Oct 2004 Edition

News analysis and analytical perspectives from India and the sub-continent

Religion and Demographics in India

Unsurprisingly, the release of religion-based census data has generated considerable controversy. While some political parties with pro-Islamic leanings have voiced their anger at such data being released in the first place, others have expressed concern at the possibility of such data being misused by Hindutva organizations.

Notwithstanding the statistical anomalies that arose from a lack of Census Data for 1991 in Assam and Jammu & Kashmir, one of the most significant findings of the data has been the substantially higher growth rate of the Indian Muslim population as opposed to other communities - such as Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists and Hindus.

Excluding Jammu and Kashmir and Assam, the decadal growth rate for Muslims was 29.3%. This was substantially higher than the growth rate for Sikhs (which was 16.9%) or Hindus (20%). On the surface, this data substantiates the common wisdom that Muslims are reproducing at a much faster rate than Hindus, and that religious conservatism and/or retrograde clerical pressures are at the heart of the matter. The literacy data also appears to reinforce common stereotypes regarding Muslims - that they are less educated than Hindus, and are 'less interested in improving their lot'.

However, a more detailed analysis of the data reveals certain unexpected aspects to the Census Data that run counter to the traditional stereotypes concerning Muslims.

For instance, there are seven states where the literacy rate of Muslims is actually higher than the literacy rate for Hindus. In Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh - the difference is quite significant. It is also notable in Gujarat and Karnataka. Muslim literacy is marginally higher in Maharashtra and Jharkhand, and the difference between Hindu and Muslim literacy in Kerala is statistically insignificant.

In the Union Territories of Daman and Diu, Pondicherry, and the Andamans, the literacy rate for Muslims is again higher than that of Hindus.

On the other hand, negative differences in literacy rates are substantial in Jammu and Kashmir (where the effects of Islamic terrorism have had exacted a very heavy toll) and the states bordering Bangladesh: i.e. Meghalaya, Assam, Tripura, and West Bengal.

In the latter states, the differences are as high as 25-50%, and since the population of Muslims has increased at almost double the rate of Hindus in states like Assam, it simply reinforces the common suspicion that there has been a steady migration of economic refugees from Bangladesh into India. (In this respect, the propaganda of the Hindutvadis may well have an element of truth to it - see note below.)

But on the other hand, a somewhat surprising aspect to the data is how Muslim literacy exceeds Hindu literacy in states where "Hindutva" currents have been especially strong - such as in Gujarat and Maharashtra.

Note: Trends for Daman & Diu, Pondicherry and the Andamans are more or less comparable to the trends for Gujarat and Tamil Nadu respectively.

In fact, there are important lessons in these Census details that ought to shake up both the Hindutva propagandists, and those amongst India's self-described "secularists" who mollycoddle obscurantist and conservative clerical elements amongst India's Muslims and cling to distorted views of Indian history.

First, it is notable that the states where literacy is generally much higher (for all categories), are predominantly those states where Mughal rule was either non-existent, weak, or successfully challenged by Maratha, Sikh, Jat (or other) rebellions.

Communal interpretations notwithstanding, these rebellions were primarily ecumenical revolts - based not just on religious differences, but deriving as much or more from regional, economic, cultural and linguistic assertions. The defeat of the Mughals thus led to something of a cultural revival and renaissance that (once freed of colonial domination) may have permitted these Maratha (and Sikh and Jat) areas to progress more rapidly than those areas where there was no opposition to Mughal rule.

Secondly, a careful perusal of Indian history reveals that clerical and fundamentalist influences were much weaker in the regional Islamic kingdoms (such as in Gujarat or the Deccan) as compared to the Islamic kingdoms that were founded in the Northern Plains by alien conquerors.

Third, a larger proportion of the Islamic population in the South was involved in trade, and hence, the urban-based population was higher. This may explain why Muslims in Southern India are better educated than their Northern counterparts (where the rural component is higher).

Hence, Hindutva elements need to refrain from false and aggressive stereotyping, especially since in all the Southern States, as well as in the Western States of Maharashtra and Gujarat, Muslim literacy exceeds the national average (in some cases, substantially so).

While it is true, that the Muslim population growth rate has exceeded the Hindu growth rate across the board (even when Muslim literacy exceeds Hindu literacy), the problem is not as acute in most states as past data might suggest. Whereas the difference in growth rates for the past decade has been quite substantial, the difference does narrow when we look at the percentage of population under the age of 6. Here, the all-India average difference between Hindus and Muslims is reduced from 50% to about 20%. Thus, as India progresses, Muslim Indians are also carried forward.

In states like Gujarat (where the Hindutvadis hold the greatest sway) the difference in the under-6 population is only about 5%.

On the other hand, the difference in the under-6 population appears quite substantial - (greater than 30%) in border states like Assam, Bengal and Tripura - but also in states like Delhi, Jharkhand, Kerala, Goa, Uttaranchal and Haryana. Here, further investigation of the causes might be useful - for instance, the Muslim population of Haryana is concentrated in the Southern part of the state where there is quite pronounced gender discrimination and backward clerical influences appear to predominate.

However, it should be noted that these states are relatively smaller states, and the difference in Hindu and Muslim projected growth rates in states such as Rajasthan, UP and Bihar (where population growth is generally higher) may be only about 10-11% (based on the under-6 population).

This is not to say that the higher Muslim growth rate ought to be entirely ignored as some ideologues insist, but rather that concerns about a high Muslim growth rate need to be more precisely and carefully targeted.

