a cura di Simone Cumbo

In una lettera al presidente Clinton datata 26 gennaio 1998 richiesero "la

destituzione del regime di Saddam Hussein", e in una lettera datata 29

maggio 1998, si lamentarono con il presidente della Camera dei

Rappresentanti Newt Gingrich e con il Senatore Trent Lott che Clinton non li

aveva presi in considerazione, reiterando al contempo il consiglio di

rovesciare Saddam Hussein. E aggiunsero "Dobbiamo stabilire e mantenere una

forte presenza militare statunitense nella regione, essere pronti ad usare

questa forza per proteggere i nostri interessi vitali nel Golfo Persico e,

se necessario, appoggiare la destituzione di Saddam". Queste lettere

portavano la firma di Donald Rumsfeld; William Kristol, direttore della

rivista di destra Weekly Standard e presidente del PNAC; Elliott Abrams, il

cospiratore colpevole dell'affare Iran-Contra che nel 2002 Bush nominò

direttore della politica del Medio Oriente del Consiglio di Sicurezza

Nazionale; Paul Wolfowitz, attuale vice di Rumsfeld al Pentagono; John

Bolton, attuale sottosegretario di stato per il controllo delle armi e la

sicurezza internazionale; Richard Perle, attuale presidente del Defense

Science Board; William J. Bennett, Segretario all'Istruzione del presidente

Reagan; Richard Armitage, attuale vice di Colin Powell al Dipartimento di

Stato; Zalmay Khalilzad, ex consulente della UNOCAL e ambasciatore di Bush

in Afganistan; e molti altri importanti militaristi americani. Oltre ai

firmatari delle lettere, vi sono anche i fondatori del PNAC, tra i tanti

Dick Cheney; I. Lewis Libby, attuale capo dello staff di Cheney; e Stephen

Cambone, burocrate del Pentagono in entrambe le amministrazioni Bush. Le

loro idee sono state rapidamente diffuse grazie ad un rapporto datato

settembre 2000 intitolato "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces,

and Resources for a New Century" (Ricostruire le difese dell'America:

strategie, forze e risorse per il nuovo secolo - N.d.T.) e da un libro

curato da Robert Kagan e William Kristol, Present Dangers: Crisis and

Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy.

Dopo che George W. Bush diventò presidente, molti di questi uomini

ritornarono a ricoprire posizioni di potere nell'ambito della politica

estera americana. Per nove mesi, erano rimasti in agguato. Stavano

aspettando, per dirla con le parole del documento del PNAC "Rebuilding

America's Defenses", un "evento catastrofico e catalizzante, una nuova Pearl

Harbor" che avrebbe mobilitato l'opinione pubblica e avrebbe consentito loro

di mettere in pratica le loro teorie e i loro piani. L'11 settembre era

quello che ci voleva. Condoleezza Rice riunì i membri del Consiglio di

Sicurezza Nazionale e chiese loro di "pensare al 'modo di trarre vantaggio

da queste opportunità' per cambiare alla base la dottrina americana e

l'aspetto del mondo sulla scia degli avvenimenti dell'11 settembre". Disse

"Penso davvero che questo periodo sia analogo a quello tra il 1945 e il

1947, quando la paura e la paranoia portarono gli Stati Uniti alla Guerra

Fredda con l'Unione Sovietica.

January 26, 1998

The Honorable William J. Clinton

President of the United States

Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy

toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the

Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold

War. In your upcoming State of the Union Address, you have an opportunity

to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat. We urge you

to seize that opportunity, and to enunciate a new strategy that would secure

the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. That

strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime

from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but

necessary endeavor.

The policy of "containment" of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over

the past several months. As recent events have demonstrated, we can no

longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to continue to

uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam when he blocks or evades UN

inspections. Our ability to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not producing

weapons of mass destruction, therefore, has substantially diminished. Even

if full inspections were eventually to resume, which now seems highly

unlikely, experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible to

monitor Iraq's chemical and biological weapons production. The lengthy

period during which the inspectors will have been unable to enter many Iraqi

facilities has made it even less likely that they will be able to uncover

all of Saddam's secrets. As a result, in the not-too-distant future we will

be unable to determine with any reasonable level of confidence whether Iraq

does or does not possess such weapons.

Such uncertainty will, by itself, have a seriously destabilizing effect on

the entire Middle East. It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does

acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is

almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of

American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the

moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world's supply of oil

will all be put at hazard. As you have rightly declared, Mr. President, the

security of the world in the first part of the 21st century will be

determined largely by how we handle this threat.

Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy, which depends for its

success upon the steadfastness of our coalition partners and upon the

cooperation of Saddam Hussein, is dangerously inadequate. The only

acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be

able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near

term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is

clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his

regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign

policy.

We urge you to articulate this aim, and to turn your Administration's

attention to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam's regime from

power. This will require a full complement of diplomatic, political and

military efforts. Although we are fully aware of the dangers and

difficulties in implementing this policy, we believe the dangers of failing

to do so are far greater. We believe the U.S. has the authority under

existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military

steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American

policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity

in the UN Security Council.

We urge you to act decisively. If you act now to end the threat of weapons

of mass destruction against the U.S. or its allies, you will be acting in

the most fundamental national security interests of the country. If we

accept a course of weakness and drift, we put our interests and our future

at risk.

Sincerely,

Elliott Abrams Richard L. Armitage William J. Bennett

Jeffrey Bergner John Bolton Paula Dobriansky

Francis Fukuyama Robert Kagan Zalmay Khalilzad

William Kristol Richard Perle Peter W. Rodman

Donald Rumsfeld William Schneider, Jr. Vin Weber

Paul Wolfowitz R. James Woolsey Robert B. Zoellick