QUOTATIONS #10

Niels Bohr --: There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum physical description. ..... It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature. [Spoken at the Como conference, 1927]

Werner Heisenberg --: The atomic physicist has had to resign himself to the fact that his science is but a link in the infinite chain of man's argument with nature, and that it cannot simply speak of *nature in itself*. Science always presupposes the existence of man and, as Bohr has said, we must become conscious of the fact that we are not merely observers but also actors on the stage of life. [The Physicist's Conception of Nature]

Albert Einstein --: Thus the last and most successful creation of theoretical physics, namely quantum mechanics (QM), differs fundamentally from both Newton's mechanics, and Maxwell's e-m field. For the quantities which figure in Quantum Physics' laws make no claim to describe physical reality itself, but only probabilities of the occurrence of a physical reality that we have in view. I cannot but confess that I attach only a transitory importance to this interpretation. I still believe in the possibility of a model of reality - that is to say, of a theory which represents things themselves and not merely the probability of their occurrence. On the other hand, it seems to me certain that we must give up the idea of complete localization of the particle in a theoretical model. This seems to me the permanent upshot of Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty. [On Quantum Physics]

Jean-Marc Besse --: Until the first half of the twentieth century the idea persisted that physical nature represented an objective reality to be described and explained, a reality located outside of man, which man faced in some way, attempting to adopt a scientific and objective view of it. Discoveries and theories of quantum physics have seriously challenged this belief. In a famous text, Heisenberg came to the general conclusion that can be drawn from one of the main aspects of quantum mechanics, which has led to a questioning of the habitual realism of classical physics: when we apply a measuring device to a quantum system, when, more precisely, we aim to measure the behaviour of a particle by means of a device, an interaction takes place, i.e., a transfer of energy between the measuring device and the measured quantum system, and hence an irreversible and unpredictable modification of the behaviour of the particle. For example, it is impossible to determine at the same time the location of a particle in space-time and its energy quantum. This perturbation of the measured object by the measuring device is generally neglected in the description of macroscopic phenomena (those related to everyday life). But it cannot be neglected at the microscopic level: this means that the definition of the natural phenomenon depends strictly on the initial conditions as well as on the measurement theory in use. The consequence that Heisenberg deducts from this is firm: what physicists apprehend.when they work at the microscopic level, the knowledge they obtain, is not the natural phenomenon in itself as independent from the observer, but an effect of the interaction between man's technical and cognitive act and a reality that cannot be reached directly. At the microscopic level, the physical, or natural object cannot be concretely described. It is just a mental scheme. ..... In conclusion: nature always pre-supposes culture, which is the framework for its analysis and interpretation. [Nature and culture]

Dmitri N. Shalin --: Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty radically undercut long-standing efforts to read the subject completely out of the picture. For Galileo and Newton, the purpose of scientific investigation was to grasp things in themselves subsisting on their own apart from the knower and his accounting practices. This precept was at the root of what Born called 'the Newtonian style' in physics, which is based on the assumption that 'the external world, the object of natural science, and we, the observing, measuring, calculating subjects, are perfectly separated, that there is a way of obtaining information without interfering with the phenomenon.' Modern microphysics furnished ample proof that the existence of a thing in itself as a meaningful object is inseparable from the process of objectivation. In modern inquiry, 'no radical separation is made between that which is observed and the observer'. Put differently, reality is objective and meaningful insofar as it becomes an object of human activity. [The Pragmatic Origins Of Symbolic Interactionism And The Crisis Of Classical Science]

