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CIA, The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face of the Cuban
Revolution, October 18, 1965: This intelligence memorandum,
written by a young CIA analyst, Brian Latell, presents an assessment
that Guevara's preeminence as a leader of the Cuban revolution has waned,
and his internal and international policies have been abandoned. In
domestic policy, his economic strategy of rapid industrialization has
"brought the economy to its lowest point since Castro came to
power," the paper argues. In foreign policy, he "never wavered
from his firm revolutionary stand, even as other Cuban leaders began to
devote most of their attention to the internal problems of the
revolution." With Guevara no longer in Cuba, the CIA's assessment
concludes, "there is no doubt that Castro's more cautious position
on exporting revolution, as well as his different economic approach, led
to Che's downfall."
U.S. Army, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the
Activation, Organization and Training of the 2d Battalion - Bolivian
Army, April 28, 1967: This memorandum of understanding,
written by the head of the U.S. MILGP (Military Group) in Bolivia and
signed by the commander of the Bolivian armed forces, created the Second
Ranger Battalion to pursue Che Guevara's guerrilla band. The agreement
specifies the mission of a sixteen-member Green Beret team of U.S.
special forces, drawn from the 8th Special Forces division of the U.S.
Army Forces at Southcom in Panama, to "produce a rapid reaction
force capable of counterinsurgency operations and skilled to the degree
that four months of intensive training can be absorbed by the personnel
presented by the Bolivian Armed Forces." In October, the 2nd
Battalion, aided by U.S. military and CIA personnel, did engage and
capture Che Guevara's small band of rebels.
White House Memorandum, May 11, 1967: This short memo to
President Lyndon Johnson records U.S. efforts to track Guevara's
movements, and keep the President informed of his whereabouts. Written
by presidential advisor, Walt Rostow, the memo reports that Guevara may
be "operational" and not dead as the CIA apparently believed
after his disappearance from Cuba.
CIA, Intelligence Information Cable, October 17, 1967:
This CIA cable summarizes intelligence, gathered from September 1966
through June 1967, on the disagreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba
over Che Guevara's mission to Bolivia. The cable provides specific
information on Leonid Brezhnev's objections to "the dispatch of
Ernesto Che Guevara to Bolivia" and Brezhnev's decision to send the
Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin's visit to Cuba in June, 1967 to discuss
the Kremlin's opposition with Castro. CIA sources reported that Kosygin
accused Castro of "harming the communist cause through his
sponsorship of guerrilla activity...and through providing support to
various anti-government groups, which although they claimed to be
'socialist' or communist, were engaged in disputes with the 'legitimate'
Latin American communist parties...favored by the USSR." In
replying Castro stated that Cuba would support the "right of every
Latin American to contribute to the liberation of his country."
Castro also "accused the USSR of having turned its back upon its
own revolutionary tradition and of having moved to a point where it
would refuse to support any revolutionary movement unless the actions of
the latter contributed to the achievement of Soviet objectives...."
White House Memorandum, October 9, 1967: Walt Rostow reports in
this memorandum to President Johnson that unconfirmed information
suggests that the Bolivian battalion--"the one we have been
training"--"got Che Guevara."
White House Memorandum, October 10, 1967: In a short
update to Walt Rostow, William Bowdler reports there is still
uncertainty about whether Che Guevara was "among the casualties of
the October 8 engagement."
White House Memorandum, October 11, 1967: In another daily update,
Walt Rostow reports to President Johnson that "we are 99% sure that
'Che' Guevara is dead." Rostow believes the decision to execute
Guevara "is stupid," but he also points out his death
"shows the soundness of our 'preventive medicine' assistance to
countries facing incipient insurgency--it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger
Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year,
that cornered him and got him."
White House Memorandum, October 13, 1967: In a final
update, Walt Rostow informs Lyndon Johnson that the White House has
intelligence information--still censored--that "removes any doubt
that 'Che' Guevara is dead."
CIA
Debriefing of Félix Rodríguez, June 3, 1975 When Che Guevara was
executed in La Higuera, one CIA official was present--a Cuban-American
operative named Félix Rodríguez. Rodríguez, who used the codename
"Félix Ramos" in Bolivia and posed as a Bolivian military
officer, was secretly debriefed on his role by the CIA's office of the
Inspector General in June, 1975. (At the time the CIA was the focus of a
major Congressional investigation into its assassination operations
against foreign leaders.) In this debriefing--discovered in a
declassified file marked 'Félix Rodríguez' by journalist David
Corn--Rodríguez recounts the details of his mission to Bolivia where
the CIA sent him, and another Cuban-American agent, Gustavo Villoldo, to
assist the capture of Guevara and destruction of his guerrilla band.
