Colonial Navies (Australia)

1877 Jervois and Scratchley reports on the defences of the Australian colonies

While there had been a British naval presence in Australian waters during the years after 1788, the first direct Australian involvement in naval defence took place in 1854 when Victoria became the first State to take steps to provide its own seaborne naval defence. In July, Governor Hotham ordered the state’s first warship, the "Victoria", at a cost of £38,000. The vessel was completed in 1855, leaving Plymouth on March 8th and arriving in Melbourne on May 31st of that year. A steam-driven screw sloop of 880 tons displacement, she was armed with 2, 9'6", 56 cwt. 32 pdrs.(pivot) and 6, 6'0", 25 cwt. 32 pdrs (carriage).

Another significant naval date was the year 1859 which saw Australia given an increased profile in the scheme of Imperial defence with the establishment of the Australia Station (see map for boundaries).

North boundary		10th° of South Latitude
East boundary		170th° of West Longitude
South boundary		Antarctic Circle
West boundary		75th° of East Longitude

This brought a Royal Naval squadron to Australia, on a semi-permanent basis, for the first time and saw the setting up of a naval base in Sydney. This squadron was to provide the main source of Australia’s "blue-water" naval defence until 1913.

The following year saw the first instance of what was to become a recuring feature of Australian defence planning, the invitation of British experts to advise on issues of military and naval defence. This first visit was by Captain Peter Scratchley (Captain, later Major-General Sir Peter Henry Scratchley, KCMG. Of the Royal Engineers. Born Paris, 24 August 1835. Commissioner of Defences of Australian Colonies 1878-1883. Commissioner of Protectorate of New Guinea 1884-1885. Died December 2, 1885.) and a party of Royal Engineers who, by September 1860, had drawn up a proposal for the defence of Port Phillip. Like most subsequent reports, its recommendations were largely ignored and in 1862 work on the proposed forts was suspended. On the other side of the world, however, there was a developing belief that colonies should, in some measure, contribute to the cost of their own defence. (A House of Commons resolution was put by Mr. Arthur Mills on March 4 1862. It urged :"That this House (while fully recognising the claims of all portions of the British Empire to imperial aid in their protection against perils arising from the consequences of Imperial policy) is of opinion that colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own external defence." Quoted in Macandie, pp. 17-18)

Funds for an ironclad warship to operate in Port Phillip Bay were included in the Victorian financial estimates for 1863, but little of consequence eventuated until 1866 when the Victorian treasurer, Sir George Verdon, visited London with the aim of acquiring warships for the Victorian navy. He was able to arrange for the construction of an "armoured monitor" at a cost of £125,000,( "The comptroller of the Navy will arrange with you the details of an armour-plated monitor or turret ship, to be constructed by contract in a private yard, but under Admiralty superintendence, and to be capable of carrying 22-ton guns. The cost of the ship is not to exceed £125,000 of which the colony will furnish £25,000. The cost of armament is to be borne by the colony. The maintenance, manning and command of the ship are to be undertaken by the Colonial government, receiving such occasional aid as heretofore in the selection of such officers and men from home as may be asked for. Quoted in Macandie, pp. 24-25. The text is from the Admiralty response to the Victorian treasurer.) to which Britain contributed £100,000, as well obtaining the provision of a large wooden warship, the "Nelson", as a training vessel. Even at this early stage in the development of indigenous naval forces the restraining hand of the Admiralty, and its insistence on ultimate control can be seen :

"It is clearly understood that this ship is maintained for the protection of the important British as well as colonial interests that require naval defence in the waters of the colony. She will therefore, in time of war be under the command of the Senior Naval Officer on the station, who, in the event of any serious emergency, will not be precluded from withdrawing her for a time from the immediate waters of the colony, in case the general safety should, in his judgement, make such a temporary withdrawal absolutely necessary. It is, of course, understood that such an emergency should be a serious one, and that due regard should be had to the wishes of the colony."

