Rakhimov's reelection was allegedly blemished with numerous violations of the electoral law. Rakhimov received 70 percent of
the vote and his only competitor, Rif Kazakulov, took only 9 percent. Kazakulov, who is the forestry minister in Rakhimov's
cabinet, made statements suggesting that it would be in Bashkortostan's best interests if Rakhimov won the election, inspiring
suspicions that his campaign was planned by the administration so that the election would have two candidates and thus be
legal (Boston Globe, 16 June). Candidates who posed a serious threat to Rakhimov's victory were all expelled from the
election on the grounds that the signatures they had collected for nomination were falsified (Moscow Times, 16 June). A
Russian Supreme Court order demanded that two of the candidates be reinstated, but this decree was ignored. However, the
electorate had little knowledge of these events since the local media offered one-sided support for Rakhimov, the independent
newspaper and radio station had been shut down, and the station director arrested. The treatment of the independent media
prompted protests in Ufa, involving several thousand people. (RFE/RL Newsline, 15 June)

The candidates barred from the election were Duma deputy Aleksandr Arinin from Our Home is Russia, former premier of the
Bashkortostan government Marat Migraziamov, and the well-known banker Rafis Kadyrov. The latter two candidates were
considered serious contenders for the position. They have accused the President of running Bashkortostan as a personal
fiefdom, exploiting the region's oil resources for private gain.

The election had a 68.3 percent voter turnout. The protest vote against all candidates was 17 percent, the highest ever in an
election of this level (Russkii Telegraf, 16 June). In Ufa, the capital of Bashkortostan and a region of high sympathy for Duma
member Arinin, only 53.4 percent of the voters participated in the election, and of them 34.6 percent voted against both the
candidates. Arinin intends to appeal the election results to the Russian Supreme Court. The Central Electoral Commission is
also investigating.

The results are not the only controversial part of the presidential elections in Bashkortostan. In the fall of 1997 a republican
code was passed stating that a candidate could become president only if he spoke Bashkir (although it was not specified how
well) (Russkii Telegraf, 4 June). The titular language is not the official language of the republic, and is spoken by less than 20% of the population. Thus, under such a law the number of potential candidates would be greatly reduced. The Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation found this law in violation of the Russian Constitution, yet the Bashkortostan parliament
retained it on the books. However, the implied ramifications of such a law did not play into the dynamic of the most recent
elections. Rakhimov was supported by all ethnic groups.

Platform
Rakhimov's primary goal since the beginning of his political career has been to win as much sovereignty as possible for his
republic. He has achieved this on many levels, perhaps most successfully by simply ignoring federal policies with which he does
not agree. His battle is not for nationalist goals, but simply greater autonomy. The center has tended to ignore such deviance in
order to maintain stability in a potentially troublesome region. Even after the dismissal of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin,
Rakhimov remains a member of Our Home is Russia's (NDR) political council (Russkii Telegraf, 16 June)

Policies
President Rakhimov plays an active role in adopting most of the republic's policies, guiding local and regional politics and
economics. In his pursuit of sovereignty he has sought to build up republican banks and promote financial autonomy from
Moscow. The administration participated in the establishment of the first Russian regional investment and credit bank,
Bashkredit (see IEWS Russian Regional Report, 4 September 1996). In December 1996 Rakhimov signed a decree allowing
local companies to pay their debts to the local budget via additional share issues, increasing the government's stake in
companies' equity capital (see IEWS Russian Regional Report, 18 December 1996). A few months later in March 1997, the
government became further involved in regional business, allocating $3.5 million from the local budget for mortgage lending in
the region (Kommersant Daily, 19 March 1997). In December 1997 the President reduced taxes on all deliveries of raw
materials to petrochemical processing plants by one third, allowing suppliers to save up to $17 a ton (Kommersant Daily, 17
December 1997).

Home District
President Rakhimov has direct control over the republic's local government since the republican constitution gives him the
power to appoint mayors. This provision goes against the federal constitution, which proclaims that state and local officials must be elected. The Russian Supreme Court ruled the Bashkortostan law on local government unconstitutional in March 1998, a
ruling the republic ignored (Kommersant Daily, 28 March). Moscow has not taken action against the republic and Rakhimov
continues to determine the character of local as well as regional politics.

Ties to Moscow
In Moscow, Rakhimov is considered a strong regional leader whose sovereignty campaign is annoying, but within the limits of
propriety (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 June). On 13 August 1992 Rakhimov, together with Sakha (Yakutiya) President Mikhail
Nikolaev and Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev, issued a statement charging the federal powers with "ignoring the legal
interests of the republics." The conflict revolved around the Russian Federation's new budget. Rakhimov and other leaders met
with Yeltsin on 23 October 1992, forming the President's Council of Republican Leaders. Slightly over a year later Tatarstan
signed the first power-sharing agreement with Moscow. Bashkortostan, on 3 August 1994, was the third Russian region to sign a similar agreement. Bashkortostan's agreement gave the republic exclusive rights over its property and mineral resources,
special privileges regarding foreign trade, and an independent system of legislative and legal institutions.

In the second round of the 1996 presidential elections, Bashkortostan overwhelmingly supported Yeltsin. Rakhimov has
expressed his loyalty for Yeltsin on several occasions. President Yeltsin also called Rakhimov and spoke of his support for the
republican president during his reelection bid (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 June).

Yet, there are clear limits to Rakhimov's allegiance to Yeltsin. Rakhimov determines his own course of action, following only
the presidential decrees with which he agrees. Rakhimov considered Gaidar's government as working against the country's
interests by destroying its economy. He also opposed Yeltsin's policy towards Chechnya, stating that Russia "should not have
tried to hold on to Chechnya by force and organize a mass grave there as an example" (OMRI Daily Digest, 17 January 1996). In February 1998 Rakhimov tested his power further by claiming the right to appoint republican Supreme Court judges, a right now held by the federal government (Kommersant Daily, 27 February).

The delicate balance of power between these two presidents is representative of the relationship between the republic and the
central government. By agressively pressing their demands, autonomous republics like Bashkortostan could destabilize Russia's
political environment. Yeltsin's tolerance for Rakhimov is the sacrifice he has offered in order to maintain relative peace and
order between the republic and the center. It is important for the central government to maintain good relations with the
ethnicly-defined republics, particularly those which have expressed their desire for autonomy from the center. As a result, if the
republics demonstrate electoral support for the central government, Yeltsin tends to turn his back on their violations and
challenges for power. It is for this reason that the federal government will probably not explore allegations of fraud in
Rakhimov's reelection. Controversial elections of a similar nature in Orel and Mordovia were not challenged by Yeltsin.