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An Assessment of the Ability of the Modern U. S. Intelligence Community to Cope with the New Non - State Threats in the Post - Cold War World, with particular attention paid to Russia.
 

Navy Air Force Marine Corps NSA NIMA NRO
THESIS: The U.S. intelligence community's ability to cope with the non-state threat of international organized crime, particularly as it originates from the former Soviet Union, is seriously challenged in the post-cold war world due to confused roles and jumbled jurisdictions and by the inability of the stated U.S. grand strategy of Engagement and Enlargement to adequately address itself to the issue of organized crime. The nature of modern threats and increased levels of international cooperation of criminals and terrorists acting on a global stage requires the U.S. intelligence community to reorganize and adapt itself to a complementary strategy of more complete cooperation.

The Threats

Transnational Threats

U.S. national security strategy now emphasizes transnational threats to nation-states by non-state actors as well as non-governmental processes and organizations. Such threats are viewed as far more probable than general war involving weapons of mass destruction.(2) A catalog of these challenges would include weapons proliferation, (including black market transfers of nuclear material or weapons of mass destruction by rogue states, terrorists or criminals), international drug trafficking, illicit electronic capital movement, terrorism, low intensity conflicts and insurgency. Illegal immigration, conflict over resources, environmental threats, population explosions, refugee flows, spread of serious diseases, and the erosion of governmental control over areas in megacities or the countryside are increasingly affecting international stability. The destructive forces faced inside U.S. borders often have their origins overseas in rogue nations that breed and harbor terrorists, or in countries where drugs are produced, or within international organized crime cartels which are principally headquartered outside our borders. Free and open societies operating in a world brought closer together by a technology revolution where information, money and people can move rapidly and easily, are inherently more challenged by these kinds of forces.(3) Indeed, in this age of modern communications and transportation such challenges are relatively unfettered by geographical borders or international protocols and thus may threaten nation-states used to operating within state and alliance systems.(4)
 
Borders are becoming incresingly permeable as a result of communications, technology, commerce and transportation.

The simple truth is that the U.S. cannot protect itself against drug-related crime, track down terrorists, seize international criminals or stop the flow of illegal arms or components of weapons of mass destruction without both unprecedented cooperation among the agencies within the government and the assistance of countries that are the origin of these forces and whose peace and stability may also be jeopardized. This reality was behind President Clinton's proposed legislation and initiatives for the U.S. government last year, which coincided with the announcement of a new international proposal to work more closely with foreign governments in order to respond more effectively in fighting these forces that challenge U.S. security from within and without.(5)

Weapons Proliferation

When the Cold War came to an end in 1991, the intelligence agencies of the U.S. government began to shift resources away from a concentration on their chief nemesis, the suddenly defunct USSR, and toward a fresh set of problems and priorities. Rising to the top of the new list of requirements was a demand for better information about a long-standing item on the American foreign policy agenda, the problem of weapons proliferation.(6) Polls indicated that Americans viewed the spread of dangerous weapons as the single most important danger facing the United States in the days following the Cold War.(7)

Especially after the Persian Gulf War policy makers began to realize that they needed better information on potential weapons proliferation culprits like Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Gates moved early in his tenure to create a new structure designed to coordinate the government's intelligence-related nonproliferation activities. Gates apparently believed that the various government agencies working on nonproliferation issues were too fragmented and needed coordination if they were going to be successful. To solve the coordination problem, the Non-Proliferation Center (NPC) was established in September 1991 and expanded in 1992.(8)
 
 
While, not exactly a laughing matter, the prospects of someone developing a "do-it-yourself" nuke are ever increasing.

Research and development related to biological weapons, often called the poor man's atomic bombs, are increasing. Less developed countries are often eager to acquire such weapons to compensate for inadequate funding or access to nuclear weapons or more conventional arms. Small quantities of precursors for the manufacturing of biological weapons can often be acquired on the open market, leading to the production of deadly chemical or biological weapons. Of no small concern are the reports that Libya is now building the world's largest underground chemical weapons plant in a mountain range near Tarhunnah. Indeed, chemical weapons programs are active in eighteen countries, including most major states of the Middle East.(9) "Ballistic missile systems that can deliver nuclear, chemical or biological warheads are available to more countries. China, North Korea, the industrialized states in Europe and South America, several Third World countries, and private consortiums, supply ballistic missile technology--and in some cases entire missile systems--to developing countries around the world,"(10) according to Former DCI, John Deutch. Advanced conventional weapons and technologies such as stealth, propulsion, and sensors are allowing rogue nations such as North Korea and Iran to accelerate the production of modern weapons which could inflict significant casualties on U.S. forces or regional allies in future conflicts. North Korea...has sold its SCUD B's and C's--with a range of 300 and 500 km respectively--to Iran, Libya and Syria and other countries. P'yongyang is now developing a 1,000-km No Dong missile that could be deployed in the near future. A Taepo Dong missile, which could reach as far as Alaska, is in development and could be operational after the turn of the century.(11)
 
 
Planning is under way in North Korea for a missile capable of reaching Alaska.

Terrorism

In the post-Cold War era, terrorists have become increasingly capable, lethal and wide-ranging. Their operating methods and technical expertise in bombmaking and other skills are more sophisticated. The U.S. Government recorded 440 international terrorism incidents in 1995, the highest total since 1991.(12) Terrorist attacks today are more deadly than in the past and will more than likely become worse. In earlier days most terrorists engaged in relatively small operations aimed at attaining specific political objectives. Today they are more likely to be aimed at accumulating high body counts as a form of punishment or revenge and in order to send a message through the worldwide communications network.(13) The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York or the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City are two examples that have occurred on American soil, and there are many more around the world. Some incidents are not even political. It has been reported that the Aum Shinriko cult in Japan, which released the deadly Sarin gas in Tokyo’s subways, had been shopping for eboli virus before the incident.
 
 
Oklahoma City Bombing--The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, domestic bombing, 1995
New York's World Trade Center--Site of a terrorist bombing in 1993

This year, the Department of Defense began a $46.5 million program to train police, doctors, and emergency personnel called "Chem-Bio Quick Response Force." Under the program, the Department selected 120 U.S. cities for reaction training to attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. In initial simulation exercises in New York and Los Angeles, emergency personnel responding to the scene were either "killed" because of a lack of preparation for toxins at the scene or they completely infected area hospitals by rushing "victims" there.(14)

Organized Crime

"Transnational organized criminal activities are growing rapidly in every region of the world, undermining political and economic development in many countries," according to Former DCI Deutch.(16) In countries like Columbia and Russia, organized crime is challenging for national leadership. Criminal groups have high-level political connections and exert significant influence in important sectors of the economy such as banking. The increasing power of organized crime threatens political stability and democracy, undermines the people's confidence in government, and encourages reactionary support for hard-line politicians. "The increasing sophistication, flexibility, and worldwide connections of organized crime groups help them to expand their activities and thwart law enforcement."(17)
 
Former Director of Central Intelligence--John Deutch

While no one disputes the existence of such organizations as the Japanese Yakuza, the Colombian Cartels or the Russian Mafiya, (upon which this paper will focus with particularity), international crime organizations are very hard to identify with precision. We do know that such organizations exist to varying degrees all over the world. The spread of liberal democratic ideals has seen a corresponding spread of capitalism accompanied by an increase of criminal organizations and their power. Among the negative and unintended consequences of postwar U.S. foreign and domestic policy have been unprecedented options for significant international organized crime.(18) These new gangsters do not operate in a vacuum. They need the right environment to survive and prosper. This environment is one of market opportunity for illegal goods and services, accompanied by government helplessness or complicity.(19) A new global commodity chain is visible in both corporate business as well as illegal business. Global criminal organizations have formed strategic alliances as a rational response to the emergence of global markets. By being able to rely on each other they have been able to consolidate their influence throughout the world.(20)

Following the models of modern multi-national companies, transnational crime organizations have diversified in their trade. No longer merely focused in the trafficking of traditional commodities such as slave labor, drugs and other contraband, they are now involved in more "legal" activities. For example, the Russian Mafiya is not only a known nuclear trafficker but is also dealing in delivery systems and computer technology. Other groups have specialized in currency trade and speculation. Illegally gained money must be introduced into a nation's legitimate financial system through money laundering schemes that disguise financial assets and allow them to be used without evidence of origin. An estimated $100 billion each year in drug profits alone may flow through the U.S.(21) Financial aspects of crime are complex due to the rapidly changing advances in technology, and the criminals are keeping up with the changes. No longer is the Mafia a bunch of thugs. Instead, they have gone hi-tech and made smart business decisions.(22)

In Italy, for example, it is estimated that the illegal economy now controls between 20-30 percent of its GNP, an incredible estimate for a western European nation. Italian Defense Minister Fabio Fabbri said in a magazine interview, "In connection with the great upheavals which have changed the face of Eastern Europe there has been a strong increase in the clandestine traffic of arms and explosives throughout the world and also in Italy ... Italy's geopolitical location has made our country a privileged crossroads of traffic to the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Europe.... It [the Mafia] has often acted as the middleman in this traffic, and it has also stocked up arms in the Balkan area..."(23)

Focus on Russia
 
The flag of Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

While other nations might be chosen for close scrutiny, it could be argued that the greatest of threats to the United States as well as to world stability are arising from nations currently in flux. Chief among such nations is Russia, and, while other states will be mentioned, Russia will be the focus of this review since it is a nuclear power and is experiencing such profound political, economic and even cultural changes.

Russia's new democratic institutions are fragile, its market reforms have brought hardships that have disillusioned many Russians, and newfound freedoms are not secure. With reformers divided among themselves, last December's parliamentary elections put Communists and extreme nationalists in charge of the Duma. Many foreign observers are concerned by the outcome of events in Chechnya, particularly if bloody counterinsurgency movements now spread to other parts of the Caucasus.(24) Indeed, the problems in Russia are as monumental as the changes have been drastic.

Russia: Weapons Proliferation and Security

In 1995 Russia agreed to supply nuclear reactors to Iran, and Iran is now developing its nuclear infrastructure and the means to hide nuclear weapons development.(25) Cooperation with Russia and China--even carried out legally under international safeguards--could substantially aid Iran's nuclear weapons efforts. Iran may still be years away from producing a nuclear weapon, but foreign assistance of the type being offered by Russia and China could shorten the time frame.(26) Russia is clearly attempting to develop closer relations with China and may be expanding its sale of weapons there and in other countries to earn much needed hard currency. Moscow is also now pressing the United Nations to lift sanctions against Iraq.

Russia still possesses a formidable nuclear arsenal. While security may be suspect, Russia apparently is maintaining high levels of readiness throughout its strategic forces, and it continues modernization programs, including a follow-on missile for the SS-25 ICBM. Former DCI Deutch noted, "Political instability, weak civilian control over the military, economic deterioration, corruption, and a general pervasiveness of crime, raise concerns about the control, security, and accountability of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal."(27)

Terrorists or rogue states will need at least 3kg of plutonium-249 or 30kg of highly enriched uranium-235 to produce a one-kiloton bomb. Those shopping for nuclear material will probably look first to Russia and the former Soviet states. The London Daily Mail quoted a Russian intelligence colonel as saying that three or four IRA members went to Russia early in 1996--before the Irish Republican Army ended its cease-fire--and met with members of the Russian Mafiya who offered to supply them with arms. The IRA team also discovered during the discussions that they could also obtain radioactive material taken from nuclear plants in St. Petersburg and Siberia that were under the control of Russian organized crime.(28)

Asiaweek Magazine(29) recounted some recent attempts to smuggle nuclear materials, which include the following:
 

The Nuclear Black Market
If reports are accurate, Russia has consolidated all its nuclear-tipped strategic missiles, formerly located in several states of the former Soviet Union, onto its own territory. Although the United States and Russia have announced that they no longer target one another's territory, a central concern of the intelligence community is insuring that Russia's strategic forces remain under the control of a responsible government and do not pose the threat of unwarned attack on the U.S.(31)

Russia and Organized Crime

To accomplish their missions, criminals in Russia have organized armies of bandits. A government report estimated that in St. Petersburg alone, there is an army of 10,000 full-time hoodlums, of which 500 are considered hardened criminals....(32)
 
The Kremlin--Seat of government in Russia

The Russian Interior Ministry estimated in its 1993 year-end statement that "about a third of organized crime groups in Russia specialize in large-scale embezzlements, financial and property manipulations and the laundering of illegal profits."(33) The report indicated that organized crime control about 40,000 businesses, including 2,000 in the state sector. It further stated, "The process of the criminalization of the economy has not been stopped."(34)Business-related murders are reported daily. Several murders have occurred in the Tyumen region of Western Siberia as rival groups fight over Russia's oil riches. Since the beginning of April, at least four executives have been murdered or injured. On July 31, 1995, a 32-year-old Moscow representative of the Volgograd Aluminum plant was shot in the head in his apartment building's hallway. An earlier stabbing of [Oleg] Kantor closely followed the murder of Yugorsky Bank's vice-president, Vadim Yafyasov, who was responsible for its business with aluminum companies.(35)

Russian officials now worry that professional criminals are sinking their hooks into the defense industry. In a single raid in early July, Moscow police seized 154 automatic weapons from a group that had embezzled them from a weapons plant in the Urals city of Izhvesk. Criminal groups are also stealing and exporting strategic materials from Russian defense plants. According to Selivanov, criminals may be colluding with defense plant managers to earn money by storing foreign radioactive waste on Russian soil.(36)

As attacks increase, foreign ventures have not been spared. On July 20 in Moscow, a John Bull pub franchised by the British company Allied Domecq was bombed with an antitank-mine. While small businesses such as retailers, restaurateurs, and consumer-goods importers are increasingly vulnerable to extortion, most big multinationals with investments in Russia haven't experienced direct violence yet.(37)

Extortion, one of the traditional practices of organized crime everywhere, is clearly taking its toll on the Russian economy. A report prepared recently for President Yeltsin by the Moscow-based Analytical Center for Social and Economic Policies, said 70 to 80 percent of private enterprises and commercial banks in major cities across Russia are forced to pay a tribute of 10 to 20 percent of their turnover to organized crime. It estimates that such crime--through payoffs, kickbacks, debt collection, money laundering or monopoly pricing--accounts for about a quarter of the inflation rate, which last year averaged 20 percent a month. A five-page summary of the report, published by Izvestiia in January 1994, highlighted the collusion between criminal gangs and local law enforcement. According to the report, "There is no doubt that the heads of Russian organized crime are gathering detailed dossiers on all top-level officials and politicians."(38)
 
A money changer on the black market

Organized crime has become the most important political problem in Russia. It threatens to damage the unstable political, economic and social systems by means of corruption and violence. It has created a situation where there is no guarantee of the Russian citizens' personal safety. The tempo of economic criminalization is far ahead of all other economic indices. Government and academic criminal justice experts believe there are 5,600 stable groups that are involved in a wide range of criminal activities. And, Russian criminal associations are increasingly more active abroad. According to FBI Director Lewis Freeh, at least twenty-four identifiable groups act abroad.(39)
 
FBI Director--Louis Freeh who made his carreer as a judge who presided over Organized Crime cases, is here shown testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee on his Bureau's efforts in that arena.

