Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2001 16:59:34 -0500 To: Matthew Gaylor <freematt@coil.com> From: Matthew Gaylor <freematt@coil.com> Subject: Israeli compromise of U.S. telecommunications? Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2001 10:41:33 -0500 From: Ronald L. Rivest <rivest@mit.edu> To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com Subject: Israeli compromise of U.S. telecommunications?
I found the following four-part report by Carl Cameron rather shocking:
Part 1: < http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,40684,00.html > Part 2: < http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,40747,00.html > Part 3: < http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,40824,00.html > Part 4: < http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,40981,00.html >
Why should we be freely giving to Israeli corporations information (call records, CALEA information) that requires court orders to obtain in this country? Such information is obviously sensitive, and the well-motivated efforts to strengthen and protect our national infrastructure should reasonably include mandating that such information not be routinely handled by any foreign entities...
A more recent story indicates that the compromise was probably severe; criminals were escaping detection because of the compromise:
< http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/12/18/224826.shtml >
This vindicates concerns many of us have expressed over the years about creating single points of failure in wiretapping systems (e.g. the vulnerability of key escrow, etc.). Of course, in this case the vulnerability was intentionally created, it seems, by giving critical capabilities to foreign entities...
Ronald L. Rivest Room 324, 200 Technology Square, Cambridge MA 02139 Tel 617-253-5880, Fax 617-258-9738, Email <rivest@mit.edu>
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