UTHR(J) Information Bulletin, released on May 19, 1999
The Vanni has been the focus of war news from Sri Lanka ever since the LTTE importuned a large number of civilians in Jaffna into the Vanni at the end of 1995 and engineered a humanitarian crisis. As the result of effective lobbying no doubt, the UN Secretary General, Mr. Boutros Ghali expressed his concern about the situation there and the Vanni was thrust into international attention. The Government therefore was obliged to be seen as caring for the people there by providing food and medicine, while the LTTE tried all means to mould the civilians and civilian life to service their military needs. The Vanni became thus the last fortress of the Liberation Tigers. The Government on the other hand while verbally espousing concern for the civilians, has been subtly applying pressures to make life difficult for them, forcing scores of thousands to leave the Vanni and move into refugee camps. For example essentials for a farming community such as kerosene, rope, fertiliser and basic medicines for a malarial region and even panadol were either banned or always in short supply. The LTTE for its part always administered supplies sent by the Government keeping its military needs in view and profited from encouraging black-marketeering, artificially aggravating shortages.
On school-children and the young there was always heavy pressure to join the LTTE. The LTTE’s military successes at Mullaitivu and Killinochchi and even halting the northward military advance had nothing in them for the civilians. Their children were turned into cheap cannon fodder in a war that was only bringing progressive ruin on the Tamil people. In the so-called cleared, liberated or Government controlled areas, an oppressive and debilitating regime has been imposed on the Tamils on the pretext of security considerations. The Government has evaded world-wide censure only by not having these offending regulations on the statute book. They are imposed covertly, illegally and administratively. By so doing they are made all the more worse by being arbitrary, while making legal redress impractical for the ordinary man.
A graphic illustration of the fate of Vanni folk is the refugee camps in Vavuniya. Confined to these camps the inmates are allowed out for a few hours at a time after obtaining a pass. They cannot leave Vavuniya for another part of the country as the means of obtaining clearance are way beyond them. These once hard-working farmers are now idling in camps, living on meagre government handouts, with no proper schooling for their children, under conditions utterly ruinous to both community and individuals. This has now gone on for close upon three years. The camps being under government control with a police guard, the NGOs are not allowed to intervene directly. At Poonthottam camp with 500 inmates for instance, the thatch was in tatters. A refugee said that he did not bathe for three days as he had been sitting in the rain. To the rest of the country and to the Tamils abroad vocally supporting the LTTE, these people have by now become ‘out of sight, out of mind’.
Where the State is concerned, subjecting Tamils to such a regime has meant rampant corruption and a degradation of state functions and state machinery. It is a worrying comment on the Sri Lankan State that by its inability to address security concerns imaginatively and intelligently, keeping democratic ideals in view, it has been moving in the direction of conjuring up images of apartheid, an arbitrary form of it without legal sanction.
When the Vanni saga began in November 1995 with the UN Secretary General’s expression of concern, it passed off as a false alarm after it became widely known that the LTTE had forced the people out of Jaffna. But today the alarm is a very real one and it should not be too late for the people when the world reacts.
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
The Army halted its northward advance along the A9 trunk road and changed tactics after losing Killinochchi last September with heavy casualties to an LTTE onslaught using cannon and suicidal waves of fighters. The losses among the LTTE too were heavy at 700 or more killed, and were comparable with the Army’s losses of considerably more than I,000. Both sides were in crisis and the LTTE launched an ambitious and somewhat heavy-handed recruitment drive. But its success was very limited.
Each of the two sides had lost between 2000 and 4000 killed during engagements in the Vanni. In deploying about 4 to 5 thousand cadre for the attack on Killinochchi, the LTTE thinned down its defences at Mankulam, which it had defended for several months, enabling the Army to capture it with ease. Such indications suggest that the present strength of the LTTE is below 10,000.