Rodríguez and Villoldo became part of a CIA task force in Bolivia that
included the case officer for the operation, "Jim", another
Cuban American, Mario Osiris Riveron, and two agents in charge of
communications in Santa Clara. Rodríguez emerged as the most important
member of the group; after a lengthy interrogation of one captured
guerrilla, he was instrumental in focusing the efforts to the 2nd Ranger
Battalion focus on the Villagrande region where he believed Guevara's
rebels were operating. Although he apparently was under CIA instructions
to "do everything possible to keep him alive," Rodríguez
transmitted the order to execute Guevara from the Bolivian High Command
to the soldiers at La Higueras--he also directed them not to shoot
Guevara in the face so that his wounds would appear to be
combat-related--and personally informed Che that he would be killed.
After the execution, Rodríguez took Che's Rolex watch, often proudly
showing it to reporters during the ensuing years.
State Department Cable, Official Confirmation of Death of Che
Guevara, October 18, 1967: Ten days after his capture, U.S.
Ambassador to Bolivia, Douglas Henderson, transmitted confirmation of
Guevara's death to Washington. The evidence included autopsy reports,
and fingerprint analysis conducted by Argentine police officials on
Che's amputated hands. (Che's hands were cut off to provide proof that
he was actually dead; under the supervision of CIA agent Gustavo
Villoldo, his body was then secretly buried by at a desolate airstrip at
Villagrande where it was only discovered in June 1997.) The various
death documents, notes Ambassador Henderson, leave "unsaid the time
of death"--"an attempt to bridge the difference between a
series of earlier divergent statements from Armed Forces sources,
ranging from assertions that he died during or shortly after battle to
those suggesting he survived at least twenty-four hours."
Southern Command, Activities of the 2nd Ranger Battalion and Death of
Che Guevara: The U.S. Special Forces Group, which trained the
Bolivan military units that captured Che Guevara, conducted an extensive
debriefing of members of the 2nd Ranger Battalion. This report, based on
interviews by a member of the U.S. Mobile Training Team in Bolivia with
key Bolivian commanders, documents the military movements, and
engagement with Che Guevara's guerrilla band. The sources also provide
key details and descriptions of his capture, interrogation and execution,
although it makes no mention of the CIA official, Félix Rodríguez, who
was present. Guevara's last words to the soldier who shot him are
reported as: "Know this now, you are killing a man."
Department of State, Guevara's Death--The Meaning for Latin
America, October 12, 1967: In this interpretive report for
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Thomas Hughes, the Latin America
specialist at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, summarizes the importance of "the defeat of the foremost
tactician of the Cuban revolutionary strategy." The analyst
predicts that Guevara "will be eulogized as the model revolutionary
who met a heroic death." The circumstances of his failure in
Bolivia, however, will strengthen the position of "peaceful
line" communist party groups in the Hemisphere. Castro, he argues,
will be subject to "we told you so" criticism from older
leftist parties, but his "spell on the more youthful elements in
the hemisphere will not be broken." The analysis fails to
incorporate evidence of the disagreement between Castro and Guevara on
the prospects for revolution in Latin America, or the Soviet pressure on
Cuba to reduce support for insurgent movements in the Hemisphere.
CIA, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Fidel Castro Delivers
Eulogy on Che Guevara, October 19, 1967: On October 18, 1967,
the third day of national mourning, Fidel Castro delivered a eulogy to a
crowd of almost one million at the Plaza de La Revolución in Havana.
The next day, the speech is transcribed and distributed by FBIS, a CIA
transcription agency that records, and translates news and television
from around the world. Calling Guevara "an artist of revolutionary
warfare," Castro warns that "they who sing victory" over
his death--a reference to the U.S.--" are mistaken. They are
mistaken who believe that his death is the defeat of his ideas, the
defeat of his tactics, the defeat of his guerrilla concepts." This
speech contributes immeasurably to the making of the revolutionary icon
that Che Guevara became in the ensuing years. "If we want to know
how we want our children to be," Castro concludes, "we should
say, with all our revolutionary mind and heart: We want them to be like
Che."
