November 23, 1939: From notes of a Conference address by the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders were present:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: There was at that time a rather severe conflict between Hitler and the commanders-in-chief of the Army, and also a difference of opinion with the leading generals concerning the offensive in the West. The Fuehrer assembled all the leaders in order to give them his opinion about this whole matter. He stated—and I was present myself—that up to that time he had always been right in his decisions and that he would also be right in the opinion that the western offensive had to be undertaken in the fall if possible. Toward the end he used very harsh words; in the third from the last paragraph of the document he states: "I shall not be afraid of anything and I shall destroy everyone who is against me." That was directed against the generals. Actually the western offensive did not take place until the spring because the weather conditions delayed them.

...but now we were already in the middle of a war and he was looking at these things retrospectively. Also, he wanted to make it clear to the generals, with whom he had a conflict at that time, that he had always been right in his political conceptions. That is the reason why he quoted all these detailed points again. .... Here it says: "If the French Army marches into Belgium to attack us, then it will be too late for us. We must be first."

Hitler at that time stated that he had received definite news that Belgium would not respect her neutrality and that he also had news already that certain preparations for the reception of French and British troops et cetera had already been made. For that reason, he wanted to forestall an attack from Belgium against us. Apart from that, in his speech of 22 August 1939, he had made a statement entirely to the opposite effect. He had said that Belgium and Holland would not break their neutrality...I had no cause on my part to raise any objection against that statement of his at that moment. ....

Sharp attacks on the British blockade, in violation of international law-these attacks were made by M. Molotov. Here too, protests were made which were turned down. But I wanted to prevent protests and the entire document shows that our deliberations always aimed at taking measures in such a way that they could not be objected to, but were always legally justified. ....

These measures were to be taken in such a way that no objection was possible. If I tell the neutrals: "This is a dangerous area in every way," and nevertheless they go there because they want to make money or because they are being forced by the British, then I need not accept any protest. They are acting for egotistical reasons, and they must pay the bill if they die. .... They received large premiums for exposing themselves to that risk, and it was their business to decide about it.

November 24, 1939: From the War Diary of the German Naval Operations Staff:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: It says "If the existing rules of land warfare cannot be applied to them." It is generally known that international law had not yet been coordinated with submarine warfare, just as the use of aircraft at that time. It says:

"In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare"—that is, a new code of naval warfare on the basis of actual developments. Throughout the war a new code of naval warfare was developing, starting with the neutrals themselves. For instance, the Pan-American Security Conference defined a safety zone 300 miles around the American coast, thereby barring a tremendous sea area for overseas trade.

Likewise, the United States fixed a fighting zone around the British Isles which was not at all to our liking, and on 4 November 1939, the United States themselves maintained that it would be extremely dangerous for neutral ships to enter it, and they prohibited their own ships and their own citizens to enter this area. We followed that up by asking the neutrals that they too should proceed in the same way as the United States, and then they would not be harmed. Then only those neutrals sailed to Great Britain which had contraband on board and made a lot of money out of it, or which were forced by the British through their ports of control to enter that area and nevertheless submit themselves to those dangers. Of course, they were quite free to discontinue doing that. ....

We had the experience during the first World War that, as soon as the order for intensification had been given and communicated, as soon as the first neutral had raised a finger to object, these measures were immediately cancelled, particularly when the United States had a hand in it. And here I am saying that under all circumstances it must be avoided that we always withdraw our measures at once; and I give a warning to the effect that we should consider our measures as carefully as possible. That is the reason for the discussion with the Foreign Office and others, namely, to avoid the situation where later on they might be withdrawn, which would mean a considerable loss of prestige and the results would not be achieved. That is the reason. Numerous protests were received by Britain too, and in most cases they were unanswered.

December 11, 1939: Raeder meets with Quisling, the leader of Norway's Nazi Party.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: Up until 11 December I had neither connections with Herr Rosenberg—except for the fact that I had seen him on occasion—nor, above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about whom I had heard nothing up to that time.

On 11 December my Chief of Staff, Schulte-Monting, reported to me that Major Quisling, a former Norwegian Minister of War, had arrived from Oslo. He was asking for an interview with me through a Herr Hagelin, because he wished to tell me about Norwegian conditions. Herr Hagelin had been sent to my chief of staff by Herr Rosenberg. Rosenberg had already known Hagelin for some time as I have mentioned before. Since reports from such a source on Norwegian conditions seemed to be of great value to me, I declared myself ready to receive Herr Quisling.

He arrived on the same morning and reported to me at length about the conditions in Norway, with special reference to the relations of the Norwegian Government to England and the reports on the intention of England to land in Norway, and he characterized the whole situation as especially critical for, according to his reports, the danger seemed to be imminent. He tried to fix a date. He thought it should occur before 10 January, because then a favorable political situation would arise.

I told him that I was not really concerned with the political situation, but I would try to arrange to have him give his information to the Fuehrer. I would be concerned only with the military and strategic situation, and in that connection I could tell him right away that it would not be possible to take any measures from 11 December until 10 January, first because the time was too short and secondly because it was winter. I considered his expositions to be of such importance that I told him I would try to arrange for him to report to the Fuehrer personally, so that these reports would reach and influence him directly.

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: I took part in that meeting. .... Quisling came on a recommendation from Rosenberg and said he had important news of a military and political nature. He confirmed, more or less, the things which we knew already. Only these things were discussed; the conference was very short. As the things we suspected were confirmed from Norway, Raeder considered this so serious that he went immediately to Hitler. Hitler wanted to talk to Quisling himself. ....

Hitler directed that as a countermeasure theoretical preparations should be made for a German landing in Norway. The order, the final order, as far as I know was not given until March. Raeder and the gentlemen from the Naval Operations Staff and also the front commanders considered that undertaking very risky. I remember Churchill's speech in Parliament when he said, after he had been questioned about that matter, that he did not believe the German Navy would undertake that risk in face of the British Navy. ....

