ALLEN, HENRY LEWIS Name: Henry Lewis Allen Rank/Branch: O2/US
Air Force Unit: 56th Special Operations Wing, Udorn AF TH (RAVENS) Date
of Birth: 21 September 1943 Home City of Record: Daytona Beach FL Date
of Loss: 26 March 1970 Country of Loss: Laos Loss Coordinates: 175900N
1023400E (TF543931) Status (in 1973): Missing in Action Category: 4 Aircraft/Vehicle/Ground:
O1 Other Personnel in Incident: Richard G. Elzinga (missing) Refno: 1579
Source: Compiled by Homecoming II Project 15 March 1990 with the assistance
of one or more of the following: raw data from U.S. Government agency sources,
correspondence with POW/MIA families, published sources, interviews. Updated
by the P.O.W. NETWORK. REMARKS: SYNOPSIS: The Steve Canyon program was
a highly classified FAC (forward air control) operation covering the military
regions of Laos. U.S. military operations in Laos were severely restricted
during the Vietnam War era because Laos had been declared neutral by the
Geneva Accords. The non-communist forces in Laos, however, had a critical
need for military support in order to defend territory used by Lao and
North Vietnamese communist forces. The U.S., in conjunction with non-communist
forces in Laos, devised a system whereby U.S. military personnel could
be "in the black" or "sheep-dipped" (clandestine; mustered out of the military
to perform military duties as a civilian) to operate in Laos under supervision
of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos. RAVEN was the radio call sign which identified
the flyers of the Steve Canyon Program. Men recruited for the program were
rated Air Force officers with at least six months experience in Vietnam.
They tended to be the very best of pilots, but by definition, this meant
that they were also mavericks, and considered a bit wild by the mainstream
military establishment. The Ravens came under the formal command of CINCPAC
and the 7/13th Air Force 56th Special Operations Wing at Nakhon Phanom,
but their pay records were maintained at Udorn with Detachment 1. Officially,
they were on loan to the U.S. Air Attache at Vientiane. Unofficially, they
were sent to outposts like Long Tieng, where their field commanders were
the CIA, the Meo Generals, and the U.S. Ambassador. Once on duty, they
flew FAC missions which controlled all U.S. air strikes over Laos. All
tactical strike aircraft had to be under the control of a FAC, who was
intimately familiar with the locale, the populous, and the tactical situation.
The FAC would find the target, order up U.S. fighter/bombers from an airborne
command and control center, mark the target accurately with white phosphorus
(Willy Pete) rockets, and control the operation throughout the time the
planes remained on station. After the fighters had departed, the FAC stayed
over the target to make a bomb damage assessment (BDA). The FAC also had
to ensure that there were no attacks on civilians, a complex problem in
a war where there were no front lines and any hamlet could suddenly become
part of the combat zone. A FAC needed a fighter pilot's mentality, but
but was obliged to fly slow and low in such unarmed and vulnerable aircraft
as the Cessna O1 Bird Dog, and the Cessna O2. Consequently, aircraft used
by the Ravens were continually peppered with ground fire. A strong fabric
tape was simply slapped over the bullet holes until the aircraft could
no longer fly. Ravens were hopelessly overworked by the war. The need for
secrecy kept their numbers low (never more than 22 at one time), and the
critical need of the Meo sometimes demanded each pilot fly 10 and 12 hour
days. Some Ravens completed their tour of approximately 6 months with a
total of over 500 combat missions. The Ravens in at Long Tieng in Military
Region II, had, for several years, the most difficult area in Laos. The
base, just on the southern edge of the Plain of Jars, was also the headquarters
for the CIA-funded Meo army commanded by General Vang Pao. An interesting
account of this group can be read in Christopher Robbins' book, "The Ravens".
This book contains an account of the loss of 1Lt. Henry L. Allen and Capt.
