The Sunday Leader - 10/3/99

Find alternatives to talking to the Tigers
By Qadri Ismail.

Pragmatism, I have often felt, is the asylum of the dull, the unimaginative, those who don't think. Actually, I have nothing against the practical in its place. I wish, for instance, that the yellow pages also listed its entries alphabetically. Its system of classification necessitates training in taxonomy to locate certain numbers like, say, the Women and Media Collective.

That kind of pragmatism is designed to make life easy. Then there are those to whom pragmatism is a convenient excuse for not solving problems.

Example: the people who argue that the national question cannot be settled without talking to the Tigers. Some hold this for ethical reasons; they believe the LTTE is the legitimate and exclusive representative of the Tamils. But most proponents of this position advocate it on 'pragmatic' grounds: we don't have an alternative. The LTTE is comprehensively armed, superbly organised, tactically brilliant and not about to be militarily defeated even in the next millenium despite the daydreams of Anuruddha Ratwatte. So, we must come to terms with it. I have an equally practical response to this. Could the realists make one citation, just one, from the LTTE record which would convince a person of average intelligence that it might, just might, compromise on Eelam? That would persuade even a person of less than average intelligence that it wants anything other than negotiations aimed at transferring power to, and demarcating the borders of, a new state? Let me, in a practical spirit, remind the pragmatic of a few things. Back in 1981, the LTTE disrupted the DDC elections. This was way before July 1983.

Appapillai Amirthalingam prevailed upon Uma Maheswaran and Velupillai Prabhakaran to give the DDCs a chance; Junius Richard Jayewardene, it was felt, had finally delivered. Mr Prabhakaran, who wanted his Eelam, did not listen. Given subsequent events, Mr Prabakharan turned out to be right; but he couldn't have known that before the polls. In 1987, India wanted him to accept provincial councils. The powerful Indian state, it was felt, would force the promise-breaking Jayewardene to finally keep his word. But Mr Prabhakaran, who wanted his Eelam, would not settle for less. In 1995, the LTTE broke off negotiations with the only anti-racist government we have ever had. (Okay, okay; at least the president and a minister or three are not racist.) At that stage, the PA government would have granted virtually anything. But the LTTE leader, who wanted his Eelam, went back to war. If all this ain't enough, think of the primary reason Mahattaya, ex-deputy-leader and legendary Tiger hero, was killed: he trusted Ranasinghe Premadasa and was prepared to compromise on the separatist demand. The evidence is clear. Mr Prabakharan wants his Eelam, his whole Eelam and nothing but his Eelam.

The only possible pragmatic response to this is to give it to him. Anyone who expects negotiations to produce actual compromise is not being realistic but, shall we say, badly in need of gray cell augmentation. I also have ethical objections to the LTTE. Consider the following: It has killed hundreds of Tamils who resisted Sinhala nationalist domination of Sri Lanka. It has killed hundreds of Sinhala and Muslim civilians who caused it no harm. It does not give a damn about more than half the Tamils in the country, those living in the south; it would happily and without conscience leave them at the mercy of a Sinhala nationalism it calls genocidal. It has killed its own cadre for expressing dissent. It has killed many other Tamils for not believing that the only way to be Tamil in Sri Lanka today is to be pro-Tiger. Despite all this, the pragmatists declare that they can live with the LTTE. Because we have no alternative. Of course, if we keep repeating this, we will indeed have no alternative. And that is what's most likely to happen. As D. B. S. Jeyaraj pointed out recently (in the excellent Nepali magazine, Himal) Ranil Wickremasinghe brilliantly insists upon talks with the LTTE. This way, he can continue to scuttle attempts at real change, like constitutional reform, but still keep the Tamil people on his side. This way, he expects the Tamil vote. For the Tamil people , in the north, south, east and west, are suffering not just Sinhala nationalist oppression, but also from the illusion that only the LTTE, and nothing but the LTTE, is on their side. The president will eventually realise this. Will realise that equal opportunity bills in lieu of devolution will be read as insults by the Tamils; that the military option has been exhausted; that she needs the Tamil vote to remain president. If she does not negotiate, Mr Prabakharan will massacre a few more innocent Sinhala villagers. In places like Ampara where the election might turn. For, the LTTE leader is not just a superb military mind; he has learnt some things about politics by now. He will force the president to negotiate. On his terms. Even a mediocre astrologer can predict what will follow. Without seeing stars. There will be a ceasefire and election campaigning will begin. The Tigers will gain new international legitimacy and, like in past ceasefires, re-oxygenate, re-arm and re-strategise. After some time, security will get relaxed. A leading Sinhalese politician or two will get killed. We will be back at war. Many innocent Tamils will be killed. A bomb or two will go off in Colombo. The war will drag on. After some more time, the pragmatists will call for new talks.

We have, they will say without blush, no alternative. Surely it must occur to an intelligent monkey that, if one strategy, talking to the Tigers has failed over and over and over and over again, we must try something new? Surely we have nothing to lose by doing so? Surely the secular, anti-racist intellectuals of this country can come up with a few new ideas? These will have to be premised upon the belief that our constitutional framework has to be radically restructured, not just tinkered with as both the PA and UNP now think. But that's for another column. Let me end this with my favourite Prabhakaran story. Soon after the 1987 accord, the LTTE leader addressed the press in Jaffna. He listened to the questions patiently, even those translated from English, and answered carefully. Eelam, he kept insisting, had only been postponed, not foreclosed. Just as he got up to leave, I asked: "Mr Prabhakaran, now that you are about to make peace with them, do you have a message for the Sinhala people?" He didn't bother to wait for the translation. He just said: "No. ' Velupillai Prabhakaran has always known he has no alternative. You can't get more pragmatic than that.