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US Military Plans To Invade Nigeria for Oil The United States may have been developing a clear and definitive military blueprint for the protection of its citizens and those of its prime ally, Great Britain, and their Nigerian oil investments in case there is the need to do so, if and when the security of Nigeria's oil producing areas becomes dangerous again.
But there are no clear indications on the attitude of the Federal Government about the implications of the blueprint.
Specifically, this reporter has learnt that on at least one occasion mid last year, the United States, under the auspices of its Army War College in Carlisle, in the state of Pennsylvania, brought together a team of diplomats, U.S. State Department officers, CIA officers, other military intelligence, representatives of Oil companies that operate in Nigeria and other civilian experts.
Their assignment was to discuss possible scenarios under which the U.S. can intervene militarily to protect its citizens in case of an attack by militants in the oil producing areas.
Such attacks in the past, including the seizures of oil platforms by such militants have led to the kidnap of foreign oil workers and was seen as a threat to the oil investments of U.S. corporate bodies. It is now also being interpreted as a U.S. National Security matter.
Mr. Mike Fleshman, a well reputed New York-based Human Rights Activist and former Coordinator of AfricaFund was one of the civilian participants of the 2-day workshop. He me that the exercise was basically an academic exercise conducted by the U.S. Army War College and open only to U.S. citizens. The workshop, which was code-named Niger Delta Security Exercise was also attended by Mr. Howard Jeter, the US ambassador in Nigeria.
Observers are wondering if there are links between that workshop and the recent FG-aborted meeting between envoys of the United States and Great Britain and Governors of Oil producing states.
Although that meeting according to the western diplomats were meant to discuss environmental concerns, which the Nigerian FG is perceived to have left effectively unaddressed, sources here say the aborted meeting may have been an extension of the concern of the U.S. and Britain to secure their citizens and investment in the oil producing area.
Efforts last week to reach the U.S. State department to further questions about this was abortive.
A news report had earlier claimed that the U.S. had offered Nigeria the protection of oil installations amid security claims that the installations in Nigeria may have become target of terrorists. There has been no word from Nigerian official circles whether such an offer was indeed made or whether it was accepted. But sources say the U.S. and Britain are exploring all means and options open to it to secure its citizens and oil investments including dealing directly with local authorities.
One source said the aborted meeting also signposts a significant shift in the U.S. and Britain attitude to the clamor of the Niger Delta people for a control of their resources.
According to the source, because the clamor is at the root of the restiveness in the oil producing area a political solution would be for the U.S. and Britain to indicate its readiness to deal with local authorities in a way that suggests support for some local control of resources as expected in a true federal system.
Equally it is believed that after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. may have seen the need to shift its diplomatic gear in Nigeria and seek to make new alliance, especially in the more diverse southern part of the country in a way it has not done before.
However, it is in the military plan to protect its citizens and those of other western nations like Britain that this resolve has been most evident.
According to Fleshman, a participant at the U.S. Army War College workshop, the United States Army Command in Europe, which oversees it African operations, played a vital role in arranging the workshop.
A top-notch U.S. consultancy firm, Cohen and Woods organized the workshop for the Defense Department. Henry Cohen was U.S. Secretary of State during the presidency of George Bush snr. and James Woods is a retired Pentagon policy chief for Africa. They both own and run the firm
Although the workshop was "essentially an academic exercise", Fleshman said the issue of military assistance for Nigeria was part of the issues that came up at the workshop. Part of that assistance was a plan to civilianize the control of the Nigerian armed forces after several years of military rule.
Other component of the assistance was the provision of 8 coastal patrol boats drawn from the U.S. World War 2 Fleet which was almost due for decommissioning, but now presented to Nigeria for use in the Oil Producing areas and the refurbishment of Nigeria's C-130 military aircraft among others.
In return, as raised at the workshop academically, the Nigerian federal Government was to authorize the U.S. military to protect or defend its citizens if the need arises at the oil producing area. This reporter cannot confirm if and whether the Nigerian Government has received or accepted such an offer and whether in fact the offer went beyond the so-called academic exercise.
Also at the workshop, participants played several roles and scenarios that may develop before and after a U.S. military intervention in the Niger Delta. Such roles included that of Human right groups, govts of countries, oil communities, and oil companies.
One of the scenarios highlighted was the possibility of a hijack on an oil platform with U.S. citizens and a threat to blow up the platform. Under such a situation, the workshop concluded that a U.S. military intervention would be justified.
According to Fleshman, when he was approached to attend the workshop and play the role of a human rights groups and also the role of the Delta communities he consulted with various human rights activists from the area in Nigeria and also informed Nigerian top diplomats in New York. He said one of the Nigerian diplomats he spoke with noted that U.S. and Nigeria had a friendly relations although the diplomat conceded that he was not aware of the workshop. "He told me that may be the Nigerian Military Attach knows."
Fleshman said when he was invited to the workshop, the exercise, also known as a "war game," he was told that the holding of the "war game" does not necessarily mean the U.S. was planning a military intervention in the Niger Delta.
But he added he was also told that before any military intervention is carried out, such war games are first organized. "The organizers told me they organize hundreds of such war games a year."
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Chad Cameroon Pipeline: US Stealing Afrika's Oil...Again!!! International development assistance for two of the poorest countries in Africa could soon be used to support a project planned by big oil companies. An international consortium consisting of Exxon, Shell and ELF is planning a multibillion dollar oil exploitation project with serious environmental and social risks that many fear may create another Ogoniland, Nigeria's oil-producing region which has seen environmental devastation and brutal human rights violations. The project consists of the development of the Doba oil-fields in southern Chad, a landlocked nation, and a 600 mile pipeline through Cameroon to transport the oil to an Atlantic port from where it is exported.
The project won't go forward, however, unless it is supported by public funding from international development agencies, mainly the World Bank. The World Bank plans to fund the project both with International Development Association (IDA) credits intended to help the poorest countries and through the International Finance Corporation (IFC), its branch that supports private sector companies directly. A final decision by the World Bank's Board of Directors is expected later this year and the first oil is scheduled to flow in the year 2000.
Exxon, the leader of the consortium, refers in project documents to the World Bank as the foundation of the financing structure for the entire project. World Bank officials confirm that the project hinges on the participation of their institution because the consortium looks to World Bank participation as the center piece of its risk reduction strategy in a politically volatile part of Africa and as necessary to attract funding from export-credit agencies and commercial banks. The international standing of governments of poor countries depends on their relationship with the World Bank. When this relationship turns sour, foreign aid and commercial lending are likely to be cut-off. The resulting political leverage of the World Bank reduces the risk of other public and private investment with which it is associated.
The World Bank claims that the project will alleviate poverty because revenue from the oil for the Government of Chad and royalties for the Government of Cameroon for the use of the pipeline would be invested in poverty programs. This argument has little credibility, however, in view of the demonstrated lack of commitment by either government to alleviate poverty.
The Doba region in southern Chad has long been the seat of an ethnic and regional struggle against Chad's central government which is closely associated with the government of neighboring Sudan, a country that the U.S. accuses of supporting terrorism. The promise of oil wealth in the south risks re-igniting the smoldering tensions with fresh demands for a federalist state and renewed violence. Foreign donors have not trusted the President of Chad to handle the country's finances. At their insistence, the Chad Treasury was under the control of a Swiss firm for several years.
The Government of Cameroon is also known for the lack of transparency in its financial transactions, with the whereabouts of the revenues from the country's own offshore oil production largely unknown. A 1995 World Bank report found the government's will to address poverty very weak and complained of financial mismanagement.
