A Response to Recent Australian Foreign Policy Initiatives on Burma

7th September 2000

 ISHR Speakers Forum, 7.30pm.
 226 Kooyong Road, Toorak, Victoria
 Prepared by Toe Zaw Latt.
 Reviewed by Ye Myint Htun [ Political Dept. - ABSDO Melbourne ]

The development and maintenance of civil society - free associations of citizens joined together to work for common concerns or implement social, cultural or political initiatives- depend upon the citizens being able to enjoy fundamental freedoms: freedom of thought, opinion, expression, association and movement. Underscoring and defending these freedoms must be an independent judiciary and the guarantee of the rule of law (Liddell:2000).

In Burma today, none of these conditions exist.

There is no freedom of the press in Burma: government censorship is heavy-handed and pervasive. Neither is there any freedom of association- there are no independent trade unions or non-government organisation. Where independent organisations do exist, they are censored and mostly outlawed.

Burma is a highly authoritarian state, and the military’s administrative reforms since 1988 have all been aimed at greater centralization of economic and political power. This is perhaps hardly surprising given the role of professional groups, students unions and Sangha organizations in the uprising of 1988.

There is no sign as yet that the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) will change it’s centralizing trend. In 1997, within days of its creation, divisional, state and township level Peace and Development Councils were formed, with a higher prevalence of military personnel than the previous Law and Order Restoration Councils. Given this situation, any moves towards civil society can only take place at the most local of local levels or for the most short-lived events - in sections of the village, among church congregations or around Buddhist monasteries- where they cannot be perceived to be a threat to the state.

Whether such local initiatives will ever, or be allowed to, develop into national civil society-like structures is very doubtful. It is here that international governments and NGOs have to be most careful: supporting local initiatives, especially if the support is financial as well as 'technical', could result in them gaining the unwanted attention of officials in Rangoon who may then either co-opt the group, or prevent them from operating freely (Liddell: 2000).

It is with these key points in mind that I would like now to consider recent Australian government initiatives to engage with the Burmese military on issues of civil society, in particular the allocation of half a million dollars to a human rights training program for military-appointed civil servants, and the idea of the establishment of an independent human rights commission in Burma. I apologise in advance for not having sufficient time to address my opinions in detail. Time restrictions do not allow this.

Australia’s current record on Burma is an embarrassment to the Australian people, but hardly surprising. The Australian government has consistently refused to adopt trade sanctions against Burma, despite increasing economic and political pressure mounted against the Burmese military by almost the entire Western world. Australia pursues a half-backed, ill-informed policy of neither encouraging nor promoting trade and relations with Burma. A recent DFAT budget allocation to run a human rights training program in Burma for military- picked civil servants, in the context of Burma’s political, social and economic reality, appears as U Tin Oo, Deputy Chairman of the NLD states, misguided.

Of greater concern, this strategy embarrassingly appears to comprise the current governments entire foreign affairs policy on Burma. In a recent statement made to a public meeting in Melbourne, Mr. Downer stated that he did not regard Aung San Suu Kyi’s party as the legal Burmese government and that he would continue to interact with the Burmese military regime as Burma’s legitimate government.

On this point alone, Mr. Downers’ strategy is counter-productive to the entire Burmese pro-democracy movement’s strategy, which does NOT recognise the legitimacy of the parties and representatives elected in the 1990 elections.

The Burmese community in Australia has repeatedly called upon the Australian Government to cease its human rights training program with Burma's military dictatorship for following reasons. The program only legitimises and gives succour to a brutal military regime.

We are very concerned that those attending the training will not be "civil servants" but rather servants of the repressive military regime. They will be military personnel disguised as civilians and ex-military personnel who will claim they are civil servants from the ministries of the Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs. In reality, they are active agents of a repressive military bureaucracy.
 
The provision of such human rights training is the first step in Australia providing assistance for the development of a "Human Rights Commission" in Burma. It will assist the regime in developing a more sophisticated 'human rights' language designed to disguise its gross human rights abuses, and to divert international attention, thus perpetuating military rule. Aung San Suu Kyi stated that it is like training a tiger to be guard a rabbit.
 
I would like to take a moment to reflect on Burma’s ability to adhere to the “Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (Paris Principles), which set out the minimum international standards for such things.

1. Independence of an human rights commission guaranteed by statute or constitution
A human rights commission is a state sponsored and funded entity established by an act of parliament with the broad objective of promoting and protecting human rights. Burma does not have a constitution in force. From 1974-1988 Burma had a constitution that gave the state absolute power and people no absolute rights. In 1988 the constitution was suspended. From 1993 onwards, the military have been drafting a new one under the pretext of a ‘national convention’. It must be asked whether a credible commission could be established in a country that has no rule or law, a judiciary subject to executive (military) powers and no functioning civil society.

2. Autonomy from government
Burma has no legal institutions that function independently of the executive (or military) and there is nothing to indicate that a human rights commission would be an exception.

