August 2002 Edition



Blasphemy Laws and Intellectual Freedom in Pakistan

Although there is hardly a state in the world that doesn't restrict political activities considered inimical to the interests of the state, in Pakistan, such considerations have led to very severe restrictions on a variety of intellectual activities and human interactions. For instance, Pakistan's Constitution prohibits the ridicule of Islam, of the armed forces, or of the judiciary, and such provisions have gone a long way in preserving the power of conservative clerical elements, the military and military-appointed judges.

Especially egregious are Pakistan's blasphemy laws that have been variously used not only to stifle political dissent, but also to intimidate intellectuals and social scientists, and Pakistan's non-Sunni minorities. They have also been a convenient tool for personal vendettas in the hands of the politically better-connected.

Pakistan's Penal Code allows for the death penalty for directly or indirectly defiling "the sacred name of the holy Prophet Mohammed." It also stipulates a 10-year sentence for insulting the religion of any class of citizens, and provides for a sentence of life imprisonment for "whoever willfully defiles, damages, or desecrates a copy of the holy Koran."

Often such laws have been invoked in what might normally be perceived as routine and innocuous conversations between neighbors or acquaintances. In November of 1992, Gul Masih, a Christian, was sentenced to death after having remarked innocently about Mohammed’s marriages. His neighbor Mohammad Sajjad, a Muslim, had made a comment stating that the Virgin Mary must have been a prostitute. Masih, in turn, replied he had read "that Mohammed had 11 wives, including a minor." Sajjad decided to file charges against Gul Masih who was then sentenced to death.

It is notable that Gul Masih had made these remarks in a private conversation, without premeditation or any deep-seated malice, clearly without any political intent, yet received the death penalty. Gul Masih's comment had merely followed the remarks of Mohammed Sajjad, and were in keeping with the tone set by Sajjad. But while Sajjad was never charged with 'insulting' Gul Masih's Christian religion, Gul Masih's seemingly harmless and perhaps factually correct rejoinder had led him to a death sentence.

Words can hardly describe the shocking injustice of this case, but this hasn't been the only such case. WLUML (Women Living Under Muslim Laws) has described the tragic case of Ayub Masih who has charged with blasphemy in 1996. A neighbor at his Arifabad village had complained that he had made the statement: "If you want to know the truth about Islam, then read Salman Rushdie." But Ayub Masih has always held that he made no such statement, and several sources indicate that the charges were deliberate fabrications designed to forcibly evict Ayub Masih, his family, and other poor Christians from their village lands. The case was registered with little investigation, and based entirely on a statement made by the complainant, Muhammad Akram. At his 1997 trial in Sahiwal, Ayub Masih was shot at, but his attempted killer was never charged with any crime. Ayub Masih's family home was also arbitrarily transferred to Muhammad Akram, who has benefited considerably after the eviction of the entire Christian populace (14 families) of the village. (See http://www.wluml.org/english/alerts/2001/pakistan/younis-shaikh.htm)

Throughout the entire legal proceedings, the case was heavily influenced by intense pressure from Islamic extremists who gathered outside the court to intimidate the judge and the defense lawyers. At a closed prison trial in April 1998, where Ayub Masih was denied the right to a defense, the Sessions Court judge of Sahiwal district sentencing Ayub to death by hanging. In protest of the sentence, Bishop John Joseph of Faisalabad shot himself in the head in public. On 25 July 2001, the Multan High Court rejected Ayub Masih's appeal against the death sentence. What is worse, protestors have threatened to kill Ayub Masih and his lawyer, Syed Sajjad Haider Zaidi, if Ayub is acquitted.

In a letter from prison Ayub Masih has written: "I am sick with various diseases and have not been allowed any medicines - my condition is getting worse all the time. Being a prisoner charged with blasphemy, I have been kept alone in a darkened cell where there is no light, no toilet, and no fan to cool me from the heat. I have to tell other prisoners I am here for theft or I would be beaten for being a Christian. I have been tortured many times."

In another case, on September 8 1996, a Shi'a Muslim, Ghulam Akbar, was convicted of blasphemy in Rahimyar Khan, Punjab, for allegedly making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Mohammed in 1995. Chandigarh's Tribune reported on Sept 10, 1998 that the 25 year old laborer had been subsequently sentenced to death "for taking the Prophet Muhammad's name in vain"

It is evident that the law is deliberately vague, almost designed for wanton misuse. The relevant legal code (Section 295C) states: "Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Mohammed...shall be punished with death and shall be liable to a fine."

A person can be charged with blasphemy on testimony alone, and be immediately and arbitrarily detained without opportunity for bail. Under this law, the only evidence needed is one 'reliable' man's word. The political and societal clout of Islamic extremists and clerics makes it unsafe for lawyers to represent the accused and for courts to acquit them. It also puts great pressure on local police officers to file phony blasphemy charges. For instance, in another case, Shafiq Masih, a Faisalabad Christian, was charged with blasphemy following a dispute with a neighbor. A crowd of over 1,000 persons soon converged on Shafiq's home and were prepared to lynch him. Although police intervention saved his life, the local police chief charged Shafiq with blasphemy to calm the sentiments of the mob. In 1997, Lahore High Court justice Arif Iqbal Hussain Bhatti (who in 1995 had ruled to acquit accused Christian blasphemers Salamat and Rehmat Masih) was killed after a spate of death threats.