THE DEATH OF CHE GUEVARA:
A CHRONOLOGY
Compiled by:
Paola Evans, Kim Healey, Peter Kornbluh, Ramón Cruz
and Hannah Elinson
OCTOBER 3, 1965: In a public speech, Fidel Castro
reads a "Farewell" letter written by Che in April, in which
Che resigns from all of his official positions within the Cuban
government. The letter, which Che apparently never intended to be made
public, states that "I have fulfilled the part of my duty that tied
me to the Cuban revolution...and I say goodbye to you, to the comrades,
to your people, who are now mine." (CIA Intelligence Memorandum,
"Castro and Communism: The Cuban Revolution in Perspective,"
5/9/66)
OCTOBER 18, 1965: A CIA Intelligence Memorandum
discusses what analysts perceive as Che Guevara’s fall from power
within the Cuban government beginning in 1964. It states that at the end
of 1963, Guevara’s plan of "rapid industrialization and
centralization during the first years of the Revolution brought the
economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power." "Guevara’s
outlook, which approximated present -day Chinese--rather than
Soviet--economic practice, was behind the controversy." In July
1964, "two important cabinet appointments signaled the power
struggle over internal economic policy which culminated in Guevara’s
elimination." Another conflict was that Guevara wanted to export
the Cuban Revolution to different parts of Latin America and Africa,
while "other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention
to the internal problems of the Revolution." In December, 1964,
Guevara departed on a three-month trip to the United States, Africa, and
China. When he returned, according to the CIA report, his economic and
foreign policies were in disfavor and he left to start revolutionary
struggles in other parts of the world. (CIA Intelligence Memorandum,
"The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face of the Cuban
Revolution," 10/18/65)
FALL, 1966: Che Guevara arrives in Bolivia
sometime between the second week of September and the first of November
of 1966, according to different sources. He enters the country with
forged Uruguayan passports to organize and lead a communist guerrilla
movement. Che chooses Bolivia as the revolutionary base for various
reasons. First, Bolivia is of lower priority than Caribbean Basin
countries to US security interests and poses a less immediate threat,
"... the Yanquis wouldn’t concern themselves... ." Second,
Bolivia’s social conditions and poverty are such that Bolivia is
considered susceptible to revolutionary ideology. Finally, Bolivia
shares a border with five other countries, which would allow the
revolution to spread easily if the guerrillas are successful. (Harris,
60, 73; Rojo 193-194; Rodríguez:1, 157;Rodríguez:1, 198)
SPRING, 1967: From March to August of 1967, Che
Guevara and his guerrilla band strike "pretty much at will"
against the Bolivian Armed Forces, which totals about twenty thousand
men. The guerrillas lose only one man compared to 30 of the Bolivians
during these six months. (James, 250, NYT 9/16/67)
APRIL 28, 1967: General Ovando, of the Bolivian
Armed Forces, and the U.S. Army Section signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with regard to the 2nd Ranger Battalion of the Bolivian
Army "which clearly defines the terms of U.S.-Bolivian Armed Forces
cooperation in the activation, organization, and training of this
unit."
MAY 11, 1967: Walt Rostow, presidential advisor
to Lyndon B. Johnson, sends a message to the President saying that he
received the first credible report that "Che" Guevara is alive
and operating in South America, although more evidence is needed. (Rostow
05/11/67)
JUNE, 1967: Cuban-American CIA agent Félix
Rodríguez receives a phone call from a CIA officer, Larry S., who
proposes a special assignment for him in South America in which he will
use his skills in unconventional warfare, counter-guerrilla operations
and communications. The assignment is to assist the Bolivians in
tracking down and capturing Che Guevara and his band. His partner will
be "Eduardo González" and Rodríguez is to use the cover name
"Félix Ramos Medina." (Rodríguez:1, 148)
JUNE 26-30, 1967: Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin
visits Cuba for discussions with Fidel Castro. According to a CIA
intelligence cable, the primary purpose of his "trip to Havana June
26-30, 1967 was to inform Castro concerning the Middle East Crisis...A
secondary but important reason for the trip was to discuss with Castro
the subject of Cuban revolutionary activity in Latin America." The
Soviet Premier criticizes the dispatch of Che Guevara to Bolivia and
accuses Castro of "harming the communist cause through his
sponsorship of guerrilla activity...and through providing support to
various anti-government groups, which although they claimed to be
"socialist" or communist, were engaged in disputes with the
"legitimate" Latin American communist parties, those favored
by the USSR." In reply Castro stated that Cuba will support the
"right of every Latin American to contribute to the liberation of
his country." (CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 10/17/67)
AUGUST 2, 1967: Rodríguez and González arrive
in La Paz, Bolivia. They are met by their case officer, Jim, another CIA
agent, and a Bolivian immigration officer. The CIA station in La Paz is
run by John Tilton; eventually the CIA’s Guevara task force is joined
by another anti-Castro Cuban-American agent, Gustavo Villoldo. (Rodríguez:1,
162)
AUGUST 31, 1967: The Bolivian army scores its
first victory against the guerrillas, wiping out one-third of Che’s
men. José Castillo Chávez, also known as Paco, is captured and the
guerrillas are forced to retreat. Che’s health begins to deteriorate.