The Nelson arrived in Australia on February 4 1868, the monitor, Cerberus, was launched on December 2 1868, completed on May 5, 1870, and, after a voyage of many trials and tribulations, arrived in Melbourne on April 9 1871. (Jones, pp. 34-35 for press commentary on arrival and role of Cerberus ) Jones considers that this represented the high point of the Victorian fleet and that this unit was more powerful than the depleted Imperial Squadron, which was at this time limited by British Admiralty "economies". The Cerberus (Described as a Turret Ship, Cerberus was a monitor of 3,340 tons, armed with 4x10" guns. Her career was mostly spent as a stationary guard-ship in Port Phillip Bay, Melbourne where she was scuttled as a breakwater in 1926.) was, in some ways, Australia’s most significant warship in that she represented a developmental shift away from sail power and towards the style of the 20th Century battleship. (Jones, p.33. See also Peter Padfield "The Battleship Era", p.52 for a discussion of the "breastwork monitor type" and its role in the development of the "modern" battleship.) To quote from the "Argus", the Cerberus represented " one of the most powerful vessels for harbour defence in the world", a statement which expresses both the confidence she gave to the colony, and the limitation of colonial naval defence perceptions as "harbour defence". To the Victorians the Cerberus represented a floating fort which could be moved from site to site, as such she replaced the Scratchley proposals of ten years earlier.

In 1876 the services of British experts were again sought by the colonial governments of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Queensland. Major General Sir William Jervois (later a Governor of South Australia) and (by then) Lt. Colonel Scratchley were sent to advise on colonial naval and military requirements and during 1877 they presented a series of reports on the defence requirements of the colonies. In general Jervois found that there was "no probability of an expedition on any extensive scale being despatched against Australia", but he was nonetheless concerned that in a war between Britain and another power, the enemy "might no doubt despatch one or more cruisers to operate against our maritime commerce, or make a descent upon any of our colonial possessions." Jervois considered that while the British navy provided "blue water" mercantile defence, the colonies were responsible for the provision of

To a considerable degree this reflected the position later taken by such Australian navalists as Creswell and Deakin in the years immediately before and after Federation. He also urged the NSW Government to purchase an iron-clad ship in order to protect the exposed areas of the coastline, recommending a vessel armed with two 18 ton guns and protected by 10" armour which would cost £150,000.( Report of Royal Commissioners into Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad 1882.) It appears that this vessel would have been inferior to the Cerberus and did not represent good value for money. In the event, the proposal to purchase was amended to one of subsidy, whereby the colony would pay the Royal navy for the provision and maintenance of the vessel. The proposal was then withdrawn and passed into oblivion. Jervois’ observations were incorporated into a Royal Commission report in 1882.

The idea that the Australian colonies might subsidise the British government for the provision of naval seems to have first appeared in the same Imperial Royal Commission report of 23rd March 1882 which concluded that:

The report noted that only one colony, Victoria, had availed itself of the provisions of the Colonial Defence Act (1865) and that the Cerberus, designed as a sea-going vessel, had been installed as a harbour defence ship. The Commissioners did "not suggest that these Colonies should maintain sea-going ships of their own for action beyond their territorial waters". The final conclusion was in favour of a subsidy for British vessels on the Australia Station.

In arguing for only restricted involvement of the Australian colonies in their own naval defence, the Admiralty could point to the legal sanction provided by the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 which represented the first authority for any form of "independent" Australian naval policy.

The act did not permit the operation of colonial forces beyond coastal waters and represented a legal anachronism which would persist until the eve of the First World War. (In 1860, legal opinion offered by Crown Law Officers (England) on position of colonial warships: "We think that all vessels of war in the Colonies intended to navigate beyond .. territorial limits should be commanded by officers holding commissions from the Crown, and be essentially part of the Royal Navy of England.", Macandie, P.12)

