reference to the Recon Patrol. He states "the Recon Patrol came in that night running for their lives. They had dropped everything and just took off, which I couldn't blame them. He also says that he could see and hear the NVA all night long. I do not recall any reports of enemy sightings on the night of 21 March 67. If there had been I certainly would have recommended firing on them. I was in the TOC (Tactical Operation Center) every day & night, when not with the Bn Commmander. I did not leave until all the fires, targets, etc. were planned and posted. I remember that some operations had occurred during the period 19-21 March. I remember this because on the morning of 22 March 67, Cpt. Dollner and I were being critiqued about the operation. A Battery 6/29th had fired 300-4000 rounds in support of the operation. Some people did not think we had done enough (An apology was accepted a few days later). During the critique, calls for fires were received from A Company 1/8th Inf (more about this later).

        As the shooting began the LRRP team finally got on the radio and called for extraction. They were behind the NVA between the NVA and the Cambodian border (the river). They were extracted by Maj. Tauch, the 1/8th XO. Unless there was a second patrol out, that we knew nothing about, then this statement is in error.

        My recollection of the events of 22 March,1967 is as follows: A Company 1/8th Inf through their FO (Lt.Shannon) called for artillery fire as soon as they started receiving fire from an unknown enemy size force. The artillery responded to their calls for fire. A number of rounds were fired in support of A 1/8th Inf before radio contact was lost. The Battery (A 6/29th) were loaded, and ready to fire, when radio contact was lost. The last correction received, was "Drop 25", called in by 1/sgt McNerney. I denied Lt. Dugloz (the FDO), and Cpt. Dollner (the Btry Co), the right to fire until radio communications were re-established. I tried, in vain, to borrow a chopper in the area. I was denied.

        Meanwhile, Maj. Tauch had extracted the LRRP team and brought them in. As soon as he landed, I went with him in the UH-1 to go to the conflict area. He had picked up chain saws, demolitions, water and ammo for the troops on the ground. Enroute to the area of conflict, I established radio contact with the FO on the ground from the reinforcing unit.

        We arrived over the area of conflict and immediately passed down by rope the chain saws and demolitions. As we started passing the water down, a machine gun opened up on us. We sustained hits, in fact some of them went up through the floor and the roof. Maj. Tauch put his fingers in the holes in the roof and said "who is shooting?". I said, "Not me", and kept throwing water and ammo out the doors. We limped out of area. I received a call from the FAC (Forward Air Controller), Cpt. Rodriguez, and he told us he saw us getting hit and he had some air support with him. I gave him the call sign of the FO on the ground and as we were leaving, I saw him fire his rockets to mark the targets for the air support. We proceeded to, and landed with difficulty, in the fire base of the 3/8th Inf and C 6/29th Arty. There were many holes under my seat and behind the pilots head. I immediately ran into the 3/8th TOC and asked my counterpart, Cpt. Titus, if he had a chopper we could borrow. We needed one. The 3/8th Inf allowed us to use the chopper they had and Maj. Tauch and I immediately returned to the conflict area. We went in and hovered over a bunch of tree stumps that the infantry troops had sawed and blow down with the materials we had dropped to them. They had made an LZ to extract their wounded. I remember loading six or seven wounded onto the chopper. The gunner and I were standing on the skids, passing them up into the chopper. All this was done while hovering 3-4 ft off the ground. The pilot then attempted to lift, but was unsuccsessful. He only got up to 10-15 ft. off the ground. He could not get enough lift. He said "One man has to go!". I immediately grabbed my weapon and radio, and jumped from 10-15 ft. and landed between two stumps, only a few inches apart. Luckily I was not injured. The pilot was then able to take the wounded out to the aid station. This went on well after dark, and about 8 o'clock or so Lt. Schoeck relieved me as the FO. He replaced Lt.Shannon, who was killed earlier in the day. I was extracted shortly therafter and returned to the 1/8th Inf TOC. Another day in Vietnam.

        POST NOTE:1/sgt McNerney thought he had killed his Company Commander and FO when he made the "Drop 25 correction", because about the time he thought the artillery fired his Company Commander (Cpt. Sands) and FO (Lt. Shannon) were hit by B40 rockets. Shortly after he recuperated from the wounds he received, I talked with him at the 1/8th Bn TOC. I told him that he had not killed his CO & FO, because I had denied the Btry permission to fire, and stopped the mission. I had to physically take him to the A Btry 6/29th FDC tent and have Lt. Dugloz (FDO) and Cpt. Dollner (CO) show him the records. I think I finally got through to him.

First SGT. David H. McNerney distinguished himself when his unit was attacked by a North Vietnamese battalion near Polei Doc. Running through the hail of enemy fire to the area of heaviest contact, he was assisting in the development of a defensive perimeter when he encountered several enemy at close range. He killed the enemy but was painfully injured when blown from his feet by a grenade.

        In spite of this injury, he assaulted and destroyed an enemy machine gun position that had pinned down 5 of his comrades beyond the defensive line. Upon learning his commander and artillery forward observer had been killed, he assumed command of the company. He adjusted artillery fire to within 20 meters of the position in a daring measure to repulsed enemy assaults. When the smoke grenades used to mark the position were gone, he moved into a nearby clearing to designate the location to friendly aircraft.
        In spite of enemy fire he remained exposed until he was certain the position was spotted and then climbed into a tree and tied the identification panel to its highest branches. Then he moved among his men readjusting their position, encouraging the defenders and checking the wounded. As the hostile assaults slackened, he began clearing a helicopter landing site to evacuate the wounded. When explosives were needed to remove large trees, he crawled outside the relative safety of his perimeter to collect demolition material from abandoned rucksacks.
        Moving through a fusillade of fire he returned with the explosives that were vital to the clearing of the landing zone. Disregarding the pain of his injury and refusing medical evacuation FIRST SGT. McNerney remained with his unit until the next day when the new commander arrived.