It was at this same time that the so-called "Great Powers" -- Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, Russia -- wanted to see an end to the constant uprisings and fightings that had disturbed the European continent. You see, at the time, peace was not necessarily -- as it is today -- brought about by a consistent symbiosis between the economy and a nation, but merely the absence of war -- pure and simple. Furthermore, revolution at the time did not mean Yeltsin jumping on a tank and declaring Russia democratic, but war. Understandably, it must have been quite daunting particularly for these conservative statesmen -- and let's not muse over this; Rich considers them conservative too -- to see the apparently barbaric acts of violence constantly reoccuring. And what of the Napoleon who, like a child, was constantly being let loose to reek political and diplomatic havoc? It certainly must have been a gargantuan task to see to. Consequently, the concert system effectively became a framework for peace whose purpose would be to settle disputes in a more peaceful manner, and through negotiation rather than force.

Dr.Palo's 3-R's © E.K.Bensah II

However, the Concert had, firstly, to deal with the troublesome Napoleon who had just lost the battle of Waterloo. Consequently, Napoleon was sent to the island of Elba where he was to remain, and paid an indemnity of about two million francs. He was, as Rich contends, to retain his title as emperor (p.3). This, in retrospect, may have appeared to be foolhardy on the Peacemakers' part, but their prime motivation for adopting such an ostensibly lenient stance towards a filibusterer like Napoleon came out of a true desire to provide what they believed to be a moderate peace. There was nothing disingenuous about their actions; they truly believed that if they gave Napoleon some perquisites then he would feel disinclined to go off on his quixotic adventures (cf Rich, p.167).

British historian Anthony Wood, lends credence to this idea when he writes:

Vienna was a more genuine Congress than the others {Potsdam, Versailles}, since it had been preceded by a logical sequence of agreements with France, restoring the Bourbon monarchy and ending the state of war, so that when the Congress met, France could take her place alongside the victorious Powers.(p.6)

This type of attitude speaks volumes about the peacemakers, and so no matter how Machiavellian or Realist they were, you may be tempted to overlook their mistakes. However, as Rich maintains, the study of diplomatic history remains a fascinating subject and what enhances this fascination is the acknowledgement that these statesmen -- no matter how initially benign or magnanimous -- are only human beings, and therefore have the tendency to forget to stick to their ideals.

That said, the Concert did demonstrate its capacity to produce positive results -- such as the Belgian Revolution (1830) that propelled Louis-Phillipe into the diplomatic highlight as hero of the hour for having suggested that the Belgian question be deliberated through the system. Unfortunately, the Concert system fell at its nadir with the Crimean War (1853-56) securing the definitive demise of a system that is today comparable to the UN Security Council in its efficacy and potential power to exercise influence in diplomacy.

But, as we all know, effective diplomacy is dependent on one thing -- human nature, and we know how transitory that is -- or was -- particularly in this period. One only has to think of Napoleon III to see how very true this contention is -- particularly because of the duplicitous role he played in fanning the flames of wild speculation about Russia's aspirations in the Ottoman Empire. This young, wild man should not escape judgement, I believe, for he is duly responsible in precipitating the Crimean War to the proportions it reached. He could have exercised restraint, but no, refused to do so instead allowing what originally was a crisis to degenerate into a hunt to chase the Russians out of town -- in this case, out of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, what broke down was a system that had kept a potentially volatile politico-diplomatic atmosphere in check. So dead was the Concert system after 1856 that it was unable to prevent the signature of Bismarck being forcedly impressed into the annals of history -- or indeed that of another Realist statesman, Cavour.

After Italian Unification in March 1861, another war soon broke out five years later in 1866 -- the Seven Weeks War, or the Austro-Prussian War in which, under the cunning of von Moltke (the strategist), von Roon (the military expert) and the Iron Chancellor himself (Bismarck), Prussia was to extend it domination across Europe, subsequently eclipsing the future of Austria. Regrettably, Austria who had been quite a key player in the Crimean War was ironically to be consigned onto a quasi-negligible diplomatic route rather than the main road (so-to-speak) of strong states. A member of the Big Five Austria certainly no longer was; and never again was she to enjoy similarly good relations with Russia.

In fact, though Cavour, Napoleon III and Bismarck were instrumental for certain favourable feats in the history of Western civilization, they are also responsible not so much for the breakdown of the Concert System as for the unrestrained and dog-eat-dog manner in which they conducted diplomacy -- as briefly illustrated below. Cavour, Italian and eventual Head of Piedmont-Sardinia, was somewhat similar to Bismarck in the way in which he reasoned; his rationale for the actions he took were predicated on what some might consider arriviste, or opportunistic. An example of this is the way in which both statesment demonstrated a complete and utter lack of restraint by employing force to unify Italy and Germany respectively. Bismarck's disregard for peaceful means to his ends , but rather Machiavellian ploys -- such as his editting of the Ems telegram that precipitated the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 -- testifies to the fact that the Concert was no longer deemed as paramount in preserving peace. Although one can argue that Bismarck was was not around to see the Concert system in effect during the period of 1815-1856, he certainly was alive to witness Italian Unification take place in 1870. As Wood writes in his book, Europe 1815-1960, about Cavour and Bismarck:

Both men made a calculated use of war to attain an end which the liberals of 1848 had hoped to achieve in a different form by different methods ; both were enabled by the mistakes of their enemies, in Bismarck's phrase, "to assume the role of the injured".

However, he warns against "press{ing} the parallel too far"(p.185) simply because Cavour and Bismarck were two very different people -- characteristically at least.

That said, there is a potential danger of consigning these two very intelligent, calculating and Realist statesmen into the category of "baddies". Baddies they were not for they were merely trying to do what they understood at the time to be the right thing -- i.e. make their country a better place, if not a great one. But as Shakespeare said of greatness, "...some have greatness thrust upon them". However, since they are only human, like all of us, they have feet of clay (metaphorically ofcourse) and they make mistakes. The mistakes of such statesmen, whilst ostensibly small, have a great potential to put a pin-prick in their fantasies, and one example there is of this is none other than good 'ole Nap III whom many historians seem to pooh-pooh for his many quixotic goals. Rich puts it wonderfully on p.167 of his book:

In retrospect, certainly from the vantage point of the United States, Napoleon III's attempt to establish a monarchy in Mexico under French auspices was the most unrealistic and quixotic of that visionary's many grandiose schemes...

Going back to the Concert, to me, there is indisputably no question that Nap III was instrumental in the breakdown of the Concert system. How far the other Big nations -- such as Britain -- were equally responsible is anyone's guess. Let's see, Palmerston advocating a bellicose stance towards Russia during the Austrian's attempt to bring a diplomatic closure to the Crimean War; the whole of British public opinion RUSSOPHOBIC; the British government -- particularly Stratford Canning and Palmerston -- doing their very best to see Russia punished...??? Supposedly, those qualify sufficiently as indications of Britain's culpability in the demise of the Concert System.

B of P?

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