

Donald T. Williams, PhD
P. O. Box # 800807
Toccoa Falls, GA. 30598
<http://doulomen.tripod.com>
dtw@tfc.edu

**“THE MIND IS ITS OWN PLACE”:
SATAN’S PHILOSOPHY AND THE MODERN DILEMMA**

Donald T. Williams, PhD
Toccoa Falls College

Note: This essay was published as “‘The Mind is its Own Place’: Satan’s Philosophy and the Modern Dilemma,” *Proceedings of the Georgia Philological Association* 2 (December 2007): 20-34. A shorter, more popular version of the same material was published as “Devil Talk: Milton’s Post-Modern Satan and his Disciples,” *Touchstone: A Journal of Mere Christianity* 21:7 (September, 2008): 24-27.

We must read [Milton] as we read the ancients or Dante or Shakespeare, with imaginative sympathy for beliefs and assumptions that are not ours—and we may find that some of these are more valuable than our own, that we need readjustment more than the work in hand. (Bush, John Milton 145)

Satan began his career by rebelling against his Maker and proceeded by trying to enlist others in his rebellion. Many readers have thought that Milton’s Satan began by rebelling against his author and has proceeded by trying to enlist others in that rebellion. A sufficient number of critics seem to have joined up in any case. Whatever we make of his cause or his case, Satan continues to demand our attention, and Milton’s characterization of his arch villain remains one of the most fascinating aspects of his great spiritual epic. To the extent that Milton’s portrait of the real Enemy of our souls is accurate, it gives us insight not only into Milton’s poetry but also into the spiritual battles in which we are still engaged.

Discussion of whether Satan is—intentionally or not—Milton’s “real hero” in *Paradise Lost* has tended to center on Satan’s personality. After the defiant freedom fighter of Books I and II—Satan as Che Guevara—the slightly pompous and definitely defensive Theology Professor which is Milton’s portrayal of God in Book III can seem a bit of a let down, even to those who have not missed the fact that this picture of Satan is created by accepting at face value his own view of himself. Did Milton fail to anticipate how much less obvious the contrast between the self-serving image created by Satan’s propaganda machine and the plain unvarnished truth of Heaven (well analyzed by Stein and others) would be to a generation jaded by constant exposure to spin doctors? No doubt. In this paper we will examine another set of clues Milton gave us as to how we should take his great Antagonist, a set that has perhaps not received the attention it deserves.

Let us focus then not on Satan’s personality but on his philosophy. By this I do not mean his political philosophy, for he has none, though this lack is mightily obscured by the ubiquity of his political rhetoric. Loewenstein has usefully shown how Satan’s rhetoric parodies that of what Milton would have considered the “righteous” Puritan revolutionary who wanted to abolish

kingship in favor of democracy, while his actual rebellion parallels Aristotle's treatment in *The Politics* of tyrants, i.e., rebels who desire to keep the same form of government (monarchy) but simply "wish it to be in their own control" (307). We will look much deeper than politics, to Satan's view of life, specifically, his metaphysics and his ethics as they are generated by his epistemology.

Forcy rightly notes that "It is evident that Milton did not assign Satan arbitrary behaviour" (313). She sees his actions as unified by his role as the "antithesis of Christ," specifically of Christ as the incarnation of the Old Testament Wisdom (316). Her theological insight is strengthened by the realization that Satan's career hangs together on a philosophical level as well. It is as if Milton had asked himself, "What would the philosophy have to be that could underlie and explain the precise series of actions and statements that Scripture and Christian tradition attribute to this character? How would a person have to think who could do the kinds of things Satan has done? What view of the world could get a person to follow just this career?" Whether Milton thought in precisely these terms of course we do not know. But if he had asked himself just these questions and set out to answer them, he could hardly have portrayed the answer in the philosophy of Satan more profoundly and consistently than he did in the character that we have. Contrary to Tillyard, Satan is not "unreasoning energy" (193); he is rather one who reasons consistently and well, but (in Milton's mind) perversely.

I would therefore like to examine, and analyze the implications of, three diabolical statements which form a chain of inexorable logic that explains Satan's course of action and would justify it to anyone who accepts their initial premise as true, or condemn it for anyone who rejects it as false. They still sit on a watershed that cuts through the landscape of our thinking today. I think that they will indicate which side of it Milton wanted us to take our stand on, and I believe that deciding whether or not we agree with him can still be a usefully clarifying exercise for us today.