(James, 250, 269)
SEPTEMBER 3, 1967: Félix Rodríguez flies with
Major Arnaldo Saucedo from Santa Cruz to Vallegrande to interrogate
Paco. (Rodríguez: 1, 167)
SEPTEMBER 15, 1967: The Bolivian Government
air-drops leaflets offering a $4,200 reward for the capture of Che
Guevara. (NYT 9/16/67)
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967: Fifteen members of a
Communist group, who were providing supplies to the guerrillas in the
southeastern jungles of Bolivia, are arrested. (NYT 9/19/67)
SEPTEMBER 22, 1967: Che’s guerrillas arrive at
Alto Seco village in Bolivia. Inti Peredo, a Bolivian guerrilla, gives
the villagers a lecture on the objectives of the guerrilla movement. The
group leaves later that night after purchasing a large amount of food.
(Harris, 123)
According to Jon Lee Anderson’s account, Che takes
the food from a grocery store without paying for it after discovering
that the local authorities in Alto Seco have left to inform the army
about the guerrilla’s position. (Anderson, 785)
SEPTEMBER 22, 1967: Guevara Arze, the Bolivian
Foreign Minister, provides evidence to the Organization of American
States to prove that Che Guevara is indeed leading the guerrilla
operations in Bolivia. Excerpts taken from captured documents, including
comparisons of handwriting, fingerprints and photographs, suggests that
the guerrillas are comprised of Cubans, Peruvians, Argentineans and
Bolivians. The foreign minister’s presentation draws a loud applause
from the Bolivian audience, and he gives his assurance that "we’re
not going to let anybody steal our country away from us. Nobody, at any
time." (NYT 9/23/67)
SEPTEMBER 24, 1967: Che and his men arrive,
exhausted and sick, at Loma Larga, a ranch close to Alto Seco. All but
one of the peasants flee upon their arrival. (Harris, 123)
SEPTEMBER 26, 1967: The guerrillas move to the
village of La Higuera and immediately notice that all the men are gone.
The villagers have previously been warned that the guerrillas are in the
area and they should send any information on them to Vallegrande. The
remaining villagers tell the guerrillas that most of the people are at a
celebration in a neighboring town called Jahue. (Harris, 123)
1 p.m.: As they are about to depart for Jahue, the
rebels hear shots coming from the road and are forced to stay in the
village and defend themselves. Three guerrillas are killed in the gun
battle: Roberto (Coco) Peredo, a Bolivian guerrilla leader who was one
of Che’s most important men; "Antonio," believed to be
Cuban; and "Julio," likely a Bolivian. Che orders his men to
evacuate the village along a road leading to Rio Grande. The army high
command and the Barriento government consider this encounter a
significant victory. Indeed, Che notes in his diary that La Higuera has
caused great losses for him in respect to his rebel cell. (Harris
123,124; NYT 9/28/67))
CIA agent, Félix Rodríguez, under the alias, "Captain
Ramos," urges Colonel Zenteno to move his Rangers battalion from La
Esperanza headquarters to Vallegrande. The death of Antonio, the
vanguard commander [also called Miguel by Rodríguez], prompts Rodríguez
to conclude that Che must be close by. Colonel Zenteno argues that the
battalion has not yet finished their training, but he will move them as
soon as this training is complete. Convinced that he knows Che’s next
move, Rodríguez continues pressuring Zenteno to order the 2nd Ranger
battalion into combat. (Rodríguez:1, 184)
SEPTEMBER 26-27, 1967: After the battle of La
Higueras, the Ranger Battalion sets up a screening force along the river
San Antonio to prevent exfiltration of the guerrilla force. During the
mission, the troops captures a guerrilla known as "Gamba." He
appears to be in poor health and is poorly clothed. This produces an
immediate morale effect on the troops because they notice that the
guerrillas are not as strong as they thought. "Gamba" says
that he had separated from the group and was traveling in hope of
contacting "Ramón" (Guevara). (Dept. of Defense Intelligence
Information Report - 11/28/67).
SEPTEMBER 29, 1967: Colonel Zenteno is finally
persuaded by Rodríguez, and he moves the 2nd Ranger battalion to
Vallegrande. Rodríguez joins these six hundred and fifty men who have
been trained by U.S. Special Forces Major "Pappy" Shelton.
(Rodríguez:1, 184)
SEPTEMBER 30, 1967: Che and his group are trapped
by the army in a jungle canyon in Valle Serrano, south of the Grande
River. (NYT 10/1/67)
OCTOBER 7, 1967: The last entry in Che’s diary
is recorded exactly eleven months since the inauguration of the
guerrilla movement. The guerrillas run into an old woman herding goats.