Raeder had told Hitler that he would have to reckon on the possible complete loss of the fleet, and that if the operations were carried out successfully he would have to be prepared for the loss of about 30 percent of the forces used. (Raeder) considered a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as much better than having to take this risk. ....

The desire for fame was not in Raeder's character. The plans for operations which came from his desk bore the mark of bold daring, but also of thorough planning. One does not work out plans to the...detail covering the distance from German ports up to Narvik, which is about that from Nuremberg to Madrid, and one does not use the Navy against a superior British fleet for the sake of fame. Raeder had told the Naval Operations Staff and the front commanders that he had to carry out that operation against all the rules of warfare because there was a compelling necessity to do so.

December 12, 1939: Raeder meets with Hitler; Conference Notes:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: Then on the 12th—that is on the next day—I went to Hitler and informed him of the conversation between Quisling and me, and I asked him to receive Quisling personally so that he might have a personal impression of Quisling. On this occasion I told him—and this is written down in one of the documents—that in cases of this kind one would have to be especially cautious, since one could not know to what degree such a party leader would try to further the interest of his party. Therefore our investigations would have to be especially careful. And I again called the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that an attempt to occupy Norway would bring with it greatest risks as well as certain disadvantages for the future situation. In other words, I carefully presented both sides of the picture in a neutral manner.

Hitler then decided to receive Quisling together with Hagelin on one of the following days. The two gentlemen then were obviously in touch with Rosenberg. I believe they stayed with him, and Rosenberg sent me, by letter, a record of a meeting which had apparently been drawn up by Quisling and Hagelin and also a description of Quisling's personality. In this letter, which is here as a document but which was not read by the Prosecution, it says specifically that Rosenberg knew what the political conditions were but that, of course, he would have to leave the military side entirely to me since I was the competent authority on that.

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: This entry in the document which you have just presented to me corroborates what I was trying to say, that is, that no party matters or matters depending on agreement along ideological lines were to be settled between Admiral Raeder and Quisling. For this reason I said that Raeder did not discuss politics with him, but merely factual matters. That Quisling, at the time of his introduction, should mention certain things as a sort of preamble is self-evident. But he points out the factor of caution and asks: "What does this man want? Does he want to work with the Party or does he really want to remain aloof? .... I believe that Raeder never saw the reports from the German Ambassador in Oslo. I at any rate do not know these reports.

December 14, 1939: Hitler meets with Quisling and Raeder.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I may say that on the basis of the conference which Quisling had with the Fuehrer in my presence on 14 December the Fuehrer ordered the OKW to deal with the matter and study it. The Fuehrer had two more conferences with Quisling on 16 and 18 December at which I was not present. The matter was then handled by the OKW according to the directives and an initial plan known as "North" was drafted. Document C-21, which I have mentioned before, shows that this Plan North was received by SKL on 13 January and then, in the course of January, the date 27 January was mentioned, the draft of a directive for the Plan North was made. That draft was made in the OKW in the usual way. Kapitaen zur See Krancke as expert for the Navy took part in it. The directive was completed on 1 March 1940, and was issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meantime, a large number of reports had been received, and it was possible to use these as a basis for the drafting of the directive.

These reports besides coming from Kapitaen Schreiber now also came direct from Quisling, who sent them to the Fuehrer. They mentioned the preparatory work carried out by the English and the French—special mention was made of the Navy Attache Kermarrec—in Norwegian ports for finding out the possibilities of landing, measurements of quays, and the height of the bridges between Narvik and the Swedish border and similar things. These reports which reached us showed clearly that within a reasonable time a landing was intended. Also political reports reached us which Hagelin received through his connections in Norwegian circles, reports which in part came directly from members of the Storting-and from members of the Government and their entourage.

All of these reports confirmed that the pretext of aid for Finland in the dispute between Finland and Russia played a certain role. The danger was discussed that England under pretext of aid for Finland would proceed to a bloodless occupation of Norway. The directive for the case Norway, therefore, was issued on 1 March. In the further course of the month of March more reports were received. In the meantime, the Altmark incident had occurred, and it was observed by Hagelin too that the behavior of the Norwegian commander was a pretense, and it was clear that in the case of any encroachment on the part of Great Britain, the Norwegian Government would protest only on paper.

Affidavit of Walter Georg Erich Giese: I can state the following about the preparations which led up to the action against Denmark and Norway: An appointment with the Commander-in-Chief was frequently made for a Mr. Hagelin and another gentleman; whose name I cannot recall at present, by a party official of Rosenberg's Foreign Political Office; as a rule they were received immediately. I also had received instructions that if a Mr. Hagelin should announce himself personally, I should always take him to the Commander-in-Chief at once.

Shortly afterwards I learned from the minute book and from conversations in my room that he was a Norwegian confidential agent. The gentleman from the Foreign Political Office who frequently accompanied him and whose name I do not remember at the moment also conversed with me and confided in me, so that I learned about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and about the preparations for the Norway campaign. According to all I heard I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler's heartiest approval. The whole enterprise was disguised by the pretense of an enterprise against Holland and England. One day Quisling, too, was announced at the Commander-in-Chief's by Hagelin and was received immediately. Korvettenkapitan Schreiber of the Naval Reserve, who was later naval attache in Oslo and knew the conditions in Norway very well, also played a role in all these negotiations. He collaborated with the Quisling party and its agents in Oslo.

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: It is not true that Mr. Hagelin was received by Admiral Raeder. Herr Giese cannot possibly have any information about that because he was stationed two rooms away. If he had perhaps noted down that he was received by me, that would in a certain sense be correct. The fact is that at the time, after the Quisling-Hagelin visit, I had said that if he were to pass through Berlin again and he had any naval political information in this connection, I should like him to make this information available to me. .... He did not meet him before Quisling's visit in December. Later he did not receive him any more. He was accompanied by Quisling, that is correct. But he did not have any special discussion with Raeder alone. The matters discussed were only naval political questions.

