From The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials by Telford Taylor: Wilhelm Keitel was the ranking officer of the German Army, but he was not a commander. His rise in rank had been chiefly due to his administrative pliancy and the marriage of his eldest son to Field Marshal von Blomberg's daughter. Hitler found him useful as a high-level amanuensis and promoted him so that the senior Field Marshal would be 'his man.' Thus Keitel's role in the military hierarchy was comparable to Ribbentrop's among the diplomats. Both were Hitler's mouthpieces and not doers on their own. In contrast to Ribbentrop, however, Keitel was soldierly and carried himself with dignity at Nuremberg. But he was not highly regarded among his fellow officers, who had given him the sobriquet 'Lakeital,' from 'Lakai,' meaning lackey. When France capitulated in 1940 Keitel openly declared Hitler 'the greatest field commander of all times.' He was the sort of weak man whom Hitler could count on to follow his orders regardless of law or morals. ....

Dr Nelte, for Keitel, was abler (in his final statement) than his predecessors and not easily put down. .... Nelte's main argument was that despite Keitel's rank (the highest in the army), impressive designation as Chief of the Wehrmacht, and personal signatures on Hitler's orders, he was not legally responsible for them. Keitel himself had made the same point in his testimony, but Nelte attempted to reinforce it by picturing Keitel as a tragic figure doomed by fate, rather than guilt, to be 'linked' with Hitler's crimes. This was true in the sense that if Hitler had not ordered the criminal acts, Keitel had neither the power nor, so far as the evidence indicated, the inclination to violate law or morals. But the weakness of Keitel's position was that he had hitched his own wagon to Hitler's star. Keitel's signature was more than a clerk's stamp. As Nelte, perhaps incautiously, admitted, Keitel was responsible for 'carrying out the Fuehrer's orders.' Thus he put his own rank and administrative authority behind Hitler's decisions.

Final Statement of Wilhelm Keitel: I acknowledged on the witness stand my responsibility in connection with my official position, and have explained the significance of this position in the presentation of evidence and in the final plea of my defense counsel. It is far from my intention to minimize my part in what took place. In the interest of historical truth, however, it seems advisable to correct a few errors in the final speeches of the Prosecution. The American chief prosecutor said in his final speech, and I quote: "Keitel, a weak, submissive tool, turned the Wehrmacht, the instrument of aggression, over to the Party." A "turning-over" of the Wehrmacht to the Party by me cannot be reconciled with my functions, either up to 4 February 1938, or after that time, when Hitler made himself Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and thus ruled the Party and the Wehrmacht absolutely. I do not recall that any sort of evidence was presented in the course of this Trial which could justify this serious allegation by the Prosecution.

The presentation of evidence, however, has also shown that the further contention "that Keitel led the Wehrmacht in the execution of its criminal intentions" is wrong. This allegation is in contradiction to the Anglo-American trial brief, which says expressly that I had no authority to issue orders. Consequently, the British chief prosecutor is also mistaken when he speaks of me as—and I quote—'a Field Marshal who issued orders to the Wehrmacht.' And when he claims that I said that I "had no idea what practical results were intended by this"—that is the quotation—I believe that this is something quite different from what I said on the witness stand, which was, and I quote the words I spoke on the witness stand: 'But when an order was given, I acted according to my duty as I saw it, without permitting myself to be confused by the possible, but not always foreseeable, consequences.'

Also, the contention that—and I quote—'Keitel and Jodl cannot deny the responsibility for the operations of the Einsatzkommandos, with which their own commanders co-operated closely and cordially,' cannot be reconciled with the results of the testimony. The OKW was eliminated from the Soviet Russian theater of war. There were no troop commanders under its orders. The French chief prosecutor said in his final speech: "Is it necessary to recall the terrible words, of the Defendant Keitel that 'human life was worthless than nothing in the occupied territories." These terrible words are not my words. I did not think them up, and did not make them the contents of any order either. The fact that my name is connected with the transmission of this Fuehrer order weighs heavily enough upon me.

At another point M. Champetier de Ribes says, and I quote: "This order was executed"—it concerned anti-Partisan activities—'by virtue of instructions from the commander of the army group, who in his turn acted according to general instructions of the Defendant Keitel.' Here again "instructions of Keitel" are mentioned, although the French Indictment itself states that I, as Chief of the OKW, could not give any direct orders to the branches of the Wehrmacht.

In the final speech of the Soviet Russian prosecutor he says, and I quote: 'Beginning with the documents on the executions of political persons, Keitel, this 'soldier,' as he likes to call himself, lied shamelessly to the American Prosecution in the preliminary examination—disregarding his oath—by saying that this decree was in the nature of a reprisal and that political persons had been kept separate from the other prisoners of war at the latter's own request. He was exposed before the Court.' The document in question is Number 884-PS. The accusation that I lied is unfounded. The Soviet Russian Prosecution overlooked the fact that the transcript of my preliminary examination on this question was not a subject of evidence before this Tribunal. Therefore, its use in the final speech of the Prosecution should not have been allowed. I did not see the transcript of the preliminary interrogation and do not know the wording. If it is complete, it will clarify the error which arose because the document in question had not been shown to me. In the examination by my defense counsel on the witness stand I presented the state of affairs correctly.

In the last stage of the Trial, the Prosecution attempted once more to incriminate me severely by connecting my name with an order for the preparation of bacteriological warfare. A witness, the former Generalarzt Dr. Schreiber, had said in his report that: "The chief of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, had issued orders to prepare for bacteriological warfare against the Soviet Union." On the witness stand here, to be sure, this witness spoke of a "Fuehrer order." But this is not true, either. The introduction of the testimony of Colonel Buerker, which was approved by the Tribunal in agreement with the Prosecution, indicates that in the autumn of 1943, I, in Buerker's own words, sharply and categorically rejected the suggestion of the Army Medical Inspectorate and the Army Ordnance Branch to begin experiments with bacteria, with the comment that that was completely out of the question and that it was indeed forbidden. This is true. General Jodl also can confirm the fact that no order of the kind alleged by the witness was ever issued; on the contrary, Hitler prohibited bacteriological warfare, which had been suggested by some departments. This proves the allegation to the contrary by the witness Dr. Schreiber to be untrue.

I claim to have told the truth in all things, even if they incriminated me; at least to have endeavored, in spite of the great extent of my field of activity, to contribute to the clarification of the true state of affairs to the best of my knowledge. Now, at the end of this Trial I want to present equally frankly the avowal and confession I have to make today. In the course of the Trial my defense counsel submitted two fundamental questions to me, the first one already some months ago. It was: 'In case of a victory, would you have refused to participate in any part of the success?' I answered: 'No, I should certainly have been proud of it.' The second question was: 'How would you act if you were in the same position again?' My answer: 'Then I would rather choose death than to let myself be drawn into the net of such pernicious methods.'

From these two answers the High Tribunal may see my viewpoint. I believed, but I erred, and I was not in a position to prevent what ought to have been prevented. That is my guilt. It is tragic to have to realize that the best I had to give as a soldier, obedience and loyalty, was exploited for purposes which could not be recognized at the time, and that I did not see that there is a limit set even for a soldier's performance of his duty. That is my fate. From the clear recognition of the causes, the pernicious methods, and the terrible consequences of this war, may there arise the hope for a new future in the community of nations for the German people.