In the meantime from last December the Army adopted tactics where it had surprise on its side and has by now taken control of considerable territory on either side of the A9 between Vavuniya and Mankulam. By taking over the famed Roman Catholic shrine of Madhu which also functioned as a UNHCR supervised refugee camp and the surrounding agricultural region, a large segment of the Vanni population has been brought under Army control.
It is now estimated that about 125,000 civilians in the Vanni have come under Army control and 150,000 to 200,000 live under LTTE control. A number well above 50,000 have gone to India and a smaller number to Jaffna, over the last 3 years.
The recent operations have been conducted with hardly any loss of life. In villages people woke up to find themselves among the Army. Farming villages not under Army control too hope that the Army would move in, in a like manner. The immediate reasons for them are economic and the protection of children. Under Army control they hope to obtain Rs. 1,200 for a bushel of paddy instead of the Rs. 500 the LTTE pays them. Apart from drastic reductions in prices of food and fuel, the cost of hiring a tractor to prepare an acre of land for sowing would drop from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 2,500. Even rope for tying cattle has presently to be purchased in the black market for smuggled goods. Their present disposition is to do with tiredness from what both sides have very unreasonably imposed on them and has nothing to do with any love for the Government.
On the whole the civilians are relieved that the recent military operations passed without causing them much hurt or damage. But there is anxiety about future uncertainties. They were tired of the regime to which the LTTE had subjected there. Food rations to displaced families though inadequate, became regular after the Army take-over. Necessities such as batteries, milk food and medicines are available at normal cost. But for the refugeese who were displaced from Killinochchi, Jaffna and other areas where military operations are taking place, it is going to be rising frustration with oppressive regimentation of a different kind.
These refugees are now without means,
living on dry rations. Earlier many of them formed the mainstay of farm
labour in the surrounding areas. For example Adampan was
a flourishing agricultural area which
had its harvest in mid-April. But the refugees from Madhu who used to work
in those fields have this time been prevented from going
there by the Army because it is still
under LTTE control. Apart from them those who ran small shops, were involved
in the fish trade, or used to fetch items for sale from
the Government controlled area, are
now out of work.
Out of sheer desperation many children
and even teenage girls started queuing up with plates outside the Army
camps at mealtimes. This gave room for rumours placing
individuals at risk. When the Army took
over Madhu in late March, the civilians had to register for dry rations.
The Army made an announcement calling upon
‘Maaveerar’ (Great Heroes - LTTE men
and women who died in action) families to register first. Taken in an unguarded
moment, several of them went forward and were
casually registered without anything
being given away. Today the Army is said to be getting much information
from persons who once had ties with the LTTE.
DERIVATION, HYSTERIA AND SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION
With large sections of the Vanni population
coming under Army control, the LTTE took measures to retain some of the
weaker sections under its control. Recruiting
among them is easier and their presence
ensured relief supplies. Many of the fisherfolk from Jaffna who were displaced
to the Vanni during the 1995 Exodus had settled
comfortably over the years at Vidatthalthivu
and Pappamoddai on the Mannar mainland coast. Early this year the Army
indicated its new strategy by a westward move
from A9. Just before the second move
towards Madhu in late March, the LTTE asked the refugee fisherfolk in Vidatthalthivu
and Pappamoddai to remove themselves
northwards to Kalliady, Illuppaikkadavai,
Vellankulam and further north.
The LTTE is thus squeezing them into
a smaller area where conditions are difficult. Their earnings have dropped
as they now face increased risk and harassment from
naval patrols operating out of Karainagar.
There is also a water problem in their congested new habitations in the
villages mentioned above. Along with an inadequate
supply, water has to be purchased at
Rs. 2/= for a pot. For a variety of reasons including a reduction of supply
by the Government, the LTTE taking a share and disruption
of administrative arrangements, the
provision of dry rations to the displaced in several areas is very irregular.
The people have heard the Government claiming over the
radio that they are being given rations
monthly. But in the Adampan/Parappankandal area for example, rations have
been given only once since the beginning of this year.
Vast numbers of people in the area north
of Illuppaikkadavai/Kalliady are suffering from repeated bouts of malaria.