In the 19th Century there was no direct threat from an Asiatic power such as would be implied by Japan during the early 20th. The major threat appeared to come from the Russians, despite the fact that their warships were based many thousands of miles away at Vladivostok. Since the Crimean War concluded in 1856, such apprehensions had receded to the back of the colonial mind, but the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey in April 1877 re-ignited those fears. Although war did not break out between Britain and Russia, the Russian naval presence in the northern Pacific inspired a review of colonial defences. In New South Wales this resulted in the construction of two torpedo boats, the Avernus and Acheron (1879) and consideration of the purchase of the ironclad previously referred to in conjunction with the Jervois-Scratchley report. In Britain itself the 1880’s were punctuated by recurrent naval "scares" which related to the perceived inferiority of the Royal Navy with regard to a combination of European threats. By 1884 the Russian forward positions in Asia were seen as a threat to India while there was a heightened degree of tension between Britain and France as a result of the British refusal to evacuate Egypt, and a similar tension between Britain and Germany over the question of African colonies. (A.J.Marder, British Naval Policy 1880-1905, p.121. Marder discusses the campaign for increased naval armaments which flowed from W.T. Stead’s letter to the Pall Mall Gazette in September.) By December 1884, the mood of panic had infected the British Admiralty which had committed itself to an expanded naval programme for the succeeding five years. From an Australian colonial perspective, this period was marked by the acquisition of local naval defence forces by all colonies except Western Australia (Concerns for naval defence resulted in the acquisition of a number of small gunboats by the various colonies. Victoria which had long displayed the greatest concern over its naval security obtained the Victoria and the Albert, South Australia the Protector, Queensland the Paluma and Gayundah, while Tasmania contented itself with a torpedo-boat which was never used). In December 1884, Imperial concern led to the appointment of Sir George Tryon to command of the Australia Station as its first Flag Officer, thus marking a significant increase in the station’s prestige and reflecting British concerns over the security of the far-east. As commander of the Station, Tryon was advised with regard to commerce protection :

"In view of the possibility of being involved in a war with Russia, you should be prepared to take necessary steps for capture of enemy’s ships, and protection of commerce within limits of your station."

The arrival of Tryon marked the assumption of a higher profile by the Australian Station. One of his tasks appears to have been to encourage the colonial administrations in Australia to make a greater contribution to the cost of imperial defence. (The First Sea Lord at the time (Sir Cooper Key) appears to have hoped that Tryon would be able to convince the Australian colonies that their best option for naval defence was a contribution towards a "special Australasian squadron" and he was to "communicate with the various Colonial Governments, and [to] endeavour to obtain their concurrence in the adoption of the system". These considerations were contained in a memorandum by Sir Cooper Key (28/10/1884) which was referred to by Tryon’s biographer Rear-Admiral C. C., Penrose Fitzgerald and which is paraphrased in Macandie, pp. 29-30.) At this stage Admiralty opinion saw many objections to the formation of indigenous colonial forces and favoured the subsidisation of a Royal Naval squadron, dedicated to the defence of Australasia. For their part the colonies were concerned that the Imperial Squadron would be withdrawn if Britain were to become involved in a war in another sphere. On March 21st 1885 Sir Henry Loch, then Governor of Victoria, raised the issue of colonial defence in a letter to Tryon. The Governor felt that there should be a squadron of ships "which could not be withdrawn from Australian waters" and which "during war, while placed under the command of the Senior Naval Officer of the station, their first duty should be the protection of the Australian Colonies". This approach provided the Admiral with the perfect opportunity to put forward Sir Cooper Key’s proposals. He stressed the need for local naval defence should an enemy appear off the coast, seeing this (if properly organised) as negating the need for a "heavy squadron" to operate in Australian waters. As to these naval vessels, he could "see no way ,in 1885, of securing efficiency save by making such vessels bona-fide men-of-war on the same footing in every respect as Her Majesty’s ships in commission". (Admiral Tryon to Sir Henry Loch, 27 March 1885. The text of this memorandum is quoted in full in Macandie, pp. 22-37.). His conclusions established the basis for Australian naval defence until 1911. He felt that :

"...the highest interests would be best served if the Colonies defrayed the expense while the Admiralty supplied men and maintained the vessels..."