"THE MIND IS ITS OWN PLACE": THE SOURCE OF VALUE

The very first words we hear from Satan record his shock at the contrast between the place where he finds himself and the place from which he has been expelled: the contrast between Hell and Heaven (I.242ff). Before he recovers himself enough to start putting his spin on the situation, he acknowledges that the change of scenery is not a very favorable one. "Mournful gloom" contrasts with "celestial light," "happy Fields / Where Joy forever dwells" with "horrors" most profound (244-5, 250-1). But, not to be deterred by anything so mundane as reality, Satan quickly turns to his rhetorical skills to salvage the situation, dramatically exhorting Hell to receive its new Possessor (252).

Possessor? To get the full effect, one must imagine a new inmate just tossed into the Tower of London making this audacious speech while the Beefeaters roll their eyes and make significant gestures toward their heads as they pocket the keys. One must likewise hear the equally futile "Here at least / We shall be free" echoing forlornly in the hollow chambers of the Tower or Newgate. As Charles Williams once said with classic British understatement, "Hell is always inaccurate" (258; see Bush, *English Literature* 404, for an excellent rhetorical analysis of the opening speech.).

Satan realizes that he needs to justify this apparent defiance of the reality being conveyed to his entire host by their senses, so he cuts quickly to the very foundation of the entire diabolical doctrine. His mind, he boasts, is not subject to change by so paltry a thing as place: "The mind is its own place, and in itself / Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n" (254-5).

This claim is as philosophically audacious as the inmate's claim to be the Tower's new "owner" is legally daring, and, Milton implies by its rhetorical context in Satan's spin-doctoring, as likely to be grounded in reality. Even Satan has already grudgingly admitted that God has

proved himself sovereign, and that this sovereignty includes the authority to “dispose and bid / What shall be *right*” (246-7, emphasis added). His propaganda would have it that this situation only “now” obtains, that it was doubtful before it was asserted by “thunder.” But for readers who agree with Milton that the Judeo-Christian God exists, this can hardly be the case. Milton would surely have expected his readers to recognize those words as more evidence for the centrifugal force of Satan’s spin cycle.

In Genesis, God in the beginning created the heavens and the earth. Whether he did so *ex nihilo* as in traditional orthodoxy or out of himself as Milton would have it makes no difference to the main point, which is that the universe’s dependence on God is total. Matter, indeed the space-time continuum (to update the discussion), have no *independent* pre-existence, as they do in pagan creation myths; they are not co-eternal in that sense. There is therefore nothing in the nature or the history of the physical universe which could give it or any of its inhabitants, spiritual or animal, any grounds for a claim to independence, or autonomy, from God. Milton’s physicalism, giving the angels more “refined” bodies, merely makes more simple and direct a claim that is also inherent in orthodoxy: that the angels in general and Satan in particular have no basis on which they can claim to be exceptions to this principle.

In Genesis, God through his Word not only gave the universe its existence; he also gave it its value. He said, “Let there be light,” and there was light. And then God saw that the light was *good*. In other words, he approved his own handiwork. Creation is just as absolutely dependent on God for its goodness as it is for its existence. In Christian tradition, God is good and the source of all goodness. Good is defined as that which corresponds, not to God’s bare will, but to his will as the expression of his character, which is inherently good. Even Calvin, who is sometimes accused of teaching a bare voluntarism, held that God’s purpose in creation was “to manifest his perfections in the whole structure of the universe” (1:51), and “if it be asked what cause induced him to create all things at first, and now inclines him to preserve them, we shall find that there could be no other cause than his own goodness” (1:56).

Good then is that which corresponds to God’s will as the expression of his character, “the proper order of the universe in relation to a universal law, the law of self-abnegation in love” (C. Williams 256). Evil is that which deviates from this standard. If God exists and is the creator portrayed in Genesis, then it simply makes no sense to speak of good or evil except in relation to him. Fish puts Milton’s point well: “What is true about the world is that God created it, and to enjoy its fruits as if they created or sustained themselves is to join Satan in chewing ‘bitter Ashes’” (*How Milton Works* 13).

Milton assumed that we would know, indeed, assume, all of this. We may disagree with him, but first we must grant him the courtesy of hearing him. Therefore, Ryken is right to “insist that the background assumption of perfection is one that the reader should be willing to grant as an *a priori* axiom.” Writing in the Seventeenth Century, Milton was “using as his material an established story and theological system. He did not have to prove that God is good and that Satan is evil” (60). If we wish to enter imaginatively into his world, we must accept, or at least suspend our disbelief in, the same premises.