The Odessa Mafiya is considered the dominant Russian organized crime group in the United States. This group established itself in the Brighton Beach area of New York City between 1975 and 1981. In the early 80's the Odessa Mafiya sent two sub-groups to San Francisco and Los Angeles with their leadership remaining in Brighton Beach.(40) It now operates in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Miami, Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago. In 1989, only 8,000 visas were granted to travelers from the former Soviet Union, but by 1993 the number had climbed to 140,000. Russia's criminal records system is too chaotic to check all of the visa applicants and many members of Russian organized crime travel freely to and from the United States.(41) FBI Deputy Assistant Director of Criminal Investigations, Jim Moody, said the FBI has 215 active investigations underway involving Russian organized crime activities, compared with 68 at the beginning of the decade. (42)

Russian criminal activities in the U.S. include a variety of schemes involving fuel fraud, including falsifying state and federal tax forms, use of fictitious companies known as "burn" companies, extending fuel by blending tax free additives such as alcohol, rigging fuel pumps, manipulating dyed fuels designed for off-road purposes, and selling lower grade fuel as a premium product.(43)

Telecommunication fraud by such groups involves stealing electronic serial numbers of customers' cellular phones and programming them into computer chips in order to "clone" the telephones. One cellular station in the Hollywood area is losing approximately $2 million a month in fraudulent calls made on cloned cellular telephones.(44)

Authorities reported that Russians believed to be a part of a Soviet crime syndicate orchestrated a massive fraud scheme to use mobile medical laboratories to conduct unnecessary and false tests on patients. These labs then sent inflated and false bills to insurance companies and collected large fees. These scams spread from California to Missouri, Illinois, and Florida, and may have gained the syndicate between $50 and $80 million in profits.(45)
 
A man stands by a hammer and sickle symbol during a May Day protest march.

Loan sharking may be growing. A recent report revealed that two Russian organized crime figures in Los Angeles lent money to another Russian émigré at 30 percent interest. The émigré borrowed $125,000 and over eight years paid back $480,000, but still owed $120,000.(46)

Of the approximately 1.5 million U.S. vehicles stolen each year, several hundred thousand are illegally exported out of the country to Central America and Eastern Europe.(47) A northern California auto theft group specializes in auto theft and operates in Sacramento, other parts of Northern California, Oregon and Washington. This group is primarily made up of blue-collar type workers from the Ukraine and Western Russia.(48) Younger members of this group steal vehicles while the older members operate body chop shops. Vehicles are also stolen, surgically stripped, and the hulls dumped where they are easily found by law enforcement personnel. These vehicles end up at salvage yards where members of this auto theft group buy the surgically stripped hull and ultimately put the vehicle back together at the chop shops. Vehicles are also bought at the salvage pools for their VIN numbers. The VIN numbers are switched to stolen vehicles. The vehicles are then taken out of state and re-registered in an attempt to conceal or clear the salvaged title. Many of the stolen vehicles are suspected shipped out of the country through Seattle, Oakland, and other port cities.(49) Some smugglers go to great lengths to perfect their operations. A Ukrainian organized crime group operating in Los Angeles manufactured its own VINs. Rather than making up random numbers that would almost certainly tip off police, the group cracked the mathematical code used when assigning new VINs. They were able to make the stolen car appear as if it had just rolled off an assembly line. The group shipped more than 200 luxury cars from Los Angeles to St. Petersburg, Russia, says Jaime Samaniego, the Los Angeles police detective who cracked the ring. He believes members of the group were intelligence officers in the former Soviet Union.(50)

Murder for hire is not confined to Russia. Los Angeles sheriff’s deputies arrested two Russian émigrés at a murder scene where two other Russians had been shot to death. One was covered in blood and carrying a handgun. Sheriff’s deputies found the two suspects in the act of cutting off the victim's fingers to hinder identification, a common practice of Russian hitmen.(51)
 
Russian crime interaction with other organized crime is becoming evident. Assistant FBI Director Moody said these groups are working with the Italian Mafia and with organized drug cartels from Asia and Columbia on heroin and cocaine trafficking and money laundering. (52) A Russian criminal whose identity was kept secret said that drugs are also moving in the other direction--cocaine is going to Russia from the United States.(53) Colombian cocaine distributors are believed to have formed an alliance with organized crime groups in Russia to import large quantities of cocaine into that country. These ties became evident after a 1.1 metric ton shipment of cocaine was seized in St. Petersburg, Russia, in February 1993.(54) The Cali cartel works with organized crime in Russia, and uses their networks to get the cocaine into Europe.(55) The Chinese Triads smuggle weapons out of China and Vietnam, and aliens and heroin into New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco. In Russia they work with criminal groups to swap heroin for abandoned Soviet weapons.(56) Illicit worldwide opium production exceeded 4,000 metric tons in 1995, enough to produce nearly 400 metric tons of heroin. Burma is the source of most of the heroin in the United States, but opium production in Afghanistan has skyrocketed since 1990. The states of the former Soviet Union are becoming a major conduit for heroin.(57)

Russian organized crime groups are wire transferring huge amounts of money, ranging from several thousand to millions of dollars from accounts located in Finland, Cayman Islands, and Europe to U.S. banks. The source of this money is not only from narcotics activity, illegal trade in arms and antiquities, and prostitution, but also is stolen from the Russian government. According to a Russian newspaper, upwards of 1.5 trillion rubles (worth in excess of $1 billion) were stolen from the state with forged documents in 1992 to 1993.(58)

Organized crime organizations instantly transfer huge sums around the world with "wire" (actually satellite) transfers, using offshore banks. Through these banks crime syndicates manipulate accounts drawn in the names of "shell" corporations, which were probably bought off-the-shelf from Panamanian lawyers. By now the economies of a number of tiny sovereign nations are dependent on laundering transactions. These countries will not threaten their livelihoods by changing their bank secrecy laws.(59)
 
If you want ot catch an "organized" criminal, follow the money trail

President Clinton recently instructed the Secretaries of State and the Treasury and the Attorney General to identify nations that are "the most egregious overseas sanctuaries for illegally obtained wealth." The U.S. will enter into negotiations with these nations in an attempt to help bring them into conformity with international standards. The President may consider sanctions against these nations should negotiations prove to be unsuccessful.(60)
 
While not a universal model, the diagram at right shows a typical organizational chart for Russian Mafiya groups working in the US.  (Source:  The Attorney General's Office of California defunct site)

Knowledgeable sources within the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) have provided one model of the traditional structure in Russian organized crime groups (see diagram above). The principle behind this structure is to minimize contact with other cells that could lead to the identification of the entire organization. Each boss, called a "pakhan," controls four criminal cells through an intermediary called a "brigadier." The boss employs two spies that watch over the action of the brigadier to ensure loyalty and that he does not get too powerful. At the bottom of the structure are criminal cells specializing in various types of criminal activity such as drugs, prostitution, political contacts, and "enforcement." A similar structure places an elite leadership on top that is buffered by support and security personnel from the street operators who are physically committing the crimes. Street operators do not know the identity of the leadership. Strategy sessions occur only among those at the top in order to ensure secrecy and to protect against detection.(61)
 
FinCEN is a bureau of the US Treasury Department and is THE expert in money laundering and following ill goten gains

There is also a traditional code of conduct within this old style of organized crime in Russia called "Vory v Zakone," or "thieves in law." This group existed throughout the Soviet era and continues today throughout the republics of the former Soviet Union. In this society the thieves in law live and obey the "Vorovskoy Zakon," the thieves' code. The members are bound by 18 codes, which, if broken, are punishable by death.(62)

A thief is bound by the code to:

According to Paul Goble, a reporter for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty(64) organized crime in Russia has at least three faces. The first includes Mafia structures familiar to all Western countries: underground criminal groups that supply the population with goods and services such as drugs, prostitution, and loan sharking that the government has prohibited. The second face of organized crime is very different but also has an analog in Western countries. It consists of criminal groups who extort legitimate businesses because the latter cannot obtain protection from the still very weak police and the courts. In fact, former CIA director John Deutch said that four out of every five private businesses in Russia were now paying protection money. He added that such extortion was robing the Russian economy of as much as $50 billion U.S. dollars every year, an amount greater than all Western aid and investment combined.(65) No doubt, both of these faces have frightened away many potential foreign investors and have accelerated capital flight from Russia. The third face of organized crime in Russia is perhaps the most frightening of all. It consists of people and groups who acquired ownership of state assets during the massive and virtually uncontrolled privatization of the Russian economy. Because so many of the people who became owners in this way had earlier been those Communist party officials who controlled these same enterprises, some have described this process as the "privatization of organized crime."(66) Now, these new "beeesneesmeen", ("businessmen") will commit almost any act to pocket quick profits for themselves and to prevent anyone from challenging their control.(67)

Organized crime is giving capitalism in Russia a bad name by providing ammunition to those former Communists or new ultra-nationalists who have not accepted the transformation of their countries as legitimate. No issue is more indicative of this problem than privatization.

Russian Privatization and Crime

One of the first measures taken by the communist parties after they seized power in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was to 'nationalize' the bulk of privately-owned properties, including industrial companies and agricultural land. The property rights of the nationalized assets were delegated to the state. However, 'the state' turned out to be an obscure notion in a Soviet-type system. Although constitutions of the socialist countries formally existed--the Stalin version of the Soviet constitution was adopted in 1936, and the constitutions of the other East European countries between 1948 and 1950--those constitutions all contained at least one clause which rendered those "rights" granted to individuals therein uncertain and allowed for an unrestrained extension of the rights of the Communist Party.(68) The absence of an independent judiciary with access to enforcement powers rendered the constitutions impotent.

Vladimir Nikiforov wrote, "For generations the law in the USSR never protected an individual from the injustice of the ruling elite. On the contrary, the law was used as a weapon by the rulers, who changed and applied it according to their interests of the moment, and it was those interests that set the border between what was legal and what was not."(69) These ideological laws effectively protected the criminal activity of the elite while suppressing any opposition to the state. Within this framework, it was very easy for elite classes to amass huge amounts of wealth and power. Many stories can be told of part members and their Swiss bank accounts, lavish parties, and hunting expeditions.(70)

During the stagnant decade of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's, the criminal sector was a growth industry in Russia. The official response to those concerned with a Soviet Mafiya was simply denial. In his book titled the Soviet Mafia, Arkady Vaksberg studies the leadership of the various republics of the USSR. To protect their positions of power, Vaksberg concludes, they had to maintain close ties to criminal organizations, arguing that it is "quite impossible to distinguish within them a 'pure' politician from a 'pure' criminal."(71) Although the economy of the USSR continued to suffer in comparison to the West, the Mafiya and the politicians continued to amass of wealth and power. Brezhnev and his family associated with known criminal leaders, and, although some of Brezhnev's family were later prosecuted, they received light sentences when compared to political prisoners who spoke against or otherwise challenged the state.(72)
 
The flag of the former Soviet Union--Just as J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI denied the existance of the Mafia in the US for decades, the Soviets denied the existance of their Mafiya with its roots in their history and economics.

Gorbachev's attempts to address the USSR's declining economy, so painfully evident when compared to the West, involved the institution of perestroika and glasnost. His reforms first revolved around more open political debate, but quickly turned to issues such as accountability for industrial productivity and privatization of sectors of the economy. The political reforms allowed the people more freedom of expression and dangled before them freer and more meaningful elections more in accordance with Western democratic ideals. However, when it became evident to some party bureaucrats that traditional paths to job security and power were eroding and they began losing their party or governmental positions, they quickly turned to various schemes to make money in the informal economy. At the same time, the new politicians were easily enticed into benefiting from the "perks" of their government positions by becoming involved in what has been described as the "cadre system."(73) The cadre system is an informal network of contacts developed between and among Communist Party members and other members of the governmental, industrial or military elite. This cadre system continues to serve as a useful network for leveraging influence and contacts into money.
 
The jury is still out as to how much Gorbachev's intended reforms had the unintended consequence of "aiding and abetting" the growth of the modern Russian Mob.

One of the centerpieces of Gorbachev's reforms was the Law on State Enterprise adopted in January of 1988. The intent of the law was to improve economic performance by introducing profit and loss accounting. It was hoped that the law would help increase productivity by making each factory more responsible, with wages to eventually be based on production and profit. In effect, however, the law merely reinforced what had been happening for years on an informal level. Historically, the managers of factories received their salary regardless of the productivity of the factory. The factory managers then supplemented their wages by trading their products for other products or money on the black market. Despite new accounting techniques these managers were still able to make more money on the black market than through the legal system, and the new law proved ineffective.