Sharp differences have already come to the fore within the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB). Whereas its vice-president Maulana Kalbe Sadiq has favoured promoting family planning among Muslims, the Board president Maulana Rabe Hasan Nadvi today rejected the very concept of family planning as being 'un-Islamic'. This conservative view has been reinforced by other clerical opinion-makers who have termed it as "contrary" to the tenets of Shari' at (Islamic jurisprudence).

Rather than pander to those who claim that "In Islam children are the gift of god", as does Maulana Nadvi - all progressive forces - (including those who claim to be "secular") need to make common cause with progressive Muslims like Maulana Sadiq and find ways to promote family planning amongst India's Muslims more effectively.

Leaders of some women's groups such as the women's wing of the CPI(M) have been less than sincere in defending the rights of Muslim women. Under the cover of fighting "communalism", they have systematically sided with the backward-looking Islamic clergy and failed to defend the reproductive rights of Muslim women. Whereas they have delivered several polemics on how Hindutvadi men wish to "enslave" Hindu women - keep them uneducated, out of work, and in reproductive bondage to their husbands, they have had almost nothing to say about the rights of Muslim women to be educated, to get jobs, and to choose if and when they wish to to reproduce. As the data shows, the gender gap in literacy is unacceptably high amongst both Hindus and Muslims, and reactionary elements within both communities need to be challenged and countered. (See table below)

But apart from focusing on the role of religion in India's population growth, one ought not ignore factors that appear to negatively affect all communities. For instance, it should be pointed out that the Hindu growth rate in states such as Bihar, Rajasthan, UP, Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand exceeds the Muslim growth rate in all the Southern states as well as Gujarat and Maharashtra. It would be folly for India's social planners to ignore factors other than religion that are contributing to higher population growth rates.

For instance, none of India's mainstream political forces - (even those that appear to be concerned about India's rapid population growth) have ever addressed sociological barriers to family planning.

Rarely ever have India's political (or socially and economically dominant) forces ever spoken out against the lack of acceptance towards those who don't wish to marry or reproduce. Indian society puts enormous pressure on young people to marry, and then reproduce. The desire for a male child appears especially insatiable. Indians who are attracted to the same gender (and would in ideal circumstance prefer not to marry) are rarely encouraged to be open about their sexual preferences or orientation. Indian society needs to be much more broad-minded on the issue of reproductive choices - and the first step would be to put an end to the prejudice that comes with being unmarried, childless, or in a non-heterosexual relationship.

Finally, it might be worth pointing out that even as the indicators for Hindus in terms of literacy and population growth are better than those for Muslims, there is little room for complacency.

Jain and Sikh families are much smaller than Hindu families:

Under-6 population percentage

Similarly, average Hindu literacy is much lower than average Jain or Sikh literacy. Moreover the average gender gap in literacy amongst Hindus is strikingly high.

Literacy and Gender Gap

Note: Gender gap has been calculated as the difference between male and female literacy divided by male literacy. In other words, it represents the proportion of women who should have been educated for the literacy rates in the community to have been absolutely even.

Although the Census report does not provide explicit data for Parsi, i.e. the Zoroastrian community (owing to their relatively very small size), it is likely that literacy rates for them would be comparable to the rates for Jains, or higher.

Because of the high gender gap, literacy amongst Hindu women is only somewhat higher than Muslim women (53.1% versus 50.1%) mainly due to the very low literacy rates in the Hindi belt.

Fortunately, the gender gap has been narrowing, and is considerably less amongst children currently enrolled in primary schools. However, a much higher percentage of girls drop out after primary school than boys. Clearly, there is still much work to be done.

In conclusion, it may be said that the most important dynamic that perhaps emerges from this data is the lingering effect of partition, and how the progress of the Indian subcontinent is hampered by adherents of the two-nation theory (as implied by the data from the states that border Bangladesh).

While there are certain worrisome distinctions between Muslims and other Indians in the rest of India that ought not to be taken lightly, it is equally important to note that differences between Hindus and Muslims ought not be exaggerated or given exclusive importance.

It is especially important not to see Muslims and Hindus as monolithic groups, because not only do the averages mask important differences based on gender and region, there are other differences (such as those that may arise from caste or class) that have not been made apparent in this latest release of census data.

It might also be worth emphasizing certain positive aspects of India's Jain communities. Almost throughout Indian history, India's Jains have played a leading role in the intellectual life of the country. They have contributed in no small measure to the progress of science and mathematics in the subcontinent, and have also made significant contributions in the cultural realm. Particularly concerned about living in harmony with nature and other living beings, some of their value systems can teach other Indians much about how life ought to be lived.

Yet, there is also a negative aspect to the data pertaining to Jains. Outside work participation rates amongst Jain women is extremely low at just 7%. It is at 14% for Muslim women, 20% for Sikh women, and 27.5 % for Hindu women (as opposed to 52.4% for men) and higher for Christian, Buddhist and other (most likely certain categories of ST or SC) women. In other words, only in 12.5% of Jain families do women work outside the home. This figure rises to over 52% for Hindus, and reaches close to 90% for those who identified with none of the major religions (most likely certain categories of ST or SC).

Finally, it should be mentioned that it is a great pity that Indians were not asked to report if they were atheists or agnostics. It is not unlikely that non-religious Indians might report the most impressive social indicators.

Related Articles:

The 2001 Census

An analysis of the recent 'Population Policy'

India's Environmental Situation

Higher Education in India

Human Development and Infrastructure in the Indian Subcontinent

Also see this Harvard Study:

Reproductive Behaviour of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh by  Dr. M.E. Khan and Dr. Bella C. Patel

For essays in Indian History, see South Asian History or Topics in Indian History

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