To overrule Rubin twice, holding three cards in his first suit, risks the possibility of more than verbal violence

"The Olympiad final", TBW 12.1980, p. 11

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 [Declarer is in 7Hx and is void in spades opposite Sx K Q J 10 4 at the dummy. Kaplan writes:]

"Seven hearts is a highly practical contract, likely to make whenever West holds the spade ace (he will probably lead it) and whenever East holds it (he will play it on dummy's king); and there are still chances in diamonds, even if no one has the ace of spades."

"Coming through for Rye" (report on the 1981 trials), TBW 1/1981, p. 12

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At Table Two, the Graves-Mittelman auction to six clubs was natural, if inexplicable; certainly Mittelman didn't know what Graves was doing, so why should I?

Ibid, p. 13

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Murray, North at Table One, deemed his hand too strong for a 16-18 one notrump. Thus [after 1Cx-p-1Dx-(1Sx)] he faced a fierce rebid problem at his second turn, which he solved, in the modern fashion, with a cue-bid.

Ibid, p. 15

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[Opponents bid and raise diamonds, Rodwell has Axxx]

At Table One, Rodwell, West, competed up to the three level, "knowing" that with East marked short diamonds [he actually had xx] almost all of West’s honors would fit well with partner’s hand. Alas, partner had no hand for them to fit with.

"Coming through for Rye, II" (report on the 1981 trials), TBW 2/1981, p. 6

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[Rodwell holds J10753/10842/--/AQ72. At game all, partner passes, RHO opens 1D and he doubles]

Ibid, p. 10

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Even with clubs two-two, the contract [3NT] was headed for down one at least (maybe down four) if South found a spade lead from

Q J 9 8 7 3 2/ A J 9 / 4/ J 10.

However, in a spectacular demonstration of today’s "never lead the suit you’ve bid" fashion, Woolsey crossed up declarer by leading the ace of hearts. Plus 400, 11 imps to France.

"Rosenblum Cup, II", TBW 1/1983, p. 13

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[The USA six-man team played against a French four-man team for the 1982 Rosenblum final]

The USA handicaps were that they had had a more relaxing semi-final match, and that in each session one U.S. pair had to sit out, chewing fingernails, developing headaches or sore throats, perhaps risking ulcers by watching Rama. On a four-man team, questions as to a player’s minor aches and pains, his cold symptoms burgeoning in the steady Biarritz downpour -such questions never arise. At game time, the player sits automatically in his appointed place, so he had better feel well. In my view, therefore, a four-man team has the edge.

"Rosenblum Cup, III", TBW 2/1983, p. 5

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If I were South, I would probably have led ace of clubs, to look at dummy. I wouldn’t have liked what I saw.

"Trials for Stockholm", TBW 3/1983, p. 7

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[An unsound 6NT makes on a squeeze]

... with East holding six hearts along with all the length in spades, the twelfth trick dropped from heaven into declarer’s lap, the reward for clean living, no doubt. (A sinful South would have received a heart lead and continuation, which would probably mess up his entries.)

Ibid, p. 10

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[At both tables South holds: KJ1097/A4/AK6/J82, opens 1NT, North goes to 3NT]

When I started to play bridge, everyone would bid: one spade-two spades; two notrump-four spades. Plus 420, for a tied board. Nowadays, for some reason that is far too subtle for me, it is fashionable to open with one notrump. I admit that it makes no difference, since the result, a tied board, is the same. Everyone went honorably down in three notrump, no swing.

"Trials for Stockholm, II", TBW 4/1983, p. 12

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[At love all, after RHO deals and passes, South holds

--- / AKQ9874/10752/92]

The problem with opening four hearts on a hand like South’s is that this inevitably acts as a sort of left-handed Texas, transferring the opponents into four spades. Then, partner is supposed to judge whether to let them play -but how can he, knowing little about South’s pattern?

"Waikiki Vanderbilt", TBW 6/1983, p. 13

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[Kay made 1NT while his team-mates made 4H]

Kay’s one-notrump contract (...) could not be defeated. Indeed, he ended up with an overtrick (he habitually overplays).

