On 3 August 1704 Governor General Axel Julius de la Gardie wrote to the Castle Court (Burggericht) in Reval. In the letter he asked the court to immediately call Colonel Bernhard Johan Mellin, the postmaster Grubb and some others to testify in the presence of Anders Lifman, who was one of the top officials in the administration. According to de la Gardie he had ordered Lifman to send provisions to Narva, but the latter had failed to carry out the instruction. De la Gardie also claimed that one ship that was to carry supplies to Narva had been diverted and used by Lifman for private business.

When Mellin testified he said that he had understood that the Governor General was troubled by the lack of provisions in Narva, but he has not been present when de la Gardie ordered Lifman to take care of the matter. Next witness on the list was Major David Philip von Hertzog, but Lifman objected as there was jealousy between him and the Major. When asked to explain he stated that something had occured last winter, but neither Hertzog nor the court deemed the event important. 

In his testimony Major Hertzog  said that he had not been present when de la Gardie gave the order to Lifma. The only thing he knew was that there had been talk in the Governor General's Chancery about the urgent need to supply Narva. The only thing he knew about Lifman's actions was that the latter once had said "God knows when Horn gets enough supplies". 

Next witness was Johan Corylander, secretary to the Governor General. Corylander said that he had no recollection of any written order to Lifman. He did know that Major General Horn last summer had learned through spies that the enemy was planning an attack on Narva and had therefore asked for provisions. De la Gardie had called a meeting and read Horn's letter aloud and it had been established that Horn had already received supplies from other places. From Reval nothing could be sent as half of Estonia had been devastated by the enemy and not only Narva but also the garrisons at Dorpat and Reval as well as Schlippenbach's army needed provisions. When Horn through a new letter had repeated his request de la Gardie had, according to Corylander, exclaimed "What can I do. Here is nothing. You have heard what Ribbing and Lifman said during the meeting." Corylander had replied: "It would be a very serious matter if such an important fortress as Narva was forced to surrender. If Major General Horn did indeed ask for more than he needed it would would most certainly result in the King demanding an explanation, but if a loss of Narva could be blamed on lack of supplies it would also be a most serious thing". Corylander had asked De la Gardie to contemplate this. The Governor General had then recalled Ribbing and Lifman, who both had agreed that nothing could be found at Reval. 

When Horn then in the autumn had repeated his request with considerable urgency the Governor General had called for Ribbing and Lifman again. He had read Horn's letter aloud and Lifman had again said "Here is nothing". Coylander had again repeated his warning and de la Gardie had sat in silence for a while. He had then turned to Ribbing and asked for his opinion. Ribbing had said that Narva most certainly needs some provisions and de la Gardie had agreed with him. Lifman had remained silent. 

To be continued...

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 11:03 PM MEST

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Count Jacob Gustaf de la Gardie (1768-1842) is one of the most prominent collectors of books and manuscripts in Swedish history. After his death most of the manuscripts came to Lund University Library, where they still remain. From the time of the Great Northern War the most important parts originate from Fabian Wrede (1641-1712), Councillor of the Realm and expert in financial matters and from three members of the de la Gardie family - Axel Julius (1637-1710) and his two sons Adam Carl (1668-1721) and Magnus Julius (1674-1741). Axel Julius was, as I have mentioned in previous posts, for many years Governor General of Estonia as well as Councillor of the Realm. Adam Carl was during the first part of the war Colonel of the de la Gardie Infantry Regiment and later became County Governor in Kalmar. Magnus Julius served abroad until after Poltava and upon returning home was appointed Colonel of the recreated Dalecarlia Infantry Regiment. He was promoted to Major General in 1713 and to Lieutenant General in 1717. He is among other things notable as a strong believer in the musket, arguing against the reintroduction of the pike that took place after Charles XII had returned to Sweden in late 1715. In de la Gardie's opinion the musket was very superior as a defensive weapon, a view which probably appeared totally irrelevant to the very attack-minded King.