Earlier Gorbachev's reforms had also encouraged a wide variety of smaller, private enterprises. Pursuant to 1986 legislation, people were free to practice formerly illegal economic practices such as: car repairs, translation, photography, etc. This freedom brought more of the common people into the informal economy as more and more people began trading services with each other to avoid state control and taxation. As the state lost control over formerly controllable activities, more people became more emboldened, including those who might have formerly advanced in society only through party or governmental ranks. The state began to be less feared and even began to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of more and more people.(74)

The Law on Cooperatives, adopted in 1988, was perhaps the most essential component of Gorbachev's reforms. This law allowed for the formation of cooperatives, which could set their own prices, conduct foreign trade, and keep a significant amount of their earned hard currency.(75) The Mafiya began to infiltrate these cooperatives and began to collect hard currency "legally," thus gaining a sense of legitimacy. This success of these Mafiya tactics, although surely unforeseen at the time, "allowed for the criminal syndicates to continue to abuse the system and even gain legitimacy within the ideological apparatus."(76)

The world will never know if Gorbachev's plans for more gradual reforms could have ever overcome the structural and cultural forces that reacted against them. The election of Boris Yeltsin to the presidency of Russia in June of 1991 doomed any plans for gradual economic revitalization. Yeltsin and his advisors opted for a "shock therapy" aimed at destroying the failed economic models of state-controlled enterprises and allowing a new, more efficient market economy to arise from the ashes. In order to cause the privatization of formerly state controlled industry; state-owned industries were required to turn themselves into joint-stock companies within a year. The only economic input the state would provide to these new companies would be credits-- an important development given the potential for corruption inherent in the former Soviet economy.(77)

Western observers cannot fully appreciate the difficulties confronting such massive and unprecedented privatization efforts. When the first programs of privatization were launched in several East European countries in the late 1980's, economists had to face an immediate and enormous pitfall-- nobody was able to tell what the true value of the state-owned fixed assets was. Even the methods of how the valuation of assets could be established were unknown. For four-- in the former USSR for seven--decades, central statistical offices published only book values of the national assets. The absence of a capital market to establish values between buyers and sellers, and because of more or less arbitrary pricing, and in a system where data and statistics were slanted to serve the vested interests of the central leadership and enterprise managers, book values could give no real guidance to establishing realistic market prices of assets.(78)

In an 'ideal' capitalist society where economic actors perform as more or less "equal partners" within the market system, or in a society where the hierarchy of different social groups is transparent and clearly defined, ownership is a legal concept. Thus, the definition of ownership specifies one's rights and obligations in connection with a certain object and in relation to others. Property rights are considered a matter of the civil code rather than that of sociology or political economy.(79) In a command economy, on the other hand, the distribution of power and the relative bargaining position of different groups within the power structure, rather than a transparent legal framework, was the decisive factor in determining "property rights." Consequently, a 'political economy approach' to understanding property rights in the USSR is more useful than a formal legal-institutional approach. Allocation of such property rights has always been uncertain in the former USSR. Formal regulations and application of the "law" almost always ended up as discretionary rules that were applied to individual cases.(80) After seven decades, these concepts become ingrained into the culture, and will certainly not die easily, despite shock therapy.

By the 1980's the informal economy had become a part of the culture of Russia as it facilitated the growth and power of both the illegal and legal forms of commerce. This "gray" economy was well documented by researchers but was very difficult to quantify. The cadre system previously referenced was mirrored in the informal sector as well. " From shop manager to factory manager, from militia man to party member, a vast network of services and supplies grew out of a state-controlled economy that was unable to respond effectively to supply and demand."(81)

This backdrop, coupled with a state of general uncertainty about both the economic and political future, created an environment that played into the hands of the criminal elements in Russia. With the rapid privatization associated with economic shock therapy, and with the criminal sector having easier access to capital than potentially legitimate competitors, the criminal elements in association with many of the former ruling elite, were able to gain control of many of these enterprises. They used their contacts within the cadre system of former party members and power elites. They were even able to obtain the one input that the government was offering--credit--to purchase these assets. "The privatization plan merely reinforced the ruling elites ability to control the economy and forced them to work with the 'informal'/illegal communities for contacts and money."(82)

Lest Western observers be unduly critical in hindsight with respect to the Russian approach to privatization, it should be remembered that prominent Western political economists such as Friedman, Grosfeld, Åslund and Lipton and Sachs were advocating privatization as the best way to create the solid foundations of a viable democracy.(83) Without a sound market economy and extensive private ownership, the danger of a backlash in the democratization process is always present. These and other authors warned that without swift and comprehensive privatization initiated by the state, a peculiar form of 'wild' or 'spontaneous' privatization, namely expropriation of the national assets by members of the communist nomenklatura might occur, if in fact it was not already happening. Some considered this danger to be the most important reason for, and a driving force behind, privatization in all of Eastern Europe.(84) There is great concern that in fact these fears have now been realized in the privatization road taken by Russia. There is certainly evidence to support the assumption that managers of the state-owned enterprises, the KGB and the Mafiya worked closely together, and the bulk of the state-owned property might have ended up in the hands of these groups.(85)

Interestingly enough, Yevgenia Albats points out in his 1994 work --The State Within a State: The KGB and its hold on Russia- Past, Present and Future-- that the KGB has been able to maintain its power throughout the crises affecting the Soviet Union and now Russia. Albats refers to the KGB as a "state within a state."(86) The KGB was the principal instrument of political oppression in the USSR. "It masqueraded the rhetoric of the laws and actively pursued only those who posed a threat to the power structure. Its ties to the criminal apparatus are very well documented. The mere fact that such a comprehensive apparatus of coercion and power was able to detect the slightest political unrest, yet not even attempt to undermine the workings of an informal, ideologically unclean sector of society draws it under suspicion."(87) With current or former KGB agents as a part of the cadre system, and the informal Soviet economy, and given the explosion of criminal activity in Russia, there is a strong likelihood that at least certain of their numbers are now directly involved in criminal enterprises. This could present a daunting task indeed to those desiring to successfully graft both political liberalization and a market economy onto Russian culture.

As with privatization, currency reform also provided opportunity for organized crime in Russia. Yegor Gaidar, educated at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University and principal economic advisor to Yeltsin, advanced plans for the stabilization of the ruble. A single exchange rate should be maintained to allow for the convertibility of the ruble at designated banks. Since the ruble would be freely convertible on international markets, foreign investors would be incentivized to make investments in the Russian economy.

This currency reform caused an explosion of money speculation and black market trading which ultimately undermined the ruble. When government controls disappeared, the ruble began to fluctuate dramatically, even within different regions of Russia. In this environment, the illegal sector of the economy began to gain greater and greater control of the country's currency and monetary policy.(88) ".... Billions of dollars worth of rubles were shipped and bought throughout the criminal organizations in Europe and Asia. This mass exchange of rubles for hard currency effectively undermined the stability of the ruble was well as making the economy more unstable. This allowed for the Mafiya to gain a tighter control on the economy since it had control of the fiscal resources of the state."(89)

Since the introduction of political and economic liberalization, the everyday life of the lower classes of Russian society has continued to deteriorate. Babushkas and other pensioners can be seen throughout Russia selling cigarettes, dried fish, toys, handmade goods, or even their own modest possessions to buy enough to eat. Although a few have become very rich, and a small middle class may be developing, particularly around Moscow, unemployment, inflation, and monetary fluctuation continue to demoralize most, particularly those outside of the urban areas. Not only is economic crime becoming more and more evident and accepted by the average Russian, but also violent crime continues to increase. "We are told again and again that a rampage of crime is inevitable during a period of the initial accumulation of capital,"(90) writes Nikolai Chapylgin. With most murderers avoiding prosecution, it is apparent to average Russians that "the authorities have no stake in solving the murders.... The conclusion is clear: the authorities have given up to the Mafia once and for all. The rulers have neither the strength nor the will to protect their people, their constituents from gangster tyranny."(91)

Many analysts in the West give Russian reformers high marks for their privatization efforts, measuring the success by the width and breadth of privatization in various sectors of the economy. Such measurements of success are at best premature and may well prove to be wrong. In fact, what has taken place in Russia so far is actually " false privatization, a phenomenon which as yet gives little basis for concluding that the normal laws of the market economy are operating in Russia."(92) Russian privatization has not pleased very many people in Russia. Neither the workers, nor the state bureaucracy as a whole, nor most managers or directors think that everything is as it should be. While this dissatisfaction could have been a catalyst for further reform, it has instead led the state to creep back in. Just as those involved in organized crime, the state bureaucracy also has an appetite for profits from the new private firms. State intervention, even if less direct than in the past, will nevertheless guarantee a misallocation of resources and send false signals to the economy. State money will be channeled to firms that, directly or indirectly, support the state apparatus. As reported in Prism, "Russia has now achieved Lenin's 'dream' of state capitalism, where the owners profit but he state decides which ones and how much."(93)

What may be even more disturbing is that state intervention now involves the added ingredient of rampant criminalization. "Russia's form of privatization has been accompanied by, indeed given birth to, the corruption of the state apparatus, the rise of organized crime, and the intermingling of the state bureaucracy and the criminal world. To be sure, the birth of capitalism has never been a pretty sight, but we must evaluate Russia according to the standards of the end of the twentieth century."(94) It may be becoming evident that Russia has experienced nothing short of another unique revolution in the waning days of the same century that witnessed its first revolution.

The steady growth of the informal economy during the 1970's and 1980's laid the groundwork for the "Velikaya Kriminalnaya Revoliustiya" (The Great Criminal Revolution)(95) currently underway in Russia. According to Patricia Kranz, an American columnist in Moscow, "In the early years of reform, managers and bureaucrats illegally used Communist Party money or state assets to set up banks or launch businesses. Now it's difficult to distinguish these Soviet survivors from the true entrepreneurs who pulled themselves up by their own bootstraps. Nearly everyone broke the law in some way."(96) Boswell indicates that, " Most of those with the greatest power were former party officials or government elites, while the common people were for the most part eliminated from the struggle."(97)

On July 12, [1995] ... the Russian Duma passed a measure that would make organized criminal activity illegal for the first time in Russian history. The bill targets crimes not covered by existing Russian law at the time, such as money laundering, financial scams, and racketeering.(98) However, despite the new legislation, the continued growth of recognized crime and corruption and increasing perceptions of injustice and unfairness, represent a significant challenge to the credibility of law and the sustainability of reforming Russia.(99) Some have observed that in 1991, every example of corruption made headline news while very few even comments on it now. "Immediate and effective responses to crimes are needed but nowhere to be found. Instead, Yeltsin appoints a crony rather than a specialist to head the FSB and names a similar man as Minister of the Interior. The inaction and involvement of the law enforcement agencies have created a situation where criminals can kill with the knowledge that they'll never be caught."(100)

As expected, the rapid economic changes in Russia require the development of an extensive new body of law, however, Russia has neither an established body of precedent nor administrators who are experienced in interpreting and applying these laws. And, since the credibility of law is to a great degree dependent on, " intangible factors such as, an individual's beliefs about fairness, good faith conduct, and right action,"(101) and, in the absence of these factors and with the judicial system in shambles, many business people choose to use Mafiya groups to enforce their claims. " Guns, bombs and grenades take the place of arbitration courts. And in a country where taxes can approach 100% of revenue--let alone profits--businesses find it almost necessary to evade taxes, making them easy targets for blackmail by the Mafiya."(102)

Now very bold, Russian criminal elements have begun to infiltrate larger enterprises. In some cases they extend loans on favorable terms to enterprises, and then later demanding control. In other cases, they try to gain influence indirectly by taking control of the company's bank. In other cases, they simply threaten top executives. Says Vladislav V. Selivanov, first deputy chief of the Moscow City Police Department's organized-crime division: "Mafia groups are trying to gain inroads into financial services and raw materials like oil and gas, diamonds, gold, metals and lumber."(103) Interior Ministry officials estimate that over 40,000 enterprises are connected in some way to organized criminals. As many as 10 of Russia's 25 big banks also may have Mafia connections.(104) When Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin admitted that 60% to 70% of the Russian economy is Mafiya, it should be painfully evident that a dangerous, perhaps unprecedented phenomenon is occurring in Russia. One American, Paul Tatum, found out just how dangerous.

Paul Tatum and the Radisson Slavyanskaya Hotel

Tatum was enthralled with the Russian culture: the churches, the museums, and the ballet. He was also enamored with Russian women. He met one on that first trip and stayed an extra few weeks.

The Edmond, Oklahoma native had been overseas before. As a 21-year-old Oklahoma State University student, he spent a semester in foreign study. Displaying en early flair for capitalism, he bought cigarettes from his tour boat captain and sold them at a 300 percent markup on the streets of Tunis. While still in his 20's, Tatum became one of the most successful fundraisers in the nation for the Republican Party. By the time he was 30, Tatum had already made big money in oil and real estate and lost a million dollars when Oklahoma City's Penn Square Bank collapsed in 1983.

Now, in Moscow, he was known by some as a "cowboy," relishing the rough and tumble environment of this new frontier.

Tatum saw that even the best of the Moscow hotels were poorly lit, shabbily carpeted monoliths with plenty of bars but no place to find a good meal or a dependable telephone. His idea was to create an environment where foreign businessmen and women could feel at home. Many American businessmen and women were avoiding Moscow or coming up dry after trying, but Tatum was tenacious. Working from a small Moscow apartment with a scratchy phone line, and backed by a few influential friends, including former Nixon chief of staff H.R. Haldeman, he cobbled together a $50 million deal for a joint venture with the giant Soviet tourism agency, Intourist, and the Minneapolis-based hotel chain Radisson Corp. Together they would turn a half-finished Intourist hotel a mile west of the Kremlin into a Western-style luxury hotel and office center.
 
Radisson Hotels--Paul Tatum's partners in a joint venture in Moscow

Tatum became very involved in Russian civic and political affairs. He was a founding member of Moscow's American Chamber of Commerce. He raised money for the Bolshoi Theater, donated to Russian Orthodox Church Schools, and helped sponsor the Kremlin Cup tennis tournament. In 1991, during the abortive hard-line coup attempt, he observed the tanks surrounding the Russian White House, he made his way through the troops, tanks, and crowds of pro-democracy citizens protecting the building to offer his cellular telephone to Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Since the telephone lines to the Russian White House had been severed, and since Americom owned and operated state of the art telecommunications systems from the hotel across the river, Tatum's cell phone allowed Yeltsin to stay in constant communications with supporters, news outlets and other key people during the crisis.
 
Borris Yeltsin--Russia's beleagured president.  One must wonder how much the members of his cabinet are involved in his country's crime problem, how much he knows about it, and how much he could do about it.

The hotel, built in 1989, was originally to be a Soviet venture but construction delays and cost overruns (with the favorable climate of glasnost) led the Soviets to seek foreign investment. What eventually evolved was a joint venture of a joint venture. Two American corporations, Radisson and Americom formed a venture called Radamer that ventured with Intourist to operate and manage the Slavyanskaya. Intourist controlled 50%, Radisson controlled 10% and Americom held 40%. Americom's involvement focused on the high technology communications, primarily for the use of businesses and businessmen and women who would patronize the hotel. This technology represented a huge investment on Americom's part.
 
