Prince Souvanna Phouma ( left ) and his half brother Prince Souphan Nouvong
After Genava Negotiations With the Pathet Lao |
The provisions of the Geneva Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities throughout Indochina and the regrouping and assimilation of the Laotian guerrillas (who then gave themselves the formal title of Pathet Lao Combat Units ) created serious misgivngs in the rebel ranks. To allow the Pathet Lao to be absorbed by the government army meant one thing to the VietMinh: a complete loss of control over this force ehich had been organized and trained as a spearhrad into the heart of Laos. a pretext and a lever for future conquest. The Pathet Lao was to become that seed of subversion with the Communists customarily gain a foothold in " bourgrois" countries.The VietMinh were not developing this convenient instrument only to surrender it. The Genava accords by no means pleased the Pathet Lao either. Deprived of their men, the Pathet Lao leaders were no bodies.Should they allow themselves to be stripped of their troops in exchange for political recognition which for the monent would bring them litle more than the advantage of running for election? Besides, there was a question of pride involved.On August 6, 1954 the total strength of the Pathet Lao Combat "regional" units attached to VietMinh companies-about 1500 men in all. To permit these paltry, disparate forces to be integrated and regrouped according to the provisions of the agreements was to proclaim the absurdly small numers of the famous liberation army. The Pathet Lao leaders knew such an admission must bring them ridicule.Although the Viet Minh conquerors had been successful in obtaining at Gneva the name "Liberation Army" for the band of guerrillas fighting under their orders, they had not succeeded in making this theorecal army a practical reality Thus, the Geneva accords satisfied the Viet Minh by surrendering to them half of Vietnam,but proved very embarrassing on the Laos issue, with official recognition being given to an army that was virtually imaginary. The inevitable result was that in Laos the Geneva agreements remained mere scraps of paper. The Pathet Lao Combat Units, as we have seen, did not exist, at least not as organized units.In contempt of the agreements they had just signed, the Viet Minh immediately began constructing the Lao Resistance Army. There was yet another clause in thesr agreements which caused the Viet Minh keen embarrassment: the return of the two provinces they were occupying at the time of the Genava Conference,Phong Saly and Sam Neua. While the Pathet Lao forces were a likely key with which to open Laos,the two northern provinces were the area in which the Viet Minh already had a well-established foothold,gained during the war in Indochina, when all problems were confused and borders no longer existed. The Viet Minh troops agents, and political syytem had infiltrated these provinces with the certain intention of eventually extending the system through the entire kingdom. Leaving the two provinces meant relinquishing their nucleus in Laos,abandoning the kingdom to its"imperialist" protectors. That had to be avoided at any cost. The history of Laos after Geneva is essentially a history of the slow and patient sabotage.by the Viet Minh and their Pathet Lao allies, of the Geneva agreements cocerning Laos. it was a methodical and about all a double-tongued sabotage Officially, Hanoi never lost an opportunity to proclaim its support of the agreements,its except in 1975, when, bowing at last to the logic of events they decided to sign agreements with the Vientiane government, but only in return for far-reaching political concessions from the Royal Government. As of July, 1945, therefore,we see the expression of two attitudes,two parallel lines of action by the Pathet Lao: the official one, a loud desire for negotiations and peace, the other, underground, a strengthening of themselves by increasing thir troop, adding to their guerilla forces, with threat or forced recuitment when necessary, mounting campaigns against the Vientiane government- in short, rendering any negotiation impossible. Among the various'recommendations' made by those idealistic counselors, the talks between the Royal Government and the Pathet Lao.The talks began on Janury 3,1955, at the Plainc des between Vientiane and Sam Neua.This city, capital of one of the two occupied provinces,had become the heaquarters of the Pathet Lao Combat Units. From the very beginning of these talks the Pathet Lao representatives made clear the position to which they were committed: in their eyes,Laos was a country only half liberated, still under the thumb of foreign colonialists.For the country to be completely independent,it had first of all to be endowed with "truly democratic" institutions. The new political organization of the kingdom, they said would be decided by the forthcoming general elections. The electoral law had to be drafted, with their advice and consent, and a joint supervisory group had to be stationed in each polling place On these conditions the Pathet Lao declared thmselves ready to cooperate with the Vientiane government,whom they nevertheless accepted only grudgingly.