The proportion is more than 50% according to some
observers. This condition can be overcome
with proper medical care. For permanent relief from the commoner ‘Vivax’
variety, a commonly used treatment involves a
supervised dosage of ‘Chloroquin’ and
‘Premaquin’ taken over a cycle of 8 weeks. These drugs too are in short
supply. But these people, in addition to not having had
proper nutrition for 9 years and having
undergone displacement for 4 years, are made to endure malaria on top of
their vastly reduced resistance. Almost everyone is
physically very weak, having a skeletal
appearance.
Amidst this deprivation there are shocking
events, the like of which have not been heard of in this country for more
than 150 years. These have followed the new
displacement into the Illuppaikkadavai,
Vellankulam areas. The parents of a new born babe quarrelled over the father’s
inability to find the money for purchasing milk food
for the infant. Then they, together,
killed the baby. In another incident the parents became so desperate without
cash, that they poisoned themselves and the children to
death.
There have been several cases, two of
them well-established, where even in a generally impoverished environment,
persons have been killed on lonely jungle tracks for
their money. In one incident it was
made to appear that the murdered person had hanged himself.
In Jeyapuram, close to Mulankavil, a
displaced family originally from Jaffna arrived, desperately hungry and
without money. They sought relief by digging up some wild
yam, which they did not know was poisonous.
The entire family perished.
Medical and educational services are
in a state of breakdown. Even in a relatively better off area such as Adampan,
there was only one clinic served by an RMP
(Registered Medical Practitioner) who
was trying to leave. Antibiotics are not available. There is no panadol
in hospital, but it is available in the black-market for Rs. 5 a
tablet. Due to the absence of refrigeration
facilities: infants have not been given their routine vaccine that are
given in the rest of the country. It has been suggested that
the MOH Mannar could arrange for monthly
visits to the area with the vaccines carried in boxes of ice.
An incident which illustrates the attitudes
of both the Army and the LTTE took place at Uyilankulam on 17th April.
An ICRC convoy carrying food was crossing into the
LTTE controlled area. Some policemen
at the final checkpoint may have moved forward a little into no-man’s land
as the convoy passed. The LTTE opened fire and killed
three of them. Technicalities aside
it was an ungracious gesture, considering that it was government food coming
to them. The Army closed the entry point for about 12
days preventing all movement, demanding
a guarantee that the LTTE will not do it again. It is understood that agreement
was reached.
But recently the ground situation has
changed and the LTTE has removed its permanent establishments in the area.
Consequently it has become easier for civilians to
cross over into the Army controlled
area. The LTTE sentries withdraw north and come to their checkpoint near
Uyilankulam (i.e. Kattankulam) only at 11.00 AM. Many
civilians get to the Army point before
then.
THR DRIVE FOR Militarisation: THE GENERAL TREND
Amidst this anarchy of crime, starvation,
sickness and hopelessness the LTTE intensified its recruitment drive. There
was full-day propaganda blaring through
loudspeakers, street dramas and interruption
of schools, playing on despondency and hopelessness. The Vanni become anything
but the pride and glory of the Tamil
people the LTTE said it would be when
it attempted to evacuate wholesale the citizens of Jaffna into the Vanni
in November 1995. It used to-be the boast of LTTE
propaganda that areas under its control
were virtually free of crime and discontent. Now in the Vanni the tragic,
inhuman reality behind fascist rhetoric was being laid bare
and the LTTE could not care less.
The LTTE had some success in Vidaththalthivu
where in the prevailing confusion amidst evacuation and uncertainty, some
joined its ranks out of frustration and
desperation. But recruitment was not
so successful in the Adampan/Parappankandal area because the people were
not so despondent and the LTTE had evacuated
everything of theirs some weeks ahead
in anticipation of the Army moving in.
In a school having classes up to the
O Level (Year I ) in Mulankavil, a teacher took his whole class of about
20 and joined the LTTE. The children were quickly removed
away from the area so as to put off
distraught parents.
