

# The Deterioration of Sino-Japanese Relations after Tiananmen<sup>0</sup>

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## Abstract

Japan is still the second largest world economy, the dominant economy and financial center in Asia, and China's biggest trade partner. However, on the contrary, the political relations between China and Japan have deteriorated severely after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, even though there exists no vital interest conflict between the two countries. With a new perspective of democracy, human rights, and people's security, this essay attempts to review the changes in Sino-Japanese relations since June 1989 until June 2005. It explains why China had to adjust its Japan policy to undergo unexpected, unintended and undesired transformation in the post-Cold War in East Asia region. It also reveals how once a remote nightmare of Japan's eventual military alliance with the U.S. against China, even not necessarily over Taiwan, comes into emerging. It concludes that only China's democratization will re-transform the PRC foreign policy, particular its Japan policy, for a better future of people's security and economic prosperity in East Asia.

### *The Recent Sino-Japanese Conflicts*

Japan is still the second largest world economy, and is the dominant economy and financial center in Asia. In 2001, Japan became China's largest trade partner, with the trade between them amounted \$90 billion. In 2003, that amount increased to \$130 billion, and China became Japan's largest trade partner too. This is a natural and normal development of the mutual-supplementary Sino-Japanese economy and it has long been anticipated even by Japan's Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in the 1950s. However, the political relations between China and Japan have become tenser and tenser after the end of the Cold War, and the PRC's Japan policy has reached its limitation under current circumstance. Since Japan's rising to world power was the same process of China's declining to the edge of bankruptcy,<sup>1</sup> some observers see Sino-Japanese interactive as a "zero-sum" game. Will China's emergence as a political, economic and even a financial powerhouse in the region inevitably exacerbate Japan's economic troubles (such as deflation, bank ills, and hollowing industries)?

The recent Sino-Japanese troubles support this concern. The 2004 Asian Cup soccer tournament, which was held in China, developed into a "Chinese nationalism vs. Japan" game all over China. In the final China vs. Japan championship on August 7 in Beijing, the Chinese government

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<sup>1</sup> Besides the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, if you have a chance to visit rural Japanese villages, you will easily find memorials devoted to every Japan-engaged war. The Japanese national goal was through "koyohei" (strong army) to "fukoku" (wealthy state), and Japan's advanced nationwide education system, which was established mainly through war gains, became the base for the Japanese miracle decades later without a formal army (officially, Japan's peaceful constitution prohibits Japan from keeping military forces).

mobilized 47 thousand police forces to protect the Japanese team and their cheering watchers.<sup>2</sup>

On February 2005, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Washington issued a joint statement which declared that their common strategic objectives include to: “Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.”<sup>3</sup> This is the first time that Japan makes a military statement concerning Taiwan’s future. In April 2005, anti-Japanese demonstrations erupted in almost every big cities in China. For example, in China’s economic center Shanghai, the Japanese consulate building was attacked and damaged, and some Japanese citizens were threatened.<sup>4</sup>

Why the Sino-Japanese political relations deteriorated so pessimistically even though there exists no vital interest conflict between the two countries? The turning point is the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, and both the Chinese political situations and the Japanese political structural have experienced undesired changes after the Tiananmen Incident. These changes made the Sino-Japanese relations change unavoidable, as well as predictable.

### ***Reversing the PRC’s Foreign Policy Transition***

The PRC foreign policy concluded its greatest transition with Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping’s meetings with Gorbachev in May 1989. For China, Taiwan was not reunified yet, but that was not a particular worry. The U.S. had promised to gradually reduce weapons sale to Taiwan in

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<sup>2</sup> Asahi Shinbum, August 9, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html>.

<sup>4</sup> For an inside information, refer to Jing Zhao’ report at Kakehashi Weekly, May 23, 2005, No.1879, <http://www.jrcl.net/web/p01b.html> (Tokyo).

the 1981 Sino-American Shanghai Communiqué. Time would solve this problem. Finally, China obtained the most favorite international environment since the Opium War one and half century ago. China's friends were all over the world. The Chinese political system also became much more open and freer in the 1980s since virtually all core members in the second generation of the CCP leadership, such as the top three party veterans, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and Peng Zhen, were victims of Mao Zedong's dictatorship.<sup>5</sup> They had learned enough lessons from their own bitter experience of inner party struggles, -at least the Chinese people hoped so.

