Further to that, the consequences of such a decision for the establishment of military bases on Bulgarian territory would pre-determine the general position, adopted by our country in the coming years. In such circumstance, it would not be a matter of a “civilizational choice” between the East and the West, but of the explicit standing of Bulgaria on the side the USA in the environment of serious internal tensions within NATO itself. The envisaged bases have no relation whatsoever to NATO, as they are solely US bases and serve the American “Eastern policy in Asia”. In this case Bulgaria will inevitably have to be involved in the implementation of the said policy.

At the same time, most French experts regard as negative the very concept for re-configuration of US bases, located abroad. According to them, the base re-location aims at the implementation of the current strategic priority of the USA – strengthening of US military-political dominance worldwide Through the construction of efficient military infrastructure to exert control of the other “centers of power”, which are competitive to the US.

Negative is the reaction to US plans in Germany as well. The unilateral character of US actions is the main target of criticism. Generally speaking, European NATO members complain that Washington does not inform them at all about US intentions, and that no actual consultations are held within NATO in spite of the fact that a probable re-deployment of US forces from Western to Eastern Europe could have its impact over the ability of the alliance to perform its current role of a defensive alliance. Certain member countries are concerned that the whole alliance could be involved post factum into the implementation of one or another US plan (as was the case with Afghanistan) and in consequence the Europeans will have to undertake part of the responsibility in case some of the above plans prove wrong.

It is obvious that the US are interested mostly in those regions, where the availability of military bases would enhance the control over traffic of energy-producing substances. Consequently, the location of such bases on Bulgarian territory would trespass onto the interests of third countries, and the negative results from the latter’s reactions could well exceed any potential American investments.

On the other hand, providing its territory for the deployment of US military bases, Bulgaria becomes a potential target of terrorist attacks, which would seriously impair its security.

Adopting a decision of this kind (for the second time after supporting the military intervention in Iraq), Bulgaria again stands in opposition to leading EU countries, such as Germany and France, which pronounce themselves against the re-deployment of US bases. This would have a negative impact over the dynamics of pre-accession processes, relevant to our country.

Stepping back from the “European vector” in the foreign policy orientation of Bulgaria and adopting an “American vector” orientation could turn out to be precipitate and wrong, having in mind the forthcoming presidential elections in the USA this year. It is possible that the Republicans lose the elections, while the Democrats may abandon the change in the military-strategic orientations, within which come the plans for re-deployment of US bases in South-Eastern Europe. Apart from this, Bulgaria is the only country in Central and Eastern Europe, which is ready to provide its territory to the USA without any “bargaining” whatsoever (for investments, implementation of major infrastructure projects, etc.). Such an attitude is absolutely unwise and should be immediately corrected.

By the provision of its territory for the location of US military facilities within the framework of the “war on terror”, Bulgaria for the third time in its recent history undertakes the risk to get entangled into a geo-political conflict with Russia, while our own experience shows that similar developments have always had negative consequences for our country. It is true that for the time being Moscow does not consider NATO as a threat to Russian interests. Nevertheless, Russians do not exclude the probability of complications in their relations with the alliance in mid- and long-term perspective, because practically the strategy of the alliance still contains the requirement for alertness as to the breaking of a large-scale war in Europe. In this connection, the interests of the European NATO members, including of Bulgaria, necessitate both the involvement of Russia into joint projects with the alliance and the further development of the political dialogue with Moscow. Only the combination between the two partnership vectors (the purely military and the further development of political dialogue) can form the necessary basis for fruitful joint actions and mitigate Russia’s concerns, i.e. to facilitate NATO in resolving issues, related to the successful encounter with new challenges, which in its turn requires not only predictability of developments along the Eastern borders of the alliance, but predictability of support on the part of Russia and its potential.

From the perspective of German interests, Germany being one of the initiators of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, as well as from the point of view of “flank” members of NATO (Norway, Poland and Turkey), the security of which depends largely on the prospects for ratification of the updated CFE Treaty, Washington obviously “overacts” in its attempt to block it, thus creating a stalemate situation and probably influencing in general the outcome of the meeting between the leaders of NATO-member countries in Istanbul in June 2004 and in particular the approach to the future relations between the alliance and Russia.

In actual fact, there is no formal connection between the ratification of the amended CFE Treaty and the Agreement, which will be prepared in Istanbul. The liability for any failure to implement it, though, should not be assigned only to Moscow as it was provoked by the unwillingness of Georgia to agree on the issue of the Russian military bases in Batumi and Ahalkalaki, as well as the position, adopted by the authorities in Transdniestr (Pridenstrovie), which intentionally hinder the withdrawal of Russian military equipment and resources from the region.

In other words, we are left with the impression that American actions are backed up by much more serious interests than the mere wish to keep to the word of the Istanbul agreements. The USA obviously have strategic interests in Georgia due to the latter’s proximity to the Caspian energy resources.

No matter how paradoxical it may sound, the ensuring of political guarantees to Russia for military restraint is in fact compliant to the interests of the NATO alliance. Firstly, this is so because having analyzed the current status and future prospects for Russian military potential, NATO came to the conclusion that Russia does not pose any threat to it. Secondly, NATO military interests, as well as US military interests, are oriented to the East and the South, and as high officials from the alliance claim –the Russian army is considered as a potential partner, the assistance of which will enhance considerably the efficiency of NATO-led operations against contemporary threats. In other words, the unwillingness of the USA and the “Atlantic” flank within NATO to provide guarantees to Moscow for military restraint on the territories of the new NATO members, comes in conflict with the pragmatic interests of constructively-minded forces within NATO to improve their relations with Moscow in all aspects of cooperation. Thirdly, the objective analysis of statements, made by most Russian officials, as well as of commentaries in the mass media, shows that if Moscow does not receive the above guarantees and NATO gradually proceeds with the strengthening of its military presence in the new member-countries and in particular the Pre-Baltic, then Russia would most probably undertake counter-measures, such as re-deployment of its land forces along the Western borders of the country, refusal to any unilateral initiatives for military restraint in Kaliningrad region or (something which cannot be wholly excluded) a transfer of some tactical arsenal to Belarus. This in its turn would create a situation of actual military opposition, which would affect the stability in Europe and will become a permanent and sufficiently significant factor to distract NATO’s attention, forces and means from the finding of solutions to the really important problems like international terrorism, the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the traffic of weapons for mass destruction etc.

The Russian consideration for political guarantees for military restraint, which were listed in the Madrid statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Russia – NATO Council as of 04.06.2003 (refusal to place nuclear weapons on the territories of Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Estonia; demonstration of reserve as to levels and deployment of conventional armed forces; maintenance of military potentials, compliant to “lawful needs” of these countries as regards security aspects; their openly declared readiness to join the amended CFE Treaty) imposes the conclusion that their political confirmation at NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004 should not presuppose any “sacrifices” on the part of the alliance. What is more, the Pentagon considerations as to the plans for re-configuration of US military presence in Europe show that the amended CFE Treaty does not hinder the implementation of US strategy as a whole. If NATO refuses to provide Moscow with the requested political guarantees for military restraint, this could be seen by Russia as a proof of US intention to keep a free hand as to the solution of the issue with re-configuration of its military presence and bases in Europe to the detriment of Russian national interests with all consequences thereof, concerning the whole continent and Bulgaria in particular.