July 1999 Edition
Indo-Pak Relations, Border wars, Pakistan's military invasions of Kashmir
After the recent military coup in Pakistan, Pakistan's claim to championing Kashmiri "self-determination" appears more and more hollow. When it invaded Kargil, it's foreign minister had repeatedly claimed that it was merely supporting "freedom fighters". Yet, these "freedom fighters" were treated with fear and disdain by the people of Kargil. There were no Kargil natives cheering their intrusion. There were no Kargil volunteers ready to join hands with them. Popularly elected representatives of the Kargil people identified with India - and saw the Indian army as their army, defending their homes and villages at great cost and hardship.
Does Pakistan's goal of "liberating" Kashmir from India have any popular basis? Would the people of Kashmir be better off in Pakistan? What does it mean when millions of Kashmiris ignore calls of election boycotts, brave the bullets of terror and vote in Indian parliamentary elections?
This comprehensive analysis explores the historic and contemporary dynamics of Kashmir's unity with India and Pakistan's failed attempts to capture Kashmir by force
Pakistan's Kargil Adventure
The recent intrusion of Pakistani troops and Pakistani supplied mercenaries in India's Kargil region is one more bid in a long series of failed attempts (since 1947) to gain possession of the territory of Kashmir. Pakistan's claim to Kashmir rests on the argument that because it is a Muslim-majority state, it must therefore, be a part of Islamic Pakistan. Were India a Hindu, Sikh or Christian India, that argument might have had a reasonable basis. But India is a secular democratic republic, home to as many or more Muslims than the entire population of Islamic Pakistan, and home to more religious communities of the world than almost any other nation. As for the Muslims of Kashmir, they rejected the very ideology that forms the founding basis of Pakistan. In 1947, like the rest of India, the majority of Kashmir's Muslims overwhelmingly supported secular political forces like the National Conference, and cast their lot with secular India.
In 1947 when Pakistan made its first attempt to occupy Kashmir by force, the people of Kashmir responded by rallying behind their leader, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, and created a 10,000 strong militia to stall the invasion, and invited India to join them in pushing back the invading forces. By their actions in 1947, and on many occasions thereafter, Muslims of Jammu & Kashmir, whether they were Kashmiri-speaking Sunni Muslims from the Kashmir Valley, or Ladakhi-speaking Shia Muslims of Kargil region, or the Gujjar (pastoral) Muslims inhabiting the mountain tracts, they have all emphatically declared their future to be with a secular India and not with a theocratic Pakistan.
In recent years, the people of Kashmir have demonstrated their identification with India in very concrete ways. In the 1996 elections, in spite of several well-publicized boycotts and even many death threats - over 55% of Kashmir (state wide) participated in the general elections. Turnout in legislative assembly elections was even higher. In several districts, turnout crossed 65%. Most recently, in the wake of the Kargil invasion by these so-called "freedom fighters", the people of Kargil have overwhelmingly supported the efforts of the Indian army in ridding the region of armed inflitrators.
Given all this, one might wonder why the Pakistani state expends so much money and blood on a cause where it has no moral or legal standing; why, with only one-sixth the population of India, it spends about half as much on military expenditure as does India (with it's much larger land and coastline to defend); and why it constantly provokes its neighbor with bellicose posturing and hostile military acts? Lately, it has even taken to warning of a possible nuclear conflict with India, even though India has (on several occasions) renounced the use of a nuclear first strike. Although no closer to realizing it's ambition to annex Kashmir, the Pakistani establishment persists with it's policy of cross-border raids and firing at civillians and other acts of sabotage and terror. .
The reasons for this retrograde policy lie in the creation of Pakistan
itself; in the nature of the Muslim League that broke with the anti-colonial
unity of the people of the sub-continent, and led a narrow and sectarian
separatist movement calling for the creation of an Islamic Pakistan.
This demand was made during the final phase of India's freedom struggle
when independance was just round the corner, but the
forces for a united and secular India were languishing in British
jails and could not effectively counter this divisive demand.
The Muslim League was essentially the voice of reaction amongst India's
Muslims and represented the interests of the Muslim feudal aristocracy. The
Congress Party, which led the freedom struggle against British rule in India
included every religious denomination and almost every ethnic and linguistic
group in the sub-continent in a united struggle for freedom from foreign
rule. This diverse composition was reflected in the Congress Party's
vision of India as a secular and democratic state. As freedom neared, the
Muslim League presented the undemocratic demand of a legislature divided on
the basis of religion with a disproportionate number of seats reserved for
Muslims (seeing as they had been former rulers.) Naturally,
this demand was rejected by the Indian National Congress, and this rejection
was correctly seen by the Muslim League as a threat to the priviliges
of the Muslim feudal aristocracy, and it's continued existence as a viable
political force.