The Radisson Slavyanskaya Hotel's Grand Staircase

The hotel became a proven moneymaker. The four-star, 430-room Radisson-Slavyanskaya became a center for Moscow's foreign community, offering business services, a press club, restaurants, a bank, swanky shops, and an English-language movie house. With the collapse of the Soviet system, Intourist's demise began. The pivotal question with regards to the joint venture then became who owned the Russian 50% share of the hotel.

By some unannounced fiat during Russia's move to privatization, the State Joint-Stock Company MOSKVA assumed control of the Russian share of the joint venture. The founders of MOSKVA took over management of transition from the state management in the hotel-tourist complex in Moscow to other forms of ownership. It oversaw the establishment of hotel chains, the integration of Moscow with international reservation networks, and the development of new tourist products to promote Moscow.
 
MOSKVA--The City of Moscow's joint venture management corporation

Tatum and Moskva eventually began to have disputes. The conflict came to a head in 1994, when Tatum tried to oust the joint venture's director. The Russian general manager had him locked out of the hotel, and guards posted at the hotel entrance barred Tatum for two weeks. By this time there were also threats against Tatum. He hired bodyguards, donned a bulletproof vest when he went out, and was noticeably being followed wherever he went. Tatum and his Russian partners were in a tense standoff, with Radisson unwilling to confront the Russians.
 
Slavyanskaya is located in a crook of the Dnieper River (labeled here the Mocsow River) located within convenient distance of the Kremlin, the Duma and rail and air stations.

Armed with a portable drill, accompanied by a group of bodyguards, and wearing a bulletproof vest, Tatum forced open a back door to the hotel and went to his own suite in the hotel where he remained, ordering out for food to maintain a presence in the hotel. Eventually the parties settled into an uneasy truce.

MOSKVA then appointed Umar Dzhbrailov, a Chechen "businessman" who leased space in the Hotel for a clothing shop, as the new General Director. Until that time the hotel has been consistently showing a profit, but shortly after Umar took the reins, the profits began to disappear. One of the duties of the General Director was to approve management expenditures for operating the hotel. As the profits disappeared, fees and expenses paid to outside parties skyrocketed. Umar began to develop a very opulent lifestyle.
 
Tatum was a founder of Moscow's American Chamber of Commerce and a patron of the arts.  He was drawn to Russia becuse of the economic climate, but the same freedom that allowed his success also contributed to the success of the organization that took his life.

Tatum then discovered that the fees and expenses were paid to questionable parties for bogus expenditures, and he began to suspect that MOSKVA and Umar were linked to the Russian Mafiya. Unable to get Radisson as concerned as he was over the matter, Tatum filed an arbitration action in Stockholm. He went public, told any news outlet who would listen about his story, and even began to sell "Freedom Bonds" to raise the money for the arbitration, promising a 100% return upon successful conclusion of the action. Behind the scenes, Tatum attempted to get the Russian federal government to take control of the Russian share of the joint Venture. According to sources, the federal government sent notice to Radisson of a Joint Venture meeting. If these sources are correct, Radisson then sent a copy of the notice to Umar, who reportedly went berserk on hearing the news.

Four days later on November 3, 1996, Tatum cut short a phone call to go meet an unknown party. Tatum and his two bodyguards started down the wide steps to the subway entrance near the hotel. Behind Tatum's group emerged a man carrying a large plastic bag. Concealed inside was a Kalashnikov assault rifle, and, although it was dusk, with shoppers lined up at kiosk windows and train travelers hauling baggage down the walk, the hitman shot Tatum eleven times in the back, hurling him to the bottom of the stairs. At the time Paul Tatum was being cut down, the normally reclusive, teetotaling, Umar made an appearance in the hotel's bar. On November 22, the State Department revoked Umar's visa cutting off his frequent trips to the U.S.
 
The outside facade of the Raddison-Slavyanskaya Hotel in Moscow

While this incident alone cannot be considered a threat to the national security of the United States, it may help Americans focus on the threat which may emanate from an emboldened organized crime network in Russia which now knows that it can strike at a high-profile, well connected American businessman with impunity. Perhaps this example will help more policy makers come to grips with the more ominous aspects of rampant criminalization in a former super-power.

The Intelligence Community

The Current Structure

For reasons of economy and security, national intelligence agencies were dispersed during the Cold War. While it is valuable to have competitive analysis from different agencies, and while bureaucratic momentum for separate agencies no doubt influenced the continued separation, perhaps one of the primary reasons for the diffusion of the intelligence mission among some 13 plus federal agencies under a variety of heads, leadership structures and oversight committees, may be the inherent schizophrenic tension between liberty and security and an inherent distrust of the military and police. Americans value both liberty and security and desire as much of both as possible. This was the basis of the one issue that the Federalists and the Anti-federalists, could agree upon (though not in the particulars) during the Constitutional debates; that the police power rightly resided with the states, and that the military must be subject to civil control. Since then, Americans have rejected or grown beyond the advice of George Washington not to become entangled in foreign affairs, and we developed a taste for, among other things, what some critics have described as economic imperialism, all the while disclaiming any desire to establish any type of hegemony, or, since Vietnam, to be the "policeman of the world." In any event, whether by choice, fate or the consequence of technological change, American interests and concerns are global. At the same time, whether as a result of reforms or caution, we have declared that only certain agencies can operate inside our own borders and others must not. Only some agencies can perform counter-intelligence operations. Only some agencies can gather information and then only under certain circumstances.

While the resources devoted to intelligence are shrinking, the objects of interest to the intelligence community and the demands for intelligence by decision-makers are becoming more far ranging and diverse. As referenced above, since the end of the Cold War the overriding threat of the Soviet Union has been replaced by an increasing array of smaller threats, each requiring attention from the intelligence community. And, while it could be argued that military expenditures could be cut, a strong case could be made that intelligence expenditures should increase. Given the high probability that a substantial increase in funding will not happen, the intelligence community should be reorganized and made more efficient so that it can address the new threats in a meaningful way with the dollars available to it.

CIA
 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), established by the National Security Act of 1947, is led by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who manages CIA in addition to serving as head of the Intelligence Community. The CIA is an independent agency, responsible to the President through the DCI, and accountable to the American people through the intelligence oversight committees of the U.S. Congress.(105)

The CIA's mission is to support the President, the National Security Council, and all officials who make and execute U.S. national security policy by: providing accurate, comprehensive and timely foreign intelligence on national security topics; conducting counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security, as directed by the President.(106)

CIA's organization has changed many times. Congress introduced sweeping changes at the end of 1996. Large parts of the Directorate of Science and Technology have been moved to NIMA, Congress has made other changes. The 1997 appropriations act added a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, responsible for overseeing collection and analysis across the community as well as directing management of personnel and resources. Also added was an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection and an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis of Production and Analysis.(107)

During hearings investigating the Ames case, then-DCI, R. James Woolsey seemed vague when questioned about key aspects of the case. The director who runs the CIA and ostensibly is responsible for the rest of the community, in truth lacks the staff, the time or the budget to effectively manage America's vast intelligence underworld.(108) "We found that there is no director of central intelligence--the term is a misnomer--and without someone in charge, who could we hold responsible?" said retired Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz.(109) Though the DCI controls the CIA, he has only nominal authority over many of the dozen other agencies that make up the intelligence community, the largest of which reside within the Defense Department.(110)

The very reason that the military has a specific section of the intelligence community is because of the specialized needs of the military. Common complaints of information gathered by civilian agencies are its lack of military utility. CIA dominance has led to criticism from other intelligence agencies--particularly military intelligence, which wants more sensitivity to its tactical battlefield needs instead of focusing on supplying information for U.S. diplomats at international conferences.(111)

Law enforcement has a whole set of unique restraints and purposes in gathering and use of intelligence and counter intelligence. As such, specifically trained personnel are essential. In particular, the FBI enjoys a special status in the intelligence community's hierarchy. The DCI does not regularly deal with the Attorney General in dealings with the FBI, but with the FBI's Assistant Director (National Security), two rungs down from Cabinet level.

"The DCI does need more authority, but the notion that you can give him budget authority over organizations for which the Secretary of Defense has legislative authority and responsibility is wholly naive," said Robert M. Gates, former DCI. (112) To at least partially address that reality the Clinton signed into law the 1997 Intelligence Appropriations Act, provisions of which were designed to shore up the DCI's stature, including the director's "concurrence" in the appointments of the heads of the defense intelligence organizations.(113) Under the Act, the DCI has three new assistant directors for tighter day-to-day controls on collecting intelligence, analysis and management. Former DCI Deutch, who had already created the position of an associate director for military operations, filled by a flag-rank military officer, proposed establishment of another associate director to be his contact with the State Department.(114) Among other things, Sec. 807 of the Act grants the DCI new powers to recommend budgeting for the intelligence community and participating in developing the Defense budget, with particular input into the intelligence expenditures, as well as more clout in establishing collection priorities. The bill provides requirements for the resolution of conflicts over collection issues within the intelligence community, and provides for the DCI's concurrence or consultation for certain intelligence-related positions in Defense, Treasury, Energy and State Department agencies as well as the FBI's Assistant Director for National Security.(115)

Justice Department
 
-The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has traditionally been the only agency tasked to domestic counter-intelligence and is the principal investigatory agency of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The FBI conducts background checks on political appointees and may be authorized by the President to collect information on subversive groups. The FBI has stated five areas of priority: counterterrorism, drugs and organized crime, foreign counterintelligence, violent crime and white-collar crime.(116)

Treasury Department
 
-The Office of Intelligence Support (OIS) succeeded the Office of National Security (ONS) in 1977. The original function under the ONS was to connect the Treasury to the National Security Council. The OIS is headed by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (National Security) who reports directly to the Secretary of the Treasury. OIS's priorities are to monitor international economic policies and to oversee the intelligence needs to the Treasury Bureaus. Traditionally this has been a top down function with the OIS providing developed intelligence to the Bureaus (the second largest law enforcement department in the federal government), but that is being reassessed and the law enforcement bureaus may take on greater counter-intelligence functions.(117)

Energy Department
 
-In 1947 it was recognized that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) should have a role in foreign intelligence and came under the auspices of the Department of Energy (DoE) in 1977 with the creation of the Department at the Cabinet level. The AEC's intelligence function is primarily internal counterintelligence to prevent foreign nations and organizations from acquiring DoE information and technology. AEC also provides technical and analytical support to the Director of Central Intelligence and other members of the Intelligence Community.(118)

State Department
 
-The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) was established in 1946 to provide the Secretary of State with assessments of information developed by the intelligence gatherers tailored to the policy needs of State, and to help formulate US policy concerning the rest of the Intelligence Community, specifically, monitoring intelligence operations outside the US to avoid policy conflicts. INR is not responsible to any other part of the Intelligence Community and the Assistant Secretary of State that heads the Bureau, reports directly to the Secretary of State. Stated priorities of INR include: reform and stability in Russia and other former communist states, economic and trade issues, human rights, terrorism, weapons proliferation, international agreements and all trouble zones.(119)

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
 
-Established in 1961, DIA is a Combat Support Agency and the senior military intelligence component of the Intelligence Community responsible for providing all-source intelligence to the armed forces. Areas of emphasis include: targeting and battle damage assessment, weapons proliferation, warning of emerging military crises, intelligence for peacekeeping missions, collecting information on foreign armed forces, and support of the UN and other US allies. The head of DIA is a three-star military officer.(120)

Army
 
-Army Intelligence, as have all the branch intelligence services, has become deeply involved with C4I, which are Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Intelligence. The Army's special interests is in utilization of intelligence to give commanders at all echelons from national to tactical the deepest possible view, and thus control, of the "battle space." The overriding concern of Army Intelligence is warfighting. The Army’s Criminal Intelligence Division (CID) carries out internal counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities.(121)

Navy
 
-The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is of prime importance to the "corporate enterprise" of the individual military intelligence agencies with the U.S. hegemony of global naval operations. ONI collects information on foreign naval forces and assets and manages the SOSUS underwater listening posts for the monitoring of submarine and surface naval activity. ONI also monitors counternarcotics, fishing, and dumping of wastes at sea as well as traditional warfighting priorities.(122)

Air Force
 
-The Air Force Intelligence mission is the development of intelligence of foreign air and space forces. The Air Force has adopted an operational priority similar to the Army's.(123)

Marine Corps
 
-Marine Corps Intelligence focuses on warfighting much like the Army except with a bottom up approach, providing intelligence to higher echelon commanders rather than the Army's top down function, befitting the Marine Corps' priorities of early deployment and force contingency.(124)

NSA
 
-Founded in 1952 as a separate organization within the Department of Defense (DOD) by merging the signals intelligence divisions of the individual armed services, NSA is responsible for planning, coordinating and directing signals intelligence and information security for both defense and non defense operations. NSA's primary responsibilities aresecuring U.S. electronic transmissions, which include radio, television, telephonic, and computer communications, and to exploit the transmissions of foreign nations and organizations.(125) The NSA alone may constitute half of the Intelligence Community's personnel.