Richard G. Elzinga: The post at Long Tieng had been under seige, and it
became necessary for Ravens to live in Vietntiane in new quarters nicknamed
Silver City, but they continued to stage out of Long Tieng. "They called
the daily flight there and back...the 'commute.' "Hank Allen, an exceptional
pilot with eyes like a hawk, took off with Dick Elzinga in the front seat
of his O-1. Allen was 'short', soon to return home after a tour in which
he had notched up four hundred combat missions, and he planned to return
directly to the States and marry his fiancee within a fortnight. Elzinga
had only just arrived in Laos, and it was his first trip up to the secret
city. Allen intended to use the 'commute' as a checkout ride. It was a
cloudy day. He took off and reported over the radio...that the O-1 was
airborne. It was the last thing ever heard from them. Neither of the pilots,
nor the plane, was ever seen again. "They had disappeared. Each of the
Ravens spent at least two hours, on top of their usual day's flying, searching
for the wreckage. No Mayday call had been heard, nor had a beeper signal
been picked up from the survival radio, and no clue to the airplane's whereabouts
was discovered. The disappearance was a complete mystery." The official
point of loss was noted as 20 miles northeast of Vientiane, Laos. Both
men were classified Missing in Action. Three years later, on March 10,
1973, a Pathet Lao agent was captured carrying three of Elzinga's traveler's
checks and money of three countries. Elzinga had not been in Vientiane
long enough to get a locker for his billfold. According to a 1974 list
compiled by the National League of POW/MIA Families, Elzinga, at least,
survived the loss of the O1 plane. Elzinga and Allen are among nearly 600
Americans lost in Laos. Even though the Pathet Lao stated publicly that
they held "tens of tens" of American prisoners, not one American held in
Laos was ever released -- or negotiated for. Since U.S. involvement in
the Vietnam War ended, nearly 10,000 reports have been received by the
U.S. Government relating to Americans missing in Southeast Asia. Many authorities
have reluctantly concluded that hundreds are still alive in captivity today.
We, as a nation, owe these men our best effort to find them and bring them
home. Until the fates of the men like Elzinga and Allen are known, their
families will wonder if they are dead or alive ... and why they were abandoned.
======================== >From - Mon Apr 10 13:05:06 2000 From: "Lee, Thomas
E. - SAIC" Subject: Information correction I am a retired US Air Force
Colonel who served in Laos covertly as part of DoD Project 404 from June
1968-June 1969. I was the intelligence officer in Savannakhet operating
in "civilian" status working for the US Embassy. I carried civilian documentation
for presentation but also possessed my military ID card. We wore civilian
clothes. One of my roles was to support the Raven forward air controllers
(FAC), the US FACs operating from "in-country" bases in Laos. See my website
at http://members.xoom.com/targeteer. The following is a paragraph from
the description of the "Raven" Forward Air Controllers operating in Laos.
We lost 21 of them from 1966-1973. "The non-communist forces in Laos, however,
had a critical need for military support in order to defend territory used
by Lao and North Vietnamese communist forces. The U.S., in conjunction
with non-communist forces in Laos, devised a system whereby U.S. military
personnel could be "in the black" or "sheep-dipped" (clandestine; mustered
out of the military to perform military duties as a civilian) to operate
in Laos under supervision of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos." **** An error
in the above description is that most of the US military personnel operating
in Laos were NOT "sheep-dipped" as you described. We were in the "Black"
in that we were technically not there, we were assigned to out of country
units and our in-country existence was generally classified for part of
the 1964-1973 period. (The existence of these operations was revealed during
Congressional Hearings in late 1969 or 1970). The Raven Program and the
complementary DoD Project 404 both began in 1966. However, there was no
mustering out of the service for the Ravens or the Project 404 personnel.
To my knowledge the only program that was "sheep dipped" as you described
was Project Heavy Green (the Air Force troops supporting Site 85 and the
TACAN site support). That accounted for under 100 people. (13 were lost)
There were military personnel operating within the Air America and CIA
(CAS) operations that may have operated under different rules. Critically
speaking the US devised the sheep dipping process. It was used across the
US intelligence community. The non-communist forces had virtually nothing
to do with that process. They did play a role in accepting the US military
members in "civilian" status by accepting our presence and not "spilling
the beans". We were not deceiving the opposition because they knew we were
military. Our deception was aimed at the World scene and the US population
regarding our activities in contravention of the 1962 Geneva Accords. ****
This was a very unique period and very misunderstood period in our military
history due to its classified nature. Fortunately, we are able to tell
our story now. Those of us that served in Laos are trying to correct this
mis-information and myth that has grown up around these activities so they
are better understood in their real context. Respectfully, Tom Lee (Thomas
E. Lee, Colonel USAF (Ret)) Savannakhet, Laos 1968-1969