Over three decades and more, the Muslim League had made little headway
in rallying India's Muslim masses behind it. However, with clandestine
encouragement and crucial tactical support from the British colonial authorities,
it eventually succeeded in achieving it's goals. A safe haven for the Muslim
feudal classes was created in the Islamic state of Pakistan. Idealogical
cover for the partition of the Indian sub-continent was sought through
the two-nation theory which argued that Muslims and Hindus of India were two
separate nations with irreconcilable differences. This was to be the justification
for the creation of Pakistan.
They did not seem to notice that the Congress had had a Muslim President
in Maulana Azad and that the Congress routinely won seats that were reserved
for Muslim candidates, (hardly indicative of irreconcilable differences
between Hindus and Muslims!). Furthermore, it didn't bother the crusaders
of Pakistan one bit that one-third of all the Muslims of the sub-continent
were to remain (as a minority) in a nation that would then be dominated by
Hindus ( a people with whom Muslims supposedly had "irreconcilable differences").
That India were to go on and elect Muslims as Presidents twice further discredited the theory. But it's biggest failure occured in 1971 when religion failed to be a glue to hold the eastern and western wings of Pakistan together. When Pakistan's military rulers responded to the democratic demands of the Bengali speaking people of the eastern region with a pogram in which three million people were butchered, the eastern part rebelled and broke away to become Bangladesh. Even as secular India survived several centrifugal currents, the champions of the two-nation theory fell out in less than 25 years. The two-nation theory collapsed completely.
Yet, it is still used as cover for Pakistan's land grabs in Kashmir. That British and US analysts continue to give legitimacy to Pakistani propoganda regarding Kashmir simply shows that the old colonial mentality of divide-and-conquer still prevails. The ruling classes of Pakistan ?the combine of feudal landlords and military generals - little changed since Pakistan's creation in 1947, are more than willing collaborators in this dangerous game. Having failed to respond positively to the democratic aspirations of the Pakistani people, they have had to suppress their growing discontent by taking harsh measures, and enforcing martial law. The people have been subject to long periods of military dictatorship; democratic governments have been routinely dismissed by unelected officials in the recent past, and more recently, the courts have upheld the most inhumane interpretations of "Islamic" medieval laws. Most importantly, the feudal-military ruling combine has found it necessary to create the perpetual myth of a vile and dangerous external enemy i.e. India - so as to provide a much needed distraction from the burning issues of poverty and under-development that confront the masses.
Hostility to India has thus become Pakistan's raison d etre and an "Islamic" jehad against India in Kashmir, a "holy" mission. Hostility towards India has thus remained at the core of Pakistan's foreign policy, a policy that has been implemented with varying levels of aggressiveness ?nbsp; military or diplomatic ?throughout the last five decades. In 1990, emboldened by it's victory in Afghanistan, Pakistan once again directed its hostile energies eastward, at Punjab and Kashmir in India, confident that its years of experience in Afghanistan would bring India down on its knees. Arming and training mercenary terrorists, planning their infiltration into India, aiding and abetting proxy wars in India's border states, fomenting an Islamic fundamentalist insurgency in Kashmir, and coordinating and organizing terrorist attacks in India has led to the death of tens of thousands of Indian citizens in the last decade. Despite these serious provocations, India's response has been measured and patient. Its efforts to counter Pakistan's hostile activities by purely defensive measures has prevented an open confrontation with Pakistan, and yet effectively defeated Pakistan's proxy war. But Pakistan has not given up.
Pakistan's new adventure in Kargil is a continuation of this old policy. The immediate goal of this quiet invasion, (which caught India napping), was to cut off Ladakh from the rest of India, and open up one more avenue for infiltration of Islamist terrorists into the Kashmir valley. If, and when India reacted, Pakistan would try and force international attention on Kashmir, thus restraining India from even taking effective defensive measures, let alone retaliating. In either case, Pakistan expected to emerge the winner.
To the extent that India has been unable to retaliate beyond the line of control, Pakistan's gambit has paid off. Unfortunately for Pakistan, the timing of the Kargil adventure has not been entirely auspicious as far as the Western imperial powers are concerned. That the U.S. has asked Pakistan to pull the intruders back seems like an unanticipated setback for Pakistan. It does not, however, mean that the U.S. has turned pro-India or that the U.S. genuinely wants the Kashmir issue to be amicably settled between India and Pakistan. The U.S. has its own interest in keeping the hostilities between India and Pakistan simmering. It gives the U.S. leverage over both the countries, and a future option to police this part of the world with a possible occupation and a base in an 'independent' Kashmir, a la Kosovo. Surely, U.S. spy satellites must have noticed the military activity in the Kargil area as early as January or February when the Pakistani encroachment began. But the U.S. did not alert India and it is unlikely that it warned Pakistan to desist from initiating hostilities. It satisfied world public opinion by giving Pakistan a slap on the wrist only after India discovered significant intrusion into its territory.