Besides, rather than challenging the U.S. worldwide hegemony, China desperately needed America's help in developing its economy, which had been the top priority of China's "Reform and Open up" policy, and became the CCP's new legitimacy to rule China. Under such a political circumstance, human rights could hardly become an important issue to hinder Sino-American relations.<sup>6</sup> The U.S. government was still supporting a dictatorial regime in Taiwan and the exiling Dalai Lama in India. However, it was widely expected by Chinese government and people that Taiwan would eventually be reunified after Hong Kong's reversion, and the Tibet problem was merely a question of how long the current Dalai Lama would physically live

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<sup>5</sup> Mao himself was a victim of the inner party struggle until he finally established his power since the Zunyi Meeting during the Long March in 1935, and he was much softer than Lenin and Stalin. Except the few senior CCP leaders who directly challenged Mao's power at his late age, almost all victims survived so they had a second or third chance to come back to power again.

<sup>6</sup> The West knew that there were political prisons in Chinese jails or labor camps. A Chinese tennis athlete's defection made a hotline news of Sino-American relations. However, as long as China would not make explicit public mistakes, there was no issue to ignite the American general public against China.

in this world. The mainstream American politics and media would have not much material for agitating the general public to contain China. As for Japan, the majority of Japanese people were still enjoying the special “nicchu yuko” (Sino-Japanese friendship) because China gave up the war reparations request when restoring their diplomatic relations in 1972.

The 1989 Tiananmen Incident ended the Cold War in East Asia with a very characteristic beginning: the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the main instrument of the Chinese Revolution, was mobilized to crack down the PRC’s own civilian people in the heart of the PRC politics. It is true that the CCP regime had oppressed the Chinese people since the founding of the PRC; nonetheless, Deng Xiaoping’s brutality<sup>7</sup> was exposed to the world which ended the legitimacy of the CCP’s one-party dictatorship to rule China. The Tiananmen Incident showed the world how ruthless and unpopular the CCP regime was, and how weak the PRC foundation was. It created public enemies all over the world. Human rights became a hot issue of Sino-American relations, and virtually all other important disputes from then on (security, trade, IPR, and the Taiwan problem) were linked to the PRC’s democracy and human rights condition, because China has been judged “standing on the wrong side of history” (President Clinton to Jiang Zemin). The CCP leadership was denounced in the world. With the legitimacy under crisis, the PRC foreign policy was caught. This affected the process of the post-Cold War

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<sup>7</sup> We now know that even Yang Shangkun, the then PRC President and Vice Chairman of the CCP Military Central Committee, opposed opening fire to civilian people. He told Dr. Jiang Yanyong that this is a grave mistake and the CCP must correct it. Li Peng, the “butcher” Prime Minister, also wrote a book recently (which was not allowed to publish) to plead innocence claiming that he was just following Deng’s order.

political transformation in the world, which in turn, forced China to adjust its foreign policy to cope with the consequences following the incident. Especially, the PRC's Japan policy was forced to undergo unexpected and undesired transformation in the post-Cold War frame.

### ***Japan's Response to the Tiananmen Incident***

Japan fully utilized the international context to achieve its national goal of economic growth since the end of the Second World War. In the post-war democratic system, the pro-USA ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) knew what Japan should do and what Japan could not do. Many Japanese commentators claimed that is Japan's "first rate of economy, third rate of politics" period, but I always pointed out that it's the most democratic period in Japan's history. The "miracle" of Japanese politics made the miracle of Japanese economy possible. The so-called LDP conservative mainstream (hoshu honryu), from former Prime Ministers Yoshida Shigeru to Miyazawa Kiichi in 1993, stick with the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine" restricting Japan from rearmament. Although the Japanese government was caught by the America-seeded "Northern Territories" problem and could not make a peace treaty with the USSR or Russia even up until today,<sup>8</sup> it successfully utilized America's fear of Japan's political neutrality potential to force the U.S. to provide capital, technology and market for Japan's economic growth. Tanaka Kakuei even went to China and established diplomatic relations with China without America's

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<sup>8</sup> For this Russo-Japanese territory dispute, see (in Japanese) Takahashi Yoshikazu, "Against Japan's imperialist territory request, to strengthen internationalism". *Kakehashi Weekly*, June 8, 1998. Tokyo: New Time Press; (in Chinese) Jing Zhao, "The so-called Northern Territories problem". *October Review*, 1998, No. 4, Hong Kong.

