After the Federal debacle at Fredericksburg in December of 1862,
President Lincoln replaced the incompetent Ambrose Burnside with
"Fighting" Joseph Hooker as commander of the Army of The Potomac.
Across the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg was Lee's vaunted Army
of Northern Virginia, still resting in their winter camp.
Hooker went right to work to lift the morale and fighting capability
of his men. He did away with the cumbersome "Grand Division"
organization for easier handling, and for the first time the Union
Cavalry was used as an independent branch of the army.
In early April 1863, Hooker began planning his move against Lee and
his forces, minus John Hood's and George Pickett's Divisions who were
away laying siege to Suffolk with General James Longstreet. Similar
to Burnside, Hooker wanted to cross the Rappahannock south of Fredericksburg.
But this had two distinct flaws: 1.) It would uncover the direct route
to Washington, which would displease Lincoln and 2.) any attempt to
cross south of the town would not go unnoticed due to pontoon bridges
being laid. He decide the plan wouldn't be feasable.
Next Hooker turned his eyes north of the Rappahannock where there were
3 shallow fords. Bank's Ford, five miles above Fredericksburg; United
States Ford, seven miles farther west; and Kelly's Ford beyond that.
He told his cavalry commander, General George Stoneman to cross the river
with 22 guns and 11,500 men no later than April 13, to turn the
Confederate left and place his forces between Lee and Richmond. Hooker
hoped that the cavalry would isolate the Army of Northern Virginia's
supplies and check a possible retreat.
But as Stoneman was about to cross, the rains came and isolated a
brigade of his forces on the south bank of the Rappahannock. He recalled
the brigade, then changed the jump-off date to the 15th. But for
almost two weeks the weather didn't change for the better.
By this time Hooker was becoming impatient. He decided to
march 60,000 men (Meade's, Slocum's, and Howard's Corps)into Lee's
rear by crossing the Rappahannock upstream.
The other two Corps with 60,000 also, under Sedgwick and Reynolds,
plus a division from Couch's Corps would attack Fredericksburg
simultaneously, thus driving a pincer movement into the Army of
Northern Virginia.
While Bank's and U.S. Ford were being heavily guarded by Confederate
forces, Kelly's Ford, 15 miles upstream, was lightly held. Crossing
the river at Kelly's Ford would conceal the 60,000 Federals moving
into Lee's rear. After crossing the Rapidan River due south, they
would move east and uncover the other two fords as the went, allowing
for easier access to reinforcements.
On April 26, Meade, Howard, and Slocum moved out of their Falmouth
camps. They were to be in position to cross the Rappahannock no later
than 4 p.m. on the 28th. From there they would march toward Ely's and
Germanna Fords on the Rapidan and take seperate routes leading southeast
to the Orange Turnpike. Couch was scheduled to march for Bank's Ford
on the 29th, meanwhile Sedgwick and Reynolds would lead their 60,000
men down to Franklin's Crossing and cross the Rappahannock below
Fredericksburg. Stoneman would add to the confusion by striking the
Virginia Central Railroad.
The grand upstream march began on the 27th. By dusk on the next day,
the head of the flanking column was approaching Kelly's Ford, while
Couch had two divisions waiting behind Bank's Ford ready to cross.
Everything appeared to be business as usual in the Confederate camps
outside Fredericksburg. It seemed as if Lee would be taken by suprise
this time. Howard had his Corps over the Rappahannock, Slocum's crossed
at dawn, followed by Meade, and finally Stoneman brought up the rear
with his horsemen.
Slocum and Howard crossed Germanna Ford the next day while Meade
crossed Ely's Ford. At 11 a.m. on the 30th, Meade reached the
Chancellor house. Sedgwick and Reynolds crossed the Rappahannock on the
29th. All the pieces in Hooker's plan seemed to be falling into place.
Lee was giving no signs of danger to his rear.
Soon after, Couch began his march across Bank's Ford with his Corps.
The combined strength of Meade, Slocum, Howard, and Couch put four Union
Corps in the Confederate rear. But after Meade reached the Chancellor
House, Hooker ordered a halt and told Dan Sickles to cross the river at
U.S. Ford. His arrival tomorrow morning would raise Federal strength
to 78,000 men ready to pounce on Lee.
Feeling that Hooker might advance on the Army of Northern Virginia
soon, Lee ordered James Longstreet to return from his siege at Suffolk
with Hood's and Pickett's Divisions. Then came word from J.E.B Stuart,
commander of all cavalry in the army, that he had captured prisoners
from three different Union Corps in his rear. Along with a report from
a courier confided to Lee that he had witnessed bluecoats crossing the
Rapidan River fords.
Marse Robert decided that this was enough intelligence to make a
reaction. He ordered two of Richard Anderson's brigades to march on
Chancellorsville. Lafayette McLaws, who commanded Longstreet's only
remaining division on the field, was put on alert for a forced march.
On the 30th, Lee received another report that the Federals were moving
east along the Orange Turnpike. At noon Anderson sent him a message
that he had prepared a good defensive position to resist a possible
attack. Lee replied that he should begin preparing entrenchments for
McLaw's division, which headed west minus one brigade soon after.
Jubal Early's division, with McLaw's other brigade, was to remain
in the Fredericksburg entrenchments and block any forward movement
by Sedgwick. Corps commander, Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, was ordered
to march west with his three divisions (Brig Gen. Robert Rodes, Raleigh
Colston, and A.P. Hill).
Lee was concentrating 45,000 men against Hooker's 78,000 4 miles east
of the Chancellor House. Barely 10,000 Confederates were left to
occupy the 5-mile entrenchments outside Fredericksburg against
Sedgwick's 30,000.