We see then that Satan’s counter-claim has laid its finger right on the crux of the claim that God is God. For if we accept the proposition that God exists and created the world, then it follows that the mind is not its own place; it, like every other place, is God’s place. If God exists and created, then there is a hierarchy of value, of goodness, objectively present in the world because he put it there, and the path to human fulfillment is for the mind to discover those values and submit itself to them, or, to the extent that it is fallen, to allow itself to be conformed to them anew by grace. God has already determined what is good, and for the mind to strike off in a different direction is both a perverse and a doomed enterprise. But if God does not exist and did not create the world, then the account of those values proffered by those claiming to speak for him is no longer privileged, and each individual must simply make up his own mind.

Satan is rejecting what C. S. Lewis called “the doctrine of objective value” (*Abolition* 29). Lewis explains,

Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or incongruous to it—believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but could merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence, or our contempt. . . . To call children delightful or old men venerable is not simply to record a psychological fact about our own parental or filial emotions at the moment but to recognize a quality that demands a certain response from us whether we make it or not. (25, 29; cf. D. Williams, “Objectivity”; cf. *Mere Humanity: G. K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, and J. R. R. Tolkien on the Human Condition*, chp. 2.)

One does not have to be a Christian to accept this view. Lewis documents an impressive consensus on it across the world in pre-modern times. But, as Milton realized, to be a Christian who takes seriously the doctrine of creation is to be logically committed to the objectivity of value because of the radical way in which the doctrine of creation grounds the existence of objective value. And therefore his Satan correctly realizes that in order to claim the right to choose—or, indeed, create—his *own* alternative values, he must eliminate that grounding. To establish one’s own values without reference to or in opposition to the ones that God has decreed is precisely to dethrone God and put oneself in his place. Therefore, Satan’s claim that the mind is its own place is not merely a justification for his rebellion; it *is* his rebellion in its very essence.

“OUR OWN GOOD FROM OURSELVES”: THE SEARCH FOR THE GOOD

We are now in a position to see why I said earlier that Satan’s metaphysics and his ethics are generated by his epistemology. He does not say, “This is the nature of reality; therefore, this is what we can know about it and this is how we know it.” Rather, he says, “This is how I choose to know the world; therefore, this is what that world is like.” In other words, he has decided that one does not *discover* truth, or meaning, or value, as is proper for a creature; one *creates* them for oneself, as is proper for one who aspires to be God. He has, in other words, rejected Fox Mulder’s belief that “The truth is out there.” Whatever truth he embraces is rather “in here,” in the mind which is its own place. From this subjectivist epistemology flows an antirealist metaphysic. This place where the demons now find themselves is not Hell because of nasty objective realities like flames that give off darkness visible in the absence of celestial light. No, it is Heaven because Satan says it is Heaven. What then do these commitments do to Satan’s ethic, his conception of the good?

The answer to that question is given, not by Satan himself, but by one of his minions. But Mammon shows by his answer that he has been a faithful disciple of his diabolical Master. Rejecting the thought of returning to Heaven to worship One whom they hate, he urges the demons rather to “seek / Our own good from ourselves, and from our own / Live to ourselves” (II.252-4), even if they must do so in Hell.

Mammon’s advice simply lays out the next logical step down the path that Satan has chosen. If the good is that which corresponds to God’s will as the expression of his character, then the search for the good must lead us *out of* ourselves, proximately to the grateful reception as his gift of that which God has made, good because it reflects his perfections, and ultimately to communion with that Other which is the ultimate goodness, God himself. But if the mind is its own place and the good is that which corresponds to its independent assertion of its own will, then the search for the good must lead us *into* ourselves, for only there, in the mind’s own place, exist the Heavens we have tried to make out of our own Hells.