3. Pluralism, including in membership
Burma has a highly polarised society with strong religious, ethnic and political divisions and it would be unlikely that a non-partisan institution could be established under military rule.

4. Broad mandate based on universal human rights standards
The Burmese military has argued against the universality of human rights for Burma at the UN Human Rights Commission and in various regional forums. It cannot be relied on to protect the universality of human rights in any legislation that it drafts.

5. Adequate powers of investigation
Fact-finding mechanisms that function independently of the executive (military) are needed. In Burma, there are no human rights NGO’s or other institutions that investigate human rights violations, and outside interventions receive a hostile response from the military.

6. Sufficient resources
Considering Burma is suffering a severe economic crisis and defence spending is estimated at 55% of the GDP, it is unlikely that Burma would be able to prioritise the allocation of resources to an independent commission over health and education spending.

7. Legitimacy
DFAT and other supporters of the initiative admit that even if a commission was established, there would be some time before it would operate effectively. The legacy of a human rights commission in Burma before democratic rule is established could be difficult to dismantle and replace with a more effective one.
(Source: Coakley: 1999)

In conclusion, we seriously doubt that the military regime would be prepared to establish a genuine independent human rights institution in accordance with the Paris Principles.

The principal problem in Burma is not around lack of knowledge of human rights amongst people, but that of absolute repression of fundamental freedoms under military rule. It is an insult to the intelligence of the Burmese people that they have no appreciation of human rights and that the military do not know that what they do is wrong. Aung San Suu Kyi in a recent television interview with journalist Ginny Stein contended that the problem in Burma was not a lack of human rights education, but a problem of the honesty of those in power. In reference to the recent incident at Dala, the Burmese military know very well that people in Burma possess a fundamental human right to move freely around their own country. The problem is that the military wish to restrict that right in order to remain in power over the country.

It is for this reason that the people of Burma have struggled for a return to democracy and the enjoyment of human rights. This struggle has been waged since 1962. The people of Burma have made untold sacrifices for this cause and continue to make untold sacrifices. The recent unjust harassment of Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues in the Dalah standoff is testimony to this.

The Australian government was conspicuously silent through last weeks roadside stand-off. Australia’s embassy in Burma refused to join the British and US Embassies in seeking access to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi during the nine days that she was blockaded by the military. The foreign Minister made no public statement in defence of her freedom of movement until a belated comment on the 4th September.

In July, Australia’s ambassador to Rangoon advised the Howard government that;

“There are clearly no grounds for optimism in the SPDC’s unchanging approach to opponents of the regime. Nor do observers in Rangoon detect any signs that the regime is willing to bend in the direction of political dialogue or any hints that meaningful movement towards transition to a freely elected government is contemplated. Rather, all the indicators point to regime being determined to remain in power at all cost, allowing only marginal reforms in the economy and society.”

The question must be asked, does the Australian government wish to work in tandem with the pro-democracy movement in Burma, or in direct contradiction? I believe, strongly, that the will of the Australian people is not to perpetuate military rule in Burma by the actions of one government, but to instead, shorten that probability and build lasting and fundamental changes for Burma.
 
Minister Downer has consistently stated that he wants to see a genuine dialogue on political reform between the regime, the NLD and representatives of the ethnic minorities occur. He has made numerous claims that he will continue his efforts, both bilaterally and through the international community, to progress genuine reform in Burma. It is the Burmese opposition’s contention that Downer has not fulfilled his commitment so far. His speeches amount to a lot of hot air.
 
Instead of listening to the democratic opposition in Burma, and co-operating with the international community to take concerted actions against the regime, he has made moves to engage with the regime on the mere pretext that neither the U.S. policy of isolating Burma, and ASEAN's constructive engagement policy, has not worked.
 
The Minister has also justified his ‘policy’ by stating that Australia may be able to persuade the regime towards a significant improvement in human rights. In reality, Downer is promoting bilateral relations with the military. At best Australia is playing up to the regime, at worst further entrenching military rule, by assisting the regime to use human rights discourses to defend their rule.
 
Independently highly publicised short-term efforts by individual nations like Australia only serve to thwart concerted, long-term strategies for change. We believe that concerted, co-ordinated international action is essential to bring about positive change and to bring an end to human rights abuses.  We believe that the actions of the Australian government are expressly counter-productive to bringing an end to military rule and human rights violations in Burma.
 
We call upon the Australian Government to immediately cease engagement with the illegitimate military regime who continue to commit gross human rights violations, and to take more effective action against them, until they have entered into dialogue with the NLD, for an effective transition to democracy.

We would like to see a foreign policy commitment on Burma that makes appropriate engagements with the democratic opposition. A radical suggestion- why doesn’t Mr. Downer make an additional allocation of funding to the NLD so that they may also undertake a similar human rights education program in Burma, in an effort to assist Burmese people develop the tools that they need to bring about the changes that they wish. A Human Rights Commission managed by the military is something that Burma does not need.