approval.<sup>9</sup>

In the Cold War period, virtually all Japanese opposition parties, including the second largest opposition party Komei Party (translated in English as Clean Government Party), were socialistic oriented. The progressive pro-PRC opposition also played an indispensable role for Japan's national interest. China "enjoyed" popular support or sympathy from almost all Japanese people, including many LDP politicians. When Zhou Enlai stated that the PRC would not deal with a Japanese government under Sato, Sato's cabinet collapsed and was replaced by Tanaka who stated his willingness to go Beijing. Thus it is easy to understand how deeply the entire Japanese society was shocked by the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 and how the incident would affect the Japanese political structure. The opposition parties either collapsed (the Socialist Party), turned round to the ruling party (Komei Party), shifted to nationalistic line (the Japanese Communist Party),<sup>10</sup> or simply disappeared without any reason to exist (the Democratic Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Alliance).

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<sup>9</sup> He was eventually punished, though. The U.S. declassified a Senate hearing indicating Tanaka took 500 million yen bribes from Lockheed for the Japanese government to purchase Lockheed airplanes. Humiliated and convicted guilty, Tanaka was forced to hand over LDP's largest faction to Takeshita Noboru and to leave the Japanese politics. Not coincidentally, his popular daughter was also fired from her Foreign Minister position by Prime Minister Koizumi in April 2002, partly because of her pro-Beijing remarks and critical remarks of the newly elected U.S. President Bush.

<sup>10</sup> The small but strong Japanese Communist Party was once declared by the CCP as one of its four enemies in Japan, along with the American Imperialists. For the transformation of the Japanese Communist Party after the Tiananmen Incident, see Jing Zhao: The Japanese Communist Party and the June 4<sup>th</sup> Incident of 1989. Sino-Japanese Studies, pp.25-32, No. 12:1, 1999.



The Socialist Party (JSP) was the largest opposition party and the only party in Japan to keep an official friendship with the CCP based on similar socialistic ideology. In 1959 the JSP Central Committee Chairman Asanuma declared in Beijing that the American Imperialism was the common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese peoples. Such close ties with the CCP (hence the PRC government) greatly enforced its bargain power within Japanese politics. For example, in the 1980s, the JSP provided information of Japanese Education Ministry's textbook censorship to the PRC and requested the PRC to respond. After the PRC criticized Japan's denial of its past war atrocities,<sup>11</sup> the JSP could raise this issue in Japan's Diet to blame the ruling LDP. The Japanese government hated the JSP, and the Japanese embassy in Beijing was always busy to collect JSP delegation's information in China, but the LDP could not curse the JSP too much because they themselves were more corrupt under the U.S. control (some times directly).<sup>12</sup> The very existence of the JSP, a powerful political ally of the PRC in the Japanese politics, was a grateful blessing to the PRC's Japan policy. On the other hand, the JSP's dramatic collapse due to the Tiananmen Incident verifies how deeply the JSP depended on China and the international Cold War context. Its successor Social Democratic Party now has only a few seats in the Japanese Congress, lacking the necessary number to introduce a bill.

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<sup>11</sup> For example, Japan's invasion of China was described as "shinshutsu (advance) to China".

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, "The 1955 system and the American connection: a bibliographic introduction"; Norbert A. Schlei, "Japan's 'M-Fund' memorandum, 7 January 1991"; Michael Schaller, "America's favorite war criminal: Kishi Nobusuke and the transformation of U.S.-Japan relations". Also see David Kaplan, "U.S. propaganda efforts in postwar Japan". Japan Policy Research Institute Working paper #11, July 1995 and Critique, February 1997.