If God exists and is the source of all goodness, then he forms an ultimate reference point through which all other beings are related, to him and to each other. That common pursuit of a common good leading back to the same reference point is the source of *community*, a common unity in the enjoyment of a common and shared good which is the basis of love. This is the life of Heaven that the faithful angels enjoy and into which Adam and Eve and their descendants are invited. But if that community of shared good is only a myth, or if it exists but has been refused, if each individual is left to try to form his own reference point—if the mind is its own place—then what is there left for the mind to do but seek its own good from itself? Having claimed the right to create its own values rather than submit to the ones that are simply “out there” by creation, the mind must look to itself to validate for itself any “good” that it chooses. And it must do so alone. For every other individual is in the same position, and even if two of them agree on the same good and agree to seek it together, their community has no basis other than their own essentially self-referential and arbitrary choices. And how far can one trust another ego as committed to its own sovereignty, its own divinity, as one’s own? That is why the demons have no understanding of love and grace, the motives of Heaven. Devil may with devil damned firm concord hold, but it is ultimately out of fear that they do so, as Satan ironically admits (II.32-5).

Only two orientations then are ultimately possible, flowing from the two rival conceptions of the nature of things: theocentric or egocentric. Is the mind God’s place or its own place? If the mind is God’s place, unity and integration with itself and other minds are theoretically possible based on God himself as the ultimate final reference point. The mind as its own place, egocentric by definition and design, leads naturally to isolation and fragmentation. The unity imposed on that natural isolation and fragmentation by Satan’s strength of will is precisely the normal definition of Hell, though Satan may call it Heaven if he will.

**“EVIL BE THOU MY GOOD”:
THE IDENTITY OF THE GOOD**

Very well, then: if the mind is its own place and in itself can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven, then it can only seek its own good from itself. What kind of good can it then expect to find? Satan realizes the answer to that question, and finally accepts it, in Book IV. Like Marlowe’s Faust, Satan is at first tempted (privately) to repent, only to harden his heart and recommit himself to evil. And, like Marlowe’s Mephistophelis (“How comes it then that thou art out of Hell?” “Why, this *is* Hell, nor am I out of it!”), he finds that escaping the Hell he has chosen is not a simple matter of redefining it in the mind’s own place. Milton’s narrator deflates all of Satan’s big talk about making a Heaven of Hell by telling us that

. . . horror and doubt distract
His troubl’d thoughts, and from the bottom stir
The Hell within him, for within him Hell
He brings, and round about him, nor from Hell
One step no more than from himself can fly
By change of place. (IV.19-23)

The ironic reprise of the word *place* can hardly be insignificant. Satan confirms the narrator’s interpretation by reproaching himself for his ingratitude to God in a soliloquy he would never have allowed his fellow demons to overhear. This forfeiture of all that is truly good weighs heavily on him, so that “Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell” (IV.75), a condition which threatens only to worsen eternally. Nevertheless, repentance is rejected because it entails submission (81). Satan still thinks it better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.

But where does this leave him? Satan accepts the fact that “all Good to me is lost” (109). He at least is under no illusions about who the ultimate Source of Good in the universe is,

however many illusions he may generate for his followers and for mankind. And so we reach the place to which Satan's path has inexorably brought him: "Evil be thou my Good" (110).

Milton has left no doubt about where he stands. Satan's promise that the mind's secession from God's rule to become its own place will allow it to make a Heaven of Hell has utterly failed in his own experience, and it can be maintained henceforth only as the most cynical of lies. Such is the official philosophy and public policy of Hell. Adam and Eve will discover bitterly when they subscribe to it that an inescapable logic of damnation flows from Satan's original premise. If the mind is its own place, then it must seek its own good from itself; and then all it can find, having severed itself from the only source of real goodness, is evil. "Evil be thou my Good" is the inevitable result of the mind's secession from the Kingdom of Heaven. And though he stubbornly clings to his philosophy as the only alternative to "submission," even Satan can no longer pretend—except to others—that what it has brought him is good.

CONCLUSIONS

Where does this discussion leave us? It would seem to leave us with the following conclusions.

First, Milton was not of the devil's party, intentionally or otherwise. He worked too hard to embed Satan's rhetoric in contexts that highlight its duplicity to have been of his party intentionally. Whether or not one agrees with the use Fish made of it—I think his notion of "implication" is a possible but not a necessary reader response—one must certainly appreciate his exposition of the pervasiveness of that embedding (*Surprised by Sin*). And, as we have shown, Milton understood Satan's position too well and had analyzed it too thoroughly to have been of his party without knowing it.

