Dr. John Garang De Mabior,
Chairman SPLM and C-in-C SPLA

22 December 1999

Dear brother

As far back as 1964, the Umma Party leadership recognised the
politico-cultural and economic aspect of Sudan's national crisis as
reflected in the civil war. It was an uphill task to convert Northern political
opinion on the matter.

Since then, you are ware, I am sure, Umma had, within Northern opinion
pioneered all the new ideas which formed the nexus of understanding between
the old and the new thinking, namely, the recognition of cultural plurality,
the founding of constitutional rights upon citizenship, the endorsement of
universal Human Rights to form an integral part of the country's future
constitution, the move to make peace agreements between the borderline
tribes to deprive the NIF regime from lining them up in their Holy War, the
initiative to secure SPLM membership of NDA, and the introduction of SPLM to
Arab opinion in the face of mutual suspicions.

Right from the inception of our decision to co-operate in the interests of
peace, democracy and a restructured Sudan, we have had an honourable
relationship in terms of the agreements we have reached, and the means to
realise our resolutions in the satisfaction of the legitimate aspirations of
the Peoples of Sudan.

Recently, we have failed to see eye to eye on certain matters:

à 1  We insisted on an IGAD update to broaden it to involve uncatered for
aspects. You were not equally enthusiastic for this revision.

à 2  We encouraged the Joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative as a necessary means
to rectify the IGAD drawbacks and to compliment it. Initially you have
welcomed the joint initiative and then had second thoughts about it. The
IGAD revision, which you suggested as a substitute, was so unfair that our
rejection of it should have caused no surprise.

à 3   Towards the end of 1998 we became increasingly anxious about the
possibility of international resolutions being implemented over the heads of
the Sudanese peoples, and the creeping Balkanisation of the Sudan. You may
not have similar anxieties. However, our discussions with important players
in the international community left us in no doubt that the SPLM/A is
regarded along with the government as responsible for Human Rights abuses,
and perpetuation of the war. The feared Balkanisation of Sudan is not viewed
in North/South terms but would be a pervasive retrogressive phenomenon. You
are not the cause of these anxieties but one of its expected victims.
However, the most important two causes of disparity in our views are the
Pace of search for a Comprehensive Political Agreement in Sudan, and the margin
of party activity within the NDA umbrella.

1.    Starting from May 1998 and the events, which led to the Horn of Africa
war and the Great Lakes war, we in Umma have seen our geopolitical region in
for a new political map with all kinds of unexpected alliances. That
heralded as far as we analysed, the diminishing of our hitherto considerable,
military and logistical space.

2.    Beginning with 1997, we detected a change of political language in
Khartoum which manifested itself in the regime's belated acceptance of the
DOP of IGAD, the acceptance of citizenship as the basis of constitutional
rights, the endorsement of some Asmara 1995 resolutions, particularly the
principle of self-determination for the South, and the appointment of a
"National" constitutional commission charged with drafting a constitution
guaranteeing political plurality. Widening margins for internal dissident
political activity, diminishing military spring boards, anxiety about
misguided internationalist agendas, and the possibility of creeping
Balkanisation, have persuaded us to move very fast indeed in the search for
a Comprehensive Political Agreement made possible by new circumstances. The
internal and external events which we saw coming and so expected were a
complete surprise to most of our NDA allies. This accounts for the different
speeds and explains some of the consequent suspicions.

3.    You were in the NDA, but not of the NDA. You maintained a relative
organisational and political distance. We tried to lift the NDA from its No
body Does Anything lethargy.

In March 1997 we suggested a ten-point crash program to accompany the
military accomplishments, and suggested a task force to implement it. The
crash program was accepted, but the task force rejected. Consequently Nobody
Did Anything. In February 1998 the Umma party's fourth external conference
criticised the NDA structures and total inactivity. We wrote an elaborate
memorandum outlining past achievements and present disabilities. We
suggested a reform program to rehabilitate its structures, to broaden the 
organisation and to activate it. To no avail.

After several unsuccessful attempts to reform and activate the NDA, we
decided to free ourselves from the NDA deadwood, to pursue our party
activity abiding by the reference resolutions.