Compared with the JSP, Komei's political turning round was much easier and natural, since it did not have a clear political principle. Komei silently dropped off all "socialist" wordings from its charters, pamphlets, meetings, and advertisements. Komei and its grassroots election body Soka Gakkai's paramount leader Ikeda Taisaku went to Beijing to meet Li Peng soon after the Tiananmen Incident. He obtained another handshake photo with a "world leader".<sup>13</sup> Komei also abandoned its peace and constitution-protection line. Since the LDP usually could not control both the House of Representative and the House of Councillors,<sup>14</sup> Komei's stance sometimes could determine Japan's important policies. In 1991, Komei's agreement made it possible for the LDP Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki to send the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) minesweepers to Gulf even though the war had ended. In 1992, Komei helped the LDP pass Japan's PKO (peace keeping organizations) bill, which legally authorizes sending the SDF abroad, under the flag of the UN. In July 1999, Komei formally decided to share power with its life-long enemy the LDP and Ozawa Ichiro's Liberal Party. During the meeting between the heads of Komei and the LDP, Prime Minister Obuchi especially mentioned Komei's role in

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<sup>13</sup> Ikeda's life-long goal is Nobel Peace Prize. Increasing Ikeda's handshake pictures with "world leaders" becomes one important accomplishment of Komei-Soka Gakkai's worldwide diplomatic activities.

<sup>14</sup> The House of Representatives were elected from middle (and later small) election districts, so the LDP usually could obtain more than half seats with less than one third popular votes. The House of Councillors were elected rationally from popular votes, so the LDP alone usually could not become the majority. When there is a conflict to form a cabinet, the House of Representatives is superior, but important bills/acts should be passed in both houses to become laws.

establishing Japan's "normalization" relationship with China.<sup>15</sup> However, this time, Komei's contribution to the Japanese national interest would no longer benefit China any more.

The Japanese government collaborated with the Chinese government to persecute Chinese people in Japan after the Tiananmen Incident.<sup>16</sup> It could not, nor has the willing to use the "democracy and human rights" card against China. Backed by Japanese people's attitude change toward China<sup>17</sup> and the Japanese politics "regime shift" since the Tiananmen Incident, the Japanese government for the first time sent a clear "No!" signal to China in 1995 by freezing a small fraction of that year's ODA (Japan's governmental Official Development Aid). More and more Japanese people are influenced by rightist media (such as Sankei, Yomiuri) to connect their attitude change to the ODA issue.<sup>18</sup> Japan used the pretext of China's two nuclear tests that year,

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<sup>15</sup> Since the JSP was China's public ally in Japan during the whole period of Cold War, Zhou Enlai knew that the LDP would not make a deal with China through the JSP. Instead, he had to utilize Komei, whose Central Committee Chairman Takeiri had personal connection with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, at the final stage to negotiate the core conditions (Taiwan status and war reparations).

<sup>16</sup> Jing Zhao, "The Betrayal of Democracy: Tiananmen's Shadow over Japan."

<http://www.hapress.com/haol.php?a=n04a02>, Historia Actual On-Line Year II. No.. 4. Spring 2004.

<sup>17</sup> Yomiuri Daily has a series of survey of Japanese people's attitude toward China since 1988. In the first time survey, 76% answered to trust China, while 14.2% answered not to trust China. In 2002 (August 24th and 25th), 37% answered to trust China, while 55% answered not to trust China. (Yomiuri, September 11, 2002.) Notice that the rightist Yomiuri does not have a favourable relationship with China, so the above numbers may not be accurate. But the Japanese people's attitude change toward China is clear and sharp.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. Yomiuri (September 11, 2002) survey shows 43% Japanese wanted to reduce ODA, 13% wanted to stop ODA to China.

emphasizing its unique experience as the world's only nuclear victim. China was annoyed. The PRC Ambassador rebuked: "Japan should first leave the nuclear umbrella under the world's solo superpower before criticizing China for developing its moderate nuclear capacity." China's Vice Premier Qian Qichen told Japan's Foreign Minister Kawaguchi: "It is understandable for Japan to reduce the ODA. However, we cannot accept the pretext of China's military expansion."<sup>19</sup> Some Chinese media asked: "If Japan can use the small amount of ODA as a diplomatic tool against China, why our government cannot use the huge amount of war reparations?"

In fact, the Chinese government has changed its policy on the war reparations issue, from suppressing its own people to tolerating, encouraging, and supporting the Chinese victims seeking for reparations from both the Japanese government and Japanese companies.<sup>20</sup> This is a positive change, because the Chinese government can no longer monopolize the PRC's Japan policy. The Chinese official line now becomes: "Although the Chinese government gave up the 120 billion USD of state-to-state reparations, however, under no circumstance the Chinese government gave up the 180 billion USD of individual reparation requests."<sup>21</sup> Neither the Japanese government nor the Japanese people are prepared to face to this "already settled"

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<sup>19</sup> Mainichi Daily, September 10, 2002.