Shelley and his school are therefore guilty of wishful thinking about Milton because they *are* of the devil's party and do know it. It was not until the Romantics had pushed Kant's epistemology in an even more subjective direction than he would have countenanced that anyone seriously thought that Satan was right about the mind being its own place. They were the first generation to believe that a healthy mind functioning properly creates its own reality rather than perceiving, with greater or lesser accuracy and clarity, the reality that is there. The only Seventeenth-Century voice that comes close is Hamlet's: "There is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so" (II.ii.255). But this is significantly the voice of a person who is trying to convince us that he is mad. There was no public philosophy in his time that would have said any such thing; "'Fact' and 'value' had not yet been sundered by the mechanical 'philosophy'" (Willey 52). Even Berkeley had not gone so far, for the table and chair in his notorious room continued to exist even when we were not perceiving them because God still saw them, and his vision trumped ours. Object permanence depended not on our minds but on God's. Dr. Johnson famously kicked a certain stone even at Berkeley. How he might have responded to Coleridge or Shelley we can only imagine (Willey 293-305; D. Williams, "Reflections").

We may also reach a new level of admiration for Milton's accomplishment in his portrait of Satan's character. That Milton's Satan is an impressive personality and a skilled rhetorician who was able to sway the minds of a third of the angels and has seduced even many of the critics is well known. He is also an original and seminal thinker whose philosophical justification of his own rebellion is both radical and brilliant. I think he is tragically and perversely wrong; but he is wrong in a most instructive way. For he is the perfect foil for the Christian view of the world that Milton believed in. He understood more clearly than any freethinker of Milton's century or the next the root of God's epistemological and metaphysical claims on humanity's allegiance and worship, and laid his philosophical axe to that root more accurately and powerfully than anyone else would until the Twentieth Century.

Thomas L. Martin has given us an insightful analysis of the moment when the opponents of the traditional view finally caught up with their Master:

Satan's rhetoric does indeed make many of the same moves as Derrida's deconstruction. Satan opens up the play of language by decentering it. He sets the difference of signifiers adrift from the moorings of presence. . . . Differences are multiplied, hopelessly complicating the possibility of univocal meaning. Hierarchical oppositions are disrupted and reversed. (45)

What Martin demonstrated in Satan's methodology, we have confirmed in terms of the substance of his claims. To say that the mind is its own place is indeed to decenter all discourse and reject the possibility of a logocentric understanding of reality; for the only Center that could be adequate to hold all the disparities of human experience together in a coherent world view would be the Logos who is the Son of the great Creator himself.

Finally, we can appreciate the way in which Milton's framing of the rationale for Satan's revolt helps to clarify the choices that still face us today. Lewalski rightly notes that "Milton's epic is preeminently a poem about knowing and choosing," for the characters first and also for the reader. Knowing and choosing—or, at least, believing and choosing. Is Satan right about the mind or not? We need to know; but, barring that, our choices will depend on what we believe about the question. Milton wanted to help us ask the question, and answer it, intelligently, for only if we do so rightly can we become "discerning, virtuous, liberty loving human beings" (Lewalski 460).

Belief in the Christian God is not just another box in an intellectual survey that we can simply decide in isolation to tick or not. It is a root belief, a *weltanschauung*-generating belief that gives us grounds for faith in the ultimate goodness and meaning of creation and of life—but only on the terms of submission to the will of that God conceived as something objective and external to ourselves. In the world of Milton's poem, to reject that submission is to put oneself on a path where all goodness and meaning are inevitably lost. As Lewis wrote so perceptively, "'Evil be thou my good' entails 'Nonsense be thou my sense'" (*Preface* 99). Perhaps it is no accident that Satan's most faithful (post)modern disciples also offer us a world in which meaning is endlessly deferred in a kind of reading that is a game without goals, the freeplay of a mind that is insistently its own place, leading nowhere because "there is nothing outside the text" (Derrida 158; cf. Vanhoozer).

In summary, Milton created the nihilistic, Derridean form of PostModernism three hundred years in advance by trying to figure out how Satan thinks. Our analysis in their contexts of three key links in the chain of diabolical reasoning shows that, while Milton was not of his great Anti-Hero's party, he presented Satan's perspective as well as its opposite with clarity and force. Milton gives us a strong defense of objective value, but even those who are not convinced by it will find that a better understanding of his poem usefully clarifies the options that still face us today.