In the Adam Carl de la Gardie papers there are quite a few letters from officers in his regiment and also some financial records concerning the creation of the regiment. In the Axel Julius papers there is one document of particular interest. It deals with the failure to adequately supply Narva in 1703-04 despite the urgent appeals of Major General Horn and an attempt by Axel Julius de la Gardie to divert attention from himself when questions were being asked. More about this in my next entry.

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 3:59 PM MEST

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On 20 August 1700 (Swedish calendar) the Russian envoy Andrey Chilkov had his first audience with Charles XII in the latter's camp on Seeland. His mission was ostensibly to prepare the arrival of a Great Embassy and to take up the position as permanent resident in Stockholm. In reality the Czar had long ago agreed to attack Sweden as soon as he had finished the war with the Ottoman Empire, so Khilkov's mission was most likely just another part of a very deliberate scheme to fool the Swedes. On 30 August Khilkov had his farewell meeting with the King in Kristianstad. It is described in some detail by Olof Stiernhöök, one of the Drabants. Khilkov came in a carriage drawn by six horses and was dressed in the Hungarian fashion. Upon arrival Khilkov took out a small piece of paper and started to read in Russian. When he had finished his interpreter stepped forward and read the same in Swedish. The message was just a note of thanks for how well he had been treated during his stay in Sweden, something he promised to report to the Czar. After that Samuel Göthe read the Swedish reply (in Swedish) and the interpreter did the same in Russian. Göthe then said (again in Swedish) that Charles XII had read the Czar's letter and asked Khilkov to present the reply to Peter along with friendly greetings. After that Charles took the Swedish letter from his advisor Count Polus and handed it to Khilkov. Göthe told the envoy that the King had decided to give him a royal dinner the same night, but as it was Friday Khilkov would eat only fish. Khilkov soon continued his journey and arrived in Stockholm on 19 September.

Two days later the news of the Russian attack reached Stockholm. On the 25th Khilkov had a meeting with Chancery president Oxenstierna and expressed surprise at the news. In his opinion, Khilkov said, it could hardly be anything else than an auxiliary corps commanded by Saxon officers. Khilkov said that he was greatly impressed by the Swedish army and navy and suggested that he should be given permission to send a courirer to the Czar with a warning. On the 24th and the 25th the Council of the Realm held meetings to discuss what to do with Khilkov and other Russians. On the 26th the Chancery wrote to the King, asking for his orders. Khilkov was at the same time asked to stay in his house. Before Charles had received the letters from Stockholm the news from Ingria had reached him and on 30 September he ordered the Council to arrest Khilkov and all other Russians, a letter which arrived in Stockholm on 10 October. 

Sources: 

Riksregistraturet

Almquist, H., Ryska fångar i Sverige och svenska i Ryssland 1700-1709. I. Ryssarna i Sverige // Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok. - 1942. - P. 38-191

Stiernhöök, O., Journal på det som passerade wedh Hans Kongl. Maijt:s drabanter... // Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok. - 1912. - P. 325-408.

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 1:09 PM MEST

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On 1 March 1709 Georg Lybecker, County Governor at Vyborg and commander of the Finnish army wrote to his colleague G. W. von Budberg, acting Deputy Governor of Riga (roughly translated):

"A Russian soldier, a native of Astrakhan, arrived yesterday. He claims that it was caused by the daily bother he has had to endure as a result of his countrymen having rebelled and his brother's desertion when the Russians were here under the fortress (in 1706 - my note). The most important he has to say is that these rebels have captured two fortresses and are now roaming the countryside, killing anyone who dares oppose them. The Khan who was placed in charge of them has mysteriously disappeared from Moscow and no one knows where he is. From travellers he has heard that our gracious King last autumn came as close as 200 versts from Moscow, where he was met by the entire Russian force. The enemy was defeated and dispersed och our gracious King then retreated. After that he hasn't noticed anything, except that everyone hopes that peace will come this winter. In Petersburg no flags or other signs of celebration had been seen, neither on the fleet or in the churches. No Prasnik had been celebrated. At about the same time eight regiments had left Ingria for Moscow. At present the northern provinces are being emptied of all suitable men, so that only one man is left at each farm. The hangman is following, taking care of everyone who dares to resist or isn't coming fast enough. However, there is such a shortage of men that not many can be found. As for the rest he says much the same as I did in my last letter, except that the Czar is expected at Petersburg and the houses and everything else has been prepared for his arrival. It is likely that he has now arrived. "

