From Schirach's IMT testimony: I was firmly convinced that Hitler would not allow a war to break out. It was my opinion that he was in no way deceived about the fact that the Western Powers were firmly resolved to be serious. Until the day when war broke out, I firmly believed that the war could be avoided. I have already stated that over a period of 12 years--that is from 1933 to 1944 or 1945; that is, 13 years--I had perhaps one or possibly two half-hour conversations with Field Marshal Keitel. I remember that one of them dealt entirely with a personal matter.

During the same period I had, I think, only one single discussion with Admiral Raeder, and Admiral Doenitz I met for the first time here in Nuremberg. I never had any official discussions with Generaloberst Jodl at all, and I talked to the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg, if I remember rightly, possibly twice for half an hour. I had no official discussions at all with the former Supreme Commander of the Army, Von Fritsch. I was his guest on one occasion only, when he was running skiing competitions for the army, and he kindly invited me because he knew that I was interested in skiing.

With his successor, von Brauchitsch, I had a general chat on questions of education when I talked before the youth of Koenigsberg in 1933. Later, I believe, I visited him once on official business; and we discussed a question that was of no particular importance for the education of youth. It was some technical matter. These are the discussions that I have had with military personalities. In fact, altogether I must say that I did not have time for conferences. I led an organization comprising 8 million people; and my duties in that organization were such that I did not possibly have the time to participate in conferences and discussions in Berlin regarding the situation, even if I had been admitted to them, which was not the case . . . .

I would judge that the leadership corps of the HJ [at the beginning of the war] had about 1,300 leaders. Those were leaders of the Banne, leaders of the districts or regions, and the corresponding staff of assistants. Of these 1,300 youth leaders, 5 to 10 men were reserve of officers. Active officers were not youth leaders and could not be youth leaders. An officer was not permitted to be a member of the Party or any one of its organs or affiliated organizations . . . .

We had absolutely no possibilities for espionage training in our youth organization. Whether Heydrich on his part, without my knowledge and without the knowledge of my assistants, had hired youthful agents in Poland and used them within his intelligence service, it is not possible for me to say. I myself did not conduct any espionage training; I had no courses for agents, and courses for training parachutists were out of the question because, after all, I had no air force. Training of that kind could only have been conducted through the Air Force . . . .

I should like to add that shortly before the war young refugees from Poland came to us in large numbers, but they of course could not return to Poland. The persecution of the Germans in Poland is a historical fact.

From the IMT testimony of Hartmann Lauterbacher: Von Schirach came to see me at the end of September or beginning of October 1939. He visited me in the house which I occupied at the time in Berlin. The conversation very quickly turned to war, and Schirach said that, in his opinion, this war should have been prevented. He held the Foreign Minister of that time responsible for having given Hitler inadequate or false information. He regretted the fact that Hitler and the leading men of the State and the Party knew nothing about Europe and the world generally and had steered Germany into this war without having any idea of the consequences.

At that time he was of the opinion that if the war could not be brought to an end in the shortest possible time, we should lose it. In this connection he referred to the enormous war potential of the United States and England. He said--and I remember the expression very well--that this war was an unholy one and that if the German people were not to be plunged into disaster as a result of it, the Fuehrer must be informed of the danger which would arise for Germany if America were to intervene, either through deliveries of goods or through actual entry into the war.

We considered at the time who could inform Hitler, who, in fact, could even obtain access to him. Schirach suggested trying in some way to introduce Colin Ross into Adolf Hitler's presence. Colin Ross was to call Hitler's attention to the threatening catastrophe and to inform Hitler of the facts. This was to be done outside the competency of the Foreign Minister and without the Foreign Minister being present. At that time Colin Ross was not yet in Germany. I remember that when he returned he was introduced into Hitler's presence by way of Schirach . . . .

I have already mentioned that the leaders of the National Socialist State and of the Party were almost totally lacking in knowledge of the world and foreign countries generally, and had consequently hit upon this man, who had seen so much of the world. Colin Ross had occasionally attended meetings of the Hitler Youth Leaders before 1939 and had addressed them and thus he was known to Schirach and the Hitler Youth. Colin Ross spoke of his experiences in every continent. In the course of this conversation Schirach referred to the excesses of 9 November 1938 and to the speech he made immediately afterwards, and said that in the circumstances it would naturally be extremely difficult to start discussions with America; that we might have to try beforehand--if circumstances permitted--and he wished to suggest this to Hitler during an interview . . . .

Schirach made use of every opportunity at the beginning of the war to convince Hitler of the need for discussions with America, and with this purpose in view, he actually brought Colin Ross to Hitler, as he told me later. Colin Ross was with Hitler for several hours. When Colin Ross visited me at Hanover he told me about this discussion and on this occasion he said that Hitler was very thoughtful. He did say also, however, that a second discussion which had been planned with Hitler had not materialized, for, according to his version, the Foreign Office had protested against this kind of information.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: In the year 1938 the motorized Hitler Youth--that is that special unit of our youth organization which the Prosecution think received preliminary training in the tank branch--in 1938 the motorized Hitler Youth had 328 vehicles of their own. There were 3,270 private cars of their family members which, of course, were at their disposal for their work; and 2,000 cars of the NSKK (National Socialist Motor Corps). In the year 1938 21,000 youth got their driving licenses. I believe, but I cannot be sure about it, that that is twice the number of youngsters that received a driving license in 1937--that is, the driving license for a passenger car. These figures alone show that the motorized Hitler Youth did not receive preliminary training for our armored forces.

The motorized Hitler Youth had motorcycles; they made cross-country trips. That is correct. What they learned in this way was, of course, useful for the Army too, when these boys later were drafted into the motorized units; but it was not true that the boy who had been in the motorized Hitler Youth went to the Army. There was no compulsion in that respect at all. The motorized Hitler Youth was not created upon the request of the Wehrmacht, but it was already created in the fighting years-long before the seizure of power, simply from the natural desire of the boys who owned a motorcycle and wanted to drive it. So we formed our motorized HJ; we used these boys as messengers between tent camps and we used them as drivers for our minor leaders, and later, in order to give them a regular training, especially knowledge of motors, of engines, we made an arrangement with the NSKK, which had motor schools and could train the boys.

Other units were created in the same way. The Flieger HJ, for example, never had any airplanes. We had only gliders. The entire Hitler Youth had but one airplane and that was my own, a small Klemm machine. Aside from that, the Hitler Youth had only model airplanes and gliders. The Hitler Youth not only taught their own members the use of gliders in the Rhoen Hills and elsewhere, but also thousands of youth from England and other countries. We had glider camps where young Englishmen were our guests and we even had camps in England. The Navy HJ, of course, had not a single warship, but from time to time our former Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder, kindly gave us an old cutter and with that we put to sea.