Ibid, p. 15

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[Norman Kay makes the killing lead]

Never fear! Norman led the five of hearts (after coming home from a singularly unsuccessful National, some ten years ago, I anonymously sent Norman a copy of Bob Ewen’s book on opening leads -maybe he read it.)

Ibid, p. 17

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About undisciplined preempts:

The young activists remember only the occasions on which the enemy fall on their faces, owing to the clever preempt; if the enemy get to a better spot than the other table, or make a contract down there, that is owing to the usual ineptitude of teammates. (...) In my opinion, the strictly preemptive effect of three-bids breaks about even over the long run, with lucky and unlucky results about in balance (perhaps the spade preempts show a small profit, the others a small loss). Three-bids can show a decent profit, though, from their descriptive effect: if partner knows within narrow limits what the preemptor holds, he can take informed action while everyone else is groping in the dark.

"The Waikiki Vanderbilt, II", TBW 7/1983, p. 9

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After 16 boards, the totals were 68 to 2 -at least KANTAR were on the scoreboard. No, they weren’t! One of the tables had taken too much time, seriously inconveniencing the tournament directors, whose afternoon team might be delayed. Hungry and furious, the directors reacted by penalizing both teams. (...) Despite the appeal by both teams, asking that all penalties be waived, the powers that be remained firm. The remarkable score stood: ROOT 64, KANTAR minus 4.

Ibid, p. 11-12

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[At game all, West has doubled 2C and South redoubles; at the other table, East runs and finally goes for 200]

"East and West", 9/1983, p. 20

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[Bergen deals at favorable and opens 2D, a two-under for spades, on

A984/4/10643/9874]

 "Spingold in Jazz City", TBW 10/1983, p. 7

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Ibid, p. 14

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[The famous case of Bergen’s dubious claim]

"You make two trumps", said declarer, Bergen, to Ross, West, showing his cards. "I’m not going to do anything stupid," said Bergen, in the process of doing something stupid, since he had claimed without considering the position if West should win and lead a diamond.

Ibid, p. 17

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Bergen’s creativity was manifested on the second deal of the match, where he picked up as dealer, nonvulnerable versus vulnerable,

9 8 5 / A 10 9 8 / K 10 7 2 / 6 4

Seduced by those spot cards, he opened two hearts, an ostensibly natural weak two-bid. [Partner goes to 4H] The silent opponents were cold for two diamonds. Four hearts went down only 50.

"Spingold in Jazz City, II", TBW 11/1983, p. 4

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Another Bergen preempt went sour when he opened two spades, nonvulnerable, on

7 5 3 /Q / J 9 8 5 / J 10 6 5 3

This was, you will be relieved to learn, a preempt in clubs. When the doubling stopped, partner was declarer at three diamonds, down 300 -only a 5 imp loss, since Bergen’s teammates scored an excellent plus 110.

Ibid, p. 10

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[Bergen opens 2D, weak two in spades, on

87642/J93/AK3/104 -opponents can make 6S!]

You may be surprised to see Bergen, East at Table One, holding such a strong hand for his weak two, but remember that he was vulnerable against not, which dictates caution. Hamman-Wolff have not geared their bidding towards reaching six-spade contracts after enemy weak-two spade bids (even Bergen’s).

Ibid, p. 12

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A Pakistani, on favorable vulnerability, heard a strong, artificial one club to his right; he held

84 / 972 / 10 5 3 2/ J 10 8 4

Three clubs, he bid, friskily. Alas, partner had no sense of humor. When the smoke cleared, PAKISTAN was in five clubs doubled, down six, 1100. The vulnerability was not favorable enough for that.

"Round 14", TBW 12/1983, p. 18

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West’s double was, presumably, a matter of honor (not through the Iron Duke!) not score, since down one doubled, for a swing of 850, yields the same 13 imps as one down undoubled.

"Stockholm semi-finals", TBW 2/1984, p. 6

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You are the dealer with favorable vulnerability, holding,

K 5 2 /A /Q 10 4 3/ Q 9 8 6 2

and open one diamond. (You wouldn’t? I’m glad to hear it, but Meckstroth did open.)