They ask her if there are soldiers in the area but are unable to get any
reliable information. Scared that she will report them, they pay her 50
pesos to keep quiet. In Che’s diary it is noted that he has "little
hope" that she will do so. (Harris, 126; CIA Weekly Review,
"The Che Guevara Diary," 12/15/67)
Evening: Che and his men stop to rest in a ravine in
Quebrada del Yuro. (Harris, 126)
OCTOBER 8, 1967: The troops receive information
that there is a band of 17 guerrillas in the Churro Ravine. They enter
the area and encounters a group of 6 to 8 guerrillas, opens fire, and
killed two Cubans, "Antonio" and "Orturo." "Ramon"
(Guevara) and "Willy" try to break out in the direction of the
mortar section, where Guevara is wounded in the lower calf. (Dept. of
Defense Intelligence Information Report - 11/28/67)
OCTOBER 8, 1967: A peasant women alerts the army
that she heard voices along the banks of the Yuro close to the spot
where it runs along the San Antonio river. It is unknown whether it is
the same peasant woman that the guerrillas ran into previously. (Rojo
218)
By morning, several companies of Bolivian Rangers are
deployed through the area that Guevara’s Guerrillas are in. They take
up positions in the same ravine as the guerrillas in Quebrada del Yuro.
(Harris,126)
About 12 p.m.: A unit from General Prado’s company,
all recent graduates of the U.S. Army Special Forces training camp,
confronts the guerrillas, killing two soldiers and wounding many others.
(Harris, 127)
1:30 p.m.: Che’s final battle commences in Quebrada
del Yuro. Simon Cuba (Willy) Sarabia, a Bolivian miner, leads the rebel
group. Che is behind him and is shot in the leg several times. Sarabia
picks up Che and tries to carry him away from the line of fire. The
firing starts again and Che’s beret is knocked off. Sarabia sits Che
on the ground so he can return the fire. Encircled at less than ten
yards distance, the Rangers concentrate their fire on him, riddling him
with bullets. Che attempts to keep firing, but cannot keep his gun up
with only one arm. He is hit again on his right leg, his gun is knocked
out of his hand and his right forearm is pierced. As soldiers approach
Che he shouts, "Do not shoot! I am Che Guevara and worth more to
you alive than dead." The battle ends at approximately 3:30 p.m.
Che is taken prisoner. (Rojo, 219; James, 14)
Other sources claim that Sarabia is captured alive
and at about 4 p.m. he and Che are brought before Captain Prado. Captain
Prado orders his radio operator to signal the divisional headquarters in
Vallegrande informing them that Che is captured. The coded message sent
is "Hello Saturno, we have Papá !" Saturno is the code for
Colonel Joaquin Zenteno, commandant of the Eighth Bolivian Army
Division, and Papá is code for Che. In disbelief, Colonel Zenteno asks
Capt. Prado to confirm the message. With confirmation, "general
euphoria" erupts among the divisional headquarters staff. Colonel
Zenteno radios Capt. Prado and tells him to immediately transfer Che and
any other prisoners to La Higuera. (Harris, 127)
In Vallegrande, Félix Rodríguez receives the
message over the radio: "Papá cansado," which means "Dad
is tired." Papá is the code for foreigner, implying Che. Tired
signifies captured or wounded. (Rodríguez:1, 185)
Stretched out on a blanket, Che is carried by four
soldiers to La Higuera, seven kilometers away. Sarabia is forced to walk
behind with his hands tied against his back. Just after dark the group
arrives in La Higuera and both Che and Sarabia are put into the one-room
schoolhouse. Later that night, five more guerrillas are brought in.
(Harris, 127)
Official army dispatches falsely report that Che is
killed in the clash in southeastern Bolivia, and other official reports
confirm the killing of Che and state that the Bolivian army has his body.
However, the army high command does not confirm this report. (NYT
10/10/67)
OCTOBER 9, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a memorandum
to the President with tentative information that the Bolivians have
captured Che Guevara. The Bolivian unit engaged in the operation was the
one that had been trained by the U.S. (Rostow 10/9/67)
OCTOBER 9, 1967: 6:15 a.m.: Félix Rodríguez
arrives by helicopter in La Higuera, along with Colonel Joaquín Zenteno
Anaya. Rodríguez brings a powerful portable field radio and a camera
with a special four-footed stand used to photograph documents. He
quietly observes the scene in the schoolhouse, and records what he sees,
finding the situation "gruesome" with Che lying in dirt, his
arms tied behind his back and his feet bound together, next to the
bodies of his friends. He looks "like a piece of trash" with
matted hair, torn clothes, and wearing only pieces of leather on his
feet for shoes. In one interview, Rodríguez states that, " I had
mixed emotions when I first arrived there. Here was the man who had
assassinated many of my countrymen. And nevertheless, when I saw him,
the way he looked....I felt really sorry for him." (Rodríguez:2)
Rodríguez sets up his radio and transmits a coded
message to the CIA station in either Peru or Brazil to be retransmitted
to Langley headquarters. Rodríguez also starts to photograph Che’s
diary and other captured documents. Later, Rodríguez spends time
talking with Che and takes a picture with him. The photos that Rodríguez