The boys, for instance, who lived in a city like Berlin, near the Wannsee, and did some rowing, became members of the Navy HJ. When entering the Wehrmacht they did not, just because they had been in the Navy HJ, go into the Navy, but just as many went afterwards into the Army or the Air Force, and it was the same with other special units . . . .

The training in these special units was carried out in such a manner that it really had a pre-military value. That is to say that whatever the boy learned in the Navy Hitler Jugend, regardless of whether he wanted to use it only as a sportsman later, or whether he actually went into the Navy, the basic principles were valuable as pre-military education. If one considers these special units of the HJ, one can establish that here a pre-military education actually took place, but not a military training. The youth were not prepared for the war in any place in the HJ; they were not even prepared for the military service, because the youth did not go direct from the Hitler Youth into the Army. From the Hitler Youth they went into the Labor Service.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: In 1940 I left the position as the leader of Youth, that is, I left the office of the Reich Youth Leadership of the NSDAP, but I retained the office of Reichsleiter for Youth Education and with that the entire responsibility for German youth. I received as an additional new post that of Gauleiter of Vienna, which was combined with the governmental post of Reichsstatthalter of Vienna and also that of Reich Defense Commissioner for Wehrkreis XVII . . . . Although during the last years of his life Hitler gave orders to the Youth of which I do not know and also my successor, Axmann, particularly in 1944, gave orders with which I am not acquainted since the relationship between us had been broken off due to the events of the war, I stand by the statement that I have made in the expectation that the Tribunal will consider me the only person responsible in Youth Leadership and that no other Youth Leader will be summoned before a court for actions for which I have assumed responsibility . . . .

That was an office [Deputy of the Fuehrer for the Inspection of the Hitler Youth] to the extent that the Reichsleiter office was concerned with youth work in the Party sector. The Youth Leader of the German Reich--that was Axmann as my successor--also had a field of activity in the State, and I too became competent for that by my appointment as inspector . . . .

At the end of the French campaign, in which I participated as an infantryman, I was in Lyon when a wireless message from the Fuehrer's headquarters was received, and the chief of my company told me that I had to report to the Fuehrer's headquarters. I went there at once; and at the Fuehrer's headquarters, which was at that time situated in the Black Forest, I saw the Fuehrer standing in the open speaking to Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. I waited a while, maybe a quarter of an hour or 20 minutes, until the conversation had ended and then reported at once to Hitler and there, outside, before the Casino building where later we all had our meal together, he told me the following in about 10 minutes:

I should propose to him a successor for the leadership of the youth. He intended for me to take over the Reich Gau Vienna. I at once suggested my assistant, Axmann, who was not a man who advocated physical or military training but was concerned with social work among the youth, and that was most important to me. He accepted this proposal . . . .

Hitler then said that I should keep my job as Reich Leader of Youth Education and that I should assume at the same time the office of the Inspector of Youth and that I should go to Vienna as the successor to Buerckel. In Vienna, especially in the cultural field, serious difficulties had arisen; and therefore I was to direct my attention to the case of the institutions of culture, particularly of theaters, art galleries, libraries, and so forth; and I was to be especially concerned about the working class. I raised the objection that I could carry out that cultural work only if independent of Goebbels, and Hitler promised at that time that this independence would be fully safeguarded; but he did not keep that promise later.

And lastly he said that he was sending the Jewish population away from Vienna, that he had already informed Himmler or Heydrich--I do not remember exactly what he said--of his intentions, or at least would inform them. Vienna had to become a German city, and in that connection he even spoke of an evacuation of the Czech population. That concluded that conversation. I received no other instructions for this office, and then we dined together as usual. I took my leave then and went to Berlin to talk to my assistants . . . .

[S]ince 1937--and I think that becomes clear from the Hossbach minutes--the Fuehrer had the idea of expatriating the Jewish population. This plan, however, did not become known to me until August 1940 when I took over the Vienna district. I reported to Hitler on that occasion, and he asked me how many Jews there were in Vienna. I answered his question, and he told me that he actually wanted all of them to be settled in the Government General. First of all, the practical measures of that action were not in my hands. I do not know how many of these 60,000 Jews were actually transported out of Vienna. I was informed that the aged were being taken to Theresienstadt and the others to Poland, to the Government General. On one occasion--it was either when I took my oath of office as Governor or when I made a speech about the evacuation of children--I even asked Hitler how these Jews were being employed, and he told me: in accordance with their professions.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: I had just started to work in Vienna when, in October 1940, I received an order to appear at the Reich Chancellery. And there Hitler personally gave me the mission of carrying out the evacuation of all German youth from areas endangered by aerial attack, and simultaneously to carry out the evacuation of mothers and infants; and he said that that should begin in Berlin and then gradually take in the entire Reich. He said that education was of secondary importance now; the main thing was to maintain the nervous energy of the youth and to preserve life. However, I asked at once that I be given the possibility of establishing an educational organization, and I did so.

I do not wish to speak about details, but one of the demands, which I made at once—this is important in connection with the Indictment—was that there should be no difficulties placed in the way of young people's participation in church services. That was promised to me, and it was expressed very clearly in my first directives for the children's evacuation. The youth leaders who were active in this field of my organizational work will confirm this. It was the most difficult, and from a psychological point of view, the most complicated work which I ever carried out. I transferred millions of people in this way; I supplied them with food, with education, with medical aid, and so on. Of course that work took up my time fully or to a large extent only during the first years. After that I had trained my assistants for that kind of work. I never tried to report to Hitler about my successes, but only about my problems. About that entire program of evacuation of children I could only report to him twice; the first time in 1940, after I had got the whole program under way, and the second time in 1941, when the evacuation had reached very large proportions. And about Vienna I could only report on very rare occasions, and in 1943 the possibility of reporting ceased altogether with the breach of relations which I will describe later . . . .

In October 1940 I was in the Reich Chancellery because that was the time when I was organizing the evacuation of youth. [Schirach is shown the October 2, 1940 document] Yes, I have refreshed my memory now. The Fuehrer asked me how many Jews were still in Vienna, and at that time ... there were still 60,000 Jews in Vienna. During that conversation, in which the question of settling Jews in the Government General was discussed, I also said that these 60,000 Jews from Vienna were still to be transferred to the Government General. I told you earlier that as a result of the events of November 1938 I was in favor of the Fuehrer's plan to take the Jews to a closed settlement . . . .

