At dusk on the first day, Lee and Jackson met for the last time
on the Orange Plank Road just over a mile southeast of Chancellorsville.
Lee had been reconnoitering that afternoon on the right and found the
terrain unfavorable for an attack. This meant either the center or
left were the only options open. Stonewall investigated the center of
the Union line earlier and reported the entrenchments there to be
strong. The ease at which he had repulsed the attack led him to believe
Hooker was about to make a withdrawl. On the other hand, Lee was
convinced that the bluecoat's main effort was to be here.
Then J.E.B. Stuart rode up bringing news that Fitzhugh Lee had been
scouting out to the west and found Hooker's right flank "in the air."
Lee asked whether there were roads to cover an approach in that
direction. Stuart didn't know, but said he would find out. Jackson
now had his mind concentrated on the right flank of the Union Army. Lee
stated his plan for Stonewall to move and attack with Stuart protecting
the march. Jackson said he would be ready to march at 4 a.m. on May
2.
At that early hour the next day, he was waiting for his chaplin, who
was familiar with the area and a cartographer to return from mapping
the roads west of Cathrine Furnace. In the meantime, he met up with Lee
to discuss the plan of attack. Marse Robert asked him what forces he
intended to assault with. "My whole corps," Old Blue Light replied. He
would lead them due west to the furnace, then due south away from the
enemy, and turn onto the Brock Road which connected into the Orange Plank
Road and Turnpike. Only McLaw's and Anderson's divisions of 15,000 men
total would remain with Lee, while Jackson would march with over 30,000
around the Union right flank.
They set out four hours late at 8 a.m. Brigadier General Rodes led
the march with his division, followed by Colston's, then A.P. Hill's
bringing up the rear.
At 2 a.m. on the 2nd, Hooker detached Reynold's Corps from Fredericksburg
to support the rear envelopment. His addition would bring the Federal
forces around Chancellorsville to a grand total of 90,000 men to repulse
the anticipated Confederate attack. "Fighing" Joe was in excellent
spirits when he arrived at his headquarters at 9 a.m. to find a courier
from Brig. Gen. David Birney, commander of a division in Sickles' Corps,
saying that he had spotted a Confederate column moving south from
Cathrine's Furnace. It included infantry, artillery, wagons, and
ambulances. Hooker took this as a sign that Lee was retreating, most
likely to Gordonsville, where Stoneman was to strike and sever the rebel's
supply line. To be cautious, Hooker warned Howard to protect his western
flank. He then sent orders to Sedgwick telling him to attack the Confederates
outside Fredericksburg if he thought success was possible.
By this time, Sickles had been given permission to advance with two
divisions to investigate the suspected movements near Hazel Grove. He
sent word back that he had disrupted the column, capturing men and wagons,
but practically all of the Confederate column was passed that area by
then. At 4:30 p.m., Hooker ordered Sedgwick to throw his entire force
at the Fredericksburg entrenchments. Couriers and commanders alike began
showing up at the Chancellor House with warnings of an impending flank
attack.
Extending for more than a mile along the turnpike, Howard's men rested
west of Dowdall's Tavern. He also had received reports of an imminent
attack. "A large body of the enemy is massing in my front. For God's
sake make some disposition to receive them!" He ordered 2 regiments
and two guns to be placed at right angles to the road. Howard believed
the thick forest provided enough cover for those 900 men. Then suddendly,
shortly after 5 p.m., rabbits came bounding from the woods.
Stonewall's march had been delayed by the fact is started 4 hours later
than expected, but the men made good time along the solid roads. After
learning of an encounter witht the Federals near Cathrine's Furnace, he
detached two brigades from A.P. Hill's division to assist a regiment
of Georgians who were hard-pressed. His other 4 brigades went ahead
with the march. "Press forward. Press forward." Jackson was demanding.
At about 2 p.m. as Stonewall approached the Orange Plank Road, the
intended objective upon which he expected to turn the column northeast
for the attack that would strike the Orange Turnpike just west of
Dowdall's Tavern, he was met by Fitzhugh Lee. He asked Jackson to ride
with him to reconoiter the enemy's right flank. They rode past the plank
road intersection, then turned eastward through the trees and up to a
little hill. When he reached the summit, Jackson became excited. Two
cannon were visible with long lines of stacked arms in their rear. The
soldiers below were enjoying their break by laughing and playing games.
Jackson's blue eyes began to twinkle at the thought of battle. But the
attack up the plank road would strike at an angle, rather than end-on;
which would not suffice. Correction of this called for a two-mile
extension of the march in order to get beyond the farthest western reach
of Union entrenchments. This meant another delay of atleast another
hour. By now it was 2:30 in the afternoon. "Tell General Rodes to move
across the plank road, halt when he gets to the old turnpike, and I will
join him there," Stonewall told a courier.
When he came back down the hill, he ran into Colston's lead brigade
and ordered them to advance a short way up the plank road and take
position at a junction where the road from Germana Ford came in from the
northwest. With the rear and right flank protected, he moved onto other
business at hand.
He rode northward and soon ran into Rodes. He told the divisional
commander to move east on the turnpike for a mile, then form his
division along a low, north-south ridge. Four brigades were in line,
two on the left and two on the right extending about a mile in each
direction from the turnpike, less than 1,000 yards from Howard's Corps.
The fifth brigade took position behind the extreme right, Colston's
3 remaining brigades prolonged the 2nd line northward, 200 yards in the
rear of the 1st line. Jackson wanted a headlong assault and no pause
for anything.
If a first-line brigade ran into trouble, it was to call for help from
the brigade in it's immediate rear. It was 4:30 p.m. by the time Colston
had formed his division in line-of-battle behind Rodes, while Hill was
still marching along the road. Another 1/2 hour went by to get his 2
leading brigades in the rear of Colston's left, while the center two
were miles down the road after being stalled by Sickles near Cathrine's
Furnace. At 5:15 p.m., Jackson looked up from his watch and asked Rodes
if he was ready. "Yes sir," came the reply.
Crashing through the half-mile of brush, the long line of Confederates
broke suddenly into the clear and let out a rebel yell before they aimed
their rifles directly at the suprised Yankees. All along the 2-mile front
the attackers bore down on the startled Federals. The Union regiments
fled leaving behind their two guns, which were quickly turned against
them. The whole line began to crumble under the weight of the Confederate
onslaught. Within 20 minutes Howard's flank division went out of
existence and degenerated into a mob. The adjacent division soon
followed suit. Not even the sight of their corps commander could rally
the fleeing men. By now it was 6:30 p.m. and they were near Dowdall's
Tavern. Cannon sounds from the right led Stonewall to believe Lee was
applying pressure to assist the confusion among the Federals.
At 7 p.m., enemy guns began firing from Fariview Heights, but the salvos
flew wildly into the air just to discourage pusuit. Chancellorsville
was just a mile ahead and the attack was hatled due to sundown.