After this practice became a well-known NDA tradition, we sought to legalise
it by proposing a resolution in June 1999 to that effect.

We declared that we shall meet anyone in pursuit of the Comprehensive
Political Agreement. The last NDA Leadership Council in Cairo called for the
formulation of a position paper. The Umma party presented a position paper
based on all previous reference resolutions.

Our Djibouti meeting with Albashir was expected to be an ordinary meeting
exchanging views about how to activate the Egyptian Libyan initiative, and
balancing the Geneva meeting with Alturabi, and providing an opportunity for
us to explain the necessity for the confidence building measures. Instead of
such a simple exchange we found that Albashir was ready for a further deal.
He was prepared to sign on a summary of our position paper. Small wonder we
accepted. Those who considered the accord on its merits appreciated it. We
were not surprised by the negative reaction of the Cairo rally because we
know exactly how "staged" it was. Although we noticed that after your last
Washington visit your views about IGAD update and the Joint Initiative
rallied to the USA position on the matter, we were shocked by the vehemence
of your negative reaction to Djibouti.

Your Kampala 8th December 1999 speech was a scathing, unfair, and distorted
attack on a party which represents majority opinion in the Sudan, and in
terms of our direct experience had the greatest input, amongst Northern
parties, in the making of new policies towards the causes of the
marginalized Sudanese groups. It contained a political language, which 
represents a complete adoption of the political rhetoric of some Northern "lost 
cause" elites who would dearly like to recruit SPLA to fight for their lost 
causes for which they have neither the will to fight, nor the masses to 
struggle. You know how much for the sake of larger considerations we have 
tolerated your digressions.

à 1  On more than one occasion you presented the Government of Sudan (GOS)
with a plan to establish two Confederate States, to divide central power
between SPLM/SPLA and the NIF regime. You mapped new boundaries for the two
states. A position in direct contravention of the Asmara resolutions and all
previous NDA agreements.

à 2  You were party to an NDA resolution in March 1998 to represent the NDA
In the IGAD process and to enlarge it in other ways. It was always assumed that
it was the Khartoum regime, which disapproved of IGAD update. It emerged
that the SPLM/A disapproves of NDA participation in IGAD and when you suggested
NDA involvement you simply repeated the unacceptable non-paper of Mr.
Johntson's delegation.

à 3  You publicly endorsed the Egyptian-Libyan Initiative and the SPLM/A
signed the Tripoli Declaration of August 1999. Later in the year you revised
your position and came close to rejecting the Joint Initiative all together.
So by the standards of abiding by the reference resolutions of NDA, the
SPLM/A track record is very poor. A similar scrutiny of Umma activities,
particularly the Djibouti accord will vindicate Umma's position as
consistent with NDA reference resolutions.

à 4  The SPLA's record on Human Rights, in the eyes of many neutral
observers has blunted if not altogether arrested the opposition campaign against 
the Human Rights record of the NIF regime. The 55th session of the UN Commission
on Human Rights in 1999, the US state Department report of Human Rights
abuses in 1998, the NGO's operating in Sudan particularly the big four who
addressed their observations to the UN Secretary General in November 1998,
the American based Human Rights Watch in December 1999, and numerous
articles in the US press have equated SPLA abuse of Human Rights to that of the 
NIF.

However, much we resent the unfairness and vehemence of your attack on Umma,
and uphold the correctness of our position, we will not allow reaction to
derail our strategic drive for Just Peace, Democratisation, Regional
Stability and the restoration of Sudan's status in the Community of the
Nations.

1.    The NIF Islamicist Agenda has failed to vitalise the economy. Failed
to win the civil war failed to uproot the opposition, failed to expand
regionally, and failed to establish a viable state and society, which could
be presented as an Islamic model.

2.    On the other hand, the armed resistance, the political opposition, the
regional response, and the reaction of the international community have
isolated, and all but besieged the Khartoum regime.