I have never agreed with these opinions of the Fuehrer, and I said here that I approached him in 1943 on the subject of this policy in the Ukraine. When in 1942 I talked about Eastern policy in Katowice, the German town of Katowice, to the German population of Upper Silesia, then, of course, I did not mean this brutal Polish policy of Hitler . . . . The policy which I was recommending to youth leaders there was not the policy which Hitler developed in his table talk . . . . I supported the policy of the Fuehrer out of erroneous loyalty to him. I know that it was not right ... I am prepared to admit that.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: I learned the details only from other persons in Berlin, after I had received my mission from Hitler--in Vienna the population had sobered considerably after the first wave of enthusiasm over the Anschluss had subsided. Herr Buerckel, my predecessor, had brought many officials to Vienna from the outside; and the German system of administration, which was in no wise more practicable or efficient than the Austrian, was introduced there. This resulted in a certain over-organization in the administrative field, and Buerckel had started on a Church policy which was more than unsatisfactory. Demonstrations took place under his administration. On one occasion the palace of the archbishop was damaged. Theaters and other places of culture were not taken care of as they should have been. Vienna was experiencing a feeling of great disillusionment. Before I got there I was informed that if one spoke in the streetcars with a North-German accent, the Viennese took an unfriendly attitude . . . .

In Vienna I had the office of Reich Governor (Reichsstatthalter), which included two administrations, the municipal administration and the national administration. In addition, I was Reich Defense Commissioner for Wehrkreis XVII, but only until 1942. In 1942, the Wehrkreis was subdivided, and each Gauleiter of the Wehrkreis became his own Reich Defense Commissioner. I was also Gauleiter, the highest official of the Party. Now the situation was such in the administration that there was an official representative to take charge of national affairs, namely, the Regierungspraesident; for the municipal administration there was another representative, the mayor; in the Party, the Deputy Gauleiter in Vienna had the title of Gauleiter. I should not like to belittle my responsibility for the Gau by explaining that, and I want to protect the exceptionally efficient Deputy Gauleiter who was there . . . .

The Reich Defense Commissioner was simply the head of the civil administration, in contrast to the situation prevailing during the first World War, where the head of the civil administration was assigned to and subordinated to the commanding general; in this war the Reich Defense Commissioner was co-ordinate with him, not subordinate.

The tasks of the Reich Defense Commissioner-at least, that is how I saw my tasks--were at certain intervals, to co-ordinate the most pressing problems of food economy, transportation--that is, local and distant transportation, coal supplies, and price regulation for the Gaue of Vienna, Upper Danube, and Lower Danube, all of which belonged to Wehrkreis XVII.

There were several meetings for that purpose-I believe three all together. In 1942 the reorganization which I previously mentioned took place. Bormann carried his point against the Reich Marshal. The Reich Marshal was of the opinion that the Reich Defense Commissioner had to be Defense Commissioner for the entire Wehrkreis. Bormann wanted each Gauleiter to be Defense Commissioner, and so that led to the division. From 1942 on I was only Reich Commissioner for Vienna.

From the IMT testimony of Fritz Wieshofer: I recollect a written order which we received either at the end of 1940 or at the beginning of 1941. It stated that "There are reasons which make it necessary once more to point out," et cetera. It obviously was a repetition of an order which had already been given. The purport of the order was that because of certain reasons, Gauleiter were prohibited from intervening on behalf of Jews in the future. I talked to Herr von Schirach about it. As far as I can recollect, von Schirach wrote on the order "To be filed." He did not say anything more about it.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: First of all, Dr. Fischer is not known to me personally. I do not want to dispute the possibility that he may have been introduced to me once and that I do not remember him; but I do not know who Dr. Fischer is. At any rate, he was not an expert working in my central office. I assume that he may have been an official, because his name appears in connection with another document also. He was probably the personal consultant of the Regierungspraesident. The note shows that this official used my stationery, and he was entitled to do that. I believe several thousand people in Vienna were entitled to use that stationery, according to the usage of German offices.

On this note he has put down a telephone conversation with the Gestapo from which it can be seen that the Reich Security Main Office--that is Heydrich--was the office which decided, by internal directives to the Gestapo, on the use of Jewish manpower. The Regierungspraesident wanted to know more about that; but I believe one cannot draw the conclusion from this that I was informed about cruelties committed by the Gestapo, as the Prosecution has concluded. It is doubtful whether I was in Vienna at all at that time. I want to remind you of my other tasks, which I have described before. [In Vienna there were] about 5,000 officials and employees.

However, if I was there, I certainly did not concern myself with the work of cleaning up the streets. But I should like to say that the variety of my tasks caused me to establish an organizational structure which did not exist in other Gau, namely, the Central Office of the Reich Leader . . . .

I have never seen this text before . . . . My office was the Central Office; it was not the office of the Reich Defense Commissioner. The affairs of the Reich Defense Commissioner were officially in charge of the Regierungspraesident, whose personal adviser took care of routine matters. My mail was delivered at the Central Office. I do not know how many copies of this were sent out, I cannot say. [After being told "100, and you got the sixty-seventh copy."] And these copies, as I gathered from the original that I saw, were not sent to me but to the competent adviser, a Herr Fischer . . . . I have no idea who this Herr Fischer was. I assume that he was the expert attached to the Regierungspraesident, the expert of defense matters . . . .

[After Schirach is handed a document dated 28 September 1940] His name is the twentieth name on the list "Regierungsrat Dr. Fischer, Expert for Reich Defense Matters"--in other words, expert attached to the Regierungspraesident. I have probably seen him at some meeting or other. I take it that he kept the minutes. However, I must admit that I have no personal recollection of this gentleman. I cannot attach any owner to that name; but it is clear to me now that he was the person who took charge of incoming mail for the Reich Defense Commissioner and probably kept the minutes as well. In view of his junior status--he is only a Regierungsrat--he cannot have held any other appointment on this council . . . .

I cannot swear that I would not recognize Dr. Fischer again if I were confronted with him. He seems to have been the official who kept the minutes. However, among the large circle of people who attended meetings of this kind, he did not come to my attention. Only very few Reich defense meetings of this sort actually took place. What seems to me the decisive point is that he did not report to me personally but to the Regierungspraesident. I believe I must describe the exact composition of this Reich Defense Council. There were the leading commanding generals of the Army and the Luftwaffe; there were various Gauleiter; there were the people mentioned here; there was Dr. Putt, the representative of the Economic Management Staff and all the others who are listed here. In this large circle of people, whom I had to welcome, there was an official who kept the minutes and who was one of many officials in my office. These meetings, as you have probably ascertained, took place very infrequently. Dr. Fischer did not report to me currently, nor did he submit to me the minutes of these sessions; the Regierungspraesident reported to me . . . .

If these reports had been meant for me, they would have been sent to me directly. Moreover, I said today that I do not dispute having been informed of the shooting of Jews in the East, but at a later period [1944]. I mentioned that in connection with the war. However, the reports themselves were not in my hands. If these reports had been before me, they would have had a certain note, which I would recognize immediately.