National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
 
-NIMA was created in late 1996 by merging the Central Imagery Office (CIO), the Defense Mapping Agency, and the Defense Dissemination Program Office with the analysis staff of the NRO (see below), National Photographic Interpretation Center and other agencies. CIO was itself created in 1992 as a joint Intelligence-Defense agency and was designated a Combat Support Agency. NIMA is responsible for the analysis of all US imagery including imagery from weather and other civil use/publicly owned satellites. They provide imagery and geospatial information and manage all functions of imagery: tasking, exploitation, production and dissemination as well as mapping, charting and meteorological functions.(126)(127)

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
 
-NRO's existence was declassified in 1992; the date of its inception is still classified. NRO is the agency responsible for all space borne reconnaissance. They are charged with the maintenance and tasking of the satellite assets of the US. The head of the NRO is the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space.(128)

The Functions of the Intelligence Community

Collection

Human intelligence, or HUMINT, is the oldest type of intelligence collection (see Genesis), and involves field operations by agents. The Directorate of Operations within the CIA is principally responsible for clandestine HUMINT collection although DIA, the State Department and the military services also contribute extensively to HUMINT.(129) According to John Deutch, "Of all the intelligence disciplines, human intelligence is indeed most subject to human frailty, but it also brings human intuition, ingenuity, and courage into play against the enemies of our country."(130)

If recent crises are predictive of the future, a substantial increase in HUMINT collection will be needed to answer the intelligence questions posed by the nature of the threats facing the world today. Among the most important intelligence needs in localized conflicts like Bosnia, terrorists groups, or criminal organizations are insights into the intentions of the leaders for which the human collector is critical.(131)

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is the collection and processing of foreign communications, noncommunication electromagnetic radiations, and foreign instrumentation signals. This is the branch of intelligence that deals with sending and receiving communications. The primary thrust is the development of the ability to send sensitive information securely and to break the security of the communications of others. The US leads the world in this field, known as cryptology, which requires the ability to intercept and analyze electromagnetic signals. SIGINT is the domain of the NSA.(132)

While other types of photographic intelligence are included in the Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) category, the primary source of IMINT is satellite imagery, though quite a lot comes from airborne platforms and includes radar, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics and the like. The National Reconnaissance Office, or NRO, is the agency responsible for collecting this information as well and NIMA is the agency responsible for the analysis of it. Primary uses of IMINT include, early warning, monitoring of treaties and agreements (particularly arms control), monitoring military operations and natural disasters.(133)

Analysis and Reporting

The analytical side of intelligence is not a direct instrument of policy in that it does not attempt to directly influence the activities of other nations or groups. Instead, analysts work intimately with and support those who are striving to achieve such influence. "Strategic intelligence services provide national security decision makers with the following: Early warning of war and other developments that could threaten core U.S. interests, especially when such developments occur in countries restricting the access of U.S. diplomats and journalists; On-going information about foreign countries' compliance with arms control and other international treaties; Support for negotiators; Independent assessments of emerging situations and problems, including economic and political developments in key countries and regions; Access to data about emerging technologies."(135)

The intelligence community's principal analytical organizations are the Directorate for Intelligence within the CIA, most of DIA, and the Bureau of Intelligence and research in the State Department. These agencies produced some impressive and often-overlooked results, such as the analysis that sustained the Western effort to control many exports of sensitive technologies to communist countries during the Cold War. Other failures, such as Iran, are notable.

If the Soviet Union is no longer the monolithic concern it once was, then the analytical problems filling the void are in many respects much more varied and complex. While chances of complete annihilation may be less, the reality of deadly attacks from numerous sources as well as the possibility of serious hemorrhaging from economic and social wounds inflicted by sustained attacks from organized crime must be faced. If the stated grand strategy of Engagement and Enlargement is to be taken seriously, then the US must position itself in both proactive and reactive modes. Even though budgets are declining, the intelligence community is still expected to produce timely and accurate intelligence on these situations, some of them involving countries about which precious little data has been developed or criminal or terrorists activities which may range from the minute to global. In addition, intelligence agencies which developed a keen sense of how communist systems function may not be as useful in the post-Cold War world as analysts who can discover what factors help enlarge democratic ideals in specific countries.

The intelligence community has been described as "archivally challenged," meaning that mountains of data are collected and never disseminated or utilized. "Theoretically, only something that has some soundness to it is disseminated. A lot of what is collected is never disseminated within the intelligence community. That is why an important part of what the intelligence community does is to make judgments about what is to be disseminated and what is not. So you have all kinds of stuff that is not disseminated, and that class of whatever you may call it, I wouldn't call it information--its raw take of some kind--is something that one has to think about in the context of whether these are called 'files' or 'raw information' or whatever."(136)

While insufficient intelligence is certainly a problem, too much unfiltered information can also impede sound policy and decision making. It is the responsibility of the intelligence community, especially in times of crisis, to deliver focused information needed to make timely, sound decisions. It has been noted that during the buildup to the Gulf War, one of the earliest and most challenging problems facing the intelligence community was limiting the intelligence sent to Allied commanders.(137) Whether in times of war or in the daily routine receipt of information, without pre-selection, customers can be overwhelmed by data and unable to select useful material out of the mountains of information.

One question regarding analysis is what type of analyst is most useful in assisting policymakers counter the types of threats facing us today? Do we need to emphasize generalists, or specialists? Alvin Toeffler claims that the trend toward more specialization is primarily a strategy to cope with "future-shock."(138)The specialist doesn't necessarily block out all novel ideas or information. Instead, he energetically attempts to keep pace with change--but only in a specific narrow sector of life. The successful physician or financier may make use of all the latest innovations and information in his profession, but may remain closed to sociological, political, or cultural changes.(139) On the other hand, many would question the relevance of generalists in today's high-tech world of increasing specialization.

The fact of the matter is that meaningful analysis is dependent on proper interpretation of data, and proper interpretation is dependent on understanding the cultural, historical, political and socioeconomic milieu in which people act. In short, in a rush to keep up with technological developments and better data collection, we must not overlook the critical role of well-rounded, liberally educated analysts and managers.
 

Qualified Personnel

One of the problems faced by the intelligence community is that the personnel most knowledgeable about interpretation of financial and business data are sought by the private sector, against whose salaries government cannot hope to compete.(140)

Also, while information databases can be built up over time and updated if resources allow, it is not cost-effective or even possible to maintain a cadre of specialists with the expertise to cover all possible contingencies. Therefore, the intelligence community has occasionally had to find ways to acquire the expertise it needs through nontraditional means such as contracting with outside entities.(141) The DoE uses the expertise of employees at its facilities such as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to facilitate and aid in analysis of technical data and in particular information regarding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Livermore has been supporting the U.S. intelligence community for 30 years by tracking and analyzing the nuclear developments in countries of importance to U.S. nonproliferation goals. This technical support assists U.S. policy makers in taking actions to encourage the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear technology and to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, Livermore has completed numerous studies of the paths to nuclear weapons production being taken by several proliferate countries. These analyses are used by many government agencies as they evaluate possible response options and develop policy strategies to reduce regional tensions and motivations for the proliferation of these kinds of weapons.(142) This type of partial privatization of intelligence may increase in the future.

Deployments often occur in regions where the neither the U.S. nor the United Nations, if involved, has a complete picture of conditions on the ground. Such situations increasingly require cooperation with the private sector--private voluntary organizations, for example--to gather information about infrastructure, language, customs, culture, and other subjects useful for operations. Certain of these organizations have been traditionally reluctant, if not averse, to cooperating with military forces or intelligence organizations and only recently have warmed somewhat to helping with peace or humanitarian operations. On the other hand, even in war operations, some such organizations have cooperated enthusiastically.(143) For example, the CIA used Kuwaiti students studying in the U.S. during the build-up to Desert Storm because the number of capable Arabic linguists in the military services and the intelligence community proved insufficient to meet the demand.(144)

Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence supports U.S. personnel and agencies by protecting them from the harmful efforts of foreign intelligence agencies and other hostile groups, and directly aids national security by protecting U.S. forces and government agencies and their personnel against espionage, sabotage, assassinations and terrorism conducted on behalf of foreign powers and organizations.(145) Reaction to crises after they develop is insufficient for national security; thus, as with all strategic assessments, counterintelligence efforts must be aimed at the identification and assessment of potential threats. Once identified, assets can be utilized to counter the operations discovered. Additional counterintelligence functions include identifying and addressing weaknesses in our own security structure.

As shown by recent security breaches of U.S. intelligence, counterintelligence measures should be, if anything, increased and better coordinated. As with domestic law enforcement efforts, the type of threat posed by Russian organized crime and other transnational organizations call for more and better counterintelligence. A step in that direction was taken in May of 1994 when the National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) was created to coordinate the efforts of the segments of the Intelligence Community tasked to counterintelligence and operates under the National Security Council. Associated agencies include FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, OSI, the military branch services, and the AEC.(146)

Covert Action

During the Cold War, the KGB engaged in covert activities to subvert noncommunist governments and political movements--in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia, as well as the United States. The CIA developed covert-action capability primarily to counter these initiatives, thus giving U.S. policymakers an effective option in situations where diplomacy or foreign aid were insufficient, but the use of military force or overt political or economic intervention was inappropriate.(147) "Over subsequent years, CIA covert operations ranged from small, discrete efforts, such as sneaking banned publications into communist states and bankrolling selected noncommunist politicians, to supporting large-scale conflicts in such theaters as Afghanistan and Angola", according the National Defense University.(148) While covert action has received some criticism, particularly when used to prop bad characters as the lesser of two evils in certain situations or when used in such a way as to keep secret the role of the U.S. or at least to provide U.S. leaders with plausible deniability, it has also been used in many cases to support democratic forces.(149)

To argue that we should eliminate covert action today when facing the types of threats the U.S. faces today would be no different that arguing against undercover police agents. It would be nice not to have them, but they are valuable when fighting tight-knit criminal organizations. When the stakes are large-scale economic crimes or the detonation of weapons of mass destruction, any queasiness over covert activity should be markedly less. Since these types of threats to national security, if carried out, are covert, their prevention or eradication must necessarily be so.

Should we have paramilitary capability as a part of the covert arsenal available to policy makers? Frank Carlucci said, "I don't see any reason to rule out that option, although, obviously, it ought to be used sparingly, and the Defense Department ought to be deeply involved as it was in the Afghanistan operation. There are those that argue that, had we mounted an Afghanistan-type operation in Bosnia, we might not have 20,000 U.S. troops there. This argument has not been accepted, but it's an option that the President at least ought to have."(150)

Possible Strategic Goals

Perhaps a good definition of strategy is that it is the selection of engagements. Using the word engagement allows for consideration of ideological, economic, or social interactions. Strategy must be in line with policy that requires that intelligence consumers, (policy makers), must be in constant communication as to their intentions with those who execute policy within the intelligence community. If we accept that the policy of the United States is that democratic and republican institutions should continue to spread and that the free market should continue to grow, then the stated national strategy of Engagement and Enlargement can be thought of as a "grand strategy." What is necessary is to adapt strategies in the use of intelligence in all its functions in a way that is compatible with the grand strategy and conforms in large part to the values of the society which it is intended to serve.

We know with a fairly high degree of precision which organizations are sending drugs into America's cities and towns. By and large, the people who are controlling that flow of narcotics, the money laundering and the corruption and the corresponding violence are beyond American borders. This is also true for organized crime of other sorts, particularly Russian organized crime and terrorists groups in other areas of the world. With good reasons for fearing that components and know-how for the manufacture of fearsome weapons could be leaking out of Russia and finding their way into the hands of rogue states or terrorists organizations, and with the obvious internationalization of crime on an unprecedented scale, it would seem foolish not to adopt a strategy of placing the highest possible priority on containing or eradicating where possible organized crime. While this does not mean we should ignore other threats, it does mean that we must recognize that, "We are increasingly facing internationalized law enforcement problems. And that means we end up going abroad. It also means that international organized crime is a very high foreign policy concern."(151)

Top Down Prioritization--Engagement and Enlargement

According to President Clinton, "The stated National Security Policy of the United States is that of Engagement and Enlargement. That is, the active countering of threats to national security and the active pursuit of increasing the values of democracy and the free market system in the world in order to deny the environment that lends allies and support to those security threats. We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Free market nations with growing economies and strong and open trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the United States to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development. These goals are supported by ensuring America remains engaged in the world and by enlarging the community of secure, free market and democratic nations."(152)

The major flaw of the Engagement and Enlargement grand strategy is that it does not and cannot directly address the issue of international organized crime. In fact, by increasing the scope of the free market, the grand strategy actually increases the environment for organized crime since its very nature is the unrestricted practice of the worst aspects of the free market system. The simple fact of the matter is that it is in the best interests of the United States that the grand strategy be modified or better defined so that we help minimize the chances that any voids left by the collapse of authoritarianism are not filled by criminal elements. Foreign policy decisions should reflect that modification.

Military Operational Needs

"Since the end of the Cold War, we've deployed thousands of American troops to such places as the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, and each of those operations requires a tremendous architecture of intelligence support," said Larry Combest, R-Texas, chairman of the House Select Intelligence Committee. "I believe we need more intelligence, not less."(153)... The Pentagon itself believes that it needs more intelligence as force structure declines, ... the Defense Department is now touting "revolution in military affairs," in which commanders wield intelligence like a cyber-spear, piercing the traditional fog of war to gain "dominant battlefield awareness."(154) Former Defense Secretary, Harold Brown has said, "Increasingly, military leaders show a willingness to trade off a wing of aircraft to buy more intelligence, because they see it as a 'force multiplier.'"(155)
 
The military will always be the primary client of the Intelligence Community.  During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the major complaint was not a lack of information, but that there was too much.

One of the U.S.' stated military preparedness criteria is the capacity to fight and win two regional conflicts (such as Korea and the Middle East), nearly simultaneously. The last times the U.S. was embroiled in Korea and the Middle East, seven Army divisions were sent each time. The current force structure maintains only ten Army divisions. The math doesn't add up. This estimation, however, is based on our old and current strategy of "overwhelming force." According to retired Col. William Mendel, "...our [military] doctrine and force structure are based on concepts of overwhelming force to achieve decisive victory against states--hardly a formula for coping with these new [transnational] threats."(156) However, if the intelligence community can be brought to a higher standard in military intelligence, then we could conceivably meet the preparedness criteria by adopting a new strategy of "tailored force." For such a force to be effective, "dominant battlefield awareness," or information dominance will have to become as quickly and as easily achieved as the U.S. achieves air or naval superiority now. In other terms: it has to pre-exist the crisis.

Focus of Current Grand Strategy: Nations Not Hostile to U.S.

An important element of U.S. security preparedness depends on durable relationships with allies and other friendly nations. Accordingly, a central thrust of the grand strategy of engagement is to sustain and adapt security relationships with key nations around the world. These ties constitute an important part of an international framework that will be essential to ensuring cooperation with allies and friendly nations includes such activities as: conducting combined training and exercises, coordinating military plans and preparations, sharing intelligence --particularly in support of multilateral peacekeeping efforts or initiatives to contain the inimical behavior of rogue states--jointly developing new systems to include cooperative research and development programs and controlling exports of sensitive technologies according to common standards.(157) To successfully "compete with Russian organized crime and other new transnational threats, we must adopt a more complete transnational approach of close cooperation with nations not hostile to the U.S.

