The LTTE and devolution

By S. D. Muni

THE LTTE'S blunt refusal to either discuss the devolution package proposed by the Sri Lankan Government or participate in the Interim Council for the northeast has not come as a surprise. The outfit made it clear months ago to Norwegian mediators that its priority over any negotiations with Colombo was military control of Jaffna. The LTTE's stance should help disabuse all those who pretend to believe that it can and must be involved in a peaceful process of resolving the ethnic conflict. Its ostensible condition for participating in any such process is that it must be based on the four Thimphu (1985) principles: (i) cultural distinctiveness of the Sri Lankan Tamils, (ii) recognition of the northeast region as their homeland, (iii) right to self- determination and (iv) a dominant role for the Tamils (read LTTE) in any interim arrangement. Three of these principles were incorporated in the devolution package inherent in the 1987 Indo- Sri Lanka Agreement.

The LTTE defied that agreement. These three principles are also generally covered in the present Sri Lankan proposals. The problem is only with the principle of self- determination. This right cannot be granted to a part of its territory by any state. Most of the post-colonial states would disintegrate if this principle was granted on the basis of ethnic nationalism. The LTTE is asking for this right only to eventually secure Eelam as a sovereign entity.

The LTTE sees any devolution package, no matter how responsive it is to the Tamil aspirations, as a negation of its main goal of Eelam. Its stakes in Eelam and the fight for it are too heavy to be given up. Any acceptance of a devolution package and its agreeing to work within a united Sri Lanka would mean the LTTE adapting itself to non-violent and democratic functioning. This is in conflict with its ideology, organisation, political experience and method of functioning. Besides, this threatens the huge economic empire built by the LTTE through regular remittances from the Tamil diaspora scattered all over the world, income from drug trade, money laundering and related commercial activity, as well as by taxing the poor and helpless Tamils living under its control. This economic empire is so big that it cannot be wished away. Recall the LTTE supremo, V. Prabhakaran's demand for money from the then Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, in 1987 in lieu of the loss of funds raised with the taxes collected forcibly from the Tamils. Money was delivered on this count by India.

One of the many factors that drove Prabhakaran to denounce the 1987 agreement and fight against the IPKF was that subsequent instalments of this promised money were not delivered. The Sri Lanka Government is not even offering any such compensation. If the LTTE were to accept any devolution package and settle the conflict peacefully, the contributions coming from the Tamil diaspora would dry up and other illegal commercial transactions now in operation would also get jeopardised.

All those who ignore the LTTE's stakes in conflict and Eelam and ask for a peaceful negotiated approach do so either for political expediency or out of fear. The LTTE has sustained itself as a formidable insurgent group by its mastery over terror. However, the perception of its overall military prowess is exaggerated. A careful look at the record of the ethnic war in Jaffna since 1983 will bear this out. For example, in May 1986, President J. R. Jayewardene's ``fight to the finish'' forced Prabhakaran and other militant leaders to pack their bags for Tamil Nadu. It was the Indian ``humanitarian'' intervention with the so-called ``bread bombs'' that saved the day for them.

The LTTE got back into Jaffna under the 1987 agreement. Between October and December 1987, the IPKF drove the LTTE out of Jaffna and bottled it up in the Vanni jungles. The LTTE could have been militarily eliminated had the IPKF had a clear political will behind it, and also had the political change in India and Sri Lanka not allowed the LTTE to manoeuvre Premadasa on its side against the IPKF. When the LTTE broke its tactical peace with President Premadasa in June 1990, Colombo had neither the moral authority nor the political will to resist.

Again during 1995-97, when the LTTE refused to come to the negotiating table and opened fire, it was driven out of Jaffna and pushed to the northeastern seaboard by the armed forces. The success of the LTTE's recent military campaign, ``Unceasing waves'', is credited more to the disarray and demoralisation in the armed forces. An important factor behind this demoralisation, besides complacency and mismanagement on the part of the Government, was the political rivalry and conflict between the ruling PA and the Opposition UNP. This did not allow the President, Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga's devolution proposals of 1995 to succeed.

The UNP's influence in the security forces even encouraged desertions. The LTTE cleverly exploited the Sinhala parties' rivalries to its advantage by going to the extent of lending open electoral support to the UNP in the Presidential race. By activating its constituencies of support in Tamil Nadu, the LTTE has also successfully blunted any possible Indian support for Sri Lanka in its recent military campaign. Notwithstanding all this, once Colombo recollected its political will, the fall of Jaffna which appeared imminent was averted.

It is therefore clear that the secret of the LTTE's military prowess lies more in its skill for political manoeuvre than its overall strength and agility on the battlefield. A sound and sincere devolution can prove a powerful weapon in isolating the organisation. The reported consensus between the PA and the UNP on devolution and constitutional changes needs to be firmed up. The agreement between Mrs. Kumaratunga and the UNP leader, Mr. Ranil Wikremesinghe, on the unit of devolution, even with a provision for referendum, and the character of the Sri Lankan state (comprising the Centre and the regions) generally meet the Tamil aspirations.

These two leaders must ignore extremist Sinhala views and grant land rights to the provincial councils. This will facilitate the efforts at securing the non-LTTE Tamil parties' acceptance of the broad parameters and substance of the devolution package, even if some of these parties such as the TULF cannot openly say so for fear of the LTTE.

India tried its best, during the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh's visit, to nudge the PA and the UNP towards each other on the Tamils issue. One hopes that a similar effort is already on in relation to the other Tamil groups. Within India also, New Delhi is making it clear to the pro-LTTE Tamil parties that the only solution to the Sri Lankan problem lies in a sound, sincere and workable devolution package.

The Tigers would continue to vitiate the process of consensus building on devolution, by mobilising all possible pressures on the non-LTTE Tamil parties from within and outside Sri Lanka. For, once a consensus emerges, there will be no opportunity left for the LTTE to politically manoeuvre Sri Lankan internal divisions to its advantage. Nor will there be any rationale left for the outfit to carry on with its war for Eelam.

This will create ideal circumstances for international mediation efforts backed by Norway, the U.S. and India to bring pressure on the LTTE to lay down arms and join the national mainstream. The chances are that the LTTE will evolve tactical manoeuvres to defuse the international pressures and wriggle out of the uncomfortable situation in search of its desired Eelam. The only option left in that situation would be to meet the military challenge of the LTTE effectively, once and for all.

(The writer is Professor, South Asian Studies, JNU, New Delhi.)