<sup>20</sup> Unlike many other democratic activists for domestic political reform who were persecuted or harassed by the Chinese government, activists on this reparations issue enjoyed wide connections with various governmental officials.

<sup>21</sup> Wang Xianyong, "How did we give up the Sino-Japanese war reparations". Dangshi wenhui (The CCP History Collection), July 2002.

reparations issue between China and Japan.<sup>22</sup> The Sino-Japanese friendship, based on the bitter experience of the worst war between the two peoples, was buried by their governments due to China and Japan's domestic politics to deter democracy. Using the pretence of anti-terrorism, which has nothing to do with Japan's security at all, the Japanese government is rushing to prepare a series of subsequent war-related acts and to sanction the "national flag" Hinomaru and "national anthem" Kimigayo with the goal to revise its peaceful constitution and to rearm Japan.<sup>23</sup>

### ***The Root Cause of Sino-Japanese Conflicts***

A historical event occurred in one site always brings about significant responses in global settings. Deng Xiaoping's crushing of the democracy movement in Beijing helped and encouraged the regimes in other countries, especially in Japan, to utilize this incident to pursue their own policies deterring democracy. The ending of Cold War in East Asia on June 4, 1989 sent the Japanese ruling class a misleading signal that they could mislead Japan from an

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<sup>22</sup> For a thorough survey on this issue, see Yan-Jun Yin, *Chunichi Senso Baisho Mondai--Chogoku kokuminseifu no senji/sengo tainichiseisaku wo chushin ni* (Sino-Japanese War Reparations). Japan: Ochanomizu shobo, 1996. See Jing Zhao's review of the book for H-Japan, April 1997. <http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=2385874357020>.

<sup>23</sup> The Japanese constitution chapter II "Renunciation of war" has only one article: "Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

economic giant to a global political power. In more than one decade, the destruction of the opposition has undermined Japan's relatively democratic system<sup>24</sup> and relatively independent foreign policy. A Japanese professor observed of the Japan-United States relationship in "a situation that can only be described as 'extreme abnormality' has become the norm."<sup>25</sup> With Japan's deepening domestic conflicts among different classes, the stagnate economy, and the corrupt politics, the Japanese ruling class has less and less options, except nationalistic militarism.<sup>26</sup> In fact, even though the Japanese government has not publicly abandoned its "three non-nuclear principles," when will Japan declare nuclear is a problem of time under current international political trend. Should another Tiananmen Incident occur again, the majority of

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<sup>24</sup> The single district election "reform," as in the US., helps artificially make up Japan's two-party system, thus makes constitution revision much easier. Previously, because one district could elect multiple representatives, more than two parties could compete against each other with various policy appealings.

<sup>25</sup> In "Toward an Independent Japanese Relationship with the United States," Ito Narihiko observed: the US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, who ordered the Koizumi Cabinet to "show the flag" and get "boots on the ground," recently stated in an interview that "Article 9 of the Constitution interferes in the Japanese-American Alliance" (Bungei Shunju, March, 2004). In discussions with LDP Secretary General Abe Shinzo, Armitage also declared that "the Japanese-American Alliance is going after North Korea" (Bungei Shunju, July 2004)". Ito's article appeared in Gunshuku (Arms Control), August 2004, was translated for Japan Focus by Vanessa B Ward at <http://japanfocus.org/175.html>.

<sup>26</sup> Yomiuri (September 11, 2002) survey shows total to 70% Japanese from different aspects consider China's military strength a future threat to Japan's security. The rightist Yomiuri does not have a good relationship with China, so the above number may not be representative of the general Japanese public, but the figure is still astonishing.

Japanese people would be easily agitated to rearm Japan.<sup>27</sup>

With the victory confirmed in Europe after years of the USSR dissolution, the U.S. turned eyes to East Asia, the world dynamic economic growth center. Now the Jiang Zemin regime had consolidated their power base and the PRC restored its relatively normal relations with the world. In 1994, the Clinton Administration had to unlink the annual renew condition of China's most-favorite-nation (MFN) status from China's human rights condition. The Taiwan problem has become the "core issue"<sup>28</sup> in Sino-American relations. To use the Taiwan card to "engage" (contain) China, the Clinton Administration turned to the almost forgotten "oxygen":<sup>29</sup> the U.S.-Japan military alliance.

