To Stay Standing, Mahathir Must Shore Up His Base

By Philip Bowring International Herald Tribune.  Oct 24 1998 edition

KUALA LUMPUR - Malaysian politics has never been so difficult to define, let alone predict. That is bad news for the status quo and for the prime minister of 17 years, Mahathir bin Mohamad.

Mr. Mahathir still bestrides the scene, his personal authority over decisions of the governing party, the United Malays National Organization, never more apparent. Yet the base on which he stands has eroded dramatically over the past few weeks. Unless he can shore it up soon, the momentum for change, any change, could reach the level that persuaded President Suharto of Indonesia that his best service to his country was to quit.

Mr. Mahathir appears to have miscalculated on three fronts:

The extent of Malay sympathy for his detained former deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, whether or not any charges against him are proved.

The degree of local skepticism toward his economic agenda. The focus of discussion has shifted from capital controls, which had some nationalistic appeal, to measures to prop up politically connected big business.

A strongly negative regional reaction. It is one thing to engage in verbal jousts with the United States and Singapore, but it is quite another to be publicly at odds with the new leaders of ethnic Malay neighbors, presidents Joseph Estrada of the Philippines and B.J. Habibie of Indonesia. Thailand, also, openly contrasts its policies with those of Malaysia.

Mr. Mahathir still has plenty of cards in his hand. His grip on the governing party executive is firm, and his appointees are hard at work rooting out Anwar supporters and forming new party branches in readiness for the United Malays National Organization's assembly in mid-1999, when the party hierarchy will be determined. There is no one of much stature around the prime minister, and his failure so far to appoint a new deputy will ensure rivalry among the contenders.

Also, his economic stimulus behind the new capital control walls may bring sufficient relief by next year to confound his critics. Much Malay big business is still beholden to the government for survival. Chinese business prefers Mr. Mahathir to the likely alternatives, and even much foreign business judges him more on the achievements of the past decade than on recent performance.

Among many middle-class Malays and most of their Chinese counterparts, there is suspicion of Mr. Anwar's religious background and fears that he will try to appeal to Muslim orthodoxy to build support. Others worry about Mr. Anwar's judgment in his choice of business associates. Should they not stick with the devil they know?

The Chinese have mostly stayed clear of the Anwar issue, suggesting that this is a Malay and party issue rather than a national one. Malay divisions are dangerous for other races, the argument goes, so minorities should keep their heads down and hope the Malays will sort themselves out.

However, events may be overwhelming this hands-off attitude.

The persistence of demonstrations against the government has surprised most observers. Sympathy for Mr. Anwar may be the immediate cause, but pressure for change of all sorts is widespread. Demands to end the Internal Security Act, stop the use of the law to incarcerate political opponents, end crony capitalism and improve the standing of the judiciary have been taken up by a wide coalition of interests. Even the Bar Council of Malaysia has weighed in with a unanimous condemnation of official actions.

For the United Malays National Organization, the worry is that an increasing number of Malay voters will abstain or, worse, vote for the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, the only viable Malay opposition, even if they do not really agree with its conservative Muslim agenda. A general election is not obligatory before early 2000, so there is still plenty of time for the United Malays National Organization to reverse the trend. But its officials have to take the Islamic party seriously in urban centers, not just in rural areas.

This prospect is even more worrying for non-Malays. But what are they to do about it? The Chinese and Indian parties in government have no clout and will stick to Mr. Mahathir as long as the United Malays National Organization does. But others are beginning to think that non-Malays should play a larger role in influencing the national agenda to achieve change while keeping religious and ethnic extremism at bay.

Whatever his faults, Mr. Mahathir has always emphasized Malaysian rather than just Malay identity. His characteristically acerbic views on some manifestations of Islam have hurt his image among religious conservatives.

Indeed, were non-Malays more convinced of Mr. Anwar's commitment to the liberal as well as reform agenda, his support would be greater. Mr. Mahathir may be authoritarian but his agenda is instinctively modernist and secular. Is multiracial, middle-class reform possible? Or will reform be captured by the religious right?

It is not difficult to sketch a gloomy scenario for Malaysia, wherein Mr. Mahathir's intransigence and the country's continuing economic decline result in deeper splits among Malays, leading to more dangers of electoral advances by the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party and a contest centered on attitudes toward religion. Mr. Anwar's political future becomes linked to the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party. Finally, relations with Singapore deteriorate as the Malaysian government seeks to stir up nationalist issues against its neighbor to divert attention from domestic ills. This in turn stirs Chinese-Malay suspicions.

In the shorter term, Mr. Mahathir faces the likelihood of repeated huge demonstrations during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in mid-November. Beyond that is the probability that whatever the verdict of the courts, Mr. Anwar will haunt Mr. Mahathir as Ninoy Aquino haunted the Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi haunts the Burmese rulers.

On the other hand, Malaysia remains a generally prosperous and upwardly mobile country. There is a huge built-in interest in stability and in continuing modernization that cuts across races and classes. For all the authoritarian instincts that have flourished under Mr. Mahathir, there are many aspects of Malaysia that are plural, open and partly democratic. Its civil service still sometimes acts as a restraining force on politicians.

The United Malays National Organization is a party that intends to remain in power. Ultimately it must rely on its Malay voters to do so. In the end it is the party's survivalist instinct that could be Mr. Mahathir's biggest threat. Despite the last two decades, the party is ultimately still bigger than its president, Mr. Mahathir. If the younger (and now educated) Malay generation thinks it would be better off with a nonentity acceptable to everyone than with a divisive, aging hero, the mantle will pass.

Unlike Indonesia, Malaysia does have a tested succession mechanism. The question now is how and when the button will be pushed to set it in motion.