The 600-mile underground pipeline through Cameroon will pass through ecologically fragile rainforest areas, including an area that is the home of a Pygmy minority of traditional hunters and gatherers. An uncontrollable influx of people in search of work will gather at the construction sites. As a result, deforestation, wildlife poaching, and the loss of farm land of local villages to the construction activities will create a destructive environmental legacy. The pipeline itself, even with state-of-the art equipment, poses the danger of groundwater contamination and pollution of important regional river systems as crude oil containing heavy metals leaks into the environment.
An environmental impact assessment is being carried out and an Environmental Panel was put in place to mitigate these problems. But the best environmental reports are of little help when there is no government commitment to carry out its recommendations. This lack of commitment is especially evident in Cameroon, a country with one of the highest rates of deforestation in the world. Once the money is flowing, the unholy trinity of oil, power, and corruption will make corrective action difficult.
Citizens of these countries who dare to complain will do so at their own risk. According to the U.S. State Department's Report on Human Rights, both the Governments of Cameroon and Chad are responsible for severe violations of human rights, the lack of freedom of expression, and their citizens' very limited capacity to change their government.
People in Chad and in Cameroon are often desperately poor, and outside aid that addresses their own priorities could do a lot to help, but the allocation of aid dollars for each country is limited. World Bank support for the oil project will divert scarce resources away from investments in health, education, environmental protection, and infra-structure that provides clean drinking water and sanitation. Ironically, World Bank studies demonstrate that these are exactly the projects that yield the best results in helping people out of poverty.
The Project and its Context
A consortium composed of Exxon, Shell and ELF, three of the world's largest oil multinationals, plans to develop three oil fields in the Doba Basin in southern Chad. Approximately 300 wells would be drilled and production is estimated at about 225,000 barrels of oil per day. Exporting the oil will require the building of a 1,100 kilometer (600 mile) long pipeline through neighboring Cameroon, as well as related infrastructure, such as pump and storage stations, about 500 km of road upgrades, and the building of a floating storage and off-loading facility on Cameroon's Atlantic coast at Kribi. Total project costs are estimated at about U.S. $ 3.5 billion. The project will not go forward without significant backing by the World Bank (please see below) and a decision by the World Bank's Board of Directors may be scheduled for as early as the summer of 1997.
Given the scale of investments and the nature of risks, the project raises serious questions. Furthermore, it appears that more attention must be given to alternative investment programs and a more balanced pattern of development that are more appropriate to alleviating poverty and promoting sustainable development.
The Role of Public Financial Institutions
A brief project report by Exxon, the lead operator of the project, states that the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank's arm which directly supports the private sector, will represent the foundation of the project financing structure.1 The reasons for this prerequisite are that World Bank involvement provides political risk insurance and serves to attract funding from other sources, especially export-credit-agencies.
World Bank Group direct participation involves IDA support of about U.S. $ 120 million and IFC investments of an estimated U.S. $ 250 million directly for the private sector companies to be established by the consortium, which is made up of Exxon (40%), Shell (40%) and ELF (20%).2
But more importantly, building on IDA's commitment to the project and its relationship with the governments, the IFC will play a key role in raising project funds on international capital markets. The IFC plans to mobilize at least an additional $ U.S. 1 billion in limited recourse debt, for which the responsibility of the parent oil companies is limited.
The Project Information Document (PID) of April 4, 1995,3 the only publicly available World Bank document on the project, does not specify if there will be separate credits to Cameroon and Chad. It does, however, state that World Bank Group financing will be only for downstream facilities, e.g. the pipeline and marine facilities, whose total cost is estimated to be U.S. $ 1.8 billion.
Helping the Poor?
According to the PID, the project will reduce poverty by promoting the economic growth of Chad and Cameroon through the private sector-led development of Chad's petroleum reserves and the royalties Cameroon will receive for allowing Chad's oil to pass through for export.
As stated in the Bank's 1994 Development Report on Infrastructure,4 World Bank investments in large-scale infra- structure are a "blunt instrument" for intervening directly on behalf of the poor. Worse, this type of investment crowds out programs that would directly benefit the social sectors, health, education, and environmental protection. The argument has been made eloquently by a former World Bank official, Martin Karcher, who decided to leave the World Bank when the Bank's planned involvement in the Arun dam in Nepal threatened to wipe out long-standing efforts to improve basic health care and education in the country.
According to interviews with World Bank staff, the poverty impacts of the Chad/Cameroon oil and pipeline project will be different for Chad and for Cameroon. In the case of Cameroon, the royalties, which may amount to as much as U.S. $ 60 million per year, will provide general budgetary support to the government and be used to meet the country's external debt burden. In the case of Chad, there will be a technical assistance project to strengthen the country's management of oil revenues, which are to be paid into a special Development Fund. The Development Fund is to be used by the government for poverty alleviation programs, but for sovereignty reasons the Government of Chad alone decides how to use the funds.
In principle, a development fund can be a critical resource for social development programs in a poor country that has limited access to outside assistance. But in practice, the situation is complicated by the entire political and socio-economic situation of a country. In a case far simpler than Chad, the Development Fund established under the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which receives royalties from the export of water from the Highlands of Lesotho to South Africa, has so far failed to benefit the people directly affected by the project and has become an instrument of the politically powerful.
Process of "Criminalization"?
In both Chad and Cameroon, civil society organizations struggling to increase democracy and defend human rights and the environment are taking root. The presence and growth of these organizations is a source of hope for more equitable and environmentally sound development, yet they face difficulties and threats from the existing power structures. They need strengthening and support, but the oil project may undermine hopes for a greater democratic opening.
At present, the situation in both Chad and Cameroon does not augur well for wide-spread benefits from the proposed project for its struggling populations. The lack of respect for human rights, as documented by Amnesty International, is pervasive in both countries. According to the U.S. State Department's Annual Report on Human Rights, both the Governments of Chad and Cameroon are responsible for severe violations of human rights, the lack of freedom of expression and association, and their citizens' very limited (in Cameroon) or non-existent (in Chad) capacity to change their government.5 The World Bank's claims of development benefits for both countries cannot be evaluated without considering the political economy of each country.
Both governments have been successful at obliterating the distinction between public and private assets. In Chad, the national treasury has been controlled by the Swiss company COTECNA for several years on the advice of donors who wanted to prevent the President of Chad from having direct access to cash in the Treasury.6 Cameroon's oil revenues are largely unaccounted for, a situation which a respected British publication describes as one of a "historic lack of transparency in its recording of trade figures, especially for crude oil exports."7 Foreign donors, especially France, and the multilateral development banks have abetted -- if not promoted -- the wide-spread corruption in Cameroon by continuing to make loans, turning it into a severely indebted country, while its natural resources are disappearing without benefiting the country's citizens.
A confidential report of June 1995 to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs warns of "the process of Criminalization" in the way many economies in Sub-Saharan Africa are being run.8 According to the report, as quoted in the magazine Novel Observateur, this "criminalization" is the result of the combined effect of economic crisis, neoliberal structural adjustment programs and the lack of legitimacy of political institutions. The report makes explicit mention of the role played by French oil companies (i.e., ELF, a partner in the consortium) in the lack of accountability and transparency (i.e., corruption) in the oil business on the continent.
Re-igniting the Civil War in Chad?
For more than thirty years Chad, a vast country two-and-a half times the size of France in the center of Africa, has suffered an intense civil war. The reasons are complex, but put simply, the war pits the largely Muslim north of the country against the south, the country's main agricultural region which is home to mainly Christians and Animists.
There are several politico-military groups around the country, but Doba is the main center of the southern rebellion against President Idriss Dby who rules from the capital of N'Djamena which lies 350 miles to the north. Much of the army is recruited from the President's ethnic group and is regarded by Chadians as the principal source of insecurity.9 The oil wealth in the south is likely to increase southern demands for greater autonomy. During Chad's 1996 Presidential elections, which were staged with the help of France and which are reported to have been largely fraudulent, the candidate who campaigned on a federalist platform was jailed.10
The fragile truce at present is at great risk from acts of sabotage and the secessionist movement fueled by resentment of northern control over the oil income. Ironically, the main ally of the Chadian Government is the fundamentalist Islamic Government of Sudan, which the U.S. accuses of sponsoring terrorism. The widening civil war in Sudan itself, which has much to do with control over oil resources, also worries many well-informed Chadians as a harbinger of things to come.