During April the LTTE moved towards militarisation
of the civilian population. All shop keepers, teachers and students were
compelled to take compulsory training. The
first few days involved physical exercises.
In the Mannar mainland area the training was staggered. After Mulankavil
and Puthukkudiyiruppu, the training of shop keepers
in the Adampan/Parappankandal area began
towards the end of April. Training in this area was disrupted by the LTTE
pulling out its structures.
The purpose of those who received the
first stage of their training in the Mannar area appears to be that of
posting them as sentries to inform the LTTE of fresh military
advances. This would help the LTTE to
direct its artillery. Rumours had been afloat that the compulsory training
will be implemented at all levels to include village
headmen and AGAs. These new orders were
received with widespread resentment. For shop keepers who absented themselves,
it meant closure of their shops as
punishment. The LTTE told those who
resisted verbally that they do not deserve to live in Tamil Eelam and should
move out of the Vanni.
A fisheries society in Vidaththalthivu
was told by the LTTE that they must all come for training. One member objected
on grounds of personal conviction. The LTTE
replied that he must then leave Tamil
Eelam. The member said that the LTTE must then give him a letter saying
that he was forced to leave, if not, when he returns, he may
like the expelled Muslims find it difficult
to prove his claims. The situation then becoming unsettled due to Army
movements, the LTTE left them alone for the present.
These moves to forcibly induct civilians
made them apprehensive of coming under Army control. That the LTTE is anxious
is clear. In his May Day speech in Mallavi,
Karikalan, a senior leader, said that
their Leader Prabhakaran would surely find a strategy to push the Army
all the way south to Vavuniya. In Koddadichcholai in the East,
a woman leader said that they are proud
to observe May Day despite all the difficulties.
Signs of disillusionment within the LTTE
have also been evident for some time. When LTTE cadre in the Vanni visit
their homes during a break riding a motor cycle or
driving a pick-up, it poses an attraction
for the children to join up. But the older intimate friends in the village
of the visiting cadre are often told, "Don’t come into this
organisation. What you see from outside
is not the reality inside. We too are waiting for a chance to leave".
Because of attempts to induct school
children into the LTTE’s military machine, parents are reluctant to send
their children to school and school attendance had dropped
to an estimated 20%.
Except for trying to move the refugees
and their equipment out, the LTTE’s attentions in what was left to them
of the Mannar District were half hearted, as the Army had
started reconnaissance moves and were
expected to bring the entire district under their control. Their more systematic
and far-reaching attentions were in North Vanni - the
Killinochchi and Mullaitivu areas.
NORTH VANNI: TOWARDS TOTAL Militarisation
Although the Army was pushed back about
3 miles north from Killinochchi town last September, it took control of
the Oddusuddan sector in December and is now within
14 miles of Mullaitivu town. This also
entailed enormous displacement northward. For many it meant loss of livelihood
and great difficulty in getting rations. Farmers who
fled from their homes and fields in
the area around Oddusuddan got into very desperate straits. One family
for example sowed on rented land in Murippu and the crops
were destroyed by floods. Closer to
the Army controlled area, there is occasional shelling by the Army, such
as in Tharmapurarri, where several displaced schools are also
situated. Those travelling out of the
eastern sector have to pass through Vattakachchi, which is subject to shelling
to Murikandy and then to Uyilankulam near Mannar.
They are advised not to travel alone
in case of shell injury. A traveller met a seven year old girl pushing
a bicycle and her father walking behind. He bad no strength from
having starved the previous day. For
these once prosperous people, even a cup of plain tea has become a luxury.
Although education is in disarray, some schools have
done unexpectedly well due to displaced
teachers from Jaffna, with one student in Mullaitivu scoring 4 As at the
A Levels.
Amidst this anarchy and hardship which
would only increase with time, the LTTE has launched an ambitious programme
of militarisation. We describe below the first
stage.