Davin C. Enigl --: The word Transcendental, is a supercharged word that immediately triggers a defensive reaction in me. This reaction is the same one that alerts me to wrong ideas, to misunderstood terms, and to make-believe fairytales. However, when it comes to philosophy, the word transcendental triggers something very different. In the philosophy of science's case, transcendental, means that a need exists for an explanatory theory that can go beyond direct empirical experimentation and yet, still use empirical experiments to test the theory. It also means that even if we possessed all possible scientific theories (even a Theory of Everything -- T.O.E), they could not get at every transcendental situation, because the explanation may either be unobtainable or indeterminate, or more importantly, . . . untestable. Testability is required for scientific status. But even testability can only tell us if a theory is scientific. It can not tell us whether the theory is corroborated or not. The wrong scientific theories fail to pass the (falsification challenge) test, yet still pass the testability requirement. So, unfortunately, testability can not tell which theory is truth-like, . . . only that the theory was scientific, truth-like or not. So, we would neither know if, say a T.O.E. was a truth-like T.O.E., nor just because it works, that it was the really only truth-like one. Passing a hundred or a million tests still does not tell us any better than passing one test, that the theory is proven right. For example, Newton's theory passed test upon test for three hundred years, . . . until one day a test was conducted that Newton's theory failed. The test compared Newton's calculations with Einstein's. Einstein said it took him about 40 days to figure out where Newton went wrong. Einstein's theory is more truth-like because Relativity is more fundamental and universal (compared to Newton's). [Philosophy of Science: Evaluation of Transcendental Realism]

Steven Poole --: [Scale confusion] provides one of the book's most interesting and useful ideas . . . . The authors explain how in physics, for example, the strong atomic force is irrelevant outside the nucleus, and gravity is irrelevant at tiny distances (until the very smallest). Things in general are only important at certain scales. Thus the question "Does God exist?" is an example of scale confusion, because "existence" only really means anything at our own size. "On a small scale, do electrons exist? ..... there is no solid thing, only a 'probability cloud' ..... In the same way, very large-scale things [such as galaxy clusters or constellations] can only metaphorically be said to 'exist'." Scale confusion reappears in the book's final section, which seeks to apply our new cosmic insights to life right here, right now. "Since civilisations cannot behave like individuals and vice versa," the authors argue, "to describe individual acts as civilisational may be a kind of scale chauvinism (the logical fallacy in which a favourite size-scale is considered more fundamental than the others)." Politicians are incontinent scale chauvinists, always muddling concepts of individuals, families, nations and civilisations to deleterious effect. This is a useful observation, well expressed. Other applications of science to society are less persuasive, for example that a mixture of "circular" and "random" motion could help us withstand the "gravity" whereby wealth inevitably clumps together in the hands of a few. The scientific metaphors do not add much to the laudable social concern. ["It's all a matter of scale", review of "The View from the Centre of the Universe" by Joel Primack, Nancy Ellen Abrams]

David Hume --: It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creations are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions. . . . But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, 'this house,' and 'that tree' are nothing but perceptions in the mind. . . . By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible), and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? . . . How shall the question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. This supposition of such a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning. To have recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit . . . if the external world be once called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that Being, or any of his attributes. [An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding]