With a per capita income of U.S. $ 210 in 1993, most Chadians are very poor. Low health indicators caused by malnutrition, lack of clean water, and sanitation are the central problems. Will the oil change that? According to recent reports, the feeling of many in the capital that the country will soon enter a golden age of oil wealth is tempered by the views of local human rights workers, journalists, and others who fear becoming the next Ogonis.11
In the Doba Region
Two worlds are clashing in the oil region, traditional peasant culture and the expatriate oil business way of life with its sophisticated technologies and base camp offering all of western amenities. Tragedy already has been visited on local people. One case involved a peasant who took his two children to see the landing of an airplane, something that had not been seen in his area for a long time, and was killed by Exxon security guards. Although the villagers testified that the peasant was one of them, had never left the village, and had just wanted to see the plane, the military chief prepared a report stating that the man was a rebel, thereby officially justifying the killing, and closed the case. Exxon hid behind the military chief and no compensation was paid to the family of the victim.12
Recent visitors to the area found that local people who have already lost houses and fields to the prospecting work, construction of the base camp, and other project-related activities are angry about the compensation they are receiving. Even a small patch of land can be a question of family survival in poor rural areas. Interestingly, the question of compensation seems not to have received much attention from the Chadian Government. At a press conference following the signing of the pipeline agreement between the Oil Consortium and the Governments of Chad and Cameroon in February 1995, the General Secretary of Chad's Presidency responded to a question on compensation by saying "we have not thought about it yet."13
There are myriad examples of how poor rural people's livelihoods suffer when infrastructure and other projects intrude on their survival economy and the levels of repression and violence increase. This situation can easily be repeated in southern Chad.
Benefits for Cameroon?
Cameroon, an oil-exporting country, used to be classified as one of Africa's middle-income nations. This status was changed to "low-income country" by the World Bank following the devaluation of the FCFA in January 1994. The devaluation led to a 25% to 30% decline in purchasing power in the capital city of Yaound alone.14 This came following a decade of severe economic crisis and growing pervasive poverty in both rural and urban areas. The revenues from the country's oil exports (please see below) have never been accounted for and the country's rich tropical rainforest is being raided by timber companies and their friends in government without consideration of the ecological and social consequences. The country's natural resources are being used for private benefit with little accountability in the system. Not surprisingly, a 1995 World Bank report concluded that Cameroon government commitment to alleviating poverty is weak.15
Today, Cameroon is a severely indebted country, which according to World Bank figures has only paid about 30% of its debt service due since 1991.16 The pipeline project, according to the already mentioned World Bank officials, will bring in hard currency royalty payments to help service the foreign debt. The project plans to create about 600 jobs in Cameroon for the duration of the pipeline construction. This is not much for a large investment, including several hundred million dollars from the World Bank Group, and hardly a contribution to sustainable development given the considerable social and ecological risks of the project.
Social and Ecological Risk
Information on the project has been very tightly managed and the out-dated World Bank Project Information Document has been the only publicly available document. Foreign journalists, including a German TV team, have not been allowed to film or photograph the Exxon base camp in southern Chad. Martin Zint, one of the journalists who recently visited the project area, thinks that Exxon seems to count on the "No Picture, No Story" strategy.
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and an Environmental Panel are intended to mitigate the social and ecological risks of the project. A summary of the EIA, which is being prepared by the U.S. consulting firm Dames and Moore, will be made available to the executive directors of the World Bank 120 days in advance of the Board vote on the project (a requirement spurred by U.S. Law17). The three member Environmental Panel is sworn to confidentiality and has not released a report.
It is striking that throughout the EIA process, there seems to have been no involvement of affected people, contrary to the Bank's instructions in its October 1991 Operational Directive 4.01 on Environmental Assessment. It is worth quoting the relevant paragraph since a conversation with members of the Environmental Panel indicated that they were not aware of it:
"Involvement of Affected Groups and Non-Governmental Organizations"
19. The Bank expects the borrower to take the views of affected groups and local NGOs fully into account in project design and implementation, and in particular in the preparation of EAs. This process is important in order to understand both the nature and extent of any social or environmental impact and the acceptability of proposed mitigatory measures, particularly to affected groups".18
Instead, Exxon seems to plan to hold public meetings in Cameroon in each locality through which the pipeline will pass with lectures and videos to explain the pipeline and its impact to lay people.19 This hardly seems to be the consultative process called for in OD 4.01.
Even if we assume that the environmental impact assessment is very good and that the Environmental Panel has the resources and influence it needs, the socio-economic and political context will make effective environmental mitigation and compensation for affected people extremely difficult. Other World Bank-funded mega projects, for example, the Lesotho Highlands Water Development Project in Southern Africa, which is also being monitored by an Environmental Panel, show how limited institutional capacity and political will on the part of governments prevent the implementation of mitigation plans.
Despite the fundamental lack of detailed information, an outline of the overall ecological and social risks of the project can be drawn.
Loss of Livelihoods and Resettlement
Rural people will be affected as their land is occupied by oil wells and other infrastructure. Southern Chad is the most fertile part of Chad, producing most of the country's food and cotton for export. How will the project affect food production? Even if the number of people to be resettled is not high, lack of institutional capacity by government-- as demonstrated by the Lesotho project -- is a formidable obstacle to adequate resettlement. But in addition to physical resettlement, there is the more prevalent problem of loss of livelihoods when productive assets -- land, trees, access to water -- are taken away from rural people without adequate compensation. The basic requirement of the World Bank's policy on Involuntary Resettlement is to ensure that affected people are at least able to maintain the standard of living they had before resettlement. But there are numerous examples in Africa and throughout the world, where the Bank has not been able to implement this provision and where poor and vulnerable groups, which are the ones who usually have to be forcibly resettled, suffer greatly as a result of resettlement and are unable to re-establish their livelihoods.
In Cameroon, the problem is not limited to the clearing of land for project infra-structure during pipeline construction. There will also be an uncontrolled influx of people seeking construction jobs or to provide services to the migrant work force along the pipeline route and around the port of Kribi. In addition, public health problems, especially in the form of AIDS, are likely to spread rapidly along the pipeline route as the work force and its entertainment industry of bars and prostitution moves through the rural areas.
Loss of Biodiversity
World Bank officials claim that the pipeline will only move alongside existing road and railway lines and therefore only pass through already degraded areas. This, however, may not be the whole picture. Stretches of the proposed pipeline route will pass through or close to still largely undisturbed rainforest areas, including areas inhabited by indigenous people. The large influx of people will result in the clearing of forest and poaching near the construction sites as people try to grow food and hunt. In addition, project-related infrastructure such as roads, construction camps, housing for workers, pump stations, etc. represent a serious threat to the survival of these forest areas and their unique wealth in plant and animal species.
Kribi, the Atlantic port from which the oil is to be exported, lies sandwiched between two national reserves, Campo and Douala Edea, which are known for the threatened fauna that they shelter. Protection of the Campo reserve is part of the Cameroon Biodiversity Conservation and Management Project funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and implemented by the World Bank. Poaching of large mammals already is a problem and is likely to increase manifold with the expected arrival of new migrants to the area.
The off-shore oil facility itself will be located outside of Kribi in front of the Lob waterfalls, one of the rare examples in the world of waterfalls flowing directly into the ocean. This is a unique area whose potential for revenue generating activities such as eco-tourism will be undermined by project infrastructure and the constant threat of oil spills.