December 14, 1939: The USSR is expelled from the League of Nations. (Kennedy II, Gill)

December 15, 1939: Raeder proposes the sale of the plans and drawings for the 45,000 ton battleship Bismarck, then still under construction, to the Russians for 'a very high price.' (Shirer)

December 17, 1939: The Graf Spree is scuttled by her crew after being forced into port at Uruguay. Note: The Graf Spee, under the command of the able Captain Hans Langsdorff, had sunk nine cargo ships with a total tonnage of 50,089; not one enemy crewmen or passenger had been killed in the process.

December 18, 1939: Raeder is severely dressed-down by Hitler due to the scuttling of the Graf Spree. (Shirer)

December 30, 1939: From the minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Raeder:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: With the beginning of the offensive in the West, Hitler also wanted a certain more energetic pursuit of the war at sea. For that reason, he asked me to introduce only at this point the intensified measures which I considered already justified because of the attitude of the British forces. These intensification's were very carefully considered in that memorandum, and they followed step by step the different steps taken by Britain. .... I had nothing to do with this violation of neutrality for we were not there when they marched into these two countries. The only thing I was interested in was to intensify the submarine war step by step, so as to meet the measures introduced by the British, which also violated international law.

December 30, 1939: From an order generated by the OKW and signed by Jodl:


January 2, 1940: From conference notes:


January 13, 1940: An extract from the War Diary of the SKL:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I maintained this point of view when reporting to Hitler. In that report I first mentioned the intelligence reports which we had at hand. Then I described the dangers which might result to us from a British occupation of bases on the Norwegian coast and might affect our entire warfare, dangers which I considered tremendous. I had the feeling that such an occupation would gravely prejudice and imperil the whole conduct of our war.

If the British occupied bases in Norway, especially in the South of Norway, they would be able to dominate the entrance to the Baltic Sea from those points, and also flank our naval operations from the Helgoland Bight and from the Elbe, Jade and Weser. The second outlet which we had was also gravely imperiled, affecting the operations of battleships as well as the courses of our merchantmen. In addition to that, from their air bases in Norway, they might endanger our air operations, the operations of our pilots for reconnaissance in the North Sea or for attacks against England.

Furthermore, from Norway they could exert strong pressure on Sweden, and that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that the supplies of ore from Sweden would have been hindered or stopped by purely political pressure. Finally, the export of ore from Narvik to Germany could have been stopped entirely, and it is known how much Germany depended on supplies of ore from Sweden and Norway. They might even have gone so far¡ªand we learned about this subsequently that such plans were discussed as to attack and destroy the ore deposits at Lulea, or to seize them.

All of these dangers might become decisive factors in the outcome of the war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best thing for us would be to have strict neutrality on the part of Norway, I also called his attention to the dangers which would result to us from an occupation of the Norwegian coast and Norwegian bases, for there would have been lively naval operations near the Norwegian coast in which the British, even after our occupation of bases, would try to hamper our ore traffic from Narvik. A struggle might ensue which we, with our inadequate supply of surface vessels, would be unable to cope with in the long run.

Therefore, at that time I did not make any proposal that we should occupy Norway or that we should obtain bases in Norway. I only did my duty in telling the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht about this grave danger which was threatening us, and against which we might have to use emergency measures for our defense. I also pointed out to him that possible operations for the occupation of Norwegian bases might be very expensive for us. In the course of later discussions I told him that we might even lose our entire fleet. I would consider it a favorable case if we were to lose only one-third, something which actually did happen later on. There was, therefore, no reason for me to expect that I would gain prestige by such an enterprise. I have been accused of this ambition by the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite might easily result.

January 20, 1940: Churchill addresses the House:


March 1, 1940 Jodl's Diary:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I cannot explain that (Goering not being informed, above) at all. I had no authority to speak about it and I cannot say why he was not consulted...that shows how little, especially in the Fuehrer's entourage, one can speak of a conspiracy. The Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, also was not present during any of the Quisling conferences or receptions and I had no authority to speak to him about these matters.

March l, 1940: From the 'most secret' document 'The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,' 'Directive for Case Weseruebung':

From Raeder's IMT testimony: May I also mention a particularly important report which I remember now. Quisling reported in February that Lord Halifax had told the Norwegian Ambassador in London that an operation on the part of the British for the acquisition of bases in Norway was planned for the near future. That report also reached us at that time.

I should like to add, as I emphasized before, that being fully conscious of my responsibility I always tried to show the Fuehrer both sides of the picture and that the Fuehrer would have to be guided by my documentary proof when deciding, to take or refrain from taking that tremendous step. But that does not mean to say that because I pointed out to my Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces that particular danger, I in any way decline to accept responsibility. Of course, I am in some measure responsible for the whole thing. Moreover, I have been accused because in a letter submitted here under C-155 I had told my officers' corps that I was proud of the way in which this extraordinarily dangerous enterprise had been executed. I should like to confirm this, because I believe I was entitled to be proud that the Navy had carried out that operation with such limited means and in the face of the entire British fleet; I still stick to that. .... In the second half of March repeated attacks were made by British planes and naval forces against our merchant ships bringing the Swedish ore down from Narvik.

March 3, 1940 Jodl's Diary:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I have very clearly explained the origin of the Norwegian campaign in documents. There was the danger that the British might occupy Norway, and information of all sorts indicated that. Of course, if we were forced to occupy the Norwegian coast, then, apart from all the numerous disadvantages which I have explained, we had the advantage that we would gain this or that base for our Atlantic submarines. I most certainly thought that (the British wanted to occupy Norway). We had so much information about it that I could have no doubt whatever, and it was fully confirmed later on.

March 4, 1940: From an interview given by Admiral Raeder to a representative of the National Broadcasting Company:


March 5, 1940: From the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff:


March 5, 1940 Jodl's Diary:


March 5, 1940 Katyn Forest Massacre: People's Commissar for Internal Affairs and First Rank Commissar of State Security, Lavrentiy Beria, had earlier suggested that the 25,700 Polish 'nationalists and counterrevolutionaries' kept at camps and prisons in occupied western Ukraine and Belarus be executed. On this day, the Soviet Politburo approves and Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, Kliment Voroshilov and Anastas Mikoyan sign the order.