Matt McCormick --: The idea that the mind plays an active role in structuring reality is so familiar to us now that it is difficult for us to see what a pivotal insight this was for Kant. He was well aware of the idea's power to overturn the philosophical worldviews of his contemporaries and predecessors, however. He even somewhat immodestly likens his situation to that of Copernicus in revolutionizing our worldview. On the Lockean view, mental content is given to the mind by the objects in the world. Their properties migrate into the mind, revealing the true nature of objects. Kant says, "Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects" (B xvi). But that approach cannot explain why some claims like, "every event must have a cause," are a priori true. Similarly, Copernicus recognized that the movement of the stars cannot be explained by making them revolve around the observer; it is the observer that must be revolving. Analogously, Kant argued that we must reformulate the way we think about our relationship to objects. It is the mind itself which gives objects at least some of their characteristics because they must conform to its structure and conceptual capacities. Thus, the mind's active role in helping to create a world that is experiencable must put it at the center of our philosophical investigations. The appropriate starting place for any philosophical inquiry into knowledge, Kant decides, is with the mind that can have that knowledge. Kant's critical turn toward the mind of the knower is ambitious and challenging. Kant has rejected the dogmatic metaphysics of the Rationalists that promises supersensible knowledge. And he has argued that Empiricism faces serious limitations. His transcendental method will allow him to analyze the metaphysical requirements of the empirical method without venturing into speculative and ungrounded metaphysics. In this context, determining the "transcendental" components of knowledge means determining, "all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori." (A 12/B 25) The project of the Critique of Pure Reason is also challenging because in the analysis of the mind's transcendental contributions to experience we must employ the mind, the only tool we have, to investigate the mind. We must use the faculties of knowledge to determine the limits of knowledge, so Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is both a critique that takes pure reason as its subject matter, and a critique that is conducted by pure reason. Kant's argument that the mind makes an a priori contribution to experiences should not be mistaken for an argument like the Rationalists' that the mind possesses innate ideas like, "God is a perfect being." Kant rejects the claim that there are complete propositions like this one etched on the fabric of the mind. He argues that the mind provides a formal structuring that allows for the conjoining of concepts into judgments, but that structuring itself has no content. The mind is devoid of content until interaction with the world actuates these formal constraints. The mind possesses a priori templates for judgments, not a priori judgments. [IEP, Immanuel Kant Metaphysics]

Kelley L. Ross --: Kant did not view things-in-themselves as containing the sum of all possibilities, and phenomena all actualities; but this [quantum] duality is conformable to Kant's metaphysics as to none other. As a contribution to the metaphysics of possibility, the quantum mechanical wave function can easily be seen as complementary to Kant's idea of things-in-themselves, where various kinds of things can happen (like free will) that are not comprehensible in terms of phenomenal reality. Kant would just have to allow that characteristics of physical reality can intrude some depth into things-in-themselves, which he would not have considered -- though we can also handle this by positing an intermediate level of reality, between true unconditioned things-in-themselves and true discrete phenomenal objects. The wave function straddles the classic Kantian boundary, sharing some properties with phenomena, others with things-in-themselves. Thus, where Kant would have considered all of phenomena governed by determinism, we now see the wave function as deterministic, while the collapse of waves into particles is random. Although chance in quantum mechanics has often been argued as allowing for free will, a free cause is still a very different thing from a random cause, which doesn't need mind or self or intention. Moral freedom is thus still left among things-in-themselves. Kant's idea that space and time do not exist among things-in-themselves has been curiously affirmed by Relativity and quantum mechanics. In Relativity, time simply ceases to pass at the velocity of light: for photons that have travelled to us as part of the Cosmic Background Radiation, time has stood still for most of the history of the universe. On the other hand, quantum mechanics now posits "non-locality," i.e. physical distances, and so the limitation of the velocity of light in Relativity, don't seem to exist. This means that although time may apply to the wave function, space may not. The full empirical reality of space is only found among discrete particles and objects. [Kantian Quantum Mechanics]

Eric M. Rubenstein --: [Wilfrid] Sellars rejects Cartesian substance dualism and the thesis that mental states are fully knowable simply by introspection. As an alternative, Sellars conceives of mental states by analogy with the postulation of microentities of theoretical physics, where thoughts and sensations are introduced to explain people's behavior, including their use of language . . . . Knowledge, and in fact all awareness, according to Sellars, is a linguistic affair. There is no such thing, accordingly, as preconceptual awareness or prelinguistic awareness or knowledge. Sellars calls this the thesis of "Psychological Nominalism," and it is at the heart of his epistemology and theory of mind. We don't know the world just by sensing it. We don't even know our own sensations just by having them. We need a language for any awareness, including of our own sensations. . . . The thesis of Psychological Nominalism claims that to be aware of something, x, one must have a concept for x. But there is a flip side to this. If one has a concept of x, one can be aware of x's. With the concept of x in hand, that is, you can notice all sorts of things you didn't notice before you had that concept. For instance, a physicist looks at a puff of smoke in a cloud chamber and sees an electron discharged. She comes to have non-inferential knowledge of something we might not, as she has certain concepts we don't as laypeople, as well as an ability to apply them directly to her experience. In other words, perception is concept-laden, and depending on what concepts you have, you can perceive different things. (Sellars wasn't the first to articulate this connection, but his development of it made for a revolutionary understanding of thinking and perception). [IEP, Sellars' Philosophy of Mind]