Source: 

Uppsala  University Library, Dorpat-Riga collection, box 3

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 8:53 PM MEST

Updated: Sunday, 14 July 2013 9:00 PM MEST

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In the Uppsala University Library is preserved a most peculiar collection called Dorpat-Riga-samlingen. It consists of three medium sized boxes, filled with largely uncatalogued and only partially sorted documents which at least to some extent were discovered in the early 1940's by library staff in a local junk-dealer's shop. Apparently they had once been acquired in Berlin by a Swedish collector, but that is as far as they can be traced. However, as many of them bear the small blue stamp of the Russian archival commission which around 1900 were trying to organize the old Swedish archive in Riga it's obvious that they must have been removed after that. There is no distinctive logic to the material, so it's entirely possible that the whoever took them was mostly after autographs and seals. The oldest documents are from around 1600, but a large proportion of them dates from the first decade of the Great Northern War.

In the collection there are many letters from local commanders during the GNW, for example more than a dozen written by Georg Lybecker. Some of these are from the time of his ill-fated expedition into Ingria in 1708 and does not only shed light on his decisions but also on what sort of information he was able to acquire. There are also quite a few letters from various officers in Livonia and Courland, not least from early 1708, as well as from diplomatic representatives abroad. In the next few weeks I will present some of the material in more detail.

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 9:20 PM MEST

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After the Saxon attack on Riga in February 1700 Swedish officials and diplomats had wondered about the position of Russia. Would the Czar join Augustus or remain neutral? The reports from the Swedish representatives in Moscow, Pskov and Novgorod were inconclusive. They often reported such matters that could be considered as preparations for war, but on the other hand the Czar and his officials made every effort to appear friendly towards Sweden - including sending the envoy Chilkov who had his first meeting with Charles XII just as the war was declared in Moscow. It was also believed that a peace or an armistice with the Ottomans was far off, something that seemed to be confirmed by news from Constantinople which the Swedes received through contacts with the Sapiehas in Lithuania.

Possibly the first person to present the Swedes with conclusive evidence of the Czar's plans was the French envoy Charles-François Caradas, Marquis du Héron (1667-1703). On 1 September 1700 he came to see General Otto Vellingk in the camp at Rujen (Latv. Rujiena). Du Héron showed Vellingk a translation of the Czar's letter to King Augustus, dated Moscow 9 August (printed as no 325 in the first volume of Pisma i bumagi). This message reached Stockholm on 15 September. On 11 September Vellingk reported more disturbing news in a letter which reached Charles XII in Karlshamn on the 19th. Lieutenant Thilou at Neuhausen (Est. Vastseliina) and Captain Ringenheim at Sagnitz (Sangaste) had informed Vellingk that the border was so heavily guarded that no real news got through, but Russians had told them that the Swedish representative in Pskov had been arrested. However, Vellingk hoped that this only meant that the Czar was prepared to assist Augustus in forcing Sweden to agree to a peace. It was first on the 19th that Vellingk got the news from Narva that Russian forces had crossed the border, a letter which by way of Stockholm reached Charles when he already had arrived at Pernau.

Source: Riksarkivet, Skrivelser till Konungen. Karl XII., vol. 30. Letters from Otto Vellingk, September 1700-1705

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 9:06 PM MEST

Updated: Sunday, 7 July 2013 11:08 PM MEST

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The background of the Russian General Rodion Baur (Родион Христианович Баур/Бауэр/Боур) seems most unclear. According to Russian Wikipedia he belonged to a wellknown Swedish noble family which had settled in Germany (perhaps the author means the "Bonde" family? Bonde is  Swedish for "peasant" - or in German "Bauer") He had entered a Swedish regiment of dragoons in Livonia and had at the time of the outbreak of the Great Northern War reached the rank of captain. During the siege of Narva, the article continues, he suddenly switched sides and deserted to the Russian army. The German Wikipedia article for some strange reason calls Baur "Christian Felix", claims that he at the beginning of the Great Northern War served in the Prussian army, then switched to the Swedish because he had fought a duel and finally went over to the Russians.