Leaking Pipelines
Oil pipelines are an environmental hazard anywhere in the world. Even with the latest state-of-the-art technology, oil leaks in pipelines can go undetected until a huge amount of damage has been done. The detection capacity of the most sophisticated technology allows leakage of 0.002% of the oil passing through. With an estimated daily volume of 9,450,000 gallons of crude oil a day (i.e., the equivalent of 225,000 barrels/ day) , this means that under the best of circumstances 2,000 gallons could leak each day without being detected.20 Crude oil contains many heavy metals, and the dangers for groundwater contamination and stream pollution should not be underestimated, especially as the pipeline crosses several rivers and runs close to the Sanaga, one of West Africa's most important river systems.
The fact that the approximately 80 centimeter (30 inch) wide pipeline is underground will make repairs more difficult. The oil from Chad's Doba fields is low quality, high sulfur, and very thick. To move the oil will require heating of the pipeline as well as pumps.. Both the heating and high sulfur content increase the risk of pipe corrosion.
ELF's Special Role in the Routing of the Pipeline
ELF has long been a major French foreign policy instrument in Francophone Africa. The former head of ELF, Mr. Le Floch-Prigent, who now stands accused of corruption in France, recently confirmed what many outside observers have long suspected: ELF put in place the Government of President Bongo in Gabon; ELF maintained control over the Government of Congo, even when it was Marxist; and the Government of President Biya in Cameroon has only survived with ELF support.21
According to Mr. Le Floch-Prigent, his role in preparation for the Chad/ Cameroon oil pipeline was to "convince the Americans discreetly that the pipeline had to traverse the Francophone part of Cameroon."22 The Francophone part of Cameroon is where the country's President and his allies are in control, while the Anglophone part of Cameroon is an opposition stronghold. Incidentally, Cameroon's own oil is exported from the Anglophone area and it would appear to have been ecologically preferable to make use of the same area instead of exposing a new -- and as of now -- pristine Atlantic coast area to oil pollution.
But more than the political considerations of the Biya Government may be at stake. According to the French publication "La Lettre du Continent," the French military see this pipeline route and the road that goes along it as providing easy access to southern Chad in case of crisis. Had the route gone through the Anglophone area to the port of Limbe, along the Nigerian border, French military movements would have been more difficult.23
Political Risk Mitigation Strategy
Interviews conducted with officials at both the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's concessional lending window for the poorest countries, and at the International Financial Corporation (IFC), the World Bank's arm for the private sector, reveal the following:
The oil companies have stated clearly that the project will not proceed unless there is substantial World Bank Group involvement in the project. There are two primary reasons for this prerequisite:
It provides political risk insurance
It serves as a catalyst for export-credit agency funding.
Political risk insurance in this case will not be provided through the Bank's regular branches providing this type of service, e.g. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) guarantees or MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency). These institutional mechanisms cannot be used because both Chad and Cameroon are qualified as too poor for regular World Bank IBRD loans and Chad is not a member of MIGA. Instead, the political risk insurance will be provided through the relationship (and leverage, one should say) of IDA with both the Chadian and Cameroonian governments. For most African countries, access to foreign aid and finance depends on their relationship with the World Bank. When this relationship deteriorates, countries face the risk that all foreign aid from multilateral as well as bilateral aid programs might be cut-off. Under such circumstances private foreign investment would also stay away. The resulting political leverage of the World Bank reduces the risk of other public and private investments with which it is associated.
Hard Loans from the African Development Bank?
Exxon representatives representing the consortium have paid regular visits to World Bank headquarters to promote the project. There have been special briefings to World Bank Executive Directors' offices and the U.S. Treasury Department and possibly the Finance Ministries of other countries. More recently, Exxon representatives have also visited the African Development Bank in Abidjan, Cte d'Ivoire, which is still in the process of overcoming years of deep-seated mismanagement. As a result of this visit, the AfDB may now consider a special "enclave" loan to support the Oil Consortium project. An "enclave" loan at the AfDB means that poor countries that usually only qualify for concessional loans from the AfDB's soft loan window, will receive high-interest loans from the Bank's regular lending window. As a result of this special "enclave" provision, Chad and Cameroon are likely to add further to their already high foreign debt burden, by contracting high interest loans to pay for their participation in the projec -- such as state participation in the pipeline.
Financial Edifice
On the basis of the World Bank's involvement, the Oil Consortium is able to spread the remaining risk more widely. World Bank presence provides the "level of comfort" necessary to attract additional funding from a whole host of other sources, such as the African Development Bank, but most importantly, the export-credit agencies of the major industrial countries. Once the export-credit agencies support the project, the commercial banks feel safe enough to provide loans. What we have is a financial structure where private sector risk is comfortably cushioned by public funds intended to help the poor in a politically unstable area of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Cushions for Corporations?
What emerges is a case of corporate welfare: The private sector -- the oil companies and the commercial banks -- are taking cover behind publicly funded or guaranteed institutions, be they the World Bank group or the export-credit agencies of individual countries. The mixing of public costs and private benefits does not fit the private sector's image of self-reliant, risk-taking initiative and enterprise in an unfettered free market system. The financial risks in this particular case are shared with -- if not shouldered by -- public funds and guarantees from both multilateral and bilateral sources.
There are clear trade-offs. Funding from the World Bank (and the African Development Bank) for each country is limited, and what ever is allocated to the Exxon/Shell/ELF project will not be available for investments in other sectors with direct positive impacts on people's lives.
Even those convinced that governmental reform in Chad and Cameroon will wipe away long-standing problems overnight and make possible a trickle-down effect from the oil and pipeline investments cannot reasonably claim that this project offers the best alternative for alleviating poverty. The World Bank itself recognizes -- at least rhetorically -- that it is investments in the social and environmental sectors, health, education, and in infrastructure that provides clean water and sanitation, that bring about the best result in helping people out of poverty.24
Oil projects hardly point the way to sustainable development, especially in countries with politically repressive regimes. And in the oil-importing countries, where the continued availability of cheap oil -- that is, sold at a price that externalizes the environmental costs of its extraction, production and transport -- oil projects such as this undermine incentives to provide energy from renewable alternatives and sustainable sources and threatens the Earth's atmosphere.
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Click Here to read the World Banks Plans to Exploit Chad's Oil | |
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U.S. Military and Corporate
Recolonization of the Congo The United States' involvement in Congo since before independence from Belgium in June 1960 has been steady, sinister, and penetrating. Most notable was the ClA's role in the overthrow (September 1960) and later assassination (January 1961) of Congo's first Prime Minister, the charismatic (and socialist) Patrice Lumumba. The full extent of U.S. machinations was not known for years, but the failure at the time of the United Nations to protect Lumumba was patent. And questions continue to linger over the mysterious plane crash in September 1961 that killed U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold as he was flying to the border town of Ndola to meet with Moise Tshombe, president of the breakaway Katanga Province. The plane fell from the sky killing all aboard 2 Is it any wonder that in Congo today there is little trust of Washington or respect for the United Nations?
INTRODUCTION
In October 1996, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), commanded by and composed mainly of Tutsi military forces from Paul Kagame's Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), along with Tutsi refugees from Zaire and some Congolese patriots, all under the titular leadership of Congolese exile Laurent Kabila, crossed into Zaire from Rwanda and Burundi. In May 1997, after only seven months of fighting, they had overthrown the 30-year dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko. While marching west across the vast expanse of the country, divisions of this army had wreaked terrible vengeance on the Rwandan Hutu exiles encamped since 1994 in eastern Zaire, where they had been driven from Rwanda by the RPA on the heels of the horrendous massacre of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Tutsis, encouraged and supervised by extremists in the Hutu-dominated government.