March 10, 1940 Jodl's Diary:


March 13, 1940 Jodl's Diary:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: The English translation as far as I can remember says "Looking for an excuse." But he needed neither justification nor excuse, because in the first paragraph of the directive of 1 March—that is to say, 2 weeks before that—he had stated what circumstances made it necessary to occupy Norway and Denmark with certain forces of the Wehrmacht. British encroachments in Scandinavia and the Baltic were to be prevented thereby, our ore deposits in Sweden safeguarded, and the bases against England for the Navy and the Air Force were to be expanded.

...the expression just used, "justification," is wrong, wrongly translated, Jodl wrote "Begruendung," "reason." But that is also wrong—please will you let me finish—even that is incorrect, because the Fuehrer had an abundance of reasons, which he laid down in the instruction issued on the 1st of March, and it was known to all of us. I have said that by the expression "Begruendung," "reason," he probably meant that he had not yet had a diplomatic note compiled. He had not told the Foreign Minister anything about it at that stage. I told you that recently under oath and I repeat it under oath today.

March 14, 1940 Jodl's Diary:


March 19, 1940 Jodl's Diary:


March 21, 1940 Jodl's Diary:


March 22, 1940: From the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: That was not at all my conception. It was the view of Kapitaen zur See Fricke, who was at that time the Chief of the Operations Department. He did not quite agree with me about the whole of this question. He was of the opinion that the British should be allowed to enter Norway first, and then we should throw them out through Sweden, a completely distorted idea which I could not approve of in any way. I had such clear information from Quisling and Hagelin, particularly at that time, the second half of March, that there was no longer any doubt whatever that within a reasonable time the British would intervene on a big scale....I did not concern myself with it.

March 24, 1940: From the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: ...that is the principle which is absolutely recognized in naval warfare, that at the moment of firing you have to raise your own flag. .... It was all a question of pulling down the flag and raising the German flag if we met the British. We did not want to fight with the Norwegians at all. It says somewhere that we should first of all try to effect a peaceful occupation. .... I cannot tell you whether any other navy did it...we have not done it and apart from that, we did not do it because on 8 April, we gave the order by wireless-and you know from our War Diary-that this should not be done, so it is quite useless to talk here about what might have been done if it has not been done.

March 24, 1940: From Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces:


March 25, 1940 Jodl's Diary:


March 26, 1940: From the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: Admiral Assmann (archivist of the Naval Operations Staff War Diary) compiled his notes from all sorts of war diaries and records. I most certainly never said that because at that time I reported to Hitler again and again that our preparations which had already been started a time ago would be complete at the end of January, and that that would be the time when the landings had to be carried out for the reasons I always put forward. It is completely wrong to assume that at that time I had the slightest doubt. Later everything was proved right. ....

He (Admiral Assmann) is not a deceiver, but he compiled the document from all sorts of papers and I cannot imagine how he could have arrived at that statement, I certainly never made it. I was in favor of carrying out the landings in Norway at the earliest possible time, after ice conditions had improved, as we had previously decided and as had been ordered by Hitler. For that I assume full responsibility. There was every reason for that. I only submitted to the Fuehrer this matter of landing in Norway on the supposition that this information was available and would continue to be available. .... Here it says, the 26th of March 1940: "Occupation of Norway by British was imminent when the Russian-Finnish peace was concluded." That very Russian-Finnish affair was making it particularly urgent for us to carry out a landing because the danger existed that the British, under the pretext of supporting the Finns, would carry out a bloodless occupation of Norway.

Then I go on to the question of the Fuehrer, whether a landing by the British in Norway might be imminent. One must consider that Assmann had summarized all that from war diaries, and this question is explained by the fact that the Fuehrer wanted to know whether the situation had changed in any way, because the peace had been signed. However, the situation had not changed at all, because we knew in reality that the landings by the British were not to be carried out to help the Finns, but for other reasons. That question, therefore, whether at the time, because of the peace treaty, the British landings might be particularly imminent, was answered by me in the negative. Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action by us at next new moon, 7th April—Fuehrer agrees. Everything remained as before. Only the question whether because of this peace treaty we ought to land at once, I answered 'no.' ....

(Raeder translates the diary entry for the Court) "Occupation of Norway by the British was imminent when the Russian-Finnish peace treaty was signed. Apparently, because of the treaty, it was postponed. Question by the Fuehrer, whether at that moment a landing by the British in Norway was imminent, was answered in the negative by the Commander-in-Chief Navy...." Yes, that did not mean that because of that we had to renounce the idea. "Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action by us at next new moon." The reasons for our landing remained the same as before; only the Finnish business could no longer be used by the British.

March 28, 1940 Jodl's Diary:


March 29, 1940: From a message by Norwegian Foreign Minister Koht to the Germans:


March 29, 1940: From a report from Dr. Breuer, the German Foreign Minister's representative in Norway:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: Dr. Breuer, the Minister to Norway, held a completely wrong view. He believed Foreign Minister Koht's assurances even though our naval attach¨¦ kept reporting that Koht was completely on the side of the British and his assurances were not to be believed. At the same time, information had been received from Hagelin that the Norwegians were giving assurances on paper but they themselves had said that they were doing that only as subterfuge and that they would continue to co-operate with the British. .... I was never in direct contact with Dr. Breuer, only with the naval attache but I must add that Dr. Breuer had only been in Oslo for a comparatively short period and that apparently he was not particularly well informed. The statements made by Norwegian Ministers were certainly not properly judged by him.