The recent statement by the German foreign minister, (as reported in the Hindustan Times), that the G-7 could not stand by forever while the fighting continued in Kargil is an ominous sign and lends credence to concerns about a future Western intervention in Kashmir. It has not helped that even as the NATO powers have ignored evidence of war-crimes on the part of the Pakistani military, they have put India under considerable pressure to keep negotiating with Pakistan when there is little scope for any constructive dialogue on the matter.
And while many foreign journalists and human rights advocates give credence to Pakistan's claims on Kashmir, few report that India's 100 million plus Muslims reject Pakistan's claims to it, and wish Kashmir's Muslims to remain with them in a secular India. Few care to note that the Indian military includes many Muslims, none of whom have ever defected to Pakistan during it's may invasions of India. Vigorous anti-Pakistan demonstrations held by India's Muslims all over India belie Pakistan's claims that it has a popular mandate to speak for the Muslims of the sub-continent, or has any moral right to call for Kashmir's secession from India.
Although the people of Pakistan have been led to believe that Pakistan's crusade for Kashmir is in the popular interest, the reality is quite different. Whereas the people of Kashmir enjoy democratic rights that the people of Pakistan don't, they are also better educated and less poor. 50 years after independence, literacy in Pakistan at 44% trails India's at 64% (as estimated by the National Literacy Mission this February). For several decades, India has led Pakistan in terms of lower infant mortality - an important indicator of social welfare. Even though Pakistan inherited some of the best irrigated parts of undivided India, Pakistan must now import wheat from the U.S - something India has not had to do for decades. And although a greater portion of Pakistan's population migrates to the gulf, and brings back consumer goods like TV sets and telephones, Pakistan now trails India in terms of color TV ownership, telephone access, and cable-TV connections. Neither has Pakistan invested in mass transit or national science and technology projects to the extent India has. If anything, Pakistan's attempts at destabilizing India have weakened the economies of both countries. Both nation's currencies have been weakened, with the Pakistani economy becoming even more dependant on bailouts from the IMF and World Bank. It is most ironic that even as the people of Pakistan endure a period of enforced austerity, the military finds the budget for it's misadventures across the border.
Unfortunately, as long as Pakistan's ruling feudal-military oligarchy can continue this bloodletting in Kashmir and elsewhere with impunity, they will do so as the best guarantee of their own existence. The people of Pakistan can change this state of affairs if they rise against their feudal-military ruling class, rein in Pakistan's army, tame the parallel state of ISI, and usher Pakistan into an era of a more democratic rule. They could insist that their governement work for peace and cooperation in the Indian subcontinent. If that happened, Kashmir could cease to be a problem dividing Pakistan and India, and the peoples of both countries could breathe easier, without the fear of war constantly hanging over them. Then, people of both nations could benefit from expanding trade and greater cooperation in science and technology. Divided families and friends could travel with ease. Both people could jointly rediscover their shared history and culture. But that rosy scenario could be decades away.
In the near term, it is more than likely that Pakistan will continue on it's present path. It is also likely that India may now respond with a substantial increase in its defense spending, just as Pakistan already did in this year's budget. Pakistan's adventurism could thus fuel an accelerated arms race in the region. That would certainly hurt India, but being six times the size of Pakistan, it could survive. It is Pakistan which might collapse and disintegrate. Financial bail-outs from the West and its agencies, such as the IMF's recent $3 billion loan, (or by Saudi Arabia) may prolong the life of Pakistan's feudal-military oligarchy but it may not prevent the ultimate disintegration of Pakistan if it's rulers continue on this suicidal course. Furthermore, continued provocation by Pakistan's rulers could exhaust the patience of India's policy-makers to the extent that they decide to retaliate against Pakistan with a tit-for-tat - (do unto others what they have done unto you) - and begin to foment ethnic conflict and insurgency in Sindh and Baluchistan. That too could herald the end of Pakistan. The two nation theory that has divided and weakened the entire sub-continent may then find a final resting place - dead and buried with the many victims of Pakistan's wars with India; those who survive may then discover the joys of being good neighbours and old friends.
Also see: Jammu & Kashmir: Self-Determination and Secession
The Struggle for Self-Determination and Democratic Rights in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)
And for a historical background on partition: The 2-Nation Theory and Partition
Also See this Book Review: A History of Pakistan and it's Origins
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