takes are preserved by the CIA. (Anderson, 793; Rodríguez:1, 193)
10 am: The Bolivian officers are faced with the
question of what to do with Che. The possibility of prosecuting him is
ruled out because a trial would focus world attention on him and could
generate sympathetic propaganda for Che and for Cuba. It is concluded
that Che must be executed immediately, but it is agreed upon that the
official story will be that he died from wounds received in battle. Félix
Rodríguez receives a call from Vallegrande and is ordered by the
Superior Command to conduct Operation Five Hundred and Six Hundred. Five
hundred is the Bolivian code for Che and six hundred is the order to
kill him. Rodríguez informs Colonel Zenteno of the order, but also
tells him that the U.S. government has instructed him to keep Che alive
at all costs. The CIA and the U.S. government have arranged helicopters
and airplanes to take Che to Panama for interrogation. However, Colonel
Zenteno says he must obey his own orders and Rodríguez decides,
"to let history take its course," and to leave the matter in
the hands of the Bolivians. (Anderson, 795; Harris 128, 129; Rodríguez:1,
193; Rodríguez:2)
Rodríguez realizes that he cannot stall any longer
when a school teacher informs him that she has heard a news report on
Che’s death on her radio. Rodríguez enters the schoolhouse to tell
Che of the orders from the Bolivian high command. Che understands and
says, "It is better like this ... I never should have been captured
alive." Che gives Rodríguez a message for his wife and for Fidel,
they embrace and Rodríguez leaves the room. (Rodríguez:2; Anderson,
796)
According to one source, the top ranking officers in
La Higuera instruct the noncommissioned officers to carry out the order
and straws are drawn to determine who will execute Che. Just before noon,
having drawn the shortest straw, Sergeant Jaime Terán goes to the
schoolhouse to execute Che. Terán finds Che propped up against the wall
and Che asks him to wait a moment until he stands up. Terán is
frightened, runs away and is ordered back by Colonel Selich and Colonel
Zenteno. "Still trembling" he returns to the schoolhouse and
without looking at Che’s face he fires into his chest and side.
Several soldiers, also wanting to shoot Che, enter the room and shoot
him. (Harris, 129)
Félix Rodríguez has stated that, "I told the
Sargento to shoot....and I understand that he borrowed an M-2 carbine
from a Lt. Pérez who was in the area." Rodríguez places the time
of the shooting at 1:10 p.m. Bolivian time. (Rodríguez:2)
In Jon Lee Anderson’s account, Sergeant Terán
volunteers to shoot Che. Che's last words, which are addressed to Terán,
are "I know you've come to kill me. Shoot, you are only going to
kill a man." Terán shoots Che in the arms and legs and then in
Che's thorax, filling his lungs with blood. (Anderson, 796)
OCTOBER 9, 1967: Early in the morning, the unit
receives the order to execute Guevara and the other prisoners. Lt. Pérez
asks Guevara if he wishes anything before his execution. Guevara replies
that he only wishes to "die with a full stomach." Pérez asks
him if he is a "materialist" and Guevara answers only "perhaps."
When Sgt. Terán (the executioner) enters the room, Guevara stands up
with his hands tied and states, "I know what you have come for I am
ready." Terán tells him to be seated and leaves the room for a few
moments. While Terán was outside, Sgt. Huacka enters another small
house, where "Willy" was being held, and shoots him. When Terán
comes back, Guevara stands up and refuses to be seated saying: "I
will remain standing for this." Terán gets angry and tells Guevara
to be seated again. Finally, Guevara tells him: "Know this now, you
are killing a man." Terán fires his M2 Carbine and kills him. (Dept.
of Defense Intelligence Information Report - 11/28/67).
Later that afternoon: Senior army officers and CIA
Agent, Félix Rodríguez, leave La Higuera by helicopter for army
headquarters in Vallegrande. Upon landing, Rodríguez quickly leaves the
helicopter knowing that Castro’s people will be there looking for CIA
agents. Pulling a Bolivian army cap over his face, he is not noticed by
anyone. (Rodríguez:1, 12; Harris, 130)
Che’s body is flown to Vallegrande by helicopter
and later fingerprinted and embalmed. (NYT 10/11/67)
General Ovando, Chief of Bolivian Armed Forces,
states that just before he died, Che said, "I am Che Guevara and I
have failed." (James, 8)
OCTOBER 10, 1967: W.G. Bowdler sends a note to
Walt Rostow saying that they do not know if Che Guevara was "among
the casualties of the October 8 engagement." They think that there
are no guerrilla survivors. By October 9, they thought two guerrilla
were wounded and possibly one of them is Che. (Bowdler, The White House
10/10/67)
OCTOBER 10, 1967: Two doctors,. Moisés Abraham
Baptista and José Martínez Cazo, at the Hospital Knights of Malta,
Vallegrande, Bolivia, sign a death certificate for Che Guevara. The
document states that "on October 9 at 5:30 p.m., there
arrived...Ernesto Guevara Lynch, approximately 40 years of age, the
cause of death being multiple bullet wounds in the thorax and
extremities. Preservative was applied to the body." On the same day,
and autopsy report records the multiple bullets wounds found in
Guevara’s body. "The cause of death," states the autopsy
report, "was the thorax wounds and consequent hemorrhaging."