Originally, the Taiwan problem was China's domestic unification process from a prolonged civil war.<sup>30</sup> However, the international reality, added by the PRC domestic problems and foreign

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<sup>27</sup> Since the September 17, 2002 summit between Koizumi and Kim, the possibility of Japan's utilizing the North Korea card to develop nuclear weapons is low. Militarily, there is no need for Japan to participate a U.S.-South Korea action to subjugate North Korea. Japan's involvement would make such a military action difficult.

<sup>28</sup> In fact, from the view of China, it has always been the most important issue between China and the U.S. since the foundation of the PRC. However, it was not the priority issue for more than two decades in the late Cold War period.

<sup>29</sup> This was coined by Joseph Nye, Clinton's Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and a point man on Asia policy. He said when the Defense Department announced a floor of 100,000 troops in East Asia: "While we are indeed stressing the increased importance of multilateral institutions, it's not at the cost of our primary attention to reinforcing the traditional security alliances we have in the region." (Washington Post, February 28, 1995)

<sup>30</sup> We can trace this perspective from the anti-imperialism Chinese Revolution for people's liberation or people's

policy mistakes, transformed the development and aspects of the Taiwan question into a PRC-U.S.-Japan tripartite interplay. The U.S. pushed Japan to “redefine” the U.S.-Japanese Security frame to transform it from the “exclusively defense-oriented” (*senshu boe*) regime to a global military alliance so Japan would be able to participate global actions with the U.S. forces. In 1996 the U.S. and Japan signed the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration and began to revise the 1978 “Defense Guidelines”. In 1999 Japan’s Diet passed three new Defense Guidelines acts to ensure that Japan would mobilize its national resources to support any U.S.-initiated military actions in “area surrounding Japan.”<sup>31</sup> After the SCC joint statement on February 2005, the Japanese Cabinet Secretary claimed that “Taiwan was included in the U.S.-Japanese alliance from the beginning of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty”! Once a remote nightmare,<sup>32</sup> Japan’s eventual military alliance with the U.S. against China over Taiwan, i.e., a de facto triangle alliance of Washington-Tokyo-Taipei to contain China, has emerged. Without a political ally inside the

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rights to peaceful life without foreign intervention. The problem is that the PRC foreign policy no longer hold this stance. So, what is the legitimacy for the PRC to rule Taiwan?

<sup>31</sup> Inside the ruling LDP, only the former Kato faction did not belong to the so-called Taiwan Gang. Kato went to Beijing to explain that 90% Japanese regard “area surrounding Japan” as North Korea, but the Cabinet Secretary-Chief Kajiyama corrected Kato stating “area surrounding Japan” includes Taiwan. In April 2002, Kato was forced to resign for tax deviance, even though that is just a common practice by almost all Japanese politicians. He dissolved his LDP faction and lost his hope to become the Prime Minister.

<sup>32</sup> For example, Asai Motofumi, a former MOFA China Section Chief, now an international politics professor at Meijigakuin University, is a famous critic of Japan’s current foreign policy. He argues that, from the minimum moral standard, Japan should not to be involved into a Taiwan conflict under any circumstance. After all, Japan’s colonization caused the Taiwan problem from the beginning.



Japanese politics, and most significantly, without a democratic mechanism inside China, the PRC's Japan policy under Jiang Zemin was left very narrow space to maneuver. The consequence of the Japanese politics in turn reacts on Chinese politics and shadows forth the Sino-Japanese relations. With the regime in Beijing oppressive to and the regime in Tokyo hostile to the Chinese people, how could Sino-Japanese relations be manipulated?

The selection of the PRC Foreign Minister itself is a show case of the PRC foreign policy. When Tang Jiaxuan was picked up by Jiang Zemin to become PRC's Foreign Minister in 1998,<sup>33</sup> most people predicted a hopeful Sino-Japanese relations because this was the first time a "Japan expert"<sup>34</sup> became PRC's Foreign Minister. Jing Zhao expressed concern and warning for the coming Sino-Japanese troubles because of Tang Jiaxuan.<sup>35</sup> Zhao knew Tang's climb-up thoroughly: as Minister-counselor and minister of Chinese Embassy in Japan in 1988-1991, Tang was in charge of oppressing Chinese students' democratic movement in Japan. Compared with his colleagues in other Western countries, it was very easy for him to collaborate with the Japanese government to persecute Chinese students in Japan.<sup>36</sup> The deterring of democracy

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<sup>33</sup> See his career at <http://english.people.com.cn/data/people/tangjiaxuan.shtml> .

