Following the Battle of Stamford Bridge
Harold and the majority of his army returned to York after the remnants of Harald Hardraada's army departed Riccall. He brought Tostig's body back to York and had it buried there. He then decided to remain at York for several more days while the captured Viking fleet at Riccall; about 250 ships, were made ready to be taken south to assist in the defense against the potential Norman invasion. He also needed to give his exhausted troops a rest before force-marching them back south. Lastly, he needed to tie up the political loose ends in the north before he left. Then, on the evening of 30 September or in the early hours of 1 October he received the worst news possible:  that William had landed in the south on 28 September. Since it would be impossible for mounted messengers to travel the 275-300 mile distance from Pevensey, where William landed, to York in three days, it is certain that Harold must have ordered a chain of beacons to be set up between London and York so that this news could be quickly communicated to him. On 1 October, within hours of receiving the news, Harold and all of his army that could ride, proceeded south as quickly as possible to handle this newest emergency.

The Situation in Normandy in Late September
Back in Normandy, since about 12 September, after making all necessary repairs to his ships that were damaged in the storm of 8 September, William had been anxiously awaiting a favorable wind so that he could put to sea. It can be certain that he knew that Harold had disbanded the fyrd and had been forced to evacuate his positions along the coast and also of the severe mauling the English fleet had suffered when it got caught in the same storm that damaged his fleet. The days passed and the wind continued unchanged from the north. William and his army literally prayed for a south wind. He had already selected Pevensey as his point of landing on the English coast, and Pevensey was almost due north of St. Valéry-sur-Somme. On 26 September William was still waiting. William knew that Harald Hardraada had invaded Northumbria, of the burning of Scarborough, and that Harold had gone north with his army. But he could not have been informed of Fulford Gate or Stamford Bridge; therefore, if he were able to sail within the next few days, he didn't know if he would be facing Harold or Harald Hardraada. Knowing that the southern coast of England was left virtually unguarded, and even possibly that Harold had gone up north, William was extremely apprehensive. Except for the wind, everything was perfect for an invasion at this time. In fact, circumstances, even as little of them as he was aware of, could not have been better. However, if he didn't get a favorable wind soon, the weather-window for crossing the Channel would close on him and it would be impossible to attempt an invasion until the spring of 1067.

William's Fleet Sails
On 27 September, a thunderstorm struck St. Valéry-sur-Somme. When it passed, the wind had shifted and was coming out of the south. This probably occurred in the morning. William quickly ordered to fleet to finish loading and get ready to set sail. The rest of the morning and part of the afternoon was occupied in the last minute loading of supplies, horses, and men. Since William wished to be well out to sea by dusk, which would begin at 5:39 p.m. and end at 6:15 p.m. on that day in 1066, he would have to depart St. Valéry-sur-Somme by mid-afternoon at the latest. He wished to time his arrival at Pevensey to coincide with daybreak or shortly thereafter; he did not want a night landing. The fleet departed with William in the lead in his flag-ship, the Mora. This ship was the largest in the fleet and had been given to him as a present by his wife; her personal contribution to the invasion. He had a lantern hung from the top of Mora's mast and instructed the rest of the fleet to follow that light throughout the night.

The next morning, the Mora was by itself; the rest of the fleet was nowhere in sight.  Fearing the worst, some of William's men panicked and urged him to turn around. William, however, being wiser than they, knew what had happened. He ordered the anchor to be dropped and ate breakfast. Soon the tops of a forest of masts began to appear over the horizon behind the Mora. Just as William had suspected, nothing had happened to the fleet, it had just been outsailed by the Mora, which was much larger and therefore had a much larger sail. Catching more wind, the Mora was a little bit faster than the rest of the fleet.

William Lands at Pevensey
At about 9 a.m. on 28 September, the fleet reached Pevensey Bay at high tide and William had the ships beached. The landing went unopposed. While the fleet was approaching Pevensey, watchers at Hastings saw it and sent riders back to London, about 70 miles away, to give the alarm.

