the distribution of the state o

An May 1050, in support their pargin at the Geneva Conference, the Viet Milin deployed all but afforts all over the area. From their until the armistice, they measurely attacked French positions and convova se all Highways 19, 21, 14 and 1. French poste is Eay Hea were continuously under supposed surfassment. It was in this period that the French Expeditionary Forces were reduced to abandon An Kon (29) June 1954) and in their withdrawal to Pieller. Task Force N° 100 was decimated by enemy amposing. After another entrapment by the Viet Milisk 25 Charles Pass on Highway 14, the and Koren Parcallon French' ceased to exist !

MOW THE REQUIARS

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1964 - 1965
THE SAME WAR
WITH A BIG DIFFERENCE

The first campaign (from January to May) aimed at objectives similar to those of the s Winter-Summer Campaign s in 1954; to paralyze Highway 19 and campaign s in 1954; to paralyze Highway 19 and campaign s in 1954; to paralyze Highway 19 and campaign s in 1954; to paralyze Highway 19 and campaign the morthern part of the Highlands (Konnun and Pleiku provinces) from the coast. They did succeed, in fact, in their military actions but it was rather their propagands and psychological warfare which brought the most serious impact upon the friendly

NOW THE REGULARS

The above statement, from a French military commander who himself has experienced the fierce vicissitudes of deadly combat and guerrilla warfare, could be used to best summarize what happened in the Central Highlands at the beginning of 1964.

Instead of separate teams of cadres sent to South Viet Nam to activate units on the spot, whole regiments were infiltrated through the «Hô Chí Minh» trail and larger supplies of weapons and equipment stealthily conveyed by sea to secret bases. On 16 February 1965, a VC ship was sunk at Vung Ro (Phu Yên) by the Vietnamese Navy and numerous caches of arms discovered at Đá Bia by the 23rd ARVN Division (same province): more than 2000 crew-served and individual weapons as well as 73 tons of ammunitions were captured.

Early 1956, the Headquarters of the 325th NVA Division made their apparition in the Highlands and assumed the control and coordination of all enemy efforts in the area. The shift to positional warfare and war of movement began.

The first campaign (from January to May) aimed at objectives similar to those of the «Winter-Summer Campaign» in 1954: to paralyze Highway 19 and control the area North of Binh Đinh, in order to isolate the northern part of the Highlands (Kontum and Pleiku provinces) from the coast. They did succeed, in fact, in their military actions but it was rather their propaganda and psychological warfare which brought the most serious impact upon the friendly




situation, especially when by June, Highways 21 and 19 Bis also fell under their control. Without exaggeration, it could be said that by the first days of July, the three northern provinces in the Highlands — Pleiku, Kontum and Phú Bon — had degenerated into chaos and it seemed that, barring a miracle, nothing could appease the panic among the local population.

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

In this deplorable conjuncture, there remains only one certainty: the Highlands were to be defended, at any cost, unless a sinister decision had been made to give up fighting and surrender. The disaster in 1954 were never to be repeated.

This determination of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam was expressed in the following concept and decision taken by second Army Corps Commander:

- r) To stimulate the troops and population by a large-scale deployment of friendly forces and by reopening the main supply routes leading into the Highlands from the coast.
- 2) To scatter the enemy pressure and break the belt they were tightening around friendly positions by accepting the enemy challenge: the war shall be waged even in handicapped conditions for friendly forces.
- 3) To check the enemy expansion by vigourous and immediate counter-attacks against any new enemy thrusts.



Within two months, continuous operations were conducted. The most important were:

- DAN TIEN 107 to break the siege at the District town of Thuan Man (Phu Bon province)
- THAN PHONG 1 and 3 to reopen Highways 19 and 21 and reestablish the main supply routes to the Highlands.
- DAN THANG 5 to dispel the enemy from Duc Co (Pleiku province).

Met by such a strong determination and reaction' the enemy was compelled to withdraw after having in their turn suffered heavy losses. For the first time in several months, the situation in the Highlands relatively improved during the month of September. Two FULRO rebel battalions, discouraged by the VC recession also left their hideouts in the jungle North of Darlac to surrender on 8 September. The tension which had oppressed the population thus far eased down as the rainy season was nearing its end.

Back in their retreat deep in the mountains and jungle, the VC ruminated their plan and assuredly, pondered over their failure in the rainy season.

Successively, their two campaigns since the beginning of the year had rather brought reverse effects and results.

The expansion and seizure of terrain which had been so easy to achieve in 1954 could not take place again, unless the ARVN vital forces were destroyed. Such a destruction could neither take place unless

large campaigns were conducted because previous separate attacks had allowed the ARVN to get out of their difficulties by a methodic and appropriate maneuver of forces, although they had only limited capabilities.

The remedy thus consisted of the following requirements:

- 1) Launching of a large campaign encompassing several attacks in different directions. The ARVN forces would be compelled to disperse and could not adequately meet the difficulties encountered.
- 2) Such a campaign conducted in accordance with the tactics « one point and two faces » (1) would surely confuse the ARVN analysis and estimate about the impact of the VC main effort. The « point » would be selected in such a manner that ARVN forces could not avoid handicaps and disadvantages, unless the challenge was not accepted.

MAJOR OPERATIONS IN II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE IN THE 1965 RAINY SEASON

		IN THE 1965 RAINY SEASON	1965 R	AIN	Y SEA	NOS		
					VIET	U	CONG LOSSES	S
NAME	TIME	PLACE	KIA	CIA	CIA Crew- Indiv-	ndiv-	DESTROYED	Miscellaneous
DAN TIEN 107	29 June I July	Thuan Man (Phu Bon)	123	2	91	26		
THAN PHONG I	16 to 25 July	Highway 19	33		ĒИ.	5	- 2 ammo caches - 431 houses - 10 tons of rice	
DAN THANG 7	3 to 18 August	Duc Co	566 26 12	8	2	94	- 2MG 50 CAL - 2 MORT 81mm	2 Barrels MG and Mortar
THAN PHONG 3	19 August 2 Sept	Highway 21	124	4 E	<u>e</u>		- 382 houses	I AN/PRC 25
QUYET THANG 165-169	23 Sept. 2 Oct.	23 Sept. Phu Cu, Bong 2 Oct. (Binh Dinh)	0011		4	44		4 MG Barrels
THAN PHONG 5 and 6	20 to 24 October	North Binh Dinh	125	0	125 10 35	91	- 4 Training Center - 5 tons of rice - 100 kg of dry fish - 20 BUNKERS	35 TONS of rice

⁽¹⁾ Literal translation of the so-called « nhất điểm lưỡng diện » tactics of the VC in the offense. The expression simply means either « one main effort and two secundary efforts » or « one main attack and two diversionary attacks ».