PRESENTATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL RULES AND
STATUTES

Rule 1-F.R.-C.P. Scope of and Purpose of Rules

   "These rules govern the procedure in the United States District Courts in all suits of a
civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty with the exceptions
states in Rule 81 - They shall be construed "and administered" to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."

   RULE I was amended in 1993 by the addition of the words "and administered" in the
final sentence. The amendment was intended to emphasize the Courts duty to ensure that the
litigation is resolved without undue cost or delay.

RULE 81 Applicability in General

Rule 81 (b) ...........Relief heretofore available by mandamus or scire facias may
be obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate motion under practice prescribed
in these rules.

    The clear intention of Rules 1 and 81 was to apply Civil Rules to all District Court
proceedings unless expressly excepted. Rule 81 contains several express exceptions to the
general applicability of the Civil Rules to civil actions. Those exceptions include copyright
actions, bankruptcy actions, and prize proceedings in admiralty. Other actions are governed by
the civil rules, but only insofar as those rules are not inconsistent with other rules or statutes
governing those actions. In the instant petition they are not inconsistent, under the liberal
provisions of the RICO venue statute 18 USC 1965 (a) Subsection (a) provides that "(a) any
civil action or proceeding under this chapter [18 USCS 1-961 at seq]-against-any-person may
be instituted in the District Court of the United States for any district in which such person

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resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs".

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

    28 U.S.C. 1361 Action to compel an officer of the United States to perform his
duty

    The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action "in the nature of
mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff".

    28 U.S.C. 1361 added a venue and service of process provision 28 U.S.C.
1391 (e) which is applicable not only to mandamus actions but also generally to all
actions in which the defendant is a government officer or employee acting in his official
capacity, or an agency of the United States. In addition 1391 (e) provides that the
summons and complaint in such an action may be served on the officer or agency by
certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.
Also, no new liabilities or causes of action against the government are created by the
statute; rather it is to facilitate review by the federal courts of administrative actions
[Department of Justice would still hold status as Wrongdoer #7 page 11 Docket #521
See Sen Rep No. 1992, 87 Cong, 2d Sass, to accompany HR 1960, 2 US Code Cong
and Adm News (1962) 2784,

CONSTRUCTION OF FACTS, AND CASE LAW IN SUPPORT OF FACTS
    First the Pro Se Litigants acknowledge and realize that a mandamus action is
an extraordinary remedy which should be utilized only under exceptional
circumstances and its issuance is dependent largely upon judicial discretion. Plaintiffs
also realize that an assumption of mandamus jurisdiction is inappropriate where
alternative remedies exist. Therefore, the plaintiffs will show that a mandamus action
is an appropriate remedy under these unprecedented and extraordinary
circumstances and that the Department of Justice is acting contrary to law and should

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be compelled by mandamus to perform duty owed to the plaintiffs.

    Construction and application of 28 USCS 1361 confers on Federal District
Courts original jurisdiction of actions in nature of mandamus to compel federal officer,
employee, or agency to perform duty owed Plaintiff 13 ALR Fed 145

RELIEF SOUGHT
    Relief sought is to compel Department of Justice to perform a non-discretionary
administrative action which the existence of a duty is owed by a federal agency to the
plaintiffs, See: Carey v Local Board No. 2 (1969, DC Conn) 412 F2d 71. "Id. 252
Mandamus: "Draft registrant could maintain mandamus proceeding against draft board
to compel board to classify him I-S under statute providing that Federal District Courts
shall have jurisdiction of any action in nature of mandamus to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to
plaintiff,

EXPLANATION OF RELIEF SOUGHT IN INSTANT PETITION
    Relief sought is primarily for Plaintiff Manos as a witness /victim pursuant to the
Federal Guidelines for Fair Treatment of Crime Victims and Witnesses in Criminal
Justice Systems Act P. L. 97-291 Oct- 12, 1982. A violation of governmental agency's
own regulations may be basis for 28 USCS 1361 jurisdiction see.- Andujar v
Weinberger (1976 SO NY) 69 FRD 690.

    On March 17, 1998 Charles LeConche brought a tort action in the Hartford
Division 3:98-CV00489 (AWT) see. in this instant case 3-.97-CV02502 (JCH),
attachment to Dkt. #29 civil cover sheet and complaint filed in Hartford Division
claiming $50,000 in damages. Mr. LeConche on May 12, 1998 amended said
complaint and added among other counts, count #26 stating that Mr. Manos "appeared
before a congressional subcommittee alleging a barrage of entirely unfounded

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allegations of criminal conduct".