Some of these unclear points can be cleared up directly. There is no doubt that Baur had served in the Swedish army in Livonia. Carl Gustaf Skytte, the commander of the Dorpat garrison, in his journal describes how Baur on 29 June 1704, after having seen Cavalry Captain Holden during a skirmish outside town, sent word to Dorpat asking to be allowed to talk to Holden. When Holden came out Baur showed him great courtesy because he had once been a private in the company where Holden had been a Lieutenant.  To the journal there is also attached a copy of a letter from Bour to Skytte in which the former writes: "Bitte meinen gewesenen Lieutenant itzigen Rittmeister Hollde unbeschwert zu grüssen...". This places Baur firmly in Drottningens Livregemente till häst, a cavalry regiment stationed in Estonia and Livonia in which Erik Johan Holden was a Lieutenant between 1679 and 1695. There are not too many muster rolls preserved for this regiment (at least not in Sweden), but the one from 1690 puts Holden in Otto Zöge's company. Unfortunately the pages are very heavily damaged and some names missing entirely.

So how about Baur and the start of the Great Northern War? Well, on 20 August 1700 Otto Vellingk wrote to Charles XII from Rujen (Latvian Rūjiena) about recent developments. According to Vellingk an enemy cavalry captain by the name of Bauer had arrived a couple of days earlier (According to Leonhard Kagg's diary Baur came on the 13th). Baur had explained that he had fought a duel, killed his opponent and been forced to flee. Baur claimed that King Augustus was weakly guarded and seems to have suggested that a strong Swedish detachment from the Riga garrison would have every chance of capturing him and destroy the Saxon camp.  Vellingk had immediately informed Dahlbergh of this and also sent the King a detailed list of the Saxon army - based on Baur's testimony. The matter is very reminiscent of Johan Gummert's action at Narva a few weeks later, when he upon arrival suggested that a a few hundred Swedish soldiers led by Gummert could capture the Czar.

Apparently Vellingk sent Baur to Narva, because it was there that the latter engineered a most curious escape (in the manuscript Utföhrlig berättelse it's stated that Baur arrived in Narva a few days before the siege started) On 28 September 1700 some gentlemen from Narva and Baur had met in the house of the merchant Samuel Meux, where they ate a dish based on celery. During their conversation one of them said that celery grew just outside the town gates and it was decided to ride out the following day to pick some more. During this expedition Baur, who was on horseback, suddenly rode off at great speed towards the Russian camp. 

Sources:

Riksarkivet, Skrivelser till Konungen, Karl XII, vol. 29

Riksarkivet, M 1373 (Utförlig berättelse, huruledes- - -enkannerligen fästningarne Narwa och Ivangorod - - - belägrade blifvit av Zahren av Muscou)

Krigsarkivet, Rullor 1620-1723, vol. 1690:21

Kagg, L., Leonhard Kaggs dagbok 1698-1722. - Stockholm, 1912

Ramsay, J., Narvas rådsturätts protokoll för d. 1 okt. 1700 angående generalen R. F. Bauer // Historiallinen arkisto. XXVIII (1920).  Tieteelisiä ilmoituksia. - P. 12-14.

Skytte, C. G., Öfversten och kommendanten Carl Gustaf Skyttes berättelse om Dorpats belägring 1704 // Karolinska krigares dagböcker jämte andra samtida skrifter.Vol. XI. - Lund, 1916. - P. 219-326

Christian Felix Bauer. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Felix_Bauer (2013-06-29)

Баур, Родион Христианович. http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%91%D0%B0%D1%83%D1%80,_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD_%D0%A5%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87 (2013-06-29)