In Kinshasa, with Kabila named President, key cabinet posts and the new Congo army and security forces were immediately staffed at the highest levels by Rwandan Tutsis.
By July 1998, Kabila realized that the Congolese people would not support the excesses of the Rwandan "foreigners" throughout their government. He also recognized the extent to which he had become a puppet of his Tutsi "allies," and after confirmed reports of atrocities by Tutsi military against Hutu exiles in the east, and later in the west of the country, had become too prevalent to ignore, and after he had uncovered an apparent Rwandan plot to assassinate him and stage a coup in Congo, Kabila ordered the Rwandans to leave.
Less than a week later, on August 2, 1998, Ugandan and Rwandan regular troops invaded Congo with regrouped, well-trained rebel forces, and began the war to overthrow Kabila that goes on to this day despite a shaky, much-violated, U.S.-supported cease-fire. Rwandans and Ugandans control most of the east of the country, and there has been a de facto partition, a gross violation of Congolese sovereignty
Yet Rwanda is a tiny impoverished nation, and Uganda is not much larger or richer, while Congo is one of the largest, richest, and most populous nations in Africa, which at one time had its most powerful army How did this happen? Could impoverished Rwanda and Uganda have orchestrated, armed, and financed such operations on their own?
Is it a coincidence that Rwandan strongman Paul Kagame was trained in the United States? That the Rwandan army received, and continues to receive, training in the U.S.? That the Pentagon has had Special Forces military training missions in Rwanda and Uganda for more than five years? That vast segments of the Congolese infrastructure, particularly the mining companies, have been taken over by U.S.- and western-linked multinationals, working with the Rwandan and Ugandan rebels and governments?
THE U.S. ROLE
The Mobutu era began with ardent U.S. support, financial and military. From 1965 to 1991, Zaire received more than $1.5 billion in U.S. economic and military aid. In
return, U.S. multinationals increased their share of the ownership of Zaire's fabulous mineral wealth. On the foreign policy front, Zaire was a bastion of anti-communism during the Cold War, in the center of a continent Washington saw as perilously close to Moscow's influence. As the State Department put it, "Zaire has been a stabilizing force and a staunch supporter of U.S. and western policies...." Mobutu's corruption and brutality were ignored for thirty years. It was only when the plunder of western-owned assets and the ruination of the country were nearly complete, when Mobutu's stolen billions had become a worldwide embarrassment, that the U.S. began to seek an acceptable change.
By this time, the U.S. was deeply involved in both Uganda and Rwanda, and very close to Paul Kagame. In 1990, Kagame, a Rwandan exile serving as a colonel in the Ugandan army was training at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, when he dropped out of the program and rushed back to Uganda to take command of the rebel army that invaded Rwanda.
After three years of civil war in Rwanda, a power-sharing peace accord was negotiated, only to collapse in 1994, when an airplane carrying Rwanda's Hutu president, Juvenal Habyanmana, was shot down, with all aboard, including President Cypnen Ntaryamira of Burundi, killed. A still secret 1997 U.N. investigation implicates Kagame in the assassinations. Warnings of a coming bloodbath, set off by the attack, were ignored, and a horrendous 89-day massacre of 500,000 Tutsis-and 50,000 Hutus-followed.
Kagame's movement then turned on the Hutu-dominated government, and took power. The massacres began again, this time of Hutus. More than a million Rwandan Hutus, both militia and civilians, who escaped the killing, died to eastern Zaire.
U.S. officials, according to the Washington Post, were pleased with Kagame and "deeply relieved that the rebels had halted the massacres, thus ending pressure for a U.S.-led intervention." As one writer observed, "Americas unease about its own attitude to the massacres in the spring of 1994 was one reason why it later sided with the triumphant victims." The U.S. "became increasingly close to the Rwandan government and the army that backed it.... Washington pumped military aid into Kagame s army and U. S. Army Special Forces and other military personnel trained hundreds of Rwandan forces."
At the same time, the U.S. kept tabs on the refugees in eastern Zaire, while mounting what was called a "humanitarian operation" in Rwanda, but which also included training of the Rwandan military in combat, counterinsurgency, psychological operations, etc.. One U.S. official interviewed by the Washington Post contended that "the United States is focusing disproportionate military assistance on Rwanda as part of the creation of a 'zone of influence' in East Africa.... " An African writer has
referred to this zone of influence as a confederation of "military princedoms [which] have appeared in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and, to a lesser extent, in Ethiopia and Eritrea.'' These U.S.-supported military regimes are characterized by "the repeated use of force in putting their internal and external policy strategies into effect." They are "obsessed with security" and they "clone themselves" by joining forces "with their own diasporas...whose citizenship is disputed .... [They] attract the services of 'rebels,' dissidents, and others, who serve as a screen for their intervention" in fragile and unstable neighboring countries. The role of the Rwandan and Ugandan princelings, Kagame and Museveni, in neighboring Congo is a classic example of U.S. meddling.
THE FALL OF MOBUTU, THE RISE OF KABILA
Still unclear is the full extent of U.S. military support for Kagame's move, via Kabila, against Mobutu and Zaire (and their bloody retribution against both Hutu militia and Hutu civilian refugees in the camps). "Many Africans," the Wall Street Journal noted, concluded that "the Zairean rebellion was the brainchild of Washington from the very start." In August 1996, six weeks before the RPA and Kabila's forces moved into Zaire, Kagame had visited Washington to discuss with Clinton administration officials the dangerous threat to his regime in Rwanda from the Hutu refugee camps in eastern Zaire, harboring militia among the civilians 2~ Both Kagame and U.S. officials later claimed unconvincingly that he left "disappointed" in not having instigated direct U.S. action. It was clear to the U.S., in any case, that Kagame was prepared to act, and that this was certainly in the U.S. government's interest. Kagame acted quickly after his visit to Washington. Kabila, a former Marxist exile, who had been recruited by the Tutsis, had been brought to Goma some time earlier, to be the national Congolese figurehead of an "insurgency" against Mobutu's army And in October 1996, when the full-scale incursion began, much of eastern Zaire was immediately taken. The camps were attacked, and many of the refugees were driven back to Rwanda or killed. It is unlikely that Kabila himself took part in the actions against the refugees, but there is no question that he had made a deal with the Devil: "Kabila's army is closely controlled by Rwandan officers who dominate its upper echelons. Kabila relied heavily on the well-trained Rwandan officers, along with Rwandan, Angolan, and Ugandan troops, to push Mobutu's army aside. But in so doing, he made a deal with people intent on bringing the 1994 ethnic war in Rwanda onto Congolese soil." as Kabila maintained his headquarters in Goma, in eastern Zaire, near the site of many of the camps. In the first months of the fighting, the U.S. denied any ties to Kabila and also denied that any foreign forces were fighting with him. Diplomatic signals, however, got crossed: At the start of the rebellion, in October, "U.S. ambassador to Rwanda, Robert Gnbbin, denied in the face of mounting evidence that the Rwandan army had any role in the action in eastern Zaire. But at the same time, in Mobutu's capital, Kinshasa, American envoy to Zaire, Dan Simpson, was denouncing the uprising as a Rwandan and Ugandan 'invasion.' The London Guardian noted, "U.S. policy initially was divided between offering active support for Rwandan intervention and looking the other way... In practice, it did both: the Pentagon helped out while the State Department pretended it wasn't happening." That the U.S. "helped out" is unquestionable; the motive for doing so is what we must address.
* A South African pilot in September 1996, "flew a planeload of assault rifles from Pretoria to...Burundi, where he was met by.. an official from the U.S. Embassy there. The weapons...were destined for Uvira...in Zaire, the birthplace of Mr. Kabila's revolt."
* In November, "senior officers from the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda were seen leaving Mr. Kabila's residence in Goma."