As it stands, the grand strategy of Engagement and Enlargement requires that the U.S. must be involved in every sphere: engaged with the threats and working to enlarge the democratic, free market community. And it must be done with fewer and fewer resources. This also requires that the U.S. must have the ability to respond strategically in every way that is consistent with the grand strategy, along the entire spectrum of engagement.
 
Possible Strategy: Law Enforcement

Inherent obstacles presented to law enforcement involving transnational criminals include foreign sovereignty, extradition, exercise of U.S. authority on foreign nationals and/or on foreign soil, jurisdiction, and Constitutional protections for non-resident, non-citizens. International terrorists and organized criminals cross easily over international borders and blur the lines that once divided domestic and international threats. If the U.S. is to meet these new challenges successfully, we must find the most effective way to harmonize the unique talents and resources of law enforcement and intelligence. Law enforcement personnel specialize in investigative skills and techniques while the intelligence community has sophisticated foreign collection abilities. According to Former DCI Deutch," routine cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement will profoundly improve our nation's security in the post-Cold War world. Recent experience has proven that when intelligence and law enforcement cooperate effectively, we can be spectacularly successful."(158)

Phil Heymann, a former Deputy Attorney General, summarized some encouraging developments: "Two things happened. With the end of the Cold War, the intelligence agencies became very involved, in part perhaps to make use of their talents, skills, and resources, in a new set of areas and that new set of areas substantially overlapped law enforcement: narcotics, terrorism, weapons proliferation, things that have law enforcement sides to them. And the second thing that happened was that with the coming of terrorism in a frightening way in the '80s, law enforcement started being given by Congress the power to punish acts that were committed abroad against American citizens or against aircraft. The result of that was suddenly the FBI had jurisdiction to go after terrorism abroad, and DEA has jurisdiction in a variety of ways to go after drugs that are at least starting abroad. At the same time, the CIA is starting to focus on the same issues."(159)

There is much yet to be done. In the interagency arena, the CIA in coordination with other members of the intelligence community could provide more strategic intelligence at the top levels of the Department of Justice and work on a case-by-case basis with law enforcement to ensure that intelligence records are kept in such a way that they may be able to be used in criminal prosecutions. Also, there could also be a great deal more common training of FBI Special Agents, Drug Enforcement Administration Agents, and CIA officers on areas where they should be cooperating, such a s narcotics.(160) In that vein, clear authority should be given to U.S. ambassadors overseas to ensure that if a conflict arises-- say in a narcotics matter between what DEA wants to do and what CIA wants to do--that the ambassador is to arbitrate the matter. (161)

On a more strategic level, at the request of President Clinton, an interagency group is developing an International Crime Bill. The bill will contain proposals to augment the ability of U.S. agencies to investigate and prosecute international criminals. It will seek authorization for increased U.S. training and assistance to other countries who show a commitment to fighting international crime but need more resources to be effective.(162) While such an initiative is certainly important, success is greatly dependent on successful relationships with law enforcement personnel in foreign countries.

Relations with Foreign Law Enforcement

One of the most effective ways to fight international crime is by building cop-to-cop bridges between American law enforcement and our overseas counterparts. Without these relationships, there cannot be the commonality of purpose and open communication required for success.(163)

The Legal Attaché Program of the FBI works closely with a large number of foreign police forces. Not only do they cooperate on specific cases, but also form something of an early warning system to alert the FBI of emerging crime threats. The FBI has opened a Legal Attaché Office in Moscow to work closely with Russian police against a variety of costly crimes. From July 1994 to April of 1996, the number of cases worked by the FBI Agents in Moscow increased from 20 to over 200.(164)

In FY 1995, the FBI performed a total of 10 In-Country Training Needs Assessments whereby, at the invitation of the host government, the FBI analyzes each country's police training needs and capabilities. A recommendation of how the FBI could assist the host country's law enforcement capabilities through targeted training follows. The assessments were conducted in Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Lithuania, Modavia, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Uruguay.(165)

In action against a growing Russian organized crime structure in the United States, the FBI arrested Vyacheslav Kirillocich Ivankov along with five of his associates on extortion charges. The Russian Ministry of Interior and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police aided the arrests in New York.(166) More recently, four Russians were charged in New York for conspiring to defraud 24 Russian companies, including a charity established to aid the victims of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, of approximately $10.8 million.(167)

The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) [UK] recently hosted meetings in London of top international criminal intelligence officers with the aim of targeting Russian-speaking organized crime. The conference was a unique collaboration, bringing together representatives from the FBI, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Italian Anti-Mafia Directorate, Germany's Bundeskriminalamt and NCIS, together with a senior officer from Russia's Ministry of Interior Police (MVD).(168)

With an eye on Russia and the former Soviet Union as well as Eastern Europe, on December 5, 1994, President Clinton, Hungarian President Goncz and Prime Minister Horn reached agreement that Hungary would host in Budapest a law enforcement training academy to train law enforcement officers from Central Europe and the New Independent States. The Department of State and U.S. law enforcement agencies opened the International Law Enforcement Academy on April 24, 1995, offering an eight-week course for mid-level police officials from Central Europe and the NIS. The course focuses on development of skills in the areas of financial crimes, organized crime, drug investigations, property crimes, human dignity, management of the investigative process, and management applications of computerized law enforcement information systems.(169)

Notwithstanding the need for more and better international law enforcement interchange, the U.S. cannot afford to rely on foreign law enforcement officials to protect the U.S. With reference to Russia, James Woolsey, former DCI, said, "... in much of the world, relations between American law enforcement and supposed law enforcement agencies of other countries, are in fact, relationships between honest American law enforcement and foreign agencies that are permeated by organized crime, are deeply involved with their own national intelligence operations and all the rest. If you meet someone from a Russian law enforcement agency these days and he has on a $500 suit and Gucci loafers, and he says that in his spare time he works for an international trading company, he may be engaged in that trading company. He may be engaged in law enforcement. He may be a case officer for Russian intelligence. He may be a principal in a Russian organized crime family. Or he may be all of the above and not see any particular conflict in any of those roles.(170)

How then should U.S. law enforcement agencies proceed in dealing with corrupt or incompetent foreign law enforcement officials? The U.S. agency runs the risk of compromising sources of information, the plan of action for dealing with the threat, and even the lives of informants. There is no easy answer, for we must deal with foreign officials, and we cannot afford to wait and react only after some cataclysmic event. Among the things we must do, however, is to better coordinate among U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies so that all concerned know who potential problem personnel are among foreign agencies.

Relations with CIA

Results of relations between U.S. law enforcement agencies and the CIA are mixed. According to John Deutch, the CIA has been playing an important role in U.S. counternarcotics policy, including critical support in the arrests of Cali drug Mafia chieftains during the summer of 1995. He indicated that the CIA aided efforts to disrupt the flow of coca products along the "Andean Airbridge" from Peru to cocaine processing laboratories in Columbia as well as in Thailand and Burma.(171) However, the DEA feels strongly that too many of their drug-cartel cases never get to court because the CIA considers them sources of information. Tension between the FBI and CIA is also increasing as the FBI, in the wake of the Aldrich Ames case, is assuming more responsibility for counter-intelligence.(172)

While some of the problems have resulted from traditional turf battles, others arise from a worry that intelligence sources could be compromised if their information is used in law enforcement investigations. Because of the nature of the new threats, policy makers must make increased cooperation a high priority and see that both communities work hard to differentiate the legitimate from the illegitimate concerns and then formulate ways to overcome the obstacles to cooperation.(173)

In terms of relating to foreign law enforcement agencies, several recommendations were made at the American Bar Association's 1995 panel on law enforcement and intelligence.(174) Law enforcement should be the organization that relates to foreign law enforcement agencies. Experience shows that foreign law enforcement agencies will simply not be as cooperative if they are dealing with U.S. intelligence when they are providing information on drug growers in Columbia as they would if it was a law enforcement to law enforcement exchange. Also, U.S. law enforcement should not do anything in violation of foreign law. If it is necessary to skirt the law of another country, it ought to be done by intelligence agencies, not because it's dirty work, but because it's very important to keep law enforcement agencies within the tradition of obeying the law. In addition, intelligence is the better organization for gathering broad, national security/law enforcement information such as "Will Yeltsin fall because of the threat of Russian organized crime?" or "Is the Colombian government under the control of its narcotics dealers?"(175) It was also observed that the CIA should be maintaining national security capacity because the most important use of intelligence is to protect against military dangers that are not present now, but will rise in the future. To be ready to protect against grave future dangers, we need to protect a CIA/NSA capacity overseas. Finally, Phil Heymann observed that, "As long as I've been in government, every agency wants to run its own foreign policy, and we need to be very careful to keep the FBI or the DEA, which is larger overseas, from developing anything in excess of what they need for liaison purposes abroad."(176)

Whether or not these divisions of labor are all still useful when confronting the dangers of today, particularly the warning of Phil Heymann, policy makers along with the intelligence community should know that divisions of labor should be toward a coordinated goal and mission and that increased cooperation will enhance success when fighting a greater number of smaller, but potentially deadly, foes.

In an article on organized crime Daniel Brandt asked, "Will we approach organized crime as a law enforcement problem, with some semblance of due process, or will we lapse into covert action?(177) James Woolsey points out that..." there are very good reasons why Title 3, for example, of the 1968 Act has many more safeguards to prevent domestic wiretaps or surveillance on the part of law enforcement than are present in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 when we are dealing with foreign powers. There are very good reasons why you need a warrant for a search to enter a premise in the United States but why the CIA overseas from time to time will enter a premise of a proliferator or a terrorist in a foreign country without, shall we say, going through the process of applying to the court of the country involved."(178)

There could be terrific practical problems at the Justice Department if the U.S. starts asking the CIA and NSA to get directly involved in law enforcement. In various assignments that the CIA might be undertaking there is a total disconnect between the perspective of the intelligence officer and the American courtroom. The intelligence officer is used to working his sources, never once considering the likelihood that his work will be scrutinized in court one day. It could be an enormous task to change that perspective. And, it would be difficult indeed to imagine a scenario where one could persuade a defense lawyer that if a CIA officer was debriefing someone in a criminal case that the defense counsel shouldn't be entitled to the interview, just as he would be if an FBI agent interviewed that person.(179)

Historically, law enforcement is aimed at getting criminal convictions and adhering to legal strictures to avoid acquittal because of the misapplication of police powers with respect to defendant rights. The ultimate goal of the intelligence community has not been to obtain convictions of specific people, but rather to gather information on or influence potential threats or targets identified by national strategic assessments. Acknowledging that historical reality, however, should bring policy makers back to some fundamental assessments. The threats of today are new but should be known; thus the targets can be identified and, if the political will is there, the elements put in place to address the threats. The game plan can be developed once the options are considered.

Possible Strategy: Isolation

It is doubtful that in this age of global intercourse isolation is even possible. Such a position is certainly not compatible with the stated strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, and would require a dramatic reduction of involvement by U.S. citizens in all international relations. It would require a complete redetermination of which matters abroad would present a clear U.S. interest and would result in an inability to anticipate or counter threats until they were onshore. It would also include tighter restrictions on immigration, visitation, customs and searches and could fly in the face of the constitutional protections afforded to visitors to the U.S. as well as our traditionally free travel policy both internal and abroad for our own citizens.

Rejection of an isolationist strategy, however, does not and should not preclude the U.S. from acting unilaterally in certain instances nor from action to insulate the U.S. from known subversives. President Clinton signed Executive Order 12978, freezing assets of the leaders, cohorts, and companies of major foreign narcotics traffickers, centered in Columbia. The order also barred U.S. individuals and companies from any commercial or financial dealings with those individuals and companies identified in the order and accompanying regulations.(180)The President also authorized the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to deny visas and entry to a broad range of organized crime members, transnational criminals, and their family members, such as in the case of Umar Dzhbrailov referenced above.(181)

Possible Strategy: Eradication

Perhaps most compatible with the Engagement part of the grand strategy, Eradication would include aggressive use of military and law enforcement to effect arrests and seizures wherever violations might be found. Not to mention issues of when and if concepts of due process might apply, inherent obstacles include those of any law enforcement policy, but on a more pronounced scale; do Constitutional protections apply to foreigners outside our borders, how is a warrant to be served oversees, or evidence to be gathered? Such an offensive policy would be implemented proactively, and if it were truly to be more than a nomenclature, would involve a true "war on _____." This would be an embracing of the role of world cop.

With Vietnam well behind us, and with the U.S. clearly leading the "New World Order," many would argue that such a policy is the correct path, both in a military and law enforcement context. Whether such a policy is possible, or whether the U.S. has the political will to pursue and sustain it may be questionable.

Possible Strategy: Deterrence

Deterrence is the traditional policy of the United States concerning weapons of mass destruction, and many could point to its success in preventing mutual superpower destruction for so many years. For that reason, I will refer to a deterrence strategy as that which includes tactical elements of all four previous policy options, each applied as the situation calls for, remembering that each has inherent obstacles. In the case of the new threats discussed herein, this strategy would entail establishing policies and tactics that would make criminal activity "unprofitable" to those who engage in it. Such a policy should include decisions described in part by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu when referring to terrorists as a policy which ... requires that living, active terrorists be detained, not released; if deported, they should be sent only to a country that wants to try them for crimes committed there and not to countries that offer terrorists safe havens and rest periods until their next offense; and allies should act like allies and not permit known terrorists of any nationality to plot, plan and move about with impunity on the assumption that their outrages will be committed elsewhere in the free world."(182) The same decisions should be made with respect to organized crime, not only because of the socioeconomic impact of their activity, but also because of the possibility that they will facilitate the delivery of fearsome capabilities to terrorists groups or rogue states.

As British Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton once put it, the essence of deterrence is to "raise the fearful doubt in the mind of any potential aggressorthat any possible gain is not worth the inevitable risk."(183) To think of it in military terms, combat power has two interlocking dimensions, physical strength and political will. If deterrence is to be effective, "the adversary must be convinced that the United States not only has the physical means to escalate the conflict but the political will to do so. That was the case in terminating the Korean War in 1953, and again in deterring the Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction in the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91."(184) The strategy of deterrence would require uses of force early on to demonstrate both dominance and will. Presuming success, that the "other side" goes to ground, the result would be a modern Cold War in a multipolar environment and the potential of escalating a new arms race with the transnational adversaries. However, in the case of rogue states such as Libya or Iran, we know that they are already attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction. In the case of terrorism and the types of new threats discussed herein, the only real options to taking a more aggressive approach is to either experience increasing hemorrhaging, calling into question the ability of democracy to continue functioning successfully, or to await some great tragedy. If the U.S. waits, there could be needless suffering, and the risk of a political backlash demanding protection in such a way that cherished freedoms could be seriously jeopardized.