SCHOOLS
Anbu, the LTTE leader in charge of schools
has ordered that all school children from year 9 (13 years) and above must
as the first step undergo 3 weeks of physical
training for 1 hour a day during school
hours. This training is conducted by LTTE cadre or by young teachers who
have been given a month’s training by the LTTE.
This will be followed by the second step
which comprises 2 weeks of weapons training. First they would be given
three types of guns - M 16, AK 47 & G 3 - along-with
grenades, would be taught how to dismantle
and reassemble them, and how many bullets each gun could fire and their
killing range. Next they would be trained how to
take up positions, and move under cover
from one position to another.
The same training procedure has to be
followed by the teachers parallely, but after school hours. The lady teachers
have been ordered to stitch T-shirts and slacks for
purposes of training.
Having heard rumours about compulsory
training, most parents kept their children away from school when schools
reopened in April. But children centinued to be sent to
tutories which are doing roaring business.
The LTTE then approached tutory staff and told them that should school
absenteeism continue at this rate, the tutories would
be closed. The tutory staff then told
the students that they should not come there unless they are attending
school. This put the parents and their children in a quandary.
But the LTTE’s next move made it impossible
to avoid training by staying away from school.
COMPULSORY TRAINING FOR THE PEOPLE’S MILITIA
Having begun with schools the LTTE drew
up a scheme for a universal people’s militia. The LTTE summoned a meeting
of village headmen (GSs), a part of the government
administration, who were to be the linchpins
of the People’s Militia. Each GS normally has about 150-300 families under
him. The GSs were told that they would be
responsible for compliance with the
regulations, were given forms for each family, and were asked to return
with the completed forms. Each head of the family has to fill in
details about members, their age, sources
and amount of income, cases of serious illness and so on. The people from
is upwards were to be placed in 3 categories: 1st - 15
to 35 years, 2nd - 35 to 45 years &
3rd - 45 years and above.
The 1st and 2nd categories will be compulsorily
trained in the village camps being organised. Those in the 3rd must go
for training unless they can establish that they are
seriously ill. Even if they are granted
exemption, they must be present in the grounds while the others are training.
The people will be allowed to collect
their relief rations sent by the Government only upon the GS certifying
that the person underwent training. Thus those 15 and above
who stay away from school will get caught
to the Militia. There is again a discrepancy between those training in
schools and those meant to be trained in the Militia. The
former would also include 13-14 year
olds. Local observers suggest that this group would be used as reserves.
Orders have already been issued and Militia training is
expected to commence during the course
of May.
THE CO-OPERATIVES
The co-ops are the bodies distributing
government rations. As an allied move, the LTTE called up meetings of co-op
administrators in different areas. They were told that
the co-ops would from now function directly
under LTTE overview. Rations, they added, should be given only to those
coming with certification from the GS. At one
meeting a coop administrator complained
that because the LTTE divert part of the rations coming in for their own
use, the co-ops run out of food to give those coming
later in the line who are entitled.
The LTTE spokesman responded that it is the fault of the co-ops. He added,
"If you tell us the number you serve, we will leave that
amount and take the rest".
In the Mullaitivu area, co-op administrators
protested that if they carried out the orders given by the LTTE, they would
get into trouble with their superiors outside the
Vanni. The LTTE spokesman replied, "If
you will not work as we want, you can handover everything to us and go".
THE LEADER
According to the new rules no one is
allowed to leave the LTTE even after the completion of the mandatory 7
years. When this was introduced some months ago, those
attaining the age of 35 were permitted
to get married, after which they would remain in the organisation but perform
non-combat duties. Those who had left the
organisation but were in the Vanni were
ordered to report back and deserters too were rounded up. The number so
brought back is said to be about 2000. There is said to
be no shortage of weapons. A section
of those reinducted have been addressed by the Leader, Mr. V. Prabhakaran.
About the first week of May the Leader
addressed a secret conference of all area leaders of the Propaganda Wing.
He was hard on them for their low effectiveness. This he
said had resulted in an appallingly
low level of recruitment. To shame them, he delivered an emotional eulogy
on the achievements of the Military Wing, with references to
Killinochchi, Mullaitivu, the SL Army’s
aborted northward advance on A9 and the achievements of suicide cadre.