More recently, Dr Younus Shaikh (a noted scholar), was convicted for blasphemy and handed a death sentence for simply stating the obvious: "that Mohammed became a practicing Muslim after receiving his revelation." The IHEU (International Humanist and Ethical Union) noted that none of the complainants to the police were eyewitnesses to the alleged offence: the complaint was lodged by leaders of the Majlis Tahaffuz Khatm-i-Nabuwat (Committee for the Protection of the Finality of the Prophethood), a conservative organization that is known to have harassed and attacked non-orthodox Muslims in the past. In the course of the trial, one of the witnesses to the prosecution was completely discredited, as it was shown that he was not present in class on the day Dr. Shaikh supposedly made his 'blasphemous remarks'. (See http://iheu.org/Shaikh/sentence.html)

Even more horrific than the blasphemy charges against Dr. Yunis Shaikh (founder of the Progressive group 'Enlightenment') have been some of the reactions to his sentence:

"I had heard from the sermons in the mosques that those who blaspheme deserve to be killed immediately. It was a weakness of faith that we did not do it" - Asghar Ali Afridi (while relating his alleged response to Dr. Shaikh's teaching, quoted from Barry Bearak, "Death to Blasphemers: Islam's Grip on Pakistan," New York Times, May 12, 2001)

"Only out of respect, because he was our teacher, did we not beat him to death on the spot." - Syed Bilal (also from the New York Times)

"Even if someone is only half-conscious when speaking against the Prophet, he must die. In Dr. Shaikh's case, his relatives have come to see us, saying the man is sorry and that he repents. But to be sorry now is not enough. Even if a man is sorry, he must die."- Abdul Wahid Qasmi (also from the New York Times)

Naturally, such views can have an extremely chilling effect on all serious academicians, even those trying very hard to remain within the bounds of Pakistan's blasphemy laws. All Dr Shaikh had said was that neither Prophet Mohammed nor his Parents could logically have been Muslims before Islam was revealed to the Prophet. That a mere statement of fact, even of one that contradicts no aspect of Quranic teachings or the Hadith could lead to a death sentence is not only amazing, it indicates how Pakistan's cultural and intellectual environment has so degraded since it's bloody inauguration in 1947.

Yet, there are valiant groups and individuals in Pakistan trying to resist such madness: On August 21, 2001 an emergency meeting was held to discuss the situation of Dr. Younis Sheikh. The Network for Human Rights Activists (NERA) Pakistan decided to launch a campaign if his conviction was upheld on appeal. The following organizations participated in the meeting:

(See http://iheu.org/Shaikh/liberalmuslumns.htm)

In addition, the blasphemy laws are used fairly routinely to harass those considered "improper Muslims such as the Ahmadis who are subject to onerous restrictions under law. Although Ahmadis regard themselves as Muslims and observe Islamic practices, a 1974 Constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority because, according to the Government, they do not accept Mohammed as the last prophet of Islam. In 1984 the Government passed an amendement prohibiting Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslim and banning them from using Islamic words, phrases, and greetings. The punishment for violation of this section is imprisonment for up to 3 years and a fine.

In the land of Islamic "purity" Ahmadis suffer from a variety of restrictions of religious freedom and widespread societal discrimination, including violations of their places of worship, being barred from burial in Muslim graveyards, denial of freedom of speech and assembly, and restrictions on their press. Several Ahmadi mosques remain closed. Hundreds of
Ahmadis await trial or sentencing on blasphemy charges. Sunni converts are especially targeted. According to Pakistan's Human Rigths Commission, Muhammad Akram was threatened with death by an influential local religious organization after he joined the Ahmadiyya community. The threat was published on the organization's own letterhead, but no legal action was taken against the group.

Five decades after having eliminated almost it's entire Hindu and Sikh populations, the 'Islamic' state of Pakistan is now turning on it's own Muslims - Shias, Ahmedis and other supposedly non-compliant Muslim sects. Non-muslims in Pakistan have always faced discrimination since under it's constitution, elements of Quranic law are imposed on Muslims and non-Muslims alike. While there is no law establishing the Quranic death penalty for apostates (those who convert from Islam), social pressure against such an action is so powerful that most such conversions take place in secret. Reprisals and threats of reprisals against suspected converts are common. "Islamiyyat" (Islamic studies) is compulsory for all Muslim students in state-run schools. Although students of other faiths are not required to study Islam by law, in practice, many non-Muslim students are compelled by teachers to complete the "Islamiyyat" studies. In recent years, there has been a trend towards increased mandatory Islamic instruction in public schools.

Not only is religious and intellectual persecution sanctioned by Pakistani law, the situation is aggravated by a generally despotic administration. For instance, Pakistan has one of the largest death cell populations in the world: in mid-1997, 2,855 people were facing the death sentence. Amongst those reportedly executed in 1997, was a young man who was only fourteen years old at the time of his alleged offence. The 1998 annual report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan stated that of the 3,480 children currently in prison, 49 children faced the sentence of death.