So the question arises as to what can and must be done to effect these strategies. How can we best bring U.S. might to bear?

Recommended Changes--Unprecedented Cooperation

Domestically, to be successful in countering the new threats, the Director of Central Intelligence should be strengthened. As John Gentry, a former CIA analyst, noted, "The Director of Central Intelligence has a number of important powers and responsibilities but he does not control the Intelligence Community in any meaningful way."(185) "The DCI was theoretically responsible for 100 percent of the nation's intelligence activities, in fact he controlled less than 15 percent of the community's assets," according to former CIA officer Victor Marchetti(186) The result of the lack of centralized control is the "predictable effect of leading to inter-agency rivalries, needless functional duplication, and a complicated structure that leads to consumer confusion about just what the Intelligence Community is doing and what it thinks."(187) Once leadership within the intelligence community is strengthened a major reorganization needs to take place. This will further strengthen the DCI by placing more assets under his control as well as enhancing efficiency.

More specifically the NSA and the CIA should be united; integrating NSA's SIGINT and other capabilities with Directorate of Operation's HUMINT collection. Analysts working directly for both collection services could help improve the efficiency of overall collection and locating NSA's collection with CIA's analytical strengths would result in better NSA targeting, particularly with respect to understanding future targeting needs. Linking CIA's analyst corps more closely to NSA would improve CIA's understanding of SIGINT and would increase its ability to judge the value and reliability of NSA's information. It would improve the tasking process, which is now so formalistic and complex that many CIA analysts do not bother to follow it in order to focus NSA on a particular target.(188)

Military Intelligence could be reformed significantly. The Secretary of Defense should mandate somewhat greater powers for DIA within the military mission. One commentator noted that, "Placement of certain analytic functions entirely in DIA's hands, while reducing the size and scope of service organizations ... could mean better coordination of DIA's work with that of the intelligence organizations of the unified and specified commands."(189) Examples of additional consolidation efforts might include the elimination of the Marine Corps' intelligence function in favor of a joint service capability.(190) In any event, the military intelligence function should be limited to tactical considerations at the service level and to strategic considerations at the level of DIA. There is no reason for the military to control or be primarily engaged in national level intelligence gathering. It only serves to further distract from the military's mission and readiness.

Strengthening the hand of the DCI and consolidation and coordination with the intelligence community carries with it the great risk of denigrating genuine intellectual competition with the community as a whole. As a result, great care should be taken to ensure competitive analysis. To ensure that a bias is not systematized within a more consolidated intelligence community, multiple analytic organizations that genuinely compete intellectually within an institutional framework of checks and balances should be encouraged as a final check and balance of the competing analytical agencies.(191)

In the 1970's, it was revealed that NIE projections during the 1960's had seriously underestimated Soviet strategic forces. As a result, DCI George Bush commissioned the now famous "B Team exercise", which was designed to utilize competitive analysis by two groups of analysts assigned to the same problem. After comparing conclusions, attempts were made to reconcile any differences; however, any remaining differences were given equal billing as competing views in the final report. While it is not a perfect solution, at least it presents both sides to the ultimate policy maker for consideration.(192)

For years the National Intelligence Council has been a weak body that has neither advised the DCI extensively nor has it performed many meaningful coordination functions. While the NIC drafts the National Intelligence Estimates, it has little independent authority over judgements or analytical resources.(193) The concept of the NIC is important as a final check and balance of the competing analytical agencies, but to perform it in any meaningful way the NIC should be expanded to include a substantial staff of respected experts. Each such agency should submit its analyses to NIC. The NIC should make independent analyses of them and present to the DCI in a side-by-side comparison of all the analyses. This will help lessen the chances that competitive analyses will not be considered.

One of the key institutional changes that led to serious denigration of the CIA's analytic performance in the 1980's was the elimination of key competing centers of analysis within the DI when the DI was reorganized along geographic lines and primary responsibility for regions of the whole was placed in the hands of a single office director.(194) In order to encourage competitive analysis and to better address the transnational character of the threats now facing the U.S., responsibility for regions should be placed within an organizational framework that encourages cross-pollination.

If we are to strengthen the DCI, then a strong checks and balances system in the form of improved congressional oversight should occur. Congress should move to strengthen its understanding and oversight of intelligence by devoting more resources to a better understanding of the performance and problems of intelligence. Congress could strengthen the oversight committees by removing term limits on committee membership and chairmanships. It should also take steps to improve staff expertise by selecting more personnel with intelligence backgrounds, and the rotation of staffers to intelligence agencies and then back to congressional committees.

If the intelligence community is serious about targeting organized crime, then the way in which that is done is by "following the money." FinCEN does this better than anyone in the world. FinCEN should be brought to membership in the intelligence community so that their particular talents can be brought to bear in a more structured way.
 
Aside from reorganization inside the intelligence community, the Treasury Department law enforcement bureaus should be consolidated into one enforcement agency--Treasury oversees the second largest law enforcement section and a fractured jurisdiction not unlike the Intelligence community. The bureaus of Treasury concerned with law enforcement are: the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); U.S. Customs; U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and Internal Revenue Service--Criminal Investigations Division (IRS-CID). Their primary concerns are for financial types of crimes and the crime in which organized criminals are most likely to engage. This will improve efficiency, free up resources, and eliminate duplication of efforts. They then should report to and receive from OIS all necessary intelligence information.

Certain agencies, as exemplified by the antagonistic relationship between the CIA and FBI, are traditionally uncooperative with others. Establishing the cooperation and requiring them to share information will assist in identifying and countering the activities of non-state actors. Some kinds of intelligence are more or less appropriate for certain kinds of efforts, such as restraints on methods of intelligence gathering domestically and for law enforcement purposes. Two-way communications must be required, for example, between the collection agencies and Defense. A recent example that points up the absolute necessity that this kind of communication be required is the recent arrest of would-be bombers in New York. FBI broke the case on the testimony of an informer within the group who happened to have an attack of conscience. This group had ties to the fundamentalist Islamic terrorist group Hamas. After the arrests were made, it was reported that The Immigration and Naturalization Service, another agency within the Justice Department, had documentation of these ties. If this information had been shared, the FBI would not have had to rely on dumb luck in order to effect these arrests. FBI would have been watching them from the moment they entered the country.

Finally, critique and feedback from policy makers should be required on a periodic basis so that the analytical agencies can meet the continuously changing needs of the intelligence consumers.

A Constabularized Military

In 1996, William Mendel made an encouraging statement when he said, "The premise of U.S. strategy is that we must counter an array of challenges to our interests: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, militant nationalism, deterioration of political and economic reform in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and transnational (gray area) phenomena such as terrorism, warlordism, refugees, narcotrafficking, environmental crises, and famine. Our national security strategy emphasizes transnational threats to nation-states by non-state actors as well as non-governmental processes and organizations which are viewed by many analysts as far more probable than general war involving WMD."(195) He went on to note, however, that, "Our doctrine and force structure are based on concepts of overwhelming force to achieve decisive victory against states--hardly a formula for coping with these new threats."(196)

How then could U.S. troops, which are not routinely trained for law enforcement missions, be of use against the new types of threats facing the U.S.? If it is now decided that troops should be more directly involved, the question then becomes how they should be used?

On the domestic front, a constabularized military contends with the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, passed as a response to the post-Civil War abuses by Union troops occupying the South during Reconstruction. The law prohibits army involvement in domestic arrests or searches and seizures, a ban that has since been extended to other branches of service.
 
Unless called to federal duty, the National Guard is not covered by Posse Comitatus and therefore has somewhat greater latitude in engaging in law enforcement-type missions. The Guard has already become an important support in the law enforcement community and is engaged in inspecting cargo for U.S. Customs, translates wiretapped messages for the DEA, and even assists the FBI in analyzing intelligence data. The Guard now has more personnel assigned to counter-drug activities than the DEA has special agents on duty.(197)

On the international front, the Clinton administration is exploring the idea of creating a special police force to hunt down war criminals in Bosnia. The force is being considered help the United Nations tribunal prosecute cases. Late last year, then Defense Secretary William Perry discussed such a force with French, Dutch, Norwegian and Danish defense ministers. European nations generally agree that a force is needed, but they disagree over who should lead it. Meanwhile Special Forces troops are learning the skills necessary to carry out more captures of alleged war criminals similar to the ones executed in July of this year.(198)

One answer may be a standing military staff for "Operations Other Than War (OOTW)."(199) A specially organized joint planning staff and a specially trained joint force should be ready to join with government, non-government, and international organizations in tackling transnational threats. If such a command were made permanent, it would be able to develop expertise in dealing with other agencies, both domestically and internationally.

The command should be able to integrate the various capabilities of the branches of service, including reserves. Military police and security officers could be involved in joint operations and training of foreign military and police units. Military logistical, transportation, and communications expertise and capabilities could be invaluable in global operations. A security assistance organization would provide support to Commanders-In-Chief of the unified and specialized commands. The most controversial element of this command would no doubt be Special Forces groups from each branch of service. Their missions would include providing security or even combat sorties against terrorists or criminal strongholds.(200)

While having this capability could be an important tool, this structure alone is still not adequate to address the new threats, especially the threat of transnational crime, and must be considered only one arrow in the quiver. The issues involved are too complex and too pervasive to be compatible with military training. For example, it is unlikely that soldiers receiving a mission briefing will have ever heard of the term "U.S. Person". A U.S. Person is defined by executive order to be "a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, and unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments."(201) U.S. Person status engages a range of constitutional protections, including those relating to illegal government searches, invasion of privacy, and warrantless arrests. Coming up against those civil and property rights enjoying Constitutional or statutory protection could easily present more formidable challenges to military training than more traditional concerns. The rules of engagement in any situation in which the OOTW personnel might be involved will likely follow the types of instructions received in U.S. police departments.

Maj. Mark Martins, instructor in the International and Operational Law Division of the U.S. Army JAG school stated, "Combat commands draft and disseminate wartime rules in the same manner they do peacetime rules; however, the rules themselves differ to reflect the increased justification for using force in wartime operations. Wartime ROE [Wartime Rules of Engagement] permit U.S. forces to open fire upon all identified enemy targets, regardless of whether those targets represent actual, immediate, threats. By contrast, the PROE [Peacetime Rules of Engagement] merely permit engagement in individual, unit, or national self-defense--the sole legal ground for international use of force during peacetime."(202)

There are two principle dangers inherent in ROE instructions. The first concern is that solders will respond tentatively to an attack, thus giving the enemy a tremendous advantage. The second danger is that the soldier will be too aggressive.(203) In May of this year a Marine corporal in camouflage patrolling for smugglers fired his M-16 rifle across Texas scrubland and fatally shot a young goatherder.(204) Troops are taught to avoid contact with civilians and use minimum force when force is required. The military's rules of engagement are similar to the rules police follow--except that camouflaged troops are not clearly identifiable as agents of the U.S. government. In this shooting, the marines did not identify themselves before firing and were not required to do so.(205)

A Militarized Constabulary
 
While a Constabularized Military may be useful, because of the inherent difference of missions and training, and because it may not be available in the event of war, it should be implemented on a somewhat limited scale. The make up of the full-time, career oriented force to attack the problem of the newer transnational threats, the U.S. should develop a corps of specially-trained federal law enforcement agents for this purpose. A group of overseas Marshals with specialized training in more tactically oriented skills will be effective than attempting to train large numbers of warfighters to be police officers. These officers will be involved in gathering or analyzing intelligence data only to the extent it may be necessary to carry out the duties of field operatives. With respect to the new threats facing the U.S., their duty would be to implement a policy that would include infiltrating suspect organizations, intercepting communications or components of weapons of mass destruction, and apprehending or eliminating criminal elements.

In the event that such a force becomes reality the tools whereby they may act overseas are already a part of U.S. jurisprudence. The extraterritorial application of RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) has not been widely litigated, but there is no particular reason to think its application could not parallel the antitrust laws in the width and breadth of its application. RICO's language applies to "any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."(206) Thus it could be argued that RICO could extend to all conduct overseas that has "direct, substantial, and eventually foreseeable effects" on United States commerce.(207) In Brink's Materials Ltd. v. Diamond (1990, CA11 Fla) 906 F2d 1519, the court ruled that, "The RICO service of process provision is permissive, not restrictive, and the court will therefore not interpret it as preventing the use of state law authority for service on foreign defendant's abroad." Further, in Biofeedtrac, Inc. v Kolinor Optical Enterprises & Consultants, S.R.L. (1993, ED NY) 817 F Supp 316, the court ruled that "Jurisdiction may be established over a foreign coconspirator in a RICO action, even though 18 USCS § 1965(d) makes no provision for service outside of the U.S., because service may be made under the law of the state in which the District Court sits."

Specially trained agents already exist. A core team could be rapidly assembled from members of FBI's Hostage Rescue Team, ATF's Swift Responses Team, the U.S. Marshal's Special Operations Group and other similar tactical response teams.But the number of agents is too small to effectively face the multiplicity of threats, even acting in conjunction with all of the assets mentioned above. The numbers will have to be augmented and their efforts carefully coordinated with those assets. This can only be accomplished with reorganization and reassignment of existing assets similar to that mentioned herein.

Conclusion

The multiplicity of new threats facing the U.S. today are in reality older threats that have taken on more ominous forms. Organized crime is not new, but the scope of its activities has grown frighteningly large, and the consequences have taken on forms which are difficult to contemplate - but contemplate we should, and act we must.

First, since organized crime is now truly transnational and since certain of its main parts are cooperating on an unprecedented global scale, the intelligence community, along with those necessary law enforcement and military components, must become truly transnational. U.S. agencies cannot hope to compete against transnational criminal organizations unless they become transnational themselves in cooperating more closely with the agencies of other nations. Transnational cooperation must be preceded with unprecedented cooperation at home.