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 3:41 PM MEST

Updated: Saturday, 29 June 2013 5:26 PM MEST

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The historian Birger Fahlborg (1880-1978) between 1932 and 1961 published a series of books concerning Swedish foreign policy 1660-1672. One of the aspects he covers in great detail is the "Eastern Question", i.e. how the provinces Ingria, Estonia and Livonia should be protected politically. The frequent Polish-Russian wars suggested that it could be fruitful to establish an alliance with one of these countries. As the Oliva treaty of 1660 removed key issues of conflict between Poland and Sweden it seemed logical to attempt to create a closer relationship between the two countries for the common defense against Russia. Fahlborg writes (roughly translated): "That the friendship with Poland, if and when it could be gained, had to be a major asset for Sweden was after the Oliva treaty not disputed by any of the Swedish statesmen". As the Republic seemed to have been weakened the Swedish government believed they could negotiate from a very strong position. In May 1660 the Swedish diplomat Johan von Weidenhayn was given an instruction which detailed the plans: Swedish forces would attack from Livonia, Ingria och Finland, while Polish armies moved in from Lithuania and the Ukraine after having convinced Cossacks and Tartars to join them. For this assistance Widenhayn should (among other things) demand a part of Polish Livonia. In 1664 the issue came to the foreground again. A new envoy was sent to Poland and the leading Councillors of the Realm discussed the situation. The Chancellor Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie spoke of the importance of preserving Poland and the envoy was given an instruction which stated that Sweden wanted an alliance in order to "reduce the Russian appetite for the Baltic Sea".

Despite changing circumstances this view of Poland-Lithuania and Russia was never far away from Swedish thinking during the next fifty years. Bengt Oxenstierna's famous "political will" from 1702 belonged to the same tradition and so did the plans of Charles XII as they manifested themselves in the negotiations with Polish representatives in 1704-05 - in return for Courland and commercial concessions Sweden would assist Poland in reclaiming the territories lost to Russia in 1667/1686. By doing this the Commonwealth and Sweden would be bound so tightly together by a common interest that the Swedish dominance of northeastern Europe would remain "forever". Maybe, as the Chancery official Samuel Bark speculated in 1707, the Swedish Empire could even be extended as far as Arkhangelsk. 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 10:10 PM MEST

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On 30 May 1697 the Governor General of Livonia Erik Dahlbergh, in light of the recent death of Charles XI, sent a long report to Stockholm about the situation in Livonia. Here is a summary of what he had to say:

1. The Church: It had not yet been brought to perfection as there were too few churches and to few clergymen. This, together with the very bad roads, made it difficult for people to come to church and as a result superstition and idolatory was common among the peasants.

2. The Judiciary: It was generally satisfactory.

3. The Economy: It was handled by Strokirch (Latvian district) and Strömfelt (Estonian district) and they understood their tasks well.

4. The Chancery: Dahlbergh had built offices for the staff, so it worked quite well.

5. The Military: The situation was, considering the dangerous times, not satisfactory. In the large and important province of Livonia there were only six cavalry companies, in all 350 men. Their horses were poor and the equipment even worse. The pistols and the carbines were so bad that they coudn't be fired even twice. The "Adelsfana" in Livonia and on Ösel (Saaremaa) had not been mustered during the last 15 years, but numbered 207 men. New uniforms had been ordered and would soon be delivered, but the unit lacked guns and swords. In March Charles XI had ordered that it should be divided into four companies, but their were not yet a sufficient number of officers. It was obvious, Dahlbergh concluded, that such a weak cavalry force could not be of any use in case of an attack. A system similar to the one in place in Sweden was needed and Dahlbergh hoped to present such a proposal in the near future.

6. The infantry: The Riga garrison had been mustered on 1 May. At that time Dahlbergh's own regiment numbered 993 common soldiers,  Governor Soop's 901, Colonel von Campenhausen's 874, Colonel Funck's 164 - in all 2 932 men. This was sufficient in time of peace, but totally inadequate of war broke out as there were 6 large bastions, the citadel, the works around the castle and also the large town fortifications. 6- 8000 men would be needed for Riga to be fully defended and it was necessary to use "national troops" as only they could be fully trusted. The inhabitants of Riga could be expected to assist in the defense, but there was a substantial jealousy between them and the garrison. 