The memorandum also contained the specifications of a proposed squadron of "cruiser catchers", together with some twelve principles for their operation as a squadron. (The final proposal was for a "Sea-Going Colonial Fleet" comprising "Six Cruiser-catchers, eight torpedo boats, sea-going, say of 150 tons. The above to be furnished, manned, and maintained by the Admiralty at the cost of the Colonies." This was refined by the time of the 1887 Colonial Conference to proposals for 5 "Archer" class (described in Conway’s Fighting Ships 1860-1905 as torpedo cruisers) of 2,000 tons (full load), armed with 6x6" guns, in consort with 2 "Rattlesnake" class (torpedo gunboats) of 550 tons and armed with 4x14" torpedo tubes and a 5" gun. It was considered that this force (in conjunction with the Imperial Squadron) would "give a very fair offensive and defensive protection" (Macandie p.40).)

The issue of naval defence was decided at the 1887 Colonial Conference. In approaching this conference, the colonial Premiers had expressed concerns over the ‘number and quality’ of vessels on the Australia Station and the ability of the Royal Navy to defend Australia. The outcome was the "Australasian Naval Defence Act" which was passed by the British Parliament in December of that year. This Act provided for an auxiliary squadron of five light cruisers and two torpedo gunboats dedicated to service in Australian waters for an annual contribution of £126,000. The naval agreement was ratified by the various colonial legislatures and was to last for a period of at least ten years, the contribution was to be shared by the states on a population basis. The agreement came into effect on April 1, 1891, while the squadron arrived in September and persisted (in one form or another) until 1911. Initially it was composed of the following vessels :

Ringarooma	cruiser (3rd. class)	2,575 tons
Tauranga	cruiser (3rd. class)	2,575 tons
Mildura	cruiser (3rd. class)	2,575 tons
Katoomba	cruiser (3rd. class)	2,575 tons
Wallaroo	cruiser (3rd. class)	2,575 tons
Karrakatta	torpedo gunboat	735 tons
Boomerang	torpedo gunboat	735 tons

The naval agreement, together with the onset of a period of economic depression ushered in a decade of stagnation in local naval defence. During the 1890’s the only "local" naval vessel acquired was the Countess of Hopetoun (1991). The local naval commandants nontheless maintained their quest for direct Australian involvement in naval defence by raising the question of an Australian Naval Reserve force. At the Colonial Conference of 1897 the Premiers a resolution was passed which supported the maintenance of the existing naval agreement, but C.C. Kingston, the Premier of South Australia, raise the issued of a naval Reserve which had been proposed by William Rooke Creswell in January of the same year( Letter from Captain Creswell to Chief Secretary, 27/01/1897. tabled by C.C. Kingston at Colonial Conference, reproduced in Macandie, pp. 58-60.). At the conference the Admiralty was not convinced, but the issue was pursued by Commander Robert M. Collins (Commander Robert M. Collins, 18 -19 , Victorian Naval commandant. In a letter of 11th October 1898 Collins commented on the desireability of establishing a reserve force of men and ships. He also noted the inappropriateness of both the existing naval agreement, and the vessels it provided, to the real needs of Australia.) 1898 and by Lord Brassey (then Governor of Victoria) on behalf of the Premiers in February 1899.

In August 1899, a Conference of Commonwealth Naval Officers considered a naval reserve force and resolved that the Admiralty should provide ships for training which could be activated in times of war. Present policy was seen as having done nothing to encourage active Australian involvement in naval defence and the Reserves scheme was seen as representing progress towards a position where Australia could defend itself.

As Federation approached, the British Admiralty had the future Dominion precisely where it wanted it with regards to naval defence. Australia was defended by the Royal Navy, it paid a subsidy for the services of a dedicated auxiliary squadron, and its indigenous coastal defence force was largely obsolete and in a state of disrepair. The conclusions of the 1882 Royal Commission, which favoured a subsidy, had been confirmed by the colonial governments in 1887 and had resulted in the creation of the "auxiliary" squadron, whose aging vessels were still in operation in 1901.

COLONIAL NAVIES