The type of coordination, cooperation and reorganization discussed herein would certainly increase the efficiency of each dollar spent in the intelligence community and that alone may be reason enough to do it. However, notwithstanding efficiencies gained, the principle reason for taking these steps may be the perspective gained. First, if the intelligence community is consolidated and reorganized without sacrificing competitive analysis to specifically address these new threats, then the targets become very real to both the intelligence community and policy makers and the resources are then more precisely aimed at the targets. In short, since the Enlargement part of the U.S. grand strategy of Engagement and Enlargement provides a larger environment in which criminal elements can operate, (including terrorists and those dealing in weapons of mass destruction) part of the grand strategy should become "Engagement of Organized Crime."

The second element of this perspective is that of seeing specific occurrences or events as part of a broader, more complete picture. The parts of a puzzle can more easily be pieced together when viewing a photograph of the whole picture. For example, reports of missing nuclear materials in Russia, reports of selling contraband, the movement of money, or the activities of terrorists might today be viewed as four separate events, perhaps involving four separate agencies, some of which may not even be American agencies. These events might not be tied together or investigated thoroughly unless seen in the context of a bigger picture, a potential new threat. If, on the other hand, these four events were tied together conceptually, and the U.S. intelligence assets are coordinated so that the threat is engaged more quickly and completely than if they were seen only as isolated events in a foreign country, perhaps the threat would remain merely a possibility. Let us hope that it will not take the deployment of a weapon of mass destruction stolen and sold for profit by a non-state actor such as the Russian Mafiya before fundamental changes occur.

Appendix

Development of the U.S. Intelligence Community

The United States has carried on foreign intelligence activities since the days of George Washington, but only since World War II have they been coordinated on a government-wide basis. 1. Mendel, William W., Col., U. S. Army (ret.). Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. "Planning for a New Threat Environment."
<http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/newthrt/newthrt.htm >. p. 1.

2. Mendel, William W., Col., U.S. Army (ret.). Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. "New Forces for Engagement Policy."
<http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/engage.htm >. p. 1.

3. Federation of American Scientists. Testimony of Frank Carlucci before a Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community.
<http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testcarl.htm. p. 2.

4. Mendel, "New Forces for Engagement Policy," p. 1.

5. Federation of American Scientists, Testimony of Frank Carlucci, pp.4-5.

6. Johnson, Loch K. Monitor-2. Strategic Intelligence and Weapons Proliferation.
<http://www.uga.edu/~cits/monit2-5.html, p. 1. (Expired)

7. Ibid. 8. Ibid.

9. Deutch, John M. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. DCI Speech 2/22/96: Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by the Director of Central Intelligence, John M. Deutch.
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/1996/dci_speech_022296.html >, p. 6.

10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., p. 7.

14. Cole, Richard M. "Government Fighting Terrorism--Within Limits." The Daily Oklahoman. 27 May 1997. Page 12.

15. Boswell, Steve. Northern Arizona University (Dept. of Political Science). The Russian Mafiya and the Global Capitalist System: A Marxist Perspective.
<http://csf.colorado.edu/gpe/termpapers/Boswell.mafiya.html> p. 1.

16. Deutch. Speech, p. 8. 17. Ibid. 18. Boswell, p. 8. 19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. United States Treasury Department--Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Money in a Borderless World: The Global Fight against Money Laundering.
<http://www.treas.gov/fincen/border.html >.

22. Boswell, p. 8.

23. Real-World Intelligence Alert. The Domestic Front.
<http://www.lookoutpoint.com/look/domestic.html >.

24. Deutch. Speech, p.3. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid.

28. GT OnLine World News. Britons Probed Report IRA Wanted Weapons in Russia (AP).
<http://www.usa.net/gtonline/archive/96-05-13/wor030.html, pp. 1-2. (Expired)

29. Pathfinder (Time Warner). Oct. 6, 1995 - The Atomic Marketplace.
<http://pathfinder.com/@@lhEe4AcAM1NbHdjk/Asiaweek/95/1006/feat5.html.

30. Deutch. Speech, p.7.

31. Kranz, Patricia. Russia's Really Hostile Takeovers.
<http://www.nd.edu:80/~astrouni/zhiwriter/spool/121.htm. August 14, 1995, p. 2. (Expired)

32. Real-World Intelligence Alert, p. 2. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Kranz., p.1.

36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., p.2. 38. Real-World Intelligence Alert, p.2.

39. Shabalin. Victor. J.L. Albini and R.E. Rogers. IASOC, The New Stage of the Fight against Organized Crime in Russia.
<http://www.acsp.uic.edu/iasoc/newstage.htm > p. 1.

40. Office of the Attorney General of California. Russian Organized Crime: Organization and Structure.
<http://www.xs4all.nl/~moscovia/crime2.html, p. 4. (Expired)

41. Brandt, Daniel. NameBase NewsLine. January-March 1995. Organized Crime Threatens the New World Order.
<http://www.alternatives.com/crime/BRANDT.html, p. 5.

42. The United States Mission to Italy. May 15, 1996. Russian Organized Crime Groups Rapidly Penetrating U.S..
<http://www.usis.it:80/wireless/wf960515/96051518.html. (Expired)

43. Office of the Attorney General of California. Russian Organized Criminal Activities in California.
<http://taren.ns.net/ag/gangs/rusorg4.html, p. 1. (Expired)

44. Ibid., p. 2. 45. Ibid., p. 3. 46. Ibid.

47. U.S. Department of State: Office of International Criminal Justice. Winter 1996. Office of International Criminal Justice.
<http://www.acsp.uic.edu/index.shtml >.

48. Office of the AG of CA. Organization and Structure, p. 3.

49. Office of the AG of CA. Criminal Activities, p. 4.

50. Richey, Warren. The Christian Science Monitor. "World's Cops Rev Up Strategies to Nab Cross-Border Car Thieves". Dec. 4, 1996, International.

51. Office of the AG of CA. Criminal Activities, p. 4.

52. The United States Mission to Italy, p. .

53. Feldstein, Mark. CNN Interactive. May 16, 1996. Russian Mob Gaining U.S. Foothold with Italian Help, Senators Told.
<http://cnn.com/US/9605/16/russian.mob/index.html >.

54. Office of the AG of CA. Criminal Activities p. 4. 55. Brandt, p. 6. 56. Ibid., p. 5.

57. Deutch, Speech, p. 8. 58. Office of the AG of CA. Criminal Activities, p. 4.

59. Brandt, p.3. 60. Ibid., p. 2.

61. Office of the AG of CA. Organization and Structure, p. 1.

62. Ibid., p. 2. 63. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

64. Goble, Paul. Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty. November 5, 1996. Russia: Analysis from Washington--Organized Crime's Three Faces.
<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1996/11/F.RU.961105151604.html, p. 1.

65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid.

68. Major, Ivan. Privatization in Eastern Europe. Edward Elgar Publishing Co. (Brookfield, VT: 1993), pp. 8-9.

69. Nikiforov, Vladimir. "The Soviet Mafia." The Tablet. February 3, 1990. pp. 131-134.

70. Boswell, p. 6.

71. Vaksberg, Arkady. The Soviet Mafia. (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, Ltd.) 1991.

72. Boswell, p. 6. 73. Ibid., p. 5. 74. Ibid., p. 6. 75. Ibid.

76. Ibid. 77. Ibid., p. 7. 78. Major, p. 23. 79. Ibid., p. 9.

80. Ibid., p.52. 81. Boswell, p. 4. 82. Ibid., p. 7. 83. Major, p. 52.

84. Ibid. 85. Ibid.

86. Albats, Yevgenia. The State within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia- Past, Present and Future. (New York: Farrar-Strauss-Giroux) 1994.

87. Boswell, p. 5.

88. Sterling, Claire. Thieves' World. (New York: Simon & Schuster) 1994.

89. Boswell, p. 7.

90. Chapylgin, Nikolai. "Power in Russia: The Criminals are Applauding." Argumenty I Fakti. 1994. No. 46. p.2.

91. Ibid.

92. Prism. 11 August Prism Part 2. "A Weekly on the Post-Soviet States."
<http://citm1.met.fsu.edu:80/~glenn/archive/msg00293.html>,p.3.

93. Ibid. 94. Ibid., p. 4. 95. Boswell, p. 4. 96. Kranz, p. 2.

97. Boswell, p. 5. 98. Kranz, p. 1 . 99. Reform and the Law in Russia, p.1.

100. Prism, pp. 1-2. 101. Reform and the Law in Russia, p. 1. 102. Kranz, p.2.

103. Ibid., p. 1. 104. Ibid.

105. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency.
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/index.html>. p. 1.

106. Ibid.

107. 104th Congress, 2nd Session. House Resolution 3259: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c104:./temp/~c104HJGkQR>.

108. Kitfield, James. "New Missions for America's Secret Army," PoliticsNow (CNN).
<http://www.politicsnow.com/news/NJournal/njarchive/0520spy.html>. May 20, 1996. p. 5.

109. Ibid., p. 3. 110. Ibid. 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid.

113. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/fbi.html>.

114. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Treasury Department--Office of Intelligence Support.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/tdois.html>.

115. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Department of Energy.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/doe.html>.

116. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Department of State--Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/dsbir.html>.

117. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Defense Intelligence Agency.
<http://www.odci.gov/dia.html>.

118. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Army Intelligence.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/ai.html>.

119. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Naval Intelligence.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/usic/ni.html>.

120. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Air Force Intelligence.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/afi.html>.

121. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Marine Corps Intelligence.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/mci.html>.

122. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. National Security Agency.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/nsa.html>.

123. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Central Imagery Office.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/cio.html>. (Expired)

124. National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Jan. 7, 1997. National Imagery and Mapping Agency Established.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/nima.html>.

125. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. National Reconnaissance Office.
<http://www.odci.gov/ic/nro.html>.

126. Office of the DCI. CIA. p. 1.

127. Ibid.

128. 104th Congress, 2nd Session. House Resolution 3259.

129. National Defense University. Strategic Assessment 1996: Elements of U.S. Power--Chapter Six: Intelligence.
<http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa96/sa96ch06.html. pp. 3-4.

130. Deutch, John M. The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Press Statement - October 31, 1995: Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch Statement to the Public on the Ames Damage Assessment.
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/archives/1995/ps103195.html>. p. 3.

131. National Defense University, p. 13. 132. Ibid., p. 4. 133. Ibid.

134. Ibid., p. 9.135. Ibid., p. 13.

136. Baker, Stewart, ed. American Bar Association. "Law Enforcement and Intelligence: An ABA Presidential Showcase Panel" Chicago, Illinois, August 6, 1995. p. 7.

137. Summers, Col. Henry G., Jr. (Ret.). The New World Strategy: A Military Policy for America's Future, (Touchstone: New York, 1995). p. 165.

138. Toeffler, Alvin. Future Shock. (Bantam: New York, 1970.)

139. Ibid. 140. Ibid. 141. National Defense University, p. 7.

142. Lawrence Livermore. National Laboratory. Stemming the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.
<http://www.llnl.gov/PAO/cbt4_testimony/03stemming.html. (Expired)

143. National Defense University, p. 7. 144. Ibid., p. 6. 145. Ibid., p. 7.

146. National Counterintelligence Center. NACIC.
<http://www.nacic.gov/cind/dirlett.htm>.

147. National Defense University, p. 11. 148. Ibid.

149. Federation of American Scientists, p. 4.

150. Ibid. 151. Baker, p. 13.

152. Clinton, Bill. 1996 National Security Strategy. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.
<http://www1.whitehouse.gov?WH/EOP/NSC/html/1996strategy.html>. February 1996.

153. Kitfield, p. 1. 154. Ibid. 155. Ibid., p. 2. 156. Mendel, p. 2.

157. Ibid. 158. Deutch. Press Statement, p. 3. 159. Baker, p. 3.

160. Ibid., p. 2. 161. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 162. U.S. DepState: OICJ, p. 2.

163. Freeh, Louis J. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the House Committee on International Relations, Hearing on Russian Organized Crime, April 30, 1996.
<http://www.fbi.gov/archives/congress/russian.htm >. p. 1.

164. Ibid. 165. Ibid., p. 4. 166. Ibid., p. 6. 167. Ibid., p. 7.

168. Two-Ten Communications Limited. International Investigators Target Russian-Speaking Organised Crime.
<http://www.open.gov.uk/ncis/press/russia.htm>. p. 1. (Expired)

169. U.S. DepState: OICJ, p. 1. 170. Baker, p. 14. 171. Deutch. Speech, p. 8.

172. Brandt, p. 3. 173. Kitfield, p. 5. 174. Baker, p. 4. 175. Ibid., p. 13.

176. Ibid., p. 14. 177. Brandt, p. 3. 178. Baker, p. 3. 179. Ibid.

180. U.S. DepState: OICJ, p. 3. 181. Ibid.

182. Netanyahu, Benjamin, ed. Terrorism: How the West Can Win. (Avon: New York, 1986), pp. 199-226.

183. Summers, p. 165. 184. Ibid., p. 172.

185. Gentry, John. Federation of American Scientists. "A Framework for Reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community."
<http://www.fas.org/irp/gentry/chapter4.html, p. 1.

186. Ibid. 187. Ibid. 188. Ibid. 189. Ibid., p. 4.190. Ibid.

191. Ibid.

192. Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Allan E. Goodman. Strategic Intelligence: for American National Security. (Princeton , New Jersey: Princeton University Press) 1989. pp. 131-136.

193. Gentry, p. 5. 194. Ibid.

195. Mendel. "New Forces for Engagement Policy," p. 1.

196. Ibid.

197. McGee, Jim. The Washington Post, Military Seeks Balance in Delicate Mission: The Drug War, November 29, 1996, p. A01.
<http://washingtonpost.com:80/wp-sr...te/1996-11/29/091L-112996-idx.html. (Expired)

198. Brender, Mark. ABC News Online. "From Peacekeepers to Police."
<http://www.abcnews.com:80/section/world/bosnia717_brender/index.html July 17, 1997. (Expired)

199. Mendel, "New Forces for Engagement Policy." p. 2. 200. Ibid.

201. Demarest, Geffrey. United States Army, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. "The Strategic Implications of Operational Law."
<http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/oplaw.htm >April 1995, p. 3.

202. Ibid., p. 5. 203. Ibid.

204. Newman, Richard J. U.S. News and Online Report. "At issue: Should troops hunt smugglers?"
<http://www.usnews.com:80/usnews/issue/970804/4bord.htm August 4, 1997.

205. Ibid. 206. 18 USCS &sect; 1968 207. Ibid.