From the IMT testimony of Ernst von Weizsaecker: An occupational force always finds it difficult to be popular anywhere. But with this one reservation I should like to state that the Navy, as far as I heard, enjoyed a good, even a very good, reputation in Norway. This was repeatedly confirmed to me during the war by my Norwegian friends. .... Breuer was not with the Legation—he was the Minister himself—and I take it for granted that he reported correctly on the subject from an objective or rather, if I may say so, subjective point of view. Whether this was really correct from an objective point of view or not, is quite another question. To put it in plain German, whether Breuer was correctly informed of the intentions of the enemy forces is another question. .... I must confess that my personal opinion tallied with the opinion of Breuer, although both our opinions subsequently proved to be incorrect and the conjectures of the Navy were justified, or—at least—more justified than the opinion voiced by the Minister.

March 29, 1940: From the German diplomatic representative in Sweden: The Swedish Government had no reason at all to believe in an impending action by the Western Powers against Scandinavia. On the contrary, on the strength of all official reports and other information, they considered the situation lately to be much calmer. In conclusion, Guenther requested me to report his statements to my government, and repeated that the Swedish Government attached the greatest value to the German Government not erroneously getting the impression of the existence of circumstances which might evoke the possibility—he would not use the word necessity at all—of special measures by Germany with regard to Scandinavia.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: But we had no reason at all to believe these assurances because obviously, quite obviously, Sweden had considerable interest in our not going to Norway, because Sweden believed that by so doing we would be able to exercise pressure on Sweden also. That was what the British wanted, according to the information we received later. Our minister was completely misinformed and as a result was not informed by us because it was known that he sided with Foreign Minister Koht. Our information was so clear, so frequent and so unequivocal, that we could certainly carry out our landing with a clear conscience and in fact this proved to be true.

Therefore, there is no point in discussing whether the order on the part of the British to land in Norway—it was Trondheim, Stavanger and, I believed, Kristiansand—whether this order was given on 5 April On the 7th, during the night of the 7th to 8th, as the British reported in a wireless message, the mine-laying in Norwegian waters was completed by British ships and on the 7th, troops were shipped on cruisers, the names of which I forget. Therefore, this actually took place and my conception was correct and not Herr Breuer's who was dismissed immediately after this because he was a failure. Thereupon, we carried out the landings on the strength of quite positive information which we can prove in detail. Sweden's action is thoroughly understandable.

April 2, 1940 Jodl's Diary:


April 4, 1940: From the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: That is quite a regular ruse of war, that warships carry a foreign flag. A requisite for the legality of that act, however, is that at the moment of an enemy action, the moment fire is opened, their own flag must be hoisted in time. That has always been done in the German Navy, especially in the case of our auxiliary cruisers, which frequently sailed under a foreign flag in order to avoid being reported by merchant ships, but which always lowered that flag in time. That is a matter of honor. It must be added that in this case, as the War Diary shows that on 8 April, on account of certain considerations, we rescinded that order, because we had the report that an English action was underway, and we feared that complications would arise from that. So this order was not carried out in the long run. I believe the document can be found which contains that. ... You also asked about Document C-115, which says that the blockade runners camouflaged as merchant ships with dimmed lights should enter Oslo Fjord unobtrusively. This too is quite a regular ruse of war against which, from the legal point of view, no objection can be made. Likewise there is nothing to be said against English names given in answer to signals of identity.

I did not finish answering one question because I was interrupted. That was the question concerning the expression "justification" or "excuse" in the War Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. As I have shown, it was not a question of the justification, which had been expressed a long time before by Hitler, but I believe that I am right in saying that the question was that the diplomatic note which, at the moment of the execution of the enterprise, had to be presented to the Norwegian and Danish governments, giving the reason for his action, had not yet been drafted, especially as he had not yet spoken to the Foreign Minister at that time at all. The Foreign Minister received the information, as he has said himself, only on 3 April.

April 4, 1940 Jodl's Diary:


April 9, 1940: Nazi forces invade Norway and Denmark.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: From the very beginning I was for good treatment of the Norwegian population. I knew that Hitler had given Gauleiter Terboven, whom he had unfortunately appointed Reich Commissioner for Norway and to whom he had entrusted the civil administration, instructions that he, Terboven, should bring the Norwegian people to him; that is to say, make them favorably disposed, and that he had the intention, finally, to maintain Norway as a sovereign state in a North Germanic Empire. Terboven was opposed to that. He treated the Norwegian population in a very unfriendly manner, and by his treatment he actually sabotaged the aims of Hitler. In close understanding with Admiral Boehm, who became the naval commander in Norway and who had taken Kapitaen Schreiber, the former attach¨¦, on his staff as liaison officer to the Norwegian population, I tried to counteract these intentions of Terboven. On the basis of the reports of Admiral Boehm I repeatedly approached the Fuehrer and told him that with Terboven he would never achieve his purpose. The Fuehrer designated Quisling chief of the Government. I cannot remember exactly when he became Minister President, but Terboven also sabotaged Quisling in his activities by making it extremely difficult for him, and even discredited him among the population.

Terboven's chief reason was, in my opinion, that he wanted to remain Gauleiter of Norway. All our endeavors were unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that Admiral Boehm tried very hard to achieve with the help of the Navy what Hitler had expected, that is, to win over the Norwegian people. I did not understand how on the one side one wanted to gain the sympathy of the Norwegians and on the other hand one sabotaged Hitler's intentions. That went on until 1942, at which time Boehm made a final report to me, in which he explained that things could not go on like that, and that Hitler's intentions would never be realized. I submitted that report to Hitler, but since it did not bring about any change—it was in the late autumn of 1942—this failure of mine became one of the reasons which finally led to my retirement.