In the world of Milton's poem, Heaven and Hell are not interchangeable, and the rejection of the one lands a person inexorably in the other. And so he asks us what all poets ultimately ask us: to consider how far his imagined world is an accurate reflection of the real one we inhabit. A typical method of salvaging the relevance of old poems to modern people is therefore misguided. It suggests that we can find in the text "not perhaps the truth that Milton intended to convey, but a truth that is central to our time" (Wheeler 121). Instead, it turns out that the choice that is central to our own time is precisely the one Milton was asking his Seventeenth-Century readers to ponder, the one he believed Adam and Eve had also faced, and Satan and the heavenly host before them.

We have only now caught up to the clarity with which Milton's Satan presented that choice to himself (though he was not so forthright with Adam and Eve, of course). According to Milton, our parents have already chosen for us in the Garden, with tragic consequences; but we are offered in Christ the opportunity to unmake that choice for ourselves. What we will do with that opportunity remains to be seen.

Works Cited

- Bush, Douglas. *English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, 1600-1660*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Pr., 1962.
- . *John Milton: A Sketch of His Life and Writings*. N.Y.: Collier Books, 1964.
- Calvin, John. *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. 2 vols. 1559. Trans. Henry Beveridge. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975.
- Derrida, Jacques. *Of Grammatology*. Tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr., 1976.
- Fish, Stanley E. *How Milton Works*. Cambridge, Ma.: Belknap Pr., 2001.
- . *Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost*. London: MacMillan & N.Y.: St. Martins, 1967.
- Forcy, Margaret. "Milton's Satan: Wisdom Reversed." *Essays in Criticism* 46:4 (Oct. 1996): 302-18.
- Lewalski, Barbara K. *The Life of John Milton: A Critical Biography*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
- Lewis, C. S. *The Abolition of Man: Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in the Upper Forms of Schools*. N.Y.: MacMillan, 1947.
- . "The Poison of Subjectivism." *Religion in Life* 12 (Summer 1953), rpt. in *Christian Reflections*, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967): 72-81.
- . *A Preface to Paradise Lost*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Pr., 1942.
- Loewenstein, David. "'An Ambiguous Monster': Representing Rebellion in Milton's Polemics and *Paradise Lost*." *Huntington Library Quarterly* 55:2 (Spring 1992): 295-315.
- Martin, Thomas L. "On the Margin of God: Deconstruction and the Language of Satan in *Paradise Lost*." *Milton Quarterly* 29:2 (May 1995): 41-47.
- Ryken, Leland. *The Apocalyptic Vision of Paradise Lost*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Pr., 1970.
- Stein, Arnold. *Answerable Style*. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Pr., 1953.
- Tillyard, E. M. W. *Milton*. 1930. Rpt. as "*Paradise Lost: Conscious and Unconscious Meanings*," *Milton Criticism: Selections from Four Centuries*. Ed. James Thorpe. N.Y.: Collier, 1950: 178-210.
- Vanhoozer, Kevin J. *Is there a Meaning in this Text?: The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998.
- Wheeler, Thomas. *Paradise Lost and the Modern Reader*. Athens: Univ. of Georgia Pr., 1974.

Willey, Basil. *The Seventeenth Century Background: Studies in the Thought of the Age in Relation to Poetry and Religion*. 1935; N.Y.: Anchor, 1953.

Williams, Charles. "An Introduction to Milton's Poems." 1940. Rpt. in *Milton Criticism: Selections from Four Centuries*. Ed. James Thorpe. N.Y.: Collier, 1950: 252-66.

Williams, Donald T. *Mere Humanity: G. K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, and J. R. R. Tolkien on the Human Condition*. Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2006.

----- "The Objectivity of Value: Properties, Values, and Moral Reasoning." *The Bulletin of the Evangelical Philosophical Society* 16 (1993): 49-58.

----- "Reflections from Plato's Cave: Musings on the History of Philosophy" (Evangelical Philosophical Society Presidential Address, 1996), *Philosophia Christi* 20:1 (Spring, 1997): 71-82.

* * * * *

Donald T. Williams, PhD, is Director of the School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of English at Toccoa Falls College in the foothills of NE Georgia. He is a past president of the Evangelical Philosophical Society. An ordained minister in the Evangelical Free Church of America with many years of pastoral experience, he has spent several summers training national pastors in Uganda and Kenya for Church Planting International. His most recent books are *Mere Humanity: G. K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, and J. R. R. Tolkien on the Human Condition* (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2006), *Credo: Meditations on the Nicene Creed* (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2007), and *The Devil's Dictionary of the Christian Faith* (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2008). His website is <http://doulomen.tripod.com>.