The Sunday Leader - 10/3/99
Find alternatives to talking to the
Tigers
By Qadri Ismail.
Pragmatism, I have often felt, is the asylum of the dull, the
unimaginative, those who don't think. Actually, I have nothing
against the practical in its place. I wish, for instance, that
the yellow pages also listed its entries alphabetically. Its
system of classification necessitates training in taxonomy to
locate certain numbers like, say, the Women and Media Collective.
That kind of pragmatism is designed to make life easy. Then there
are those to whom pragmatism is a convenient excuse for not
solving problems.
Example: the people who argue that the national question cannot
be settled without talking to the Tigers. Some hold this for
ethical reasons; they believe the LTTE is the legitimate and
exclusive representative of the Tamils. But most proponents of
this position advocate it on 'pragmatic' grounds: we don't have
an alternative. The LTTE is comprehensively armed, superbly
organised, tactically brilliant and not about to be militarily
defeated even in the next millenium despite the daydreams of
Anuruddha Ratwatte. So, we must come to terms with it. I have an
equally practical response to this. Could the realists make one
citation, just one, from the LTTE record which would convince a
person of average intelligence that it might, just might,
compromise on Eelam? That would persuade even a person of less
than average intelligence that it wants anything other than
negotiations aimed at transferring power to, and demarcating the
borders of, a new state? Let me, in a practical spirit, remind
the pragmatic of a few things. Back in 1981, the LTTE disrupted
the DDC elections. This was way before July 1983.
Appapillai Amirthalingam prevailed upon Uma Maheswaran and
Velupillai Prabhakaran to give the DDCs a chance; Junius Richard
Jayewardene, it was felt, had finally delivered. Mr Prabhakaran,
who wanted his Eelam, did not listen. Given subsequent events, Mr
Prabakharan turned out to be right; but he couldn't have known
that before the polls. In 1987, India wanted him to accept
provincial councils. The powerful Indian state, it was felt,
would force the promise-breaking Jayewardene to finally keep his
word. But Mr Prabhakaran, who wanted his Eelam, would not settle
for less. In 1995, the LTTE broke off negotiations with the only
anti-racist government we have ever had. (Okay, okay; at least
the president and a minister or three are not racist.) At that
stage, the PA government would have granted virtually anything.
But the LTTE leader, who wanted his Eelam, went back to war. If
all this ain't enough, think of the primary reason Mahattaya,
ex-deputy-leader and legendary Tiger hero, was killed: he trusted
Ranasinghe Premadasa and was prepared to compromise on the
separatist demand. The evidence is clear. Mr Prabakharan wants
his Eelam, his whole Eelam and nothing but his Eelam.
The only possible pragmatic response to this is to give it to
him. Anyone who expects negotiations to produce actual compromise
is not being realistic but, shall we say, badly in need of gray
cell augmentation. I also have ethical objections to the LTTE.
Consider the following: It has killed hundreds of Tamils who
resisted Sinhala nationalist domination of Sri Lanka. It has
killed hundreds of Sinhala and Muslim civilians who caused it no
harm. It does not give a damn about more than half the Tamils in
the country, those living in the south; it would happily and
without conscience leave them at the mercy of a Sinhala
nationalism it calls genocidal. It has killed its own cadre for
expressing dissent. It has killed many other Tamils for not
believing that the only way to be Tamil in Sri Lanka today is to
be pro-Tiger. Despite all this, the pragmatists declare that they
can live with the LTTE. Because we have no alternative. Of
course, if we keep repeating this, we will indeed have no
alternative. And that is what's most likely to happen. As D. B.
S. Jeyaraj pointed out recently (in the excellent Nepali
magazine, Himal) Ranil Wickremasinghe brilliantly insists upon
talks with the LTTE. This way, he can continue to scuttle
attempts at real change, like constitutional reform, but still
keep the Tamil people on his side. This way, he expects the Tamil
vote. For the Tamil people , in the north, south, east and west,
are suffering not just Sinhala nationalist oppression, but also
from the illusion that only the LTTE, and nothing but the LTTE,
is on their side. The president will eventually realise this.
Will realise that equal opportunity bills in lieu of devolution
will be read as insults by the Tamils; that the military option
has been exhausted; that she needs the Tamil vote to remain
president. If she does not negotiate, Mr Prabakharan will
massacre a few more innocent Sinhala villagers. In places like
Ampara where the election might turn. For, the LTTE leader is not
just a superb military mind; he has learnt some things about
politics by now. He will force the president to negotiate. On his
terms. Even a mediocre astrologer can predict what will follow.
Without seeing stars. There will be a ceasefire and election
campaigning will begin. The Tigers will gain new international
legitimacy and, like in past ceasefires, re-oxygenate, re-arm and
re-strategise. After some time, security will get relaxed. A
leading Sinhalese politician or two will get killed. We will be
back at war. Many innocent Tamils will be killed. A bomb or two
will go off in Colombo. The war will drag on. After some more
time, the pragmatists will call for new talks.
We have, they will say without blush, no alternative. Surely it
must occur to an intelligent monkey that, if one strategy,
talking to the Tigers has failed over and over and over and over
again, we must try something new? Surely we have nothing to lose
by doing so? Surely the secular, anti-racist intellectuals of
this country can come up with a few new ideas? These will have to
be premised upon the belief that our constitutional framework has
to be radically restructured, not just tinkered with as both the
PA and UNP now think. But that's for another column. Let me end
this with my favourite Prabhakaran story. Soon after the 1987
accord, the LTTE leader addressed the press in Jaffna. He
listened to the questions patiently, even those translated from
English, and answered carefully. Eelam, he kept insisting, had
only been postponed, not foreclosed. Just as he got up to leave,
I asked: "Mr Prabhakaran, now that you are about to make
peace with them, do you have a message for the Sinhala
people?" He didn't bother to wait for the translation. He
just said: "No. ' Velupillai Prabhakaran has always known he
has no alternative. You can't get more pragmatic than that.