He gave them a time frame in which to take steps to
boost recruitment.
The Leader further ordered them to conduct
daily pocket meetings in every village. The lack of variety in propaganda
material too came up for discussion. While the LTTE
controlled Jaffna, in addition to the
Eelanatham daily, the Viduthalaippuligal (Liberation Tigers) came out monthly.
At present the Eelanatham continues to be published
daily, but the second is irregular.
The Leader asked them to regularise Viduthalaippuligal, and to put out
additional leaflets.
Some of the measures mentioned above
are being implemented and for the others orders have been given. Delays
and modifications may be occasioned by constraints and
public resentment. These are high handed
and even fascist measures to impose on a helpless, starving, sickly, frightened
and an almost hysterical population, brought to
this point by their liberators by methodically
blocking all saner alternatives. Whatever the personal merits of the Leader,
his charisma and endurance, his manner of
struggle, as we have always said, is
a mockery of liberation, and renders the Tamils objects of contempt. A
heavier responsibility rests with those sections of the Tamil
elite who flattered his vanity, without
whose services this tragedy could not have been prolonged for so long.
Take one example: The Leader has moved
far towards using the food sent by the Sri Lankan Government for the displaced
as wages for military service in warring against
the same government, on the grounds
that it is a genocidal government. He knows that human rights concern from
around the world, and rightly so, would never allow the
government, whatever its inclinations,
to completely stop the food supply and starve the people. It is moreover
a concern he never allowed his own people.
Most Tamils have doubts about his cause,
those directly affected are often angry such as the victims of the Jaffna
Exodus, and one day the survivors of the Vanni ordeal
too will be angry. Yet the Tamils’ historical
experience of the Sri Lankan state and the regular humiliations they face,
constantly reinforce a gut feeling of sympathy for his
cause. It is of course most often the
self-indulgent feeling of those at a safe distance from his organisation.
To understand this and move some way
towards eradicating such gut feeling, we also need to confront and come
to terms with attitudes and practices of the State and of
the Southern elite, that contribute
to it.
CIVILIANS AND THE SECURITY REGIME
Earlier we referred to Tamils coming
out of the Vanni who are confined to refugee camps in subhuman conditions.
There are now about 14,000 such refugees in Vavuniya.
This measure has no legal sanction.
It is hard to make a list of such unlawful measures. Being unlawful, they
are often individual and arbitrary innovations increasingly
going out of control. To take a common
sort of example, an old man had come out of the Vanni and was in Vavuniya
trying to get a pass to travel to Trincomalee and join
his daughter. Instead of going to a
refugee camp where the procedure to come out is arduous, he submitted his
application and boarded himself at the Hindu Youth
Council for Rs. 30 a day. 52 days later
a Tamil police officer passing by saw him and inquired. The old man who
had practically exhausted his money was living on bread
and plain tea, asked the police officer
to buy some for him.
After further inquiries, the officer
checked and found that the old man’s application had not even been faxed
to the Trincomalee police to check on his daughter, and took
steps to dispatch him there. In such
matters Tamil civilians have no rights and the Police are not bound by
any obligation to perform their self-imposed duty expeditiously.
In the meantime, after 52 days, the
old man had begun to starve.
In another instance a displaced elderly
man on a wheel chair with an ailment wanted to go from Vavuniya to Colombo
to consult a specialist. The Police wanted a letter
from the DMO, Vavuniya, stating that
consultation for the ailment was unobtainable in Vavuniya. It was in clear
breach of a man’s right to travel within his own country
and to consult a doctor of his choice.
Moreover this case and that above reeate to persons who are clearly neither
terrorists nor suicide bombers.