April 9, 1940: As the invasion begins, a German memorandum is handed to the Governments of Norway and Denmark attempting to justify the German action:


April 19, 1940 Jodl's Diary:


April 24, 1940: Gauleiter Josef Antonius Heinrich Terboven is appointed the Reichskommissar of Norway.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: Several times (I asked Hitler specifically to dismiss Terboven) And I suggested that he should appoint General Admiral Boehm as commander of the armed forces for Norway and give him far-reaching powers so that he could carry out his—Hitler's—aims. I suggested that the Fuehrer should as soon as possible conclude a peace with Norway because only in that way could he bring about co-operation between Norway and Germany and make the population turn to him. I told him the attempts of sabotage by the Norwegian emigrants would lose their meaning and cease and that possibly the Norwegian emigrants who were leaning toward England at that time could be induced to return, because they might be afraid that they might "miss the bus"; especially from the point of view of economic advantages. The task of defending Norway would be considerably easier if a state of peace could be brought about.

And I suggested that he should appoint General Admiral Boehm as commander of the armed forces for Norway and give him far-reaching powers so that he could carry out his—Hitler's—aims. I suggested that the Fuehrer should as soon as possible conclude a peace with Norway because only in that way could he bring about co-operation between Norway and Germany and make the population turn to him. I told him the attempts of sabotage by the Norwegian emigrants would lose their meaning and cease and that possibly the Norwegian emigrants who were leaning toward England at that time could be induced to return, because they might be afraid that they might "miss the bus"; especially from the point of view of economic advantages. The task of defending Norway would be considerably easier if a state of peace could be brought about.

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: Raeder in speaking to Hitler advocated a policy of peace. He suggested repeatedly that attempts should be made for peace with Norway. He was in agreement in that respect with the German Commander-in-Chief in Norway, Generaladmiral Bohm, while Terboven, who was directing political matters, was of a somewhat different opinion...there were serious differences and quarrels all the way up the line to Hitler. Hitler at that time told Raeder that he could not make peace with Norway because of France. Raeder advocated the same thing concerning France. He tried to arrange a conference with Admiral Darlan in an effort to forward these matters. He had pointed out to Hitler, when the Atlantic Coast was fortified, that it would be better and more practical to make peace with France than to make great though inadequate sacrifices for defense. Hitler replied that he fully agreed but out of consideration for Italy he could not conclude a peace treaty with France.

May 8, 1940: From a statement by the First Lord of the British Admiralty: Therefore we limited our operations in the Skagerrak to the submarines. In order to make this work as effective as possible, the usual restrictions which we have imposed on the actions of our submarines were relaxed. As I told the House, all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk as opportunity served.

May 19, 1940: The Nazis invade France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; Winston Churchill becomes British Prime Minister. French General Henri Honore Giraud, a member of the Superior War Council, is captured by German troops while trying to block a German attack through the Ardennes.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: This was always my point of view, that from the experience of the first World War Belgium and Holland, as far as the Navy was concerned, could not offer any useful bases, since all forces were under the control of the British Air Force. In the first World War serious fighting occurred between the submarines leaving their ports and destroyers stationed nearby. Therefore I declared myself not to be interested in Belgium and Holland.

May 26, 1940: FDR delivers a Fireside Chat to the American people:


May 27, 1940: U-37, commanded by Kapitanleutnant Ernst, sinks the Sheaf Mead. From the U-boats log:


June 1940: After the fall of France, twelve U-boat flotillas are established in Brest, La Rochelle, La Pallice, St Nazaire, Lorient and Bordeaux.

June 3, 1940: From a memorandum of the German naval war staff:


June 6, 1940: Engelbert Endrass' U-46 torpedoes the armed merchant cruiser RMS Carinthia off the coast of Ireland. Four crew members are killed in the initial explosion. Carinthia remains afloat for 35 hours before sinking on 7 June, allowing the rescue of all others on board.

June 8, 1940: While evacuating British troops from Norway in 1940, the aircraft carrier HMS Glorious is sunk with the loss of over 1,200 lives.

June 11, 1940: From a letter from Raeder to the German Navy:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: There is manifold proof to show that I was not expecting a war in the fall at all, and in view of the small extent of rearmament of the German Navy this was quite natural. I have stated quite clearly in my speech before the U-boat officers in Swinemuende that we could not count on it. ....

The reason (the above letter was written) was that a number of torpedo boats had misfired and this could be traced to the fact that torpedoes had not yet been as perfectly developed as they should have been at the beginning of a war. An additional reason was that, now that the war had so suddenly broken out, many officers believed that it would have been better to have developed the submarine weapon as much as possible first, so that at least this weapon would be ready in large numbers in the event of a war. I objected to that opinion precisely because such a war was not to be expected. And on Page 6, 8th paragraph, I emphasize again, in the second line, that the Fuehrer hoped until the end to postpone the imminent dispute with England until 1944 or 1945. I am speaking here of an imminent dispute. An imminent dispute is not exactly something to strive for, it is rather to be feared.

June 13, 1940>: From orders concerning 'conditions under which fire may be opened' issued to U-boat commanders:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: The following changes (in weapons of war) took place (between 1936 and 1939)...It turned out that because of the airplane the submarine was no longer in a position to surface and to investigate enemy ships or any other merchant ships, particularly near the enemy coast where the U-boats carried on their activities at first. There was no regulation at all issued about airplanes...the changes took place in the airplane. The ever increasing efficiency of the airplanes and the extension of their activities also over the seas led to the situation where it became impossible to examine any merchant vessel without aircraft being called to threaten the submarine. That got worse and worse, so that later on even rescuing had to be restricted because of enemy aircraft, and the entire submarine warfare was completely turned upside down in that manner.

June 15, 1940: An extract from the Naval War Diary:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: It had happened just before, that is before the 15th of June, that a submarine had penetrated into the area of Bornholm, which is a long way to the west, and then had given wrong recognition signals when the patrol boat near Bornholm called it. If the wrong recognition signals are given, then it means that it could not be a German submarine but it must be a foreign one. In this case, the course of the ship and the location would bring us to the conclusion that it must be a Russian boat. Apart from that, Russian submarines at that time had repeatedly been located and reported off German ports—Memel, for instance, and others. Consequently, we had the impression that Russian submarines were already occupying positions outside German ports, either to lay mines or to attack merchant or warships. For that reason, as a precaution, I had to report this and I had to propose that we should take action against non-German submarines in these areas outside German ports. That suggestion was passed on the same day and this additional statement was made, which, in my opinion, was not necessary at all, but which prevented complications from arising. ....