Ibid, p. 8

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Franco carefully picked his way among winning lines and found the only losing line in a game everyone else made.

"Stockholm semi-finals, II", TBW 3/1984, p. 5

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Lauria leaped to three spades, rather gaily. LHO doubled (negative, thank the Lord), and Mosca had a little fun too, raising to four spades. Szwarc-Mouiel had no sense of humor. They doubled, led trumps early and collected (...) 1100.

Ibid

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[A 3D weak jump overcall is raised to 5D]

Ibid, p. 9

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They had been playing and playing for a week and a half, using some 25 systems to make nearly 50,000 sensible bidding decisions plus a few hundred flaky calls and a few dozen brilliant ones (a brilliant call is a flaky one that works like a charm.)

"Same old story" (1983 BB final), TBW 4/1984, p. 3

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The results throughout this match seem to point to a strange conclusion: can it be that it pays to bid with strong hands, and to pass with weak ones?

Ibid, p. 10

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[On overcalling 4H with a hand like

9 6/ A Q J 9 8 7 3 2/ A J 6/ ---]

It is less obvious to me than it was to Hamman and Lauria (...) that one should jump to four hearts with the West card. (...) The major argument against preempting is that your side has no idea what to do if the opponents bid on -you know nothing about partner’s hand, and he knows next to nothing about yours. The usual tactic is for the preemptor to double next to show extra values, as Lauria did (...) However, this double does not solve the problem -it merely allows the preemptor to blame partner for any bad result while claiming credit himself for any good one.

Ibid, p. 12

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[Previously, Kaplan had criticised a 1NT opening with a 5-card major that led in a loss]

With these cards,

K 10 4 / A K Q 6 5 / 7 4 / A 4 2

Franco opened a sensible one heart; at the other table, Sontag preferred to preempt with one notrump -his sixth sense had told him, perhaps, that the opponents were cold for four spades. Against the one-heart opening, the Americans easily reached their game, scoring 620; against one notrump, the Italians stopped at two spades, plus 170 -10 imps to the USA. Now I know why to open one notrump with such hands.

Ibid, p. 17

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[Both Easts reply 2C to partner’s 1D on

A K / 9 5 / 10 6 4 3 / A K Q J 5, end to 3NT]

Both auctions above bristled with modern science, yet got nowhere. In the bad old days, everybody used to jump shift with hands like East’s (vulgar and disgusting, I know), and the only problem remaining was to stay out of seven. Is this progress?

Ibid, p. 17-18

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Garozzo, behind the heart bidder with,

10 9 7 / K J 9 8 2 / Q 7 6 / A 7

had been lulled to sleep by a long relay auction when it came time to double.

"Same old story, II" (1983 BB final), TBW 5/1984, p. 8

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Then DeFalco-Franco had one of those unusual unusual-notrump disasters, the sort they tell me never happen.

Ibid, p. 10

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[At love all, West bids 3NT at third position and North holds:

K J 10 9 7/ A 8 5 2/ 5/ K 9 6; partner is weak with spade void and five hearts]

In the dumb old days we used to have to pass over one notrump with hands like North’s, accepting the fact that the odds were wrong when opener had an ace more than we did. With our dumb luck (we were lucky in the old days), we ended up plus 300 or so against four spades doubled. Nowadays, there are all sorts of delicious devices for entering the auction.

At Table Two, the Americans used Landy to get to four hearts doubled ... minus 500.

Ibid, p. 12

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"Vanderbilt in San Antone", TBW 7/1984, p. 7

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"Hooks and Crooks - the '84 Spingold", 11/1984, p.7

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... so the loss from two-bids was held under 30 imps, an affordable price for a little fun.

Ibid, p. 8

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Ibid, p. 10-11

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If you are wondering about South's strange pass to five clubs, remember that his partner's third-seat openings are not bonded by the Lloyd's of London, and that their one-diamond openings do not promise diamonds.

Ibid, p. 14