The Neumünde garrison was very weakened and it was necessary to bring in new recruits from Finland to Budberg's regiment. The garrisons and Pernau and Dorpat were also weak. Kokenhusen was manned by just 70 men and Kobron by 40.

7. The artillery: Dahlbergh enclosed a list of the needs.

8.  Provisions: The food situation in Livonia was difficult. Since the cavalry could be expected to have to abandon the countryside in case of war there was a need for larger magazines in the towns.

9. The Fortifications: Dahlbergh gave along and detailed description of the situation at Riga, what had been done and what was needed. Kobron was very weak and not even worty of a garrison, but because of the strategically important position it should be strengthened. Neumünde was unfinished, but it could be developed into a nice fortress. More work was also needed at Pernau. Dorpat was "bizarre", i.e. the position was unsuitable. However, as it was the only major fortification near the Russian border it seemed wise to continue with improvements. Kokenhusen was poor and should really be torn down, but there were no resources to build a new fortress. The fort at Ewst (Aiviekste) should be rebuilt and garrisoned. Dahlberg also wanted to tear down the many old, half ruined castles in the countryside as they could be used by an invader.

Finally Dahlbergh suggested remedies for the ongoing famine and pointed out the vulnerability of the postal communications if the German mail was cut off. Last winter the Finnish mail had failed to appear for three consecutive months.

Source: LVVA, Fond 7349, op. 1. vol. 69, Copy book of outgoing letters in Swedish.

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 8:29 PM MEST

Updated: Friday, 21 June 2013 9:12 PM MEST

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During the time of the Great Northern War communications were understandably slow, a factor which is important to bear in mind when it comes to judging responses to events. Here are some examples:

The attack on Riga 11 February 1700: the news reaches Stockholm around 6 March. The King, who was in Kungsör, issued his first orders on 7 March.

Letters from the commander of the relief army in Livonia Governor Vellingk: A letter dated 4 July 1700 reached the King at Humlebaek on the 31st. Such letters were often sent by more than one route - on 1 August Vellingk wrote that he had sent two couriers with his previous letter dated 25 July. One copy was carried by Lt. Colonel Hans Henrik von Liewen, who was to sail from Pernau and the other went from Reval through Stockholm with Captain von Essen. In a letter dated Rujen 11 September Vellingk could inform Charles that Essen had returned with the King's letter dated 13 August. This news reached Charles in Karlshamn on 19 September. On 19 September Vellingk had just been informed of the Russian invasion of Ingria.

The fall of Nöteborg on 13 October 1702: the news reached Vyborg on the 17th and Stockholm on the 30th. Charles XII, who was near Kraków, seems to have received the first reports in early December. 

Letters from the Swedish Governor in Pomerania (Stettin) to his colleague in Livonia (Riga): About 10-14 days. 

Letters from the Swedish representative in Danzig to the Governor General of Livonia: About 5 days.

Letters from the Swedish representative in Moscow to the Governor General of Livonia:  About 10 days-3 weeks.

Letters from the Swedish representative in Novgorod to the Governor General of Livonia: About 1 week.

News from London to reach Stockholm: About 3 weeks.

News from London to reach Göteborg: About 2 weeks.

Letters from Stockholm to the Governor General of Livonia: About 2 weeks when the mail could go directly by boat, otherwise close to a month.

Letters from Estonia/Livonia to reach Charles XII in Poland: Of course very much depending on his whereabouts. A letter written by W. A Schlippenbach on 6 April 1704 was answered by the King in Heilsberg (Lidzbark Warmiński) on the 22d, while a letter dated Reval 15 August reached him in Lemberg (Lviv) on 8 September.

News of the defeat at Poltava: Firm confirmation reached Riga through the arrival of Josias Cederhielm, who had been sent by the Czar with peace terms. Cederhielm reached Riga in the evening of 16 August 1709 (Swedish calendar). He arrived in Stockholm on 1 September. 

Posted by bengt_nilsson at 8:57 PM MEST

Updated: Wednesday, 19 June 2013 11:07 PM MEST

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