From the IMT testimony of Unterbannfuehrer Gustav Dietrich Hoepken: I do not know a Dr. Fischer either in the Central Bureau or in the Reichsstatthalterei. I assume he was a colleague of Oberregierungsrat Dr. Felber, who specialized in these matters. Also I see they were secret letters, and were therefore addressed to him personally. The Regierungspraesident [Dellbrugge] reported directly to Herr von Schirach about matters concerning the Reich Governor and the Reich Defense Commissioner. I was not present at these conversations; consequently I cannot say to what extent he reported to von Schirach on these matters.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: I stated the other day, and I repeat this, that the idea of evacuating the Jews from Vienna was Hitler's idea that he communicated to me in 1940 at his headquarters. Furthermore, and I want to make this quite clear, I stated that after the events of those November days in 1938 I was actually of the opinion that it would be better for the Jewish population to be accommodated in a closed settlement than to be regularly singled out by Goebbels as a target for his propaganda and his organized actions. I also said that I identified myself with that action suggested by Hitler, but did not carry it out.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: The well-known foundation Klosterneuburg, the famous monastery, served as a receiving office for collections of works of art taken from our art museum. I can no longer give you exact details with regard to this. I believe there were very few people in the monastery, that the large building was not being used to the fullest possible extent, and that we urgently needed more space for the expansion of the experimental station run in conjunction with our State School of Viniculture. I believe that is why this monastery was confiscated . . . . I myself as head of these schools was naturally extremely anxious to have such a school established in Vienna. At one time the idea expressed here of taking Klosterneuburg and housing one of the Adolf Hitler Schools in it did occur to me, and I probably did discuss it with Herr Scharizer [Schirach’s deputy]; but I dropped the idea completely. Klosterneuburg was never converted into an Adolf Hitler School . . . .

Since the museum space available in Vienna was not sufficient for the very large collections, we wanted to turn this monastery into an additional large museum which would be open to the public. We began to carry out this plan, and a great part of the collections was transferred to the building. In addition, we needed the strongly built cellars of this monastery for the safekeeping of the many art treasures which we had to protect against bombing attacks.

It occurred to me that we might house an Adolf Hitler School in this building and I discussed the possibility with one or two of my colleagues and then abandoned it: Firstly, because it would have caused some ill-feeling if we had housed an Adolf Hitler School in a building which had formerly been consecrated ground, and secondly, because we badly needed the monastery for these other purposes. I have nothing to add to my explanation . . . . Bormann showed his anti-religious views most clearly in 1943; but they had already begun to appear in 1937.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: Well, the Church in Vienna had actually been persecuted under my predecessor, Buerckel, and this can be proved. I mentioned yesterday the demonstrations before the Archbishop's Palace. But from the day of my arrival in Vienna, anti-Church demonstrations in the nature of a political agitation no longer took place. Immediately upon my arrival I gathered all the political officials and all my other colleagues of the Gau and demanded that they should never, either in writing or by word of mouth, express anything likely to offend the religious sentiments of other people. I believe that this is a fact that was gratefully noted by the entire population of Vienna. From that day on there were no further actions against the Church. Just how much Church property, though, was called in compliance with the law for special war contributions, a law that likewise applied to other property--I cannot tell you without documentary evidence . . . . I myself, during a visit by Hitler to Vienna where he signed a southeast pact, told him I was of the opinion that the property confiscated belonged to the Gau and not to the Reich. That was my point of view and one that I believed to be entirely correct.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: Bormann's covering letter referred to Church property; I referred to property belonging to enemies of the people and the State, for that was a technical expression at the time. I should like to mention in this matter that when I came to Vienna in 1940 the confiscation of such property was already in full swing; an argument had arisen on the subject between the Gauleiter and the Reich Minister for Finance. The Reich Minister for Finance wanted the confiscated property taken over by the Reich, while I considered that This property should remain fundamentally the possession of the Gau.

So far as I can remember, I was involved in this question only through the following confiscation’s: Prince Schwarzenberg possessed property, the greater part of which lay in the region of the Upper Danube; the smaller part was the famous Vienna Palace. Now this Prince Schwarzenberg had refused, in the presence of some German consul general, or consul abroad, to return to Germany and serve in the Army. Thereupon his property was confiscated. In the interest of the Reich I endeavored to maintain this property for the Vienna Reich Gau and to prevent it from passing over to the Reich. I have no files before me, so I cannot from memory give you any information about other, similar actions.

I am not responsible for confiscation’s in the other Austrian Gau. But I may state one thing here-namely, that I put an end to all confiscation’s throughout the entire Reich. When, through an intermediary, women from an Austrian convent appealed to me for help, I asked my father-in-law to act behind Bormann's back and explain to Hitler the disastrous political effects which these confiscation’s would have and to beg him to issue a direct order for their suppression. This was achieved, and when the order was put through, Bormann turned against my father-in-law as well. From then on I never had any further opportunity to bring this question to the Fuehrer's notice.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: Since 1933 I tried to bring about good relations with Yugoslav youth. Starting in 1936 or 1937 I extended invitations to Yugoslav youth groups, as well as to youth groups of all European countries, to visit and inspect German youth institutions. Yugoslav youth groups actually came to Germany in reply to my invitation. But I know nothing about the enlisting of Yugoslav youths in the German Army; I do not believe that. I can only say that at the time of the regency of Prince Regent Paul there was very close collaboration with Yugoslav youth. During the war we maintained good relations with both Serbian and Croatian youth. German youth visited Serbia and Croatia, while Serbian and Croatian youth came to German youth camps, German youth leader training schools, and so on, and looked at our institutions. That, I think, is everything I can say about this. But we had friendly relations not only with Yugoslavia but also with many other countries . . . .

I know that there were young people among the German minority in Yugoslavia, just as in Romania and Hungary. I know that this German youth felt that it belonged to the Hitler Youth, and I think it is perfectly natural that these young people welcomed the German troops on their arrival. I cannot give information on the extent to which collaboration existed between the troops and the youth but that it did exist is also quite natural. Of course, it could not be considered military collaboration, but rather the kind of co-operation which will always exist between an occupying force and the youth of the same country or nationality as the members of that force. But that has nothing to do with espionage or the like. I do not know how the divisions of the Waffen-SS, of which there were very many, were recruited. It is possible that some members of the German minority were recruited then and there, but I have no definite information on this.