* By spring, a State Department official, Dennis Hankins, was ensconced in a local hotel in Goma "as the first full-time American diplomat posted to the capital of the rebel alliance.
* In April, the House passed a resolution calling on Mobutu to step down.
KABILA ARRIVES
Despite U.S. approval of and involvement in the overthrow of Mobutu, U.S. support for Kabila from the beginning was mixed at best, and hostility later intensified, as he became increasingly estranged from his Rwandan and Ugandan Tutsi mentors. After arriving in Kinshasa on May 19, 1997, Kabila's new government and teams of ecstatic Congolese began to clean up the capital and restore the country's infrastructure, bringing a semblance of normalcy to their lives, despite armed confrontations between newly appointed local police and rapid deployment squads. According to UNICEF 15,000 young soldiers patrolling Kinshasa did not speak the language and were strangers to the city Locals refused to have anything to do with them.
These "faceless" army and security forces, being reorganized under instructions from Rwanda and including many unidentified soldiers working for state security services, were regarded as "foreigners" by the people and viewed with distrust. Lt. Col. James Kabarebe, who became Army Chief of Staff, had been head of the Rwandan Republican Guard before he led the forces that overthrew Mobutu. Many other key figures had similar backgrounds. Jackson Nzinza, a Ugandan Tutsi who became Congo's Chief of National Security, had been the head of Rwanda's Internal Security Organization, allegedly responsible for numerous political murders, an activity he continued to practice in Congo. Bizima Karaha, Kabila's Foreign Minister, was another Rwandan Tutsi, whose uncle is a member of the Rwandan Parliament. Col. Ibingira, who later became Commander of North Kivu, was deeply involved in massacres of Hutu refugees.
During the 15 months between the May 1997 entry into Kinshasa and the August 1998 start of the current war, the U.S. became openly critical of the Kabila government. Most complaints voiced were related to ongoing murderous assaults on the Hutu refugees, who were not being protected properly in the U.N.-run camps or by Doctors Without Borders, who were also present. But there were other undercurrents, related to Realpolitic.
In April and May of 1997, as the downfall of Mobutu was imminent, reports of massacres which had occurred during the march to Kinshasa began to appear with regularity although it was often unclear just who the perpetrators had been. The AP reported on May 22 that "one of Kabila's soldiers" had shown a reporter a mass grave. The June 1 Boston Globe reported massacres of refugees who had "tried to flee troops led by then rebel leader Laurent Kabila." On May 28, 1997, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said "Kabila lacks democratic credentials." The AP report noted that "skepticism is strong among U.S. officials about the willingness of Kabila, once associated with leftist causes, to lead Zaire to democracy" At the same time, other Clintonites appeared optimistic. "U.S. officials are generally pleased with Kabila's actions since his forces deposed Mobutu two weeks ago. He has included opposition elements in his government and has promised free elections within two years." There were reports of mass graves in Kisangani, and U.N. efforts to investigate "have been blocked by forces affiliated with Kabila's Rebel Alliance." Still, some U.S. officials continued to believe that "alliance forces involved in wrongdoing were acting independently of Kabila." On June 3, a USAID team arrived in Congo to assess its assistance needs, particularly "funds to help Congo meet the challenge of holding national elections in April 1999, the target date set by President Kabila."
The next month Kabila's Foreign Minister, Bizima Karaha, visited Washington and, as evidenced by a lengthy interview he gave to UPI, did little to enhance U.S.-Congolese relations.:39 He was in Washington to ask the Clinton administration for help in reconstructing the country. But, as UPI noted, he was "not bringing a message the Clinton administration wants to hear."
For one thing, the U.S., with its typical monomania for "free and fair elections," even in the wake of the overthrow of thirty years of relentless dictatorship, was insisting that elections take place within two years, which, admittedly, Kabila had announced when he took over. Karaha referred to the pledge as merely "a goal," one which he doubted could be reached, given the continuing instability in the country
Karaha was also vehement in ruling out any participation in the new government by opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, Mobutu's last prime minister. "The United States," UPI noted, "one of the few nations to recognize Tshisekedi's brief appointment to head Mobutu's government during some of the fiercest fighting, has pointed to the opposition leader as exactly the type of figure that should be included in Kabila's administration." Karaha, with perhaps less diplomacy than might be expected from a foreign minister, called Tshisekedi a "provocateur" who "wants to create anarchy and chaos...an enemy of the people and of the government."
The handwriting was on the wall. A senior official told the UPI reporter "that Kabila can 'kiss goodbye' any hopes of American help if the positions taken by Karaha on elections and on Tshisekedi prove accurate reflections of the policies Kabila plans to pursue."
WAR CRIME ALLEGATIONS
The demand that the massacres committed during the overthrow of Mobutu be fully investigated and that the perpetrators be identified and punished was raised, but the U.N. and the Clinton administration never revealed what they knew-that these were Tutsi revenge killings. A few reports conceded that the atrocities were committed by troops beyond Kabila's control. The media attacks against Kabila were relentless, always ignoring the astonishing degree to which foreign nations, Rwanda and Uganda, exercised absolute control over the Congolese military and security services.
Kabila responded cryptically to calls from human rights organizations demanding investigation into the massacres, claiming that countries and international groups must assume some of the responsibility "All the forces...including in the name of sending humanitarian assistance, are [also] responsible...for these great violations." He stopped short of conceding that Rwandan troops, in fact, committed mass killings in their sweep across the country But he hinted at complicity by both the U.S. government and certain human rights groups.
An October 1997 Human Rights Watch report with the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues stated, "Kabila's troops, particularly Rwandan allies, segregated and executed young men, former Hutu government officials and Hutu intellectuals." They accused the U.S. of ignoring the massacres to "hasten a conclusion to the region's three-year refugee crisis."
An exception to most media coverage was a revealing Washington Post investigation by Scott Campbell, placing much of the blame on Paul Kagame's Rwandans, and noting that, while the Defense Department admitted training RPA troops inside Rwanda, "knowledgeable witnesses told me they had seen U.S. soldiers in the company of RPA troops on Congolese territory on various dates including July 23rd and 24th of this year... Massacre sites continue to be cleaned up and potential witnesses intimidated... Rwandan officers and troops remain in the Congo in the same areas where they participated in massacres, representing a lethal threat to any who would dare collaborate with the U.N. team."
Campbell concluded by urging that "Kabila and the international community.. insist that Kagame withdraw his troops from Congolese territory and investigate anyone suspected of killing civilians. Armed Hutu soldiers and militia must also finally be disarmed and brought to justice."
It became apparent that the Clinton administration would welcome Kabila's overthrow, and perhaps had always envisioned such an outcome. The desired scenario was floated in World Policy Review, where, in the summer of 1998, just before the second Congo invasion, Frank Smythe savaged Kabila, calling him a "thug," and stating that "Voices from all quarters say that the Kabila regime is corrupt. Even his former allies in Rwanda, Uganda, and Eritrea have begun asking whether they should have recruited another Zairean to lead operations in eastern Zaire." The notion that Paul Kagame was sensitive to charges of official corruption is laughable, but Smythe's article confirmed that the die was cast.
At the same time, much "shiny new military hardware was appearing at Kigali airport in Rwanda." It was not long before what the western press would dub "Africa's First World War" began.
OUSTER, ATTEMPTED COUP, AND INVASION
Only four months after President Clinton's March 1998 trip to Africa, Kabila ordered all Rwandan and Ugandan Tutsi troops and military instructors out of the country. On July 28, 1998, they began to leave, taking much of what was left of the DRC treasury with them.
Kabila later described a foiled assassination attempt against him as the factor that precipitated the ouster, as well as the Tutsi killings of Hutu refugees, which had spread to the central Equatorial region.