Patrick Fleming --: Kant believes we could only be self-conscious if we united all experiencings in one stream of experience. In short, our making of nature is the source of all our knowledge of it. . . . This aspect of the argument leads Kant to restrict all the claims about the objective validity of the categories to the realm of phenomena. He writes that the categories are *mere forms of thought* that apply to objects, but these objects *are only appearances* (B 151). This leads to the famous neglected alternative objection. It is objected that Kant overlooks the possibility that categories might by chance apply to the mind-independent world as well. A critic might object that all Kant has shown is the world must be structured if humans are to experience it, but it might be the world rather than our minds that does synthesizing. However, Kant is committed to the idealism for a number of reasons. First, it would be a remarkable coincidence if material objects, in conforming to the categories independently of human tinkering, should direct themselves according to our needs to experience such a world. Second, Kant is discussing the necessities of experience, which he believes entails a subjective source. Necessary truths must not be grounded in the contingent facts of the world, but in the a priori structure of our minds. The application of the categories to experience is intended to show that the world is law-governed. In this process we are prescribing laws to nature and *making nature possible* (B 160). If the world is necessarily causally regular, this must be because of some subjective source of our experience of it. Kant even goes as far as to say *things in themselves would necessarily, apart from any understanding that knows them, conform to laws of their own* (B 164). There are relevant objections to be raised here, but our project now is not one of assessment. All that is relevant is to see the way Kant understood the idealist thesis to be indispensable to his argument. [Kant and Strawson on the Objectivity Thesis]

Kelley L. Ross --: Despite, but also because of, the paradoxes of his thought, much of philosophy in the Twentieth Century has been ill conceived knock-offs of Kant's theory. The idea that the mind produces the world it knows conspicuously turns up in Wittgenstein's theory of language and now with tedious, endless repetition in *post-modern* theories that see all reality as *socially constructed* on the basis of no more than *power* relationships (ultimately derived from the Marxist notion of ideological *superstructures* to class and economic relations). These all produce a fundamental paradox that was avoided by Kant, for they are all relativistic and subjectivist denials that knowledge even exists, which nevertheless maintain that this circumstance is a fact that can be known and demonstrated with some certainty -- though the *edifying* version of this recognizes the paradox by not trying such a demonstration, while still expecting us to accept the conclusion (!?). Thus, Wittgenstein sees all reality as created by particular languages, even though one might think this would imply that truths about language would be created by particular languages also. And since common sense expressed in most historical languages has actually affirmed that the world exists independently of what we say or think about it, this should mean that it does. Kant, of course, does not see the process of synthesis producing anything relativistic or subjectivist: the realism of phenomena is fully meant. The knock-offs of Kant are rarely realistic. While the knock-offs occupy fashionable opinion, basic misconceptions about Kantian theory are casually perpetuated. For instance, a defining characteristic of Kantian philosophy is that synthetic a priori propositions are not self-evident and can be denied without contradiction. What makes them true a priori is that they have a cognitive ground which is not in empirical intuition (i.e. perception). Although it is often claimed, as by the great French mathematician Poincaré, that the existence of non-Euclidean geometry refutes Kant's philosophy of geometry, in fact Kant's view of the nature of the axioms of geometry as synthetic a priori propositions means that Kant could have predicted the existence of non-Euclidean geometry. This should be obvious given any clear understanding of the meaning of "synthetic." Only Leonard Nelson fully appreciated this circumstance. [Immauel Kant]

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