(U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram, 10/18/67)
OCTOBER 10, 1967: General Ovando announces that
Che died the day before at 1:30 p.m. This means that Che lived for
twenty-two hours after the battle in Quebrada del Yuro, which
contradicts Colonel Zenteno’s story. Colonel Zenteno changes his story
to support General Ovando’s. (James, 15)
The New York Times reports that the Bolivian
Army High Command dispatches officially confirm that Che was killed in
the battle on Sunday October 8th. General Ovando states that Che
admitted his identity and the failure of his guerrilla campaign before
dying of his wounds. (NYT 10/10/67)
Ernesto Guevara, the father of Che, denies the death
of his son, stating that there is no evidence to prove the killing. (NYT
10/11/67)
OCTOBER 11, 1967: General Ovando claims that on
this day Che’s body is buried in the Vallegrande area. (James, 19)
OCTOBER 11, 1967: President Lyndon Johnson
receives a memorandum from Walt W. Rostow: "This morning we are
about 99% sure that "Che" Guevara is dead." The memo
informs the President that according to the CIA, Che was taken alive and
after a short interrogation General Ovando ordered his execution. (Rostow,
"Death of Che Guevara," 10/11/67)
OCTOBER 11, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a memorandum
to the President stating that they "are 99% sure that ‘Che’
Guevara is dead." He explains that Guevara’s death carries
significant implications: "It marks the passing of another of the
aggressive, romantic revolutionaries...In the Latin American context, it
will have a strong impact in discouraging would -be guerrillas. It shows
the soundness of our ‘preventive medicine’ assistance to countries
facing incipient insurgency--it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion,
trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that
cornered him and got him." (Rostow 10/11/67)
OCTOBER 12, 1967: Che’s brother, Roberto,
arrives in Bolivia to take the body back to Argentina. However, General
Ovando tells him that the body has been cremated. (Anderson, 799)
OCTOBER 13, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a note to the
President with intelligence information that "removes any doubt
that ‘Che" Guevara is dead." (Rostow 10/13/67)
OCTOBER 14, 1967: Annex No.3 - three officials of
the Argentine Federal police, at the request of the Bolivian Government,
visited Bolivian military headquarters in La Paz to help identify the
handwriting and fingerprints of Che Guevara. "They were shown a
metal container in which were two amputated hands in a liquid solution,
apparently formaldehyde." The experts compared the fingerprints
with the ones in Guevara’s Argentine identity record, No. 3.524.272,
and they were the same. (U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram,
10/18/67)
OCTOBER 14, 1967: Students at Central University
of Venezuela protest the U.S. involvement in Che’s death.
Demonstrations are organized against a U.S. business, the home of a U.S.
citizen, the U.S. Embassy and other similar targets.
OCTOBER 15, 1967: Bolivian President Barrientos
claims that Che’s ashes are buried in a hidden place somewhere in the
Vallegrande region. (Harris, 130)
OCTOBER 16, 1967: . The Bolivian Armed Forces
released a communiqué together with three annexes on the death of Che
Guevara. The communiqué is "based on documents released by the
Military High Command on October9...concerning the combat that took
place at La Higuera between units of the Armed Forces and the red group
commanded by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, as a result of which he, among
others, lost his life..." The report states that Guevara died
"more or less at 8 p.m. on Sunday, October 8...as a result of his
wounds." Also, in order to identify his body it requested the
cooperation of Argentine technical organizations to identify the remains
to certify that the handwriting of the campaign diary coincides with
Guevara’s. Henderson, the U.S. Embassy agent in La Paz, comments that
"it will be widely noted that neither the death certificate nor the
autopsy report state a time of death." This "would appear to
be an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of earlier
divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions
that he died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he
survived at least twenty-four hours." He also notes that some early
reports indicate that Guevara was captured with minor injuries, while
later statements , including the autopsy report, affirm that he suffered
multiple wounds. He agrees with a comment by Preséncia, that
these statements are "going to be the new focus of polemics in the
coming days." (U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram, 10/18/67)
OCTOBER 18, 1967: The U.S. Embassy in La Paz,
Bolivia sends an airgram to the Department of State with the Official
Confirmation of Death of Che Guevara. (U.S. Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia,
10/18/97)
OCTOBER 18, 1967: A CIA cable highlights the
errors leading to Guevara’s defeat. "There were negative factors
and tremendous errors involved in the death of Ernesto "Che"
Guevara Serna and the defeat of the guerrillas in Bolivia... ."