On August 2, only four days later, Rwanda and Uganda invaded Congo from the east with ground troops from their regular armies. And just two days after that, in what must have involved months of forward planning, there were two airborne invasions by Rwanda in the west, and Ugandan troops simultaneously landed in the south and occupied the ports.
An attempted coup was under way.
While some "rebels" were involved in the invasion (mostly former Mobutu officers), "Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers...constitute the major portion of those troops which are combating Kabila's government," according to a statement at the time by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. Nevertheless, it was months before Uganda and Rwanda admitted that their soldiers were involved in the invasion. (The U.S. has yet to confirm its participation.)
The early fighting in western Congo almost reached Kinshasa. For nearly a month, Rwandan troops controlled Kitona airport, and Ugandans in the southwest held the Inga dam, cutting electricity and water into the capital. In mid-August, when the invaders totally defied a demand from the Organization of African Unity to lay down their arms, Zimbabwe and Angola, and later Namibia, decided to send troops to Congo to assist the government in beating back the assault. It was only after fierce fighting, with vital military support from the Angolans and Zimbabweans, along with spirited defense from the local populace in Kinshasa, that the rebels were repulsed at the gates of the capital. Ultimately, by the end of August, they were driven back to the eastern regions.
LIFE IN THE OCCUPIED ZONE
The battle in eastern Congo is another story, one that still rages, despite more than a year of cease-fire efforts. In North Kivu, South Kivu, and Haut-Congo provinces the invaders have been able to occupy vast reaches of territory, at present more than half of the entire country. (Congo is more than one-fourth the size of the U.S.) The isolated infrastructure of this area, encompassing most of the mineral wealth of Congo, has remained under the effective control of rebel groups, as proxies for the Ugandans, the Rwandans, and the various mining firms and their private security forces.
Since the invasion, for almost two years, the fortunes of the "rebel" groups, themselves riven with splits and recriminations, have been inextricably tied to the mercurial and deteriorating relations between Uganda and Rwanda, all competing for Congo's fabulous mineral wealth. Personal relations between the Ugandan and Rwandan leaders were close for many years, ever since Kagame, as an exile in Uganda, was a rising star in its army. He helped Museveni come to power By the summer of 1999, however, relations were so strained between the two countries that their troops fought a bloody three-day battle in Kisangani. Rwanda had attempted, unsuccessfully, to take control of the Haut-Congo capital, where the Ugandan army and rebels have their headquarters.
THE REBEL SURROGATES
One branch of the Congolese Union for Democracy (RCD), based on the border with Uganda, is headed by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, a former university professor who was brought from exile in Tanzania and appeared in public three weeks after the attempted coup. By all reports, he is a Congolese nationalist who is in favor of a non-military solution, but whose ambition to be the leader of Congo has him, in some analysts' opinion, in "over his head." Wamba dia Wamba first operated out of Goma with the protection of Rwandan Tutsi and former Mobutu troops. When political-military differences became severe, in April 1999, ousted by the military faction and in fear for his life, he moved the headquarters of his group to Kisangani and renamed his operation RCDML. He is now under the protection of the Ugandan army
Rwanda backs the military branch of Wamba's former group, still in Goma and now led by Dr. Emile Ilunga, from Katanga, Kabila's home province. Ilunga's faction is now called RCD-Goma. The security chief for this branch is Bizima Karaha, Kabila's former foreign minister.
Yet another group, the Movement for Congolese Liberation (MLC), in the north central region, is also backed by Uganda, led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, a young businessman during the Mobutu era. His group is composed of some former Mobutu officers and soldiers. Curiously, his father, Saolona Bemba, a very wealthy former close associate of Mobutu, was put in jail in Kinshasa when Kabila took power. The elder Bemba somehow transformed himself into Kabila's political ally and is now the DRC Minister of Economy and Industry (even as his son plots the overthrow of the Kabila government).
The rebels are definitely not welcome in most of the northeast half of the country they control. "[T]he men seeking to overthrow the President of Congo, Laurent Kabila, have been decidedly unpopular even as they conquered nearly half this huge country. They are linked too closely with Rwanda, which provides the rebels with troops and arms but is despised by many ordinary Congolese." The London Economist had earlier acknowledged that "The second rebellion in two years is unpopular with most Congolese. In 1996, the rebels [here meaning Kabila's forces] held crowded rallies at which they recruited young fighters. In the eastern Kivu province which the rebels [here meaning Kabila's opponents] still hold, and in the towns outside Kivu which they have captured...rallies have been...sparsely attended...rebel leaders have been booed, and there have been no lines of young men eager to join.''
Abuses, indeed atrocities, by the RCD and other rebel groups in North and South Kivu have been well-documented. "Reports from South Kivu strongly suggest the danger of large-scale violence among different ethnic groups there. Among several alleged massacres and atrocities is the burial alive of 15 women in Kivu province by rebels, apparently in suspicion of contacts with Mayi-Mayi forces." Mayi-Mayi are a local tribe that supports Kabila because of their antipathy for the Tutsi aggressors.
Another conflict-this one in the rebel-controlled area bordering on Uganda-is a Ugandan-instigated war between the Hema and the Lendu tribes. Long at peace, albeit tensely, they began battling fiercely when Ugandan forces took control of the region and paid the Hema to step up the level of warfare. The fighting has been described as "massacres on a chilling scale." The Ugandans have used the fighting as an excuse to send more regular army troops into the area. Many other examples of infighting among rebel groups and their sponsors are surfacing.
Although it is "generally agreed that the rebels are thoroughly detested in the areas they have now occupied for more than a year," the Congolese army has been unable to dislodge them.
So, "de facto partition" has come to Congo. Money is a major factor. As Le Monde Diplomatique noted, "the well-equipped Rwandan and Ugandan troops [with the rebels] are paid in dollars."
And the dollars are flowing. Eastern Congo, virtually annexed by Uganda and Rwanda, is one of the most mineral-rich areas in the world. Gold and diamonds and rare strategic minerals are flowing into the two countries, earning vast sums for their treasures.
The border between Congo and Rwanda is "a mere formality." The international mining companies that operate in Kivu protect the Rwandans, who "have a monopoly on the mining and marketing of those minerals."
The West has ignored the blatant theft of Congo's sovereign natural resources. Some believe this is because its bonafides were so shattered by its apparent indifference to the 1994 atrocities. Paul Kagame was politically sophisticated enough, some analysts noted, that, since 1994, he has "played on Washington's sense of guilt about the genocide.'' Le Monde Diplomatique agreed "The genocide of the Tutsis is now invoked to play on the international community's sense of guilt and persuade the United States to look with a kindly eye on what is nothing less than a plan to conquer and control the resources of the Congo." Others believe, instead, there is an overwhelming coincidence of interests for all of the parties involved-greed.
THE LUSAKA ACCORD
Less than two months after rebels had taken control of eastern Congo and were moving toward the diamond mines in the southwest near Angola, Susan Rice began to press for a cease-fire. After two days of discussion with Kabila in Kinshasa, on November 1, Rice went to Zambia for talks with President Frederick Chiluba, the anointed mediator. In Lusaka, Rice pressed her point. "There is absolutely no military solution which is viable." Given the unending U.S. military support for Rwanda and Uganda, Rice knew well why a military solution was impossible for the Congolese, half of whose country was under foreign occupation.
But more than eight months were to elapse before any agreement was reached. With the crucial support of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, Congo was able to halt any further rebel advances and to protect the vital southeast, Katanga, with its diamond mines. (Rebel groups and their Ugandan and Rwandan sponsors were constantly squabbling, having splits, and moving headquarters, and the Rwandans and Ugandans were fighting each other )
Moreover, the Americans' hand-picked peace broker, Chiluba, was hardly neutral. Frederick Chiluba, president of Zambia, was known to allow UNITA to transit through Zambian territory in their constant forays against Angola. Chiluba was also discovered to have extensive interests in the internationally outlawed UNITA diamond trade, the main source of financing for the rebel group. UNITA was not only wreaking havoc, as it has for 25 years, in Angola, Congo's close and critical ally its troops were now fighting the DRC in Congo as well, alongside the Rwandan rebels.