I consider the first point right because it is always important to get in before one's opponent, and this was happening under certain definite conditions. The second point was ordered by the Fuehrer. Neither of the two points was ever carried out, and therefore it is useless, in my opinion, to discuss this matter. ...if they (Soviet subs) appeared in our waters to reconnoiter or to carry out some other war action, then I considered it right (to destroy them). I considered that better than that our ships should run into Russian mines.

June 15, 1940: From an order from Keitel to Raeder:


June 22, 1940: France signs an armistice with Germany. Under its terms, the French army is to be disbanded and two thirds of France is to be occupied by the Germans. The French are to be allowed to keep possession of their fleet, but it is confined to port.

August 1, 1940: Raeder reports to Hitler that the earliest possible date for an invasion of Britain is September 15. Hitler gives Goering the go-ahead for Operation Eagle, the Luftwaffe bombing campaign against Britain. (Read)

August 2, 1940: The Bismarck, the third of four German battleships, is commissioned.

August 17, 1940: Germany declares a 'total blockade of Britain.'

August 19-29, 1940: During this time period, seventeen ocean-going U-boats have made their way to the Atlantic. Thirteen smaller U-boats have left their base to prepare to lay mines in British waters and to patrol the North Sea.

September 1, 1940: Doenitz is promoted to Vizeadmiral (Vice Admiral).

September 3, 1940: President Roosevelt addresses congress:


September 7, 1940: US State Department Circular:


September 17, 1940: Hitler postpones Operation Sealion.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: In the course of the month of September we still believed that the landing (in England) could be carried through. As a necessary condition the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and I, too, always insisted—and he realized this fully—that for a landing air superiority would have to be on our side; and therefore we were waiting to see whether we could actually produce this air superiority in time for the landing, which due to weather conditions could not be carried out later than the beginning of October. If it were not possible by then, it would have to be postponed until May of the following year.

It developed that air superiority could not be produced to the necessary extent; consequently it was said that the landing was to be postponed until the spring of the following year. Further preparations were to be taken and they actually were taken. But in the course of the winter the idea of a landing was completely abandoned, and Hitler decreed that preparations in the harbors along the Channel should be carried on only to such an extent as would give the British the impression that this landing actually was to take place. In September I had the impression that Hitler no longer had any great interest in this landing and that in his own mind he was completely committed to the Russian campaign in conjunction with which he, of course, could not carry out the landing in England.

September 26, 1940: From official notes of the German naval war staff:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: May I first remind you that in the summer of 1940, that is to say, July, August, and September, we in the Navy were very much occupied with preparations for a landing in England; therefore it never entered our heads that there could be any plans for action in another direction. In August I heard from some Army office, possibly that of the Commander-in-Chief, that considerable troop transports were going to the East. I asked Hitler what that meant and he told me it was a grandiose camouflage for his intentions to invade England. He knew that I would be against it right away if he were to speak about an enterprise against Russia.

In September—I cannot recall the date exactly—he finally admitted to me that he had certain intentions against Russia. In September I reported to him at least twice, my more important report was 26 September, when I did everything I could to dissuade him from any undertaking against Russia. In that report which I made in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl I emphasized particularly the strategic military side; first, because I could do that in all clarity in the presence of other people, and then because I assumed that such military reasons, that is, the possibility of failure of an operation against Russia at a time when the struggle was on against England, would impress him and dissuade him from that plan.

On 26 September, after making this official report, I asked for a personal conference alone with Hitler. Keitel and Jodl can testify that I always did this when I wanted to discuss something particularly important with the Fuehrer, where I had to go beyond the conventional procedure and which I could only do if nobody else was present. One could tell Hitler a lot of things if one was alone with him, but one could not make any such statements in a larger group. Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl know that very well, particularly well, because they were the ones who in such cases always had to leave the room.

On that occasion I gave Hitler my views in detail; first, that it was not possible to break the pact myth Russia, that it would be morally wrong, that it would serve no purpose because the pact gave us great advantages and was a basis for a sound policy for Germany later on. Then I told him that under no circumstances could he start a two-front war, as it was he who had always emphasized that he would not repeat the stupidity of the government of 1914 and that, in my opinion, it could never be justified. Then I put to him again the difference of the forces on each side, the absolute necessity for the Navy to concentrate on the war against England and particularly at that moment when all resources were strained to the utmost to carry out the invasion.

On that day I had the impression that Hitler was inclined to listen to my argument because later, or the next day, the naval adjutant, Kapitaen Von Puttkamer, reported to me that Hitler had spoken in very much the same vein as I had spoken, and had appreciated my argument. That went on for several months. I presented many such reports, returning always with the same arguments. I believed again in November that I had been successful. To my utter surprise, however, on 18 December, Directive Number 21 (Barbarossa) came out, which dealt with the case of a war with the Soviet Union before the termination of the war against England. It is true, of course, that it was a directive for an eventuality. .... I was always in favor of the Bismarck policy, that we should have a common policy with Russia. ....

In September 1940 for the first time I heard certain statements from Hitler himself that he was thinking of a war with Russia, given certain circumstances. Even in the directive he mentioned one of these prerequisites, one of these circumstances. He did not say to me at that time that in any circumstances he wanted to wage war, but that we had to be prepared, as it says in Paragraph 1, that before crushing England we might have to fight against Russia. And from September on I began to make objections to him. .... But in spite of that, as the highest man of the Navy, I was not in a position to hold out the threat of resignation at that moment. I was too much of a soldier to be able to do that, to be able to leave the Navy at a moment like that.

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: Raeder informed me fully, because the prospect of war with Russia was much too serious to be taken lightly. Raeder opposed most energetically any plan for a war against Russia; and, I should like to say, for moral reasons because Raeder was of the opinion that the pact with Russia should not be broken as long as the other side gave no cause for it. That, as far as Raeder knew, was not the case in October. That economic treaty—as we called it at that time—to our knowledge was about 90 percent at the expense of the Navy.