3.    Under pressure from the steadfastness of the resistance, the regime's
own failures, and the pressure of its internal schism it changed direction
allowing a greater margin of freedom inside the country. It changed its
regional address towards good neighbourliness. It changed its international
agenda. Small wonder that our NIF "intransigence dividend" receded. Our room
for military pressure and diplomatic isolation contracted. However, the
opportunity for political action multiplied, and the possibility of that
action leading to a political resolution of Sudan's conflicts or failing
that providing a springboard for a greater political pressure has become very
real.

4.    In the circumstances, to expect our regional neighbours to maintain
their previous position towards the Sudanese opposition unchanged is wishful
thinking. Apart from their positive response to the regime's changed
diplomatic language, their own national agendas have drastically been
altered by internal security priorities, and the requirements of the Horn of 
Africa, and the Great Lakes regional wars. They are honourable neighbours who 
know that we have a just cause. Therefore it is reasonable to expect them to 
link their normalisation with Sudan with the resolution of Sudan's internal
conflicts.

5.    Our monitor of the internal political situation, the regional
position, and the developments within the regime indicates that it is possible 
to clinch a Peace Agreement, a program for Democratic Transformation, and all
the items in our Asmara agenda. All that remains is to decide upon the
mechanism to reach it, the measures to ensure compliance and the transition
arrangements.

This is a viable scenario, which could clinch a political agreement to
realise the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Sudan, and if the
regime fails to deliver, create the political dynamic for an irresistible 
political pressure.

There are two possible alternative scenarios to this:

A.  An eradicationalist scenario to mount a successful challenge to the
regime and uproot it. Although this fulfils the dreams of many who have
suffered so much at the hands of this regime, the means to do so are not
available. All that can be realised is to create a continuous condition of
instability in Sudan, which could disintegrate state, and society and
"Somalize" the country.

B.   Perpetuate the war related Humanitarian tragedy in Sudan and so create
conditions for possible international Intervention. Intervention, if and
when it comes, will not aim at a comprehensive resolution of conflicts in Sudan.
It will simply apply a Kosovo or an East Timor pattern. It is a recipe for a
very dangerous national and international polarisation. Such polarisation
could very well act as a conduit for a revitalised Islmicist come back in
league with Islamicist protest and reaction world-wide. High handed foreign
initiatives are counter productive. They simply allow the regime to portray
its position as an anti-Neocolonial struggle as well as a defence of Islam
and National Sovereignty.

Both scenarios are enigmatic and totally abhorrent form a patriotic point of
views.

6- The developments inside the Sudan especially after 12 December 1999 could
lead to one of the four following developments:

a.       Alturabi succeeds in restoring the status quo ante.

b.      Albashir's success tempts him to develop a full-blown military
dictatorship.

c.       The two sides resort to force in a massive way, and in the
circumstances, expediting the deterioration towards Somalization.

d.      Further tragedies making foreign intervention inevitable.

The four possibilities are catastrophic to the Sudan and can only be averted
by an opposition strategy that is viable, realistic, and relevant.

Umma's own reading of the situation, plus National consultations and
discussions with our neighbours, and with members of the International
Community argues for the following program:

1st   To convene a national All Party Conference to discuss and resolve
all national conflicts and usher into a Comprehensive Political Agreement.

2nd   The National Conference to be guided by a Declaration of Principles
for a Comprehensive Political Agreement (DOPCA).

3rd   The mediation mechanism for the conference should decide its time,
place, membership, agenda, and through consultations with the parties to
conflict issue the DOPCA. It should consist of a two plus five representing
our North African and Horn of Africa neighbours, backed up by an extended
IPF.

4th   Until the conference reaches agreement, the country should be
governed by a Transition Constitution. The Transition Constitution should be
drafted by a technical committee from the following sources:

a)    The Constitution drafted by the National Commission.

b)   The IGAD DOP.

c)    The Asmara 1995 resolutions.

d)   The Nation's Call.

1st   The Transition Constitution to be enacted by a summit of the
country's political leadership acting as a Constituent body.

2nd   The appointment of a National Transition Government to govern the
country until it holds the plebiscite and the general National Elections as
required by the Comprehensive Political Agreement by the All party National
Conference.

Finally, please accept our best regards.

Al-Sadig Al-Mahdi,
Umma Party President