<sup>34</sup> In my opinion, Tang is merely a translator. He lacks some basic diplomatic training. For example, he liked to show off his Japanese language level rather than his PRC Foreign Minister position when meeting with Japanese. Unfortunately, his Japanese language is not so fluent. In one situation, when he spoke to the Japanese media in Japanese, he did not understand the Japanese word "genmei" has three meanings (two meanings are "to formally state" and "to strictly order"). So when a Japanese correspondent asked how Tang Jiaxuan, a foreign official, could "strictly order" the Japanese Foreign Minister, Tang answered in Japanese: "Yes, I genmei'ed her."

<sup>35</sup> See Jing Zhao's various postings in H-Japan, H-US-Japan in 1998.

<sup>36</sup> Eventually, I became the only Chinese student to be suspended of my scholarship, to be expelled from Japan's

unavoidably deteriorated the Sino-Japanese political relations irreversibly. The two regimes in Beijing and Tokyo betrayed and failed the Sino-Japanese friendship bitterly.

***Conclusion: Toward People's Security in East Asia***

We are living in a sole super-power era, and the super-power is much more powerful in military, economic, political, technological, and cultural influence than any empire throughout history. Since the U.S. President announced that any country that is not “with us” is “against us”, no country, even China, dares to risk standing defiant of U.S. demands. However, on the other hand, as the anti-war presidential candidate Howard Dean pointed out: “America’s war in Iraq is also the beginning of the end of the American Empire.” Especially in East Asia area, China’s rising can no longer be ignored; it is playing more and more important roles in almost every international fields.<sup>37</sup>

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universities, was beaten by a Chinese spy hired by a Japanese national university, and was followed by Japanese secret and public polices until I fled out of Japan in 1995. See Jing Zhao, “The Betrayal of Democracy: Tiananmen’s Shadow over Japan.” <http://www.hapress.com/haol.php?a=n04a02>, *Historia Actual On-Line Year II*. No.. 4. Spring 2004.

<sup>37</sup> For example, before September 11, 2001, some Americans indicated that not only Seoul, but also Pyongyang and Beijing should accept the idea of a U.S. military presence in Korea even after the unification (Avery Goldstein, U.S. policies toward Asia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 17, 2001). However, the Bush Administration now has to rely on China to deal with North Korea.

In the regard of East Asia's future, while focus is on whether the U.S. and China could find a method to compromise over Taiwan,<sup>38</sup> and people's security and prosperity are under threat from the hegemonic U.S.-Japanese military alliance and Taiwan's irresponsible independent attempts, for the Chinese people, the most danger is the PRC one-party dictatorial political system. People hoped Jiang Zemin's stepping down from the Chinese politics in September 2004 provides a chance for the new Hu Jintao leadership to clear out Tiananmen's shadow over the PRC foreign policy. Although the new Hu regime has disappointed people, the PRC foreign policy is still undergoing transformation, and it is the Chinese people's responsibility to help, to push, and to force the new regime to change. Among so many powers/forces/actors in this area, only China's democratization will not only achieve a peaceful reform for domestic social justice and political freedom, but also re-transform the PRC foreign policy toward people's security and economic prosperity. Never before in the modern history, the Chinese people have a greater role to determine their own fate. Never before in the modern history, the Chinese people will make a greater contribution to East Asia and the world's security, peace and prosperity.

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<sup>38</sup> Human rights issue is not vital to both sides, and the Taiwan problem is not so vital to the U.S. interest as it to China. That is the reason the U.S. maintains an "ambiguity strategy" policy on Taiwan. Since the Bush Administration has created so many enemies in the world, it's ability to "protect Taiwan" has been reduced. On the other hand, as pointed out by Renmin University's Song Xinning at the International Symposium and Annual Conference of the Association of Chinese Political Studies, San Francisco State University, July 29-31, 2005, the current CCP leadership has given up the will to "unify" China in their generation, so they made "Anti-secession Laws" rather than "Unification Laws" to maintain status quo.