From the IMT testimony of Hartmann Lauterbacher: The establishment of a cordial understanding between German youth and world youth generally was undoubtedly one of those tasks the importance of which Schirach constantly emphasized to his youth leaders, and I always had the impression that this task was, as I might almost say, his particular passion. I myself, on his orders--and perhaps I am a cardinal witness on precisely this point--visited the various European countries, from 1935 onwards, at least once a year and sometimes even two or three times a year, so that I could get in touch with existing youth organizations and with organizations of combatants of the first World War, in order to establish contact with them. It can truthfully be said that the Hitler Youth sought contacts with all the countries of Europe; and I myself, at the direct order of Von Schirach, visited England several times. There I met the leader of the British Boy Scouts and his colleague.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: From my knowledge, I can say that when the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories was created, Reichsleiter Rosenberg expressed a wish that the Reich Youth Leader should put at his disposal an official for the youth department in the new Ministry. This official was appointed; he was taken into the Ministry and directed its youth department. He was, of course, responsible to the Eastern Minister. I cannot say more about this point. Reports from this department did not reach me . . . . I meant that the head of this department or whatever he was, this official in the Eastern Ministry who came from the Hitler Youth, did not report to me. He naturally reported to his immediate superiors in the Reich Youth Leadership. The Reich Youth Leadership was located in Berlin, and I assume that the officials of its staff were in constant touch with him . . . .

The measures taken there were carried out according to directions laid down by the Reich Minister, who was the immediate superior of his officials. If actual youth measures, the treatment of youth, and so on, were dealt with, I am sure that this official or youth leader discussed the matter with the Reich Youth Leadership and made a report to it. The Minister is always responsible for the youth official in his Ministry, and not the organization from which the youth official happens to come.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: In this book of mine, Die Hitlerjugend-Idee und Gestalt, the word "Lebensraum" (living space) is not used at all to my knowledge. Only the word "Ostraum" (eastern space) is used, and I think it is in connection with a press service in the East. In a footnote, in connection with a description of the tasks of the Colonial Advisory Board in the Reich Youth Leadership, there is a statement to the effect that, as a result of the activities of this Colonial Advisory Board the necessity of drawing the attention of youth to the exploitation of the eastern territory—and by that is meant the thinly populated eastern area of Germany—should not be overlooked.

That was at a time when we in the youth organizations were particularly concerned with the problem of the "flight from the land," that is to say, the migration of the second or third sons of farmers to the cities. I formed a special movement of youth to combat that trend, the Rural Service, which had the task of stopping this flow of youth from the country to the towns and also of bringing home to youth in towns the challenge of the country.

Of course I never thought of a conquest of Russian territory because ever since I occupied myself with history it was always my point of view politically that the policy regarding mutual security with Russia, which broke off with Bismarck's dismissal, should be resumed. I considered the attack against the Soviet Union as the suicide of the German nation.

Late-June 1941: In the initial stage of Operation Barbarossa, Lviv (Lvov) in the Ukrainian is taken by the Germans. The evacuating Soviets kill most of the prison population. When Wehrmacht forces arrive in the city, they discover evidence of mass murders committed by the NKVD and NKGB. Ukrainian nationalists are organized as militia and civil population is allowed to take revenge on the "Jews and the Bolsheviks" and indulge in several pogroms in Lviv and the surrounding region. The Lviv pogroms take a toll of 4000 to 10.000 Jews.

From an interrogation record of Ida Vasseau submitted by the Soviet Prosecution: The atrocities against the Jewish and the Soviet population of Lvov were perpetrated not only by adult Germans and old Nazis, but also by the German youth of the Fascist youth organization in Lvov. These youngsters, dressed in uniforms, armed with heavy sticks, hunting knives, and often with pistols, ran about the streets, broke into Jewish apartments and destroyed everything in them. They killed all the inhabitants of these apartments, including the children. Very often they stopped children who looked suspicious to them in the streets, shouted: "Stop, you damned Jew!" and shot them on the spot. This Hitlerite youth was often active in locating Jewish apartments, hunting Jews in hiding, setting traps, and assaulting innocent people on the streets, killing them if they were Jews and dragging others away to the Gestapo. Often their victims were Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, and people of other nationalities. This terror of adult and young Germans continued until the last day of the German occupation of Lvov. The intention of completely annihilating the Jews was especially apparent in the "Ghetto actions" in which Jewish children of various ages were systematically killed. They were put into houses specially set up for Jewish children and when sufficient children had been assembled, the Gestapo accompanied by the Hitler Youth broke in and killed them

From Schirach's IMT testimony: I do not believe a word of what is contained in this document. [Note: Much to the annoyance of the Soviet team, the Tribunal will ultimately rule the interrogation record of Ida Vasseau inadmissible.]

From the IMT testimony of Unterbannfuehrer Gustav Dietrich Hoepken: Himmler and Schirach were motoring through East Prussia from Himmler's quarters to his special train. In the car Himmler asked Schirach: "Tell me, Schirach, how many Jews are still in Vienna?" Schirach answered, "I cannot say exactly. I estimate 40,000 to 50,000." And Himmler said: "I must evacuate these Jews as quickly as possible from Vienna." And Schirach said: "The Jews do not give me any trouble, especially as they are now wearing the yellow star." Then Himmler said: "The Fuehrer is already angry that Vienna, in this matter as in many others, is made an exception, and I will have to instruct my SS agencies to carry this out as speedily as possible." That is what I remember of this conversation.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: During the last 2 days I looked at these monthly reports most carefully. The bottom right-hand corner of the cover of these monthly reports--and I want to make this categorically clear-bears initials something like "Dr. FSCH.," that is Dr. Fischer's initials. At the top the reports are not initialed by me, but by the Government President, with the notation that they should be put into the files. But I must point out that if they had been submitted to me, then there would have been on them the notation, "submitted to the Reichsleiter," and the official submitting them would have initialed this notation. If I myself had seen them, then my own initials would be on them with the letters "K.g.," noted.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: In the way of documentary material that decree contains no more than that the Gauleiter could make suggestions and submit requests to the competent of flees for the allocation of labor. But they were held responsible--I do not know whether by this decree or another one--for the supervision of the feeding and quartering, et cetera, of foreign workers. This feeding and quartering, et cetera, of foreign workers was--in my Gau and I believe also in all other Gau of the Reich--mainly in the hands of the German Labor Front. The Gauobmann of the German Labor Front in Vienna reported to me very frequently about the conditions among German workers and foreign workers in the Gaul He often accompanied me on inspection tours of industries; and from my own observations I can describe my impressions here of the life of foreign workers in Vienna as far as I could watch it.

I well remember, for instance, my visit to a large soap factory where I saw barracks in which Russian and French women were living. They had better quarters there than many Viennese families which lived six or eight people in lithe usual one-room apartments with kitchen. I remember another inspection where I saw a billet of Russian workers. It was clean and neat, and among the Russian women who were there I noticed that they were gay, well nourished, and apparently satisfied. I know about the treatment of Russian domestic workers from the circle of my acquaintances and from the acquaintances of many assistants; and here, also, I have heard, and in part observed myself, that they were extremely well treated.

Let me say something in general about Vienna as a place for foreign workers. For centuries foreign workers have worked in Vienna. To bring foreign workers from the southeast to Vienna is no problem at all. One likes to go to Vienna, just as one likes to go to Paris. I have seen very many Frenchmen and French women working in Vienna, and at times I spoke with them. I also talked to French foremen in the factories. They lived as tenants somewhere in the city, just like any other private person. One saw them in the Prater. They spent their free time just as our own native workers did.