Che’s presence at the guerrilla front in Bolivia, " ... precluded
all hope of saving him and the other leaders in the event of an ambush
and virtually condemned them to die or exist uselessly as fugitives."
The fact that the guerrillas were so dependent on the local peasant
population also proved to be a mistake according to the CIA. Another
error described in this cable is Che’s over-confidence in the Bolivian
Communist Party, which was relatively new, inexperienced, lacking strong
leadership and was internally divided into Trotskyite and Pro-Chinese
factions. Finally, the cable states that the victory of the Bolivian
army should not be credited to their actions, but to the errors of
Castroism. " The guerrilla failure in Bolivia is definitely a
leadership failure..."("Comments on the death of Ernesto
"Che" Guevara Serna," 10/18/67)
OCTOBER 18, 1967: Fidel Castro delivers a eulogy
for Che Guevara to nearly a million people --one of his largest
audiences ever--in Havana’s Plaza de la Revolución. Castro
proclaims that Che’s life-long struggle against imperialism and his
ideals will be the inspiration for future generations of revolutionaries.
His life was a "glorious page of history" because of his
extraordinary military accomplishments, and his unequaled combination of
virtues which made him an "artist in guerrilla warfare."
Castro professes that Che’s murderers’ will be disappointed when
they realize that "the art to which he dedicated his life and
intelligence cannot die." (Anderson, 798; Castro’s Eulogy,
10/18/67)
OCTOBER 19, 1967: Intelligence and Research’s
Cuba specialist, Thomas L. Hughes, writes a memorandum to Secretary of
State, Dean Rusk. Hughes outlines two significant outcomes of Che
Guevara’s death that will affect Fidel Castro’s future political
strategies. One is that "Guevara will be eulogized as the model
revolutionary who met a heroic death," particularly among future
generations of Latin American youth. Castro can utilize this to continue
justifying his defiance of the usual suspects--"US imperialism, the
Green Berets, the CIA." Another outcome is that Castro will
reassess his expectations of exporting revolutions to other Latin
American countries. Some Latin American leftists "will be able to
argue that any insurgency must be indigenous and that only local
parties know when local conditions are right for revolution." (Intelligence
and Research Memorandum, "Guevara’s Death--The Meaning for Latin
America", 10/19/97)
NOVEMBER 8, 1967: The CIA reports that Cuba is
threatening assassin a prominent Bolivian figure, such as President
Barrientos or General Ovando, in revenge of Che Guevara’s death. ( CIA
cable, 11/8/67)
JULY 1, 1995: In an interview with biographer Jon
Lee Anderson, Bolivian General Mario Vargas Salinas reveals that "he
had been a part of a nocturnal burial detail, that Che’s body and
those of several of his comrades were buried in a mass grave near the
dirt airstrip outside the little mountain town of Vallegrande in Central
Bolivia." A subsequent Anderson article in the New York Times sets
off a two-year search to find and identify Guevara’s remains.
(Anderson,1)
JULY 5, 1997: Che Guevara biographer, Jon Lee
Anderson, reports for the New York Times that although the
remains have not been exhumed and definitely identified, two experts are
"100 percent sure" that they have discovered Che’s remains
in Vallegrande. The fact that one of the skeletons is missing both of
its hands is cited as the most compelling evidence. (NYT 7/5/97)
JULY 13, 1997: A ceremony in Havana, attended by
Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials, marks the return of Che’s
remains to Cuba. (NYT 7/14/97)
OCTOBER 17, 1997: In a ceremony attended by
Castro and thousands of Cubans, Che Guevara is reburied in Santa Clara,
Cuba. (NYT, 10/18/97)
LIST OF SOURCES
Anderson=Anderson, Jon Lee, Che Guevara : A Revolutionary
Life, Grove Press, 1997.
Harris= Harris, Richard, Death of a Revolutionary: Che Guevara's
Last Mission, W.W. Norton and Company Inc.,1970.
James= James, Daniel, Che Guevara: A Biography, Stein and Day,
1970
National Security Files, "Bolivia, Vol. 4" Box 8.
NYT=New York Times
Rodríguez:1=Rodríguez, Félix I.,Shadow Warrior, Simon and
Schuster Inc., 1989
Rodríguez:2=Rodríguez, Félix . BBC documentary, "Executive
Action," 1992.
Rojo= Rojo, Ricardo, My Friend Che, The Dial Press, Inc., 1968
WT= Washington Times
NEW BOOKS ON CHE GUEVARA
Henry Butterfield Ryan, The Fall of Che Guevara
(New York: Oxford University Press, November 1997; $27.50)
Jorge Castañeda, Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara
(New York: Knopf; October 1997, $30.00)
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