Why Pevensey?
William had several excellent reasons for choosing Pevensey as his landfall. First, but not foremost, the area was thinly populated; therefore, he could reasonably expect very little resistance at best. As it turned out, there was none at all. More important was the geography of the area. Whereas today, the Sussex coastline is gently curving and comparatively featureless, in 1066 it was extremely irregular. See the map below. Notice the three lagoons: Pevensey, Bulverhythe, and Brede. William was to put these three substantial lagoons to excellent use.

THE HASTINGS PENINSULA
(As it appeared in 1066)

The area depicted on the map is 15 miles north-south and 25 miles east-west, and shows what the coastline of East Sussex would have looked like at high tide on 28 September 1066. The difference between high tide and low tide in this area is 20 feet. Therefore, at low tide the lagoons would be reduced to marshlands.  In planning for this invasion, William had studied Caesar's invasions of 55 and 54 B.C. and, in particular, Caesar's mistakes. Knowing what Caesar had done wrong, and the consequences, was an immense help to William to ensure he did everything right. For example, Caesar had not taken proper account of the Channel's weather and tides; therefore, when he incorrectly beached and moored his transports many of them were flailed about and were badly damaged or sunk as they were flung into one another. By selecting Pevensey lagoon (or Pevensey Bay) as his landing point and beaching his ships as far up on the land as he could get them during high tide, they were perfectly safe from the elements, even to the point of being fully out of the water when the tide went out. Of course, this had a drawback: if he needed to use his ships, he had to wait for the tide to come back in to float them.

Taking another look at the map, you will see that the Hastings Peninsula is bordered on the west by Pevensey lagoon and on the east by the River Brede. Each is a formidable barrier. At high tide, the portion of the Brede that formed the lagoon would have been about one-quarter mile wide at its western end, at Sedlescombe, and widening to a mile or more as it approached its junction with the Channel. Hastings, situated almost in the center of the peninsula on the coast, was about 10 miles from Pevensey.  About two miles to the west of Hastings lay Bulverhythe lagoon. This lagoon, along with the many small rivers and streams that fed it, formed another natural barrier in the center of the peninsula. William would situate himself in the area between the Pevensey and Bulverhythe lagoons, which would protect his flanks against attack. The presence of the very formidable Brede lagoon further to the east would further assure no assault from that direction. There was only one way in or out of the peninsula from the mainland; a road that crossed a thousand-yard-long ridge along the southern extremity of Caldbec Hill. This ridge, which is marked by crossed swords on the map, was bordered on the east and west by the headwaters of the Brede and Bulverhythe rivers and numerous, impenetrable marshes and streams that encompassed the headwaters. About 1,000 yards south-south-east of the ridge was Telham Hill, over which the only road also passed. Occupying this thousand yard area between the hills was a valley called Sentlach, which in Anglo-Saxon means "sandy area." (Please note that the "hills" on the map are not to scale.)

William Occupies the Hastings Peninsula
Having landed without opposition at Pevensey, William immediately began to strengthen the old Roman fort at the mouth of the lagoon. Next, he set about securing his left flank by capturing Hastings. To do this, he sent a small land force, via Crowhurst, and a small portion of his fleet to take the place. Hastings was taken on 29 September, apparently without a struggle, and William had a castle built there. With Hastings firmly in his grasp, William sent out raiding parties to terrorize the countryside. His main purpose for doing this was to entice Harold into battle while his army was still in a weakened condition from the recent battle at Stamford Bridge, and further to entice Harold to fight on a battleground of William's choosing. During the first days of October, William received intelligence from Norman sympathizers living in the area of the results of Stamford Bridge; of the condition of Harold's army; of the fact that earls Edwin of Mercia and Morcar of Northumbria were licking their wounds and would not support Harold; that Harold was on his way back to London from York with a depleted army which consisted mainly of his Housecarls; and that the Viking fleet captured by Harold would soon be heading south. Realizing that time was Harold's ally and his enemy, and knowing of Harold's impetuous reputation, William determined to entice Harold into an early battle in the confined space of the Hastings Peninsula while Harold was comparatively weak. To this end, William stepped up his campaign of terror and destruction. The Hastings Peninsula was within Harold's old earldom of Sussex, and William was certain that Harold would not sit idly by while his old earldom was ravaged and razed.