During the time I was in Vienna, I built more factory kitchens than there are in any other Gau in Germany. The foreign workers frequented these kitchens just as much as the native workers. About treatment at the hands of the population, I can only say that the population of a city that has been accustomed for centuries to work together with foreign elements, will spontaneously treat any worker well who comes from the outside. Really bad conditions were never reported to me. From time to time it was reported that something was not going well here or there. It was the duty of the Gauobmann of the Labor Front to report that to me. Then I immediately issued a directive from my desk by telephone to the regional food office or the quota office for the supply of material, for kitchens or heating installations, or whatever it vitas. At any rate, I tried within 24 or 48 hours to take care of all complaints that came to me.

While we are on the subject I would like to give my impression of the use of manpower in general. I am not responsible for the importation of labor. I can only say that what I saw in the way of directives and orders from the Plenipotentiary General, namely the Codefendant Sauckel, always followed the line of humane, decent, just, and clean treatment of the workers who were entrusted to us. Sauckel literally flooded his offices with such directives. I considered it my duty to state that in my testimony . . . .

A large portion [of the foreign workers] was employed in agriculture, some in the supply industry. Whether there were some directly in the armament industry I could not say. The armament industry was not accessible to me in all its ramifications, even in my functions as Gauleiter, because there were war production processes which were kept secret even from the Reichsstatthalter.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: First of all, then, I want to explain why I addressed Bormann with "Du," in the friendly form. Bormann and I come from the same town; I knew him from Weimar, but only slightly. And when in 1928 or '29 he came to Munich, he paid me a visit, and because he was the elder of us he suggested to me that we should call one another "Du." We maintained that form until 1943, when on his own initiative he dropped it and addressed me in his letters only with "Sie."

Now, the text of this teletype message: We were in the third year of the war; the Czech population both in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and in Henna had remained perfectly quiet; in the Protectorate conditions were almost like those in peacetime. I had a very large Czech population in Vienna, and as a result of the attempt on Heydrich's life I feared that in the Protectorate there might be unrest which would no doubt have serious repercussions in Vienna. This was the time when German troops were advancing on the peninsula of Kerch; it was a time when we could not afford to have anything happen behind our front. And simultaneously with the news of the murder of the Protector I received official notification that the attempt, as is mentioned in this document, had been carried out by British agents and with British weapons.

During the same month we heard, and it was also mentioned in the Wehrmacht communiqués, that British bombers had bombed residential areas in Hamburg and Paris and had attacked German cultural sites at Kiel. And so I suggested a reprisal measure to establish before the world British guilt in this attempt and to prevent serious unrest in Czechoslovakia. That is all I have to say. This teletype message is genuine.

May I at this point also comment on a difficulty of translation which occurred during the last cross-examination on Friday? The German word "Rester" was at that time translated into the English "savior." It is an expression which I used in my book when I described the Fuehrer as a "Rester," and the difficulty lies in the translation of that word into English: it can only be translated into English as 'savior.'' But retranslated into German, "savior" means "Hedland." In order to make quite clear what the German "Rester" is meant to express in English, I should have to use an explanatory phrase. If I say that the exact translation is "rescuer," then the real meaning of the word "Rester" is clearly set forth; and there is nothing blasphemous in the comparison or the description of the head of the State as a "rescuer." But if I had written in German that the head of the State was a "Hedland," then, of course, that would be blasphemy . . . .

I had no definite plan in mind. I thought that one ought to choose an objective corresponding to the sites hit by British bombers in Germany. I was thinking of the cultural buildings in Germany which had been attacked, and I wanted to suggest this as an opportunity to make clear unmistakably that the murder of Heydrich had not been committed by the Czech population but by the Czech emigrants in London with British support. This retaliation in the third year of the war was to be a reply both to the attempt against Heydrich and to the attacks on German cultural monuments. The Wehrmacht communiqué’s had already announced them, and they were generally known. It was not at all necessary for me to point to the bombing of German cultural sites. It was a fact known to the entire German population from the daily attacks of British bombers.

I considered Heydrich in this particular case as the representative of the Reich in Bohemia and Moravia and not as the Chief of the Gestapo. I knew that he was the Chief of the Gestapo. I did not know that he had committed the atrocities that have meanwhile become known. That [the terror of the Gestapo] is an expression which enemy propaganda used against him. I merely want to state here that for me the Reich Protector Heydrich was during this third year of the war a person other than the Chief of the Gestapo. This was a political matter . . . .

This is a suggestion [evacuating all the Czechs out of Vienna] which did not originate with me personally, but which goes back to a remark about Henna which the Fuehrer himself had made in 1940 while I was reporting to him at his headquarters. I think I already mentioned during my own testimony that he said, "Vienna must become a German city and the Jews and Czechs must gradually be evacuated from Vienna." I already said that during my own testimony here. I have no recollection of it, but it is possible that in the excitement of this event, which disquieted me greatly, I said something like that [evacuating all the Czechs out of Vienna].

From the IMT testimony of Hartmann Lauterbacher: I only knew Heydrich from meeting him a few times in the Reich Youth Leader's Office, and I had a good impression of him personally. I am forced to have a different opinion of him now; but only because I now know of his measures. He had intervened on his own initiative and through his own agencies in cases of homosexuality. Schirach forbade that and told him that these matters too were first of all subject to his own jurisdiction. I participated in one conference on the question of homosexuality in the Hitler Youth. That conference did not take place with von Schirach, but with one of the officials from the Reich Youth Leader's Office who, as Chief of the Hitler Youth Legal Administration, conducted the discussion with Heydrich.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: I have no exact recollection, but I consider that these records here are genuine, and they probably represent the sense of what I said at the time. I was very much perturbed by Heydrich's death. I was afraid of serious trouble in Bohemia and Moravia, and I expressed my fears. The essential thing is that after calm consideration of this plan I dropped it, and did nothing more about it. It is true that I put the idea of such an evacuation of the Czechs into words. It is equally true, and a historical fact, that I dropped the idea and that it was never carried out. It is correct that I suggested the bombing of a British cultural site as an answer to the attempt against Heydrich and to the innumerable bombardments of German cultural places in the third year of the war, at a time when vital interests of the German people were at stake.

From the Affidavit of Hans Marsalek: Baldur von Schirach visited the camp [Mauthausen] in the autumn of 1944. He, too, went to the detention building and also to the crematorium.