    In order for Mr. Manos to exonerate himself from this tort action which in reality
was and is a violation of 18 USCS 1512 witness tampering, Mr. Manos served two
subpoenas, one on Inspector Sheryl McLaughlin served September 11, 1998, the
other on Mr. Luskin served September 17, 1998. Ms. McLaughlin is a former FBI
Agent now working for Mr. Luskin's Inspector General's Office as an investigator. In
that capacity Ms. McLaughlin took statements from the persons present at the July 30th
E. Board Meeting held at Capriccio Restaurant and turned them over to Mr- Luskin.
Subpoena attachment attached as Exhibit A of instant petition. Mr. Luskin has refused
to turn over the statements to Mr- Manos on Mrs. McLaughin's behalf and his own,- See
two letters to Mr. Manos one dated September 23, 1998 and the other dated
September 29, 1998 from Mr. Luskin attached as Exhibit to instant petition. In said
letters the Court will notice that Mr. Luskin claims privilege in direct contradiction to Mr.
Luskin's own statements before Senator William McCollum Subcommittee on Crime,
July 25, 1996, in which he portrayed himself as an outside attorney and not a criminal
defense attorney: See exerpts from hearing filed in Dkt #52 amendment to Standing
Order #20. These exceptional circumstances give rise to plaintiff's request for
mandamus relief. The Department of Justice meets monthly and bimonthly with Mr.
Luskin and exchanges information and evidence gathered by Mr. Luskin's IG Office.
Therefore, the Department of Justice is in possession of the statements needed by Mr.
Manos. If they claim they are not in possession they have the ability to be in
possession through the Operational Agreement. This right is therefore a duty owed to
Plaintiff Manos pursuant to the Fed. Guidelines of the Crime Victim and Witness Act P L
97-291.

RELIEF SOUGHT JOY FOR PLAINTIFFS Wall, MANOS & COOKSEY
    There are preliminary question of law that will be addressed at preliminary

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hearings in this instant case concerning the Executive Board of Local 230 in the meaning of
18 USC 1961(4) and the "Operational Agreement" in the meaning of 18 USC 1961 (4)
before facilitating and conspiracy to violate RICO can be addressed.

    These statements given to the Inspector Generals Office will give the Court a clear
view in making judgments on preliminary questions of law, and the plaintiffs consider Mr.
Luskin's response to the subpoenas an unnecessary and costly delay.

    The plaintiff therefore take the position that the Department of Justice has a "ministerial
duty" to the plaintiffs to release said statements. see: White v Matthew (1976 DC Conn) 434 F.
Supp, 1252 Affd. (CA 2 Conn) 559 F 2d 852, O The United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut 434 F. Supp. 1252 T- Emmett Clarie, Chief Judge, found that delays in
administrative hearings on entitlement to disability insurance benefits violated Social Security
Act, and Department of Health, Education and Welfare appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Feinberg, Circuit Judge held in its pertinent part that: (1) Social Security Act did not preclude
mandamus review with respect to speed of proceedings".

   In addition, holding again jointly to Andugiar v Weinberger (976, SD NY) 69 FRD 690,
"violation of governmental agency's own regulations maybe basis for 28 USCS 1361
jurisdiction. The plaintiff jointly take the position that the "Operational Agreement" is a violation
of the principles of Federal prosecution. See: United States Attorney's Manual-Chapter 110-9-110
110-401 Page 5, "Inclusion of a RICO count in an indictment solely or even primarily to create
a bargaining tool for later plea negotiations on lesser counts would not be appropriate and
would violate the principles of Federal prosecutions"

. Previous cited by plaintiff page #5 Dkt#52.
  Andujar v Weinberger also addressed due process ID 691 "allegations of lengthy delays in
delivery of social security benefits state constitutional claims of denial of property without due
process giving Federal District Court mandamus jurisdiction with

   For the purposes of showing the Court the exceptional circumstances in this
instant matter the plaintiffs enter Exhibit C " Communications Release and Warning
Letter from United States House of Representatives, Honorable Harris W. Fawell,
Chairman of Subcommittee tc Mr. Arthur Coia, General President LIUNA, CC to the
Honorable Donald M- Payne Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Employer
Employee Relations, Mr. Charles LeConche, Business Manager, LIUNA Local 230,
The Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General and Robert D. Luskin, Esq. LIUNA GEB
attorney.