But for progressive activists in Pakistan, fighting to change things is compounded by military rule, and a press core that is repressed and inhibited in several ways from reporting the truth. The Government (and other powerful societal elites) use a variety of means to subjugate the press.

The government uses its large advertising budget to influence content, largely ensuring that most journalists practice self-censorship, and the broadcast media remains a closely controlled government monopoly. It is common knowledge that journalists, who are mostly underpaid, are on the unofficial payrolls of many competing interests, and the military (or elements within it) is presumed to be no exception. Police and other law and order agencies, the ISI, political parties, extremist religious and other sectarian groups, militant student organizations, and commercial entities frequently pressure newspapers to carry stories favorable to their point of view, in utter disregard of truth or propriety. While such practices occur throughout the world, in Pakistan, the pressure is much harder to evade or ignore since it can include physical violence, the sacking or torching of offices, and blatant interference with the distribution of newspapers.

Landlords and their agents, who have become accustomed to terrorizing their landless workers (many of whom are treated little better than slaves) often retaliate against journalists who shed light on their crimes. Journalists who have taken the brave step of exposing landlords responsible for crimes - such as the kidnapping and gang rape of an orphan - have risked being fired upon, or ruthlessly manhandled by the landlords in question. Rarely have the local police registered any complaints against such landlords. Journalists working in small provincial towns and villages generally face many more difficulties from arbitrary local authorities and influential landed individuals than their big city counterparts.

Periodically, prominent journalists doing especially notable work are arrested to send a message to others thinking of emulating them. On September 15 1998, Pervaiz ul Hassan was arrested after reporting on corruption in the local police force and civil administration. In the same month, a journalist in Peshawar began receiving death threats and went into hiding after publishing articles about child abuse at various local madrassahs (religious schools) and about the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam party's General Secretary for the NWFP. Members of the Tehrik-i-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) attacked four journalists in Karachi after covering the funeral of a slain TJP leader and the subsequent riot. Earlier, Zafaryab Ahmad, a free-lance Lahore-based journalist, was arrested and charged with sedition after he reported on child labor. In 1997, the Chief Commissioner in Islamabad, banned five Sindhi-language publications in the second half of 1997 for "objectionable material against Pakistan," i.e., expressions of Sindhi nationalism.

Since all those able to shape public opinion in Pakistan face such fearful constraints on their activities, it is little wonder that Pakistan's law enforcement agencies easily get away with wrongful arrests, arbitrary detentions, and even torture and child rape. All manner of right-wing militias function with almost complete impunity. Landlords in rural Sindh and political factions in Karachi operate private jails. Human rights groups allege that as many as 50 private jails, housing some 4,500 bonded laborers, were being maintained by landlords in lower Sindh. Some prisoners reportedly have been held in them for many years.

On some campuses, well-armed groups of students, primarily from radical religious organizations, clash with and intimidate other students, instructors, and administrators on matters of language, syllabus, examination policies, grades, religious doctrine, and dress code. These groups facilitate cheating on examinations, interfere in the hiring of staff at the campuses, control new admissions, and sometimes control the funds of their institutions. At Punjab University, the Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba (IJT--the student wing of the religious political party Jamaat-i-Islami) imposes its self-defined code of conduct on teachers and other students.

However, the greatest authority over civil society is exercised by the military which controls the press and it's coverage of the armed forces, through the Office of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR). Detailed public discussion of the military as an institution is severely hampered since any published discussion, let alone criticism, of the defense budget is proscribed by law. Ultimately, it is the supreme authority of Pakistan's military leadership that is not only instrumental in preserving Pakistan's oppressive culture and institutions, it is also the greatest obstacle for progress - for Pakistan's landless poor, for Pakistan's women, for non-Sunnis, for academicians and intellectuals, and for any one trying to bring about positive social change.

In it's recent twenty-page report, "Reform or Repression? Post-Coup Abuses in Pakistan," Human Rights Watch has said that the Musharraf government has detained opponents and former officials without charge, removed independent judges from the higher courts, banned public rallies and demonstrations, and rendered political parties all but powerless. Yet, on numerous occasions, the US administration has showered praise on Pakistan's military dictator. Obviously, the cries of anguish of Pakistan's suffering polity have little impact on the Mandarins in Washington.

Pakistan's activists for social change face a long and arduous battle. They must receive all the support and solidarity that those living in more liberated societies can muster on their behalf. Washington's support for military dictators and military intervention in Pakistan's civilian life must be effectively confronted so that the people of Pakistan can begin to liberate themselves from the shackles of social and intellectual banditry and despotism.


Related Essays on Democratic Rights in Pakistan:

Constitutionally Sanctioned Gender Oppression

Trade Union Rights in Pakistan


Back for other selections from South Asian Voice for other articles on issues confronting India and the region.

Also see South Asian History or Topics in Indian History for relevant essays that shed some light on the history of the subcontinent.


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