From the IMT testimony of Alois Hollriegel (Unterscharfuehrer at Mauthausen): I was until the winter of 1942 with a guard company, and I stood guard. From 1942 until the end of the war I was detailed to the inner service of the concentration camp. I remember Pohl, Glucks, Kaltenbrunner, Schirach, and the Gauleiter of Styria, Uiberreither [visiting the camp]. Von Schirach was accompanied by other gentlemen. There was a group of about 10 people, and among them I recognized von Schirach and Gauleiter Uiberreither. I naturally did not know why he came to the camp, but I remember that this group came with von Schirach and Schutzhaftlagerfuehrer (Protective Custody-Camp Leader) Bachmeyer. At any rate I could see that it looked like an inspection.

I cannot remember any specific preparations [made before the inspection] but I do remember it was in the evening. I can't tell you the exact time; it was the time of the evening roll call. The prisoners had assembled for roll call and all the hands on duty also had to fall in. Then this group came in . . . . I cannot remember noticing that any preparations had been made.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: As the witness Hollriegel has testified before this Tribunal, I visited Mauthausen Concentration Camp in 1942. The testimony given by another witness, Marsalek, to the effect that this visit took place in 1944, is incorrect. I also mentioned it when I was interned, in June 1945 and in the course of my preliminary interrogation in Nuremberg . . . . I therefore confirm Hollriegel testimony. There was a meeting at Linz at which various departments of the Ostmark participated. There were conferences on economic or agrarian problems, and in the late afternoon we went to Mauthausen Concentration Camp at the request of Gauleiter Eigruber. At the time I was rather surprised that the Gauleiter was even in a position to invite us there. I assumed that he had previously been in touch with the SS offices, and that the reason for Eigruber's invitation was that he wished to erect a rifle factory or something of the kind there. At any rate, though I can no longer remember exactly, it was somehow connected with the production of the Steyr Works . . . .

We were shown about by the camp commandant. His name—as has already been mentioned here—was Ziereis, or something of the kind . . . . SS Camp Commandant. And I should now like to give you my first impressions. The camp area was very large. I immediately asked how many internees there were. I believe I was told 15,000 or 20,000. At any rate, the figure varied between 15,000 and 20,000. I asked what kind of internees were imprisoned there and received the reply I was always given whenever I inquired about concentration camps--namely, that two-thirds of the inmates were dangerous criminals collected from the prisons and penitentiaries and brought to work in the camp; that the remaining third was allegedly composed of political prisoners and people guilty of high treason and betrayal of their country, who, it is a fact, are treated with exceptional severity in wartime . . . .

I witnessed one food distribution and gained the impression that, for camp conditions, the food ration was both normal and adequate. I then visited the large quarry, once famous and now notorious, where the construction stone for Vienna had been quarried for centuries. There was no work going on at the quarry since the working day had come to an end, but I did, however, visit the works where the stone was cut. I saw a building with an exceptionally well-equipped dental clinic. This clinic was shown to me because I had questioned Ziereis about the medical assistance afforded in the camp. I would add that, during this visit, I asked in general the same questions which I had been used to ask during all my visits to the camps of the youth organizations--that is, questions pertaining to food, medical aid, the number of people in the camp, et cetera.

I was then taken to a large room in which music was being played by the prisoners. They had gathered together quite a large symphony orchestra, and I was told that on holiday evenings they could amuse themselves, each man according to his own tastes. In this case, for instance, the prisoners who wished to make music assembled in that room. A tenor was singing on that occasion-I remember that particularly.

I then inquired about the mortality rate and was shown a room with three corpses in it. I cannot tell you here and now, under oath, whether I saw any crematorium or not. Marsalek has testified to that effect. I would not, however, have been surprised if there had been a crematorium or a cemetery in so large a place, so far removed from the city. That would be a matter of course. I would of course have endeavored to do something about it. But I was under the impression that everything was in order. I looked at the inmates, for instance, and I remember seeing, among others, the famous middle-distance runner Peltzer, who was known as a sexual pervert. He had been punished because he had, on innumerable occasions, freely committed sexual offenses against youths in his charge in a country school.

I asked Ziereis, "How does one ever get out of these concentration camps? Do you also release people continuously?" In reply he had four or five inmates brought to me who, according to him, were to be released the very next day. He asked them in my presence, "Have you packed everything, and have you prepared everything for your release?"—to which, beaming with joy, they answered, "Yes." . . . .

I cannot remember [whether on this occasion I also asked Camp Commander Ziereis whether political prisoners from my Vienna district—that is, from the city of Henna—were interned in the camp], but you may take it for granted that, on an occasion of this kind, I would certainly ask after prisoners from my own Gau. But I cannot remember. Herr Marsalek mentioned it in his testimony, and I consider it probable. I should, in connection with this visit, like to add the following: I have always been rather hampered in my recollections of Mauthausen . . . . After May 1945 I heard innumerable radio reports on Mauthausen and other concentration camps, and I read everything I could lay my hands on in the way of written reports about Mauthausen—everything that appeared in the press—and I always pondered on the question, "Did you see anything there which might have pointed to a mass destruction of human beings?" I was, for instance, reading the other day about running belts for the conveyance of corpses. I did not see them.

I must add that I also visited Dachau; I must not forget that. In 1935, together with the entire Party leadership group, I paid a visit to Dachau from Munich. This visit was a result of the objections against existing preventive custody measures expressed by certain political leaders to the Deputy of the Fuehrer Hess who, in turn, passed these objections on to Himmler who subsequently sent out an invitation to inspect Dachau. I believe that there were, at that time, 800 or 1,000 internees at Dachau.

I did not participate in the entire official visit for I was conversing with some of the Gauleiter who were being shown about the camp. I saw quite excellent living quarters at Dachau and, because the subject interested me particularly, I was shown the building which housed the camp library. I saw that there were also good medical facilities. Then—and I believe this fact is worthy of mention—after the visit I spoke with many Gauleiter and Reichsleiter about the impression they had formed of Dachau. All impressions gained were to the effect that all doubts as to Himmler's preventive custody measures were definitely dispersed, and everybody said that the internees in the camp were, on the whole, better accommodated than they would have been in a state prison. Such was my impression of Dachau in 1935, and I must say that ever since that visit my mind was far more at ease regarding conditions in the concentration camps. In conclusion, I feel I must add the following:

Up to the moment of the final collapse I firmly believed that we had 20,000 people in the Mauthausen Camp, 10,000 at Oranienburg and Dachau—two more large camps whose existence was known to me and one of which I had visited—and possibly 10,000 more at Buchenwald, near Weimar, a camp I knew by name but which I had never visited. I therefore concluded that we had roughly 50,000 people in the German camps, of which I firmly believed that two-thirds were habitual criminals, convicts, and sexual perverts, and one-third consisted of political prisoners. And I had arrived at this conclusion primarily because I myself have never sent a single soul to the concentration camps and nourished the illusion that others had acted as I did. I could not even imagine, when I heard of it—immediately after the collapse—that hundreds of thousands of people in Germany were considered political offenders.

