HEADQUARTERS JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY APO 159 C/O P.M. SAN FRANCISCO CALF 9 May 1945 HISTORICAL REPORT OF THE 295TH JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY FOR THE V3 - PALAWAN - OPERATION SECTION I. BACKGROUND 1. The plan called for an amphibious landing by the 186th Regimental Combat Team, reinforced, on the shores of Puerta Princessa, Palawan, P.I. Shore Fire Control Parties of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company were attached to furnish necessary Shore Fire Control communications. a. The target beach was of coral, ending at a mangrove swamp. The terrain was densely wooded and had but one road, making progress difficult. 2. Palawan had been in the hands of the Japanese for approximately three years but the beach landing was unopposed. SECTION II. OPERATIONS 1. It was decided that the following elements of the 295th Joint Assault Signal Company would be furnished: a. With the 186th ROT Headquarters, One (l) Naval Liaison Team which consisted of one Naval Liaison Officer and four enlisted personnel. b. With each Assault Battalion Headquarters, One (l) Shore Fire Control Party which consisted of one Naval Liaison Officer, one Artillery Spotter, and ten enlisted personnel. 2. The elements joined their Regiment and Battalion Headquarters on 26 February 1945 and prepared to embark the same date. JASCO personnel were instructed by team officers in SOI, Field Orders, and general orientations. 3. The landing was made at 0845, 28 February 1945. The Regimental N.L.O. station wee set up on the beach by lOOO; shortly thereafter the Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties checked in. Communication was good. 4. No firing was called for by JASCO parties except one request for a mission which was denied. All JASCO teams were relieved attachment 1 March 1945 and embarked same day for return to organization. 5. No casualties were incurred during the operation. SECTION III LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The type map used 1/50000, gunfire maps could and should have been replaced with 1/25000 photo maps which were available. 2. Essential materials for Naval Gunfire Control on this operation were either of inferior quality or non-existent due to difficulty in contacting Navy. No gunfire annexes to the operation plan were available for our officers. 3. The rapid advance of the troops, due to absence of enemy opposition, placed a burden on the radio carrying team and also resulted in poor reception on the SCR 694 due to its limited range. 4. Use of assigned vehicles is an absolute necessity for Shore Fire Control Parties. In all previous operations as in this one, the chief factor preventing absolute efficiency of these parties has been lack of transportation. The health of the command sharply declines during an operation and back breaking loads over long distance, rough terrain, and at necessarily hurried pace is thought to be one of the chief reasons. 5. Maps, Field Orders, General Orders, Bulletins and Circulars are not available at this headquarters as enclosures. VINCENT W. FOX Captain, Sig C Commanding 1 Incl: Roster Officers ROSTER OF OFFICERS, 295TH JASCO, PARTICIPATING IN V-3 PALAWAN OPERATION 1st Lt Robert L. Burge, 0416381, FA. 1st Lt Walter H. Jensen, 01175756, FA. Lieut Benjamin D. Mathon, 171137, USNR. Lt (jg) George W. Boyce, 224255, USNR. Lt. (jg) Warren B. Woods, 270441, USNR. ******************************************************************* Consolidated Report on PALAWAN Operation, 2/25 - 3/2 1. PREPARATION. This operation was marked by the decidedly poor preparation relative to liaison with the infantry unit supported and distribution of maps and data. Assignments to units were made at such a late date as to allow practically no time for discussions with commanding and subordinate officers on the capabilities of naval gunfire. Since several of the unit commanders had previously suffered unfortunate losses from our own fire, it was more necessary than ever to win back their confidence in our supporting weapon. Last minute pressures and preparations prevented us from fulfilling this initial phase of our naval gunfire liaison duty. What liaison was attempted was in the hands of an officer independent of our organization knowing little of our methods, and apparently desirous of handling the whole problem alone. Essential materials for naval Gunfire control on this operation were either of inferior quality or nonexistent. Due to difficult liaison with the Navy contact officer, no gunfire annexes to the operation plan were available for our officers. Much valuable information ordinarily carried in such an annex was absent from the verbal summary which we received shortly before loadinq. The other essential, good maps, was likewise neglected when we received small scale, 1/50,000 gunfire maps despite the availability of excellent photomaps a 1/25,000 r.f. for the field artillery. The type map used in the LUZON operation was ideal with its r.f. of 1/36,000. Either this type or artillery photomaps should be sought for future landings. 2. THE LANDING. After an intensive gunfire and rocket preparation we landed on an undefended beach at 0845, February 28. The Rgt. N.L.O. station was set up on the beach by 1000; shortly thereafter the Battalion teams began to check in. Communi- cation was good. With no enemy opposition our troops advanced quite rapidly and continuously, placing a great burden on our radio-carrying team members and in the case of the F.O. teams bringinq them to the point of utter exhaustion. In addition this swift progress of our forward teams increased the distance between them and the Rgt. station, thus creating a new problem of poor reception by our SCR 694 radios. When distances were more that three or four miles between sets of this type, we found that they were incapable of efficient communication with each other. Messages between these stations were either relayed via the firing or control ships on sent through the Battalion SCR 284s. All officers who participated in this operation have agreed that unles the terrain is absolutely impassable to vehicular traffic, jeeps with mounted SCR 284s are essential to the proper fulfillment of our duties. B.D. Mathon Lieut. USNR
KWAJALEIN |
MAJURO |
SAIPAN |
LINGAYEN GULF |
ENIWETOK |
ZAMBOANGA |
MALABANG PARANG |
UNIT CITATION |
GENERAL ORDERS |
COMPANY ROSTER |
295 JASCO HOMEPAGE |