By the end of the year, pressures on Kabila to enter talks were overpowering, even though it had become clear to the world that Congo had been invaded and occupied by foreign powers and was not in the throes of a civil war.
In January 1999, Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola agreed to an African-sponsored cease-fire framework, but since the rebel groups had not been invited to the meetings, nothing would be meaningful until they agreed.
The wheeling and dealing intensified through the spring of 1999. Numerous meetings were held under the auspices of the Organization for African Unity and the Southern African Development Community. Nevertheless, it took U.S. pressure on the participants-including Nelson Mandela's good offices (splitting still further what were once the united frontline states)-to forge an agreement that would satisfy the rebels. This was not difficult, given the impressive level of U.S. military and economic support for Rwanda and Uganda, as well as for the South African government.
In June, foreign and defense ministers gathered in Lusaka, later joined by their nations' leaders, and by July 7 new terms of the cease-fire accord had been announced. Clinton's special envoy for Africa, Howard Wolpe, who was in Lusaka for the duration, noted, somewhat ominously "Our sense is that the key players have come to comprehend how enormously costly this is not only to the people of the Congo but to the entire region."
Of all Congo's allies, Angola has the most serious stake in the outcome of the war. UNITA forces have been using southern Congo to attack Luanda's troops since Mobutu's time and had long before joined with Rwandan Tutsi fighters. In late August 1998, only weeks after the war began, UNITA representatives met with Kagame. Some UNITA fighters were also captured in "rebel" skirmishes. Further complicating the situation, "UNITA has reportedly received South African arms, shipped to Mozambique and flown on South African aircraft to Angola by way of Zambia." After decades of support for UNITA, the U.S., according to U.N. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, now proposed to "throw its weight behind" efforts to "tighten and enforce sanctions" against them
The effect on Namibia has also been significant. In August, a separatist group in Namibia's Caprivi Strip, previously inactive, launched a series of military attacks made possible by supplies and other assistance from UNITA. Their "suspected motive," the New York Times noted, "is to punish Namibia for its role in the Congo war" As recently as February 2000, UNITA troops were attacking Namibian border villages. Namibia has "a growing problem with UNITA along its border with Angola and in the breakaway Caprivi Strip.... Caprivi separatists reportedly receive aid not only from UNITA, but also from Botswana and Zambia." In addition, Zimbabwe's contributions to the Congo war effort played a major role in the devastation of its economy and the likely ouster of President Robert Mugabe.
When everyone sat down in Lusaka, the rebels dampened U.S. enthusiasm by refusing to sign the accord (unable to agree on who would sign it on their behalf). It would take another month and a half before the RCD rivals agreed that both factions would sign.
It was just at this moment that Richard Holbrooke began to take center stage. In August, Clinton administration horse-trading with Senate Republicans had abandoned funding for U.N. projects overseas that supported abortion programs in exchange for confirmation of Holbrooke as U.N. ambassador In the meantime, his Africa staff had been shepherding the accords to their signing, maintaining a constant pressure on Kabila to accede.
The agreement called for a step-by-step withdrawal of foreign troops, including the rebels, within 180 days, rather than immediately as the African-sponsored version had required. This meant that the rebels would stay in Congo. In any case, that deadline was never met. The foreign troops never left
Cease-fire violations since then have become rampant. By mid-November each side accused the other of violations. Susan Rice continued to insist, "Lusaka is the only viable way It can and must be implemented." She then announced that Richard Holbrooke would travel to the region in December When he did, he "acknowledged that unlike the Balkans, where military might and billions of dollars have been devoted to peacemaking, NATO was not available to impose a settlement." Nevertheless, he was both threatening and patronizing. The OAU, he insisted, must "get its act together," or the U.S. would not support a peacekeeping operation at all.
This was a reference to another critical provision of the accords, calling for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force within 120 days, another unmet deadline. The U.N. force has only just been authorized, after a special session of the Security Council in January. Albright, Holbrooke, and company had learned to be less publicly ham-handed since their manipulations of the Rambouillet meetings on Yugoslavia had been widely exposed, and the Security Council sessions were relatively open and smooth, paving the way for U.N. approval.
Nevertheless, the U.S. role continues to grow, even as the U.N. prepares to deploy a woefully inadequate 5,000-man peacekeeping force. The Pentagon is already giving military advice to the U.N on that force. It is, in the words of Holbrooke, giving "the United Nations the benefit of U.S. experience in such matters." Direct participation of U.S. personnel remains a touchy subject, after the debacle in Somalia, also under Clinton's watch. Unfortunately former South African President Nelson Mandela has not only offered to send South African troops to Congo, but has also publicly urged the participation of U.S. forces there, a certain recipe for disaster
WHAT IT REALLY MEANS: BALKANIZATION
The U.S. shaping of, and insistent support for, the Lusaka accords only highlights what has been clear for some time. The agreement was not a good deal for the Congo government, and Kabila was forced to accede only because of the implicit threat that refusal would be met by even greater assistance to the rebels and the potential dismantling of the entire country. In stark contrast to the resolutions of the OAU and the SADC, and to the earlier draft agreement before the last gathering in Lusaka, the final accord did not even recognize the legitimacy of the DRC government or President Kabila.
When the agreement was signed, U S. envoy Howard Wolpe noted, "its a very important beginning to have all the parties together, collectively laying out a road map." But the map is of a partitioned, divided Congo, contrary to the OAU Charter and a throw-back to the Berlin Conference of 1885, when the western powers drew the boundaries of African nations with impunity
More than a year ago, the New York Times launched what can now be identified as a major propaganda campaign to legitimize the Balkanization of Africa, much as the re-Balkanization of Yugoslavia was promoted in the West during the 1990s. On January 12, 1999, when the Lusaka accord
lay well in the future, a front-page article by lan Fisher with Norimitsu Onishi entitled "Congo's Struggle May Unleash Broad Strife to Redraw Africa," appeared. Its rhetorical trick was to lay the responsibility for the current borders on meddling European colonialists, implying, despite OAU recognition of those borders as inviolate, that the redrawing of those boundaries by African combatants might be more legitimate: "The borders of African nations, set up arbitrarily by the Europeans who colonized the continent a century ago, are supposed to be inviolate. Yet Congo is now split in two, perhaps for good."
While the article paid lip service to the "stability" lent to the continent by respect for those boundaries, it planted the seeds of doubt: "The borders established [at the Berlin Conference] had little to do with geography or the lines that separated ethnic groups."
A few days later, the Times campaign continued, more directly A long article on January 16 by Howard W French was entitled "The African Question: Who Is to Blame? The Finger Points to the West, and Congo Is a Harsh Example." While some recognition was given to the generally exploitative legacy of "European subjugation and rule," the imposition of boundaries was stressed: "colonial subjugation brutally ended Africa's sovereign evolution toward modern nation-states." An African scholar at the State University of New York at Buffalo was quoted: "The example I like to think of is if an African imperial army had marched into Europe in the Middle Ages and required Germany France, and England to live together by force of arms. It would have unleashed untold mayhem... " "Almost every time the Europeans created a state," French wrote, "ethnic groups or previously existing African polities were split by the new borders, undermining the new states' claims to legitimacy in the eyes of their inhabitants."
PERMANENT DIVISION?
Most recently the Times, while never openly endorsing partition, has lauded the "relative stability" of the current division of Congo and has opined that the main mission of the U.N. peacekeeping force will be to "provide security in relatively stable zones.
It is not unlikely that the boundaries of a two-Congo Africa have already been set-imposed yet again by the western powers.
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