There is something else to be said on the whole question of the concentration camps. The poet Hans Carossa has deposed an affidavit for me, and this affidavit contains a passage about a publisher whom I had liberated from a concentration camp. I wish to mention this because it is one of many typical cases where one exerted one's entire influence to have a man freed from a concentration camp, but then he never tells you afterwards how he fared in the camp. In the course of the years, I have received many letters from people having relatives in the concentration camps. By establishing, in Vienna, a fixed day on which audience was granted to anybody from the population who wished to speak to me, I was able to talk to thousands of people from every class and standing.

On one such occasion I was approached by someone who requested me personally to free some friend or relative in a concentration camp. In cases like that I usually wrote a letter to the Reich Security Main Office—at first to Herr Heydrich and later to Herr Kaltenbrunner--and after some time I would be informed that the internee in question had or had not been released, according to the gravity of the charges brought against him. But the internees released never told me their experiences in the camp. One never saw anybody who had been ill-treated in the camps, and that is why I myself, and many others in Germany with me, was never able to visualize conditions in the concentration camps at all.

From the IMT testimony of Fritz Wieshofer: All I can say on that subject is that when I came back from the front--and this was either in the autumn of 1942 or in June 1943--the adjutant who was on duty at the time told me that he had accompanied Herr von Schirach to a concentration camp, Mauthausen Camp. Some time afterwards--it must have been when I came back from the front the second time, at the end of 1943--Herr von Schirach also told me that he had been to Mauthausen. I only recollect that he said that he had heard a symphony concert there.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: I did not make any inflammatory anti-Semitic speeches, since I attempted, both as Reich Youth Leader and youth educator, not to add fuel to the fire; for neither in my books nor in my speeches--with the exception of one speech in Vienna, to which I shall refer later on and which was not made at the time when I was Reich Youth Leader--have I made any inflammatory statements of an anti-Semitic nature. I will not make myself ridiculous by stating here that I was not an anti-Semite; I was--although I never addressed myself to the youth in that sense.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: First, I want to say that I did make that speech. The quotation is correct. I said that. I must stand by what I have said. Although the plan of the deportation of the Jews was Hitler's plan and I was not charged with its execution, I did utter those words, which I now sincerely regret; but I must say that I identified myself morally with that action only out of a feeling of misplaced loyalty to the Fuehrer. That I have done, and that cannot be undone. If I am to explain how I came to do this, I can only reply that at that time I was already "between the Devil and the deep sea." I believe it will also become clear from my later statements that from a certain moment on I had Hitler against me, the Party Chancellery against me, and very many members of the Party itself against me. Constantly I heard from officials of the Part, Chancellery who expressed that to the Gauleiter of Vienna, and from statements made in Hitler's entourage that one was under the impression--and that this could be clearly recognized from my attitude and my actions--that I was no longer expressing myself publicly in the usual anti-Semitic manner or in other ways, either; and I just have no excuse. But it may perhaps serve as an explanation, that I was trying to extricate myself from this painful situation by speaking in a manner which today I can no longer justify to myself.

From the IMT testimony of Unterbannfuehrer Gustav Dietrich Hoepken: I know from the press officer Gunther Kaufmann...that directly after this speech Von Schirach instructed Kaufmann that every point in the speech should be telephoned to the DEB (Deutsches Nachrichtenburo) in Berlin, with the remark that he had every reason to make a concession to Bormann on this point. I assume that Schirach knew that his position in Vienna was precarious, and that he constantly heard, especially from the Party Chancellery, that he must take a stricter course in Vienna.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: I had reported to Hitler and ... he had told me that the Viennese Jews would be sent to the Government General [Poland]. Before that, I had never thought of an emigration of the Jews from Austria and Germany for resettlement in the Government General. I had only thought of a Jewish emigration to countries where the Jews wanted to go. But Hitler's plan, as it then existed--and I believe that at that time the idea of exterminating the Jews had not yet entered his mind--this plan of resettlement sounded perfectly reasonable to me-reasonable at that time . . . .

I no longer remember exactly when, but in any case it was after the occupation of Hungary [that I suggested to Hitler that the Jews from Hungary and the Balkan States be allowed to emigrate to some neutral country, taking their goods and chattels with them]. Among the innumerable suggestions which I made to the Fuehrer and to the Minister for Foreign Affairs through Colin Ross, was one to the effect that the entire Jewish population of Hungary be transferred to the neutral countries. If the witness Steengracht has stated here that this idea had been discussed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that it had emanated from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then he probably spoke in good faith. The idea originated in discussions held between Colin Ross and myself, and Ross then put it down in the form of a memorandum. But--and this is specially important--it was reported verbally to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs who, in turn, informed Colin Ross, on the occasion of a further visit, that the Fuehrer had definitely turned the suggestion down . . . .

The only directive which I received in connection with the deportation of the Jewish population from Vienna was a question from Hitler asking about the number of Jews living in Vienna at the time. That number, which I had forgotten, was recalled to my memory by a document put to me by the Prosecution. According to that document I reported to Hitler that 60,000 Jews were then living in Vienna. That figure probably comes from the registration office. In former times about 190,000 Jews, all told, lived in Vienna. That, I believe, was the highest figure reached. When I came to Vienna there were still 60,000 Jews left. The deportation of the Jews was a measure immediately directed, on orders from Hitler, or by Himmler; and there existed in Vienna an office of the Reich Security Main Office, or local branch office under Himmler-Heydrich, which carried out these measures...The head of that office was--that I found out now; I did not know his name at the time--a certain [SS Sturmfuehrer] Brunner . . . .

It was entirely impossible for me to stop the deportation of the Jews or to have any influence thereupon. Once, as early as 1940, I told the chief of my Regional Food Supply Office that he should see to it that departing Jewish people be provided with sufficient food. Frequently, when Jews wrote to me requesting to be exempted from deportation, I charged my adjutant or some assistant to intervene with Brunner so that possibly an exception might be made for these persons. More I could not do. But I have to admit frankly, here and now, that I was of the opinion that this deportation was really in the interests of Jewry, for the reasons which I have already stated in connection with the events of 1938 . . . . I am, therefore, also not in a position to state when the deportation of the Jews was concluded and whether the entire 60,000 were dragged out of Vienna or if only a part of them was carried off.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: Because of the fact that the Reich Commissariat was subdivided, I had to meet from time to time with the Reichsstatthalter of other provinces in order to discuss the most important questions, especially concerning our food economy. However, I believe it was in 1943, Dr. Ley came to me in Vienna and brought me an official order from the Fuehrer, according to which it was considered illegal--that was the way he expressed it--for more than two Gauleiter to meet for a conference. At that time I looked at Dr. Ley speechless; and he said: "Yes, that does not concern you alone. There is still another Gauleiter who has called a conference of more than two, and that fact alone is already considered as virtual mutiny or conspiracy."