Getting permission to travel out of the
North has been made a tedious process. In Mannar town which serves a large
area, it means hanging about for several whole days
at the pass office to see the police
officer, even paying a bribe through an agent, and much paper work. Those
who plan systems do not even know if they work, and make
the public suffer instead. For example,
for a person coming from the LTTE area to travel abroad or to Colombo,
someone in the cleared (Army controlled) area has to stand
guarantee. Someone in Mannar town for
example has to surrender the local Army identity card and is given a temporary
pass to remain in Mannar - not valid for travelling
out of town. The person going abroad
upon completing arrangements in Colombo has to send the guarantor by fax,
copies of the visa and ticket. These are then produced
to the Police who in turn ask the Colombo
Airport by fax if the traveller has left. A lady who stood guarantee for
an old lady going to India submitted the fax and went and
hung around at the pass office to get
back her Army identity card (which again has no legal recognition). At
length she learnt that the Colombo Airport never responds to
such queries from the local police.
The illegality of the whole range of
practices, including compulsory registration in Colombo - in practice for
Tamils only - and the need to carry the registration form
around are underpinned by one singular
fact: When an Inspector General of Police and the Attorney General were
asked about registration and the need to carry the form
in Colombo, the responded that these
were not necessary. But it goes on. There is a particularly interesting
absurdity. Sections of the security forces run rackets to
smuggle persons from the-North int,
Colombo in their vehicles for about Rs. 20,000 per head. There have been
cases of smugled persons being apprehended by the Police
in Colombo and then let off, because
there are no legal grounds for prosecution. The most the Police can do
is to detain the person on grounds of suspicion under the
PTA and have the detention order extended
from time to tame by me magistrates, knowing well that there is no use.
The bulk of the Tamil detainees belong to this
category. Being made to work in this
chronic regime has a strong corrupting influence on security officials.
The system drives the policeman to ask
not what law this person is in breach of, but rather how much he can pay?
These practices have spawned host of shady lawyers
and agents, claiming to be able to bribe
police officials and even magistrates. It brings about the degradation
of the whole system of law, and of the State itself.
With the Government bereft of any political
strategy to integrate the Tamils into the national fabric, these security
regulations become more and more oppressive and
arbitrary with every bomb that goes
off in Colombo. They may be bearable for a few months. But continued indefinitely
with no end in sight they become in effect a system
of apartheid under the name of security,
but without a legal framework.
COUNTERING AN IMPENDING TRAGEDY
A very perilous situation now confronts
us in the Vanni that could carry the tide of events in several unexpected
directions. Like every fascist movement the LTTE will run
the course of destroying itself. It
is also characteristic of them that in their final inferno they try to
take large numbers of their own people down with them.
Thanks to the Government’s procrastination,
the UNP’s opportunism and the volatility of the Southern political scene,
a political solution to the ethnic problem once more
looks distant. This created desperately
in the ordinary Tamil mind, that if the LTTE is finished, they would be
cheated once again. In many unseen ways the failure to have
a political solution in place generates
the dynamism to prolong the conflict. Had the Government’s ‘Peace Package’
been a fact of life today, we would have faced a far less
daunting situation in the Vanni. There
would have been hope for the people, and hence more resistance to the LTTE’s
impositions. Indeed there is resistance even today.
It is imperative that we face up to,
in advance, the limitations of the Sri Lankan Forces. When operations were
started in Jaffna during 1995, without any provocation from
below the Air Force bombed a refugee
concentration in Navaly killing 12O civilians in July and again in Nagar
Kovil killing about 40 civilians in September. In the Vanni
today, the LTTE, unlike in Jaffna in
1995, is doing everything possible to blur the distinction between combatants
and non combatants. A couple of aerial attacks like the
ones above in Jaffna, and total mobilisation
is bound to be seen as legitimate, with the people feeling that they were
with their backs to the wall.
The experience in 1995 (as recorded in
our Special Report No. 6, The Jaffna Exodus) could give us ideas for the
protection of civilians. There is a compelling case for
enabling International NGOs to go into
the LTTE controlled areas and organise safety zones for the civilians.
If the Government Forces are enjoined to conduct themselves
with restraint, it may well turn out
that large numbers of LTTE cadre, many of whom are fighting for the lack
of an alternative, would surrender when the opportunity arises.
Most of the displaced persons in the
Vanni would have come out into the Government controlled area by now, if
not for Government restrictions. Those who come out
have been confined to camps in sub human
conditions, while there is land in Vavuniya for them to live independently
in temporary abodes. This is part of the mindset of a
state machinery that has lent complicity
to displacing Tamils and Muslims in Trincomalee urban limits, settling
Sinhalese in their place and regularising the new occupation
[see for example Special Report No.
8]. The present plight of Tamil refugees also has much to do with state
ideology rather than with legitimate security concerns.
Urgency demands that the immediate concern
should be directed towards the civilians in the conflict zone. International
agencies should be enabled to go into the area
with such quantities of food and medicine
as are deemed adequate. This will not save the LTTE which is in the process
of destroying itself. But it would do much to
protect the people and keep them away
from the LTTE
The political solution too can no longer
be delayed. From the time of the B-C pact of 1957 it has been our experience
that delay and defensive pleading eroded credibility
and caused governments to renege on
their commitments. The country itself has continued to remain an intellectual
and economic backwater, dominated by paranoid and
increasingly security conscious ruling
interests, thus unable to realise its potential. Indeed a mental framework
dependent on interests which cannot countenance the
truth, leads inevitably to intellectual
degradation. The 1980s and particularly the Southern insurgency, amply
revealed that the Tamil militancy was to a considerable extent
a pretext for the repressive laws and
military machine these ruling interests called into existence. The country
needs a new vision, not a repackaging of discredited notions.
What the President has been saying in
public, goes a considerable way in that direction.
THE TRAGEDY
A demand for federal status for, broadly
speaking, the North-East, with far-reaching provisions for autonomy, would
be irresistible in the modern world. There should be a
concerted attempt by all concerned to
bring this about. This alone would help the Tamils to find their feet and
for the State to dismantle this system of creeping apartheid
that is increasingly enveloping the
lives of Tamils. Eventually there should be a demilltarised North East,
with no more than a token presence of the national army.
As for the Tamil diaspora, it is these
issues, and especially the protection of civilians in imminent danger,
towards which they should direct their considerable lobbying
powers. The Tigers and the destructive
power they wielded were indeed for the most part the creation of an ideologically
driven state that was pushing the Tamil people to
live at the end of their nerves. It
was for them a regime of violence with impunity - both mob violence and
state violence. Lands they had farmed for several decades, and
their own homes, often enough ceased
to belong to them, having been snatched away overnight by gazette notifications
hatched in secret.
But propping up the Tigers in their present
form would only further the decimation of the Tamil community. And it can
be done only at the expense of children of families
in the Vanni, who are groping for survival
amidst starvation, fear and disease. A struggle that ultimately leaves
Tamil children and teenage girls holding empty plates,
queuing outside Sri Lankan Army camps
at mealtimes, is no liberation struggle.
The nature of the Tigers and where they
would carry the Tamil people have been well understood for many years.
But thanks to the opportunism of many, this has been
obfuscated and the suffering of the
Tamil people prolonged. The following was written by Dr. Rajani Thiranagama,
the 10th anniversary of whose murder falls this year, in
the context of the Indian Army’s advance
into Jaffna in October 1987:
"ÉÉ They continued to lure
the army, just to run away, letting the people face the result. It was
cruelest of all when they told the people that another 500 to 1000 must
die
for them to have a viable international
publicity campaign. This was not an isolated instance or statement of a
group without contact with the leadership. It was
pronounced at many places and in many
forms. When the people were starving, wandering around like dogs for rice,
the Tigers issued leaflets asking the people to
boycoff Indian distributed food.
When the children were dying with diseases,
they threatened those who cared for them, ordering them not to issue Indian
drugs. Did they offer alternatives, so that we
could eat Tiger food and give our children
Tiger drugs?..." (The Broken Palmyra p 359).