We gave Russia one heavy cruiser, heavy artillery for battleships, artillery installations, submarine engines, submarine installations, and valuable optical instruments for use on submarines. Besides, Raeder was of the opinion that the theater of operations should not be allowed to be carried into the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea was our drill field, I might say. All our recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place in the Baltic Sea. We had already partly stripped the Baltic coast of batteries and personnel for the purpose of protecting the Norwegian and the French coasts. We had very small oil reserves at our disposal, the synthetic oil production was not yet in full swing. The Navy had to turn over some of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently, Raeder was strongly opposed to waging war against Russia.

September 27, 1940: An extract from the official publication Das Archiv on the Doenitz's promotion to vice admiral:


September 27, 1940: Nazi-Germany, Italy and Japan sign a formal alliance called the Tripartite Pact, a 10 year military and economic alliance forming the foundation of the Axis alliance.

September 27, 1940: From a statement by US Secretary of State Hull:


September 29, 1940: FDR delivers a Fireside Chat to the American people:


October 16-19, 1940: The first major Wolf Pack attack occurs as convoy SC7 is repeatedly attacked by a pack of seven U-boats, sinking 20 ships out of 34 in the convoy. The very next night, convoy HX79 is attacked with further losses of 14 ships, making a total of 34 ships in 48 hours.

October 28, 1940: Hans Jemisch's U-32 sinks the ocean liner RMS Empress of Britain while traveling along the west coast of Ireland. The Empress of Britain is the largest ship sunk by a U-boat in WW2.

October 29, 1940: US Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, draws the first number in the first peacetime military draft in US history. Note: Stimson, a Republican, had been Taft's Secretary of War, Governor of the Philippines under Coolidge, and Secretary of State under Hoover.

October 30, 1940: To support the Greek government, the British send an expeditionary force to Crete and other Greek islands. In addition, the Soviet government sends 134 fighter aircraft to the Greeks to help stem the Italian invasion.

November 11-12, 1940 Battle of Taranto: The British aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious demonstrates the vulnerability of moored capital ships to surprise attack by carrier-based aviation by attacking the Italian fleet at Regia Marina naval base in the harbor of Taranto. The enemy fleet is devastated as a consequence of the attack by a mere 12 British Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers launched from the Illustrious. At a total cost of 2 aircraft destroyed, 2 pilots killed and two captured, the British kill 59 Italian sailors and wound 600, sink 3 battleships, and severely damage 2 other battleships and a light cruiser. Note: The Japanese planning staff will study the Taranto attack intensively while masterminding their attack on Pearl Harbor.

November 12-14, 1940: Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov travels to Berlin to meet with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler.

November 14, 1940: From official notes of the German naval war staff:


December 13, 1940: From Direction Number 20 - Operation Marita:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: In the beginning I had but little knowledge of the political intentions of the Fuehrer as far as Greece was concerned, but I did know of his Directive Number 20, dated 13 December 1940. .... The next time I heard about these things again was when I heard that the British had landed in southern Greece on 3 March. We learned that on about 5 or 6 March. For this reason I asked the Fuehrer that he occupy all of Greece in order to prevent the British from attacking us from the rear, by air, and from erecting air bases, all of which would hamper the conduct of our war not only in Greece but also in the eastern Mediterranean.

The fact was that when a political decision had been made by Hitler of his own accord and without having consulted anyone, I, as Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, always had to draw my strategic conclusions from this political decision and then had to make to him my proposals on naval and on other warfare as far as they concerned me. Since in December he had already considered the possibility that all of Greece would have to be occupied, the case had now actually arisen for me to make this proposal to him for the reason I have already mentioned. When I said "all of Greece," that implied to me and the Naval Command the entire Greek coast, where the British forces might land.

December 18, 1940: Hitler gives orders for military preparations against the USSR. From Directive No. 21:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: Such directives were drafted in the OKW after the Fuehrer had taken his political decision, in the Armed Forces Operations Staff; and in that Armed Forces Operations Staff there was also one naval officer and one or more Air Force officers who, under the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Stay, dealt with matters concerning the Navy and Air Force when such directives were being drafted. The directive then went to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and they were ordered, for their part, to work out and present suggestions for the execution of the orders of the Fuehrer. They had no influence on the directive itself and did not see it at all beforehand.

May I add one more thing? I have been accused by the Prosecution that I used my influence with the Fuehrer not for moral and ethical reasons but that I tried in a cynical way first to settle the account with England and then to assail Russia. I have said before that I told all my reasons to the Fuehrer whenever I had the chance, but that I could not do that in a public meeting or in the presence of other people, nor could I write it down in my war diary, because the sharp words which fell there must not become known to other people by means of the war diary.

I want to point to Document C-170...which dates from 23 August 1939 to 22 June 1941. It is a compilation of many excerpts from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff—and from my minutes of conferences with Hitler in which the Russian question was dealt with. This is not a literal reproduction of my statements or word for word excerpts from the War Diary, but it is a summary of excerpts by the naval archivist, Admiral Assmann. I will not read details from these many entries, but I should like to point out that precisely this document, C-170, shows in a large number of entries contained therein that, since the beginning of the war in 1939, I continuously used my influence with the Fuehrer to maintain good relations with Russia for the reasons which I have previously mentioned. It would lead us too far if I were to start quoting several entries here. But the document, I would like to emphasize, is entirely convincing. ....

We had the first conference in January...I had reported to the Fuehrer on 4 February about our intentions and in March the Navy began with certain preparations. I have said already that the Navy throughout the first period was hardly concerned with major operations, but only with the cutting off of the Gulf of Finland by mines and light naval forces. I do not know whether that is in Directive 21 or somewhere else but the Fuehrer, at my urgent request, had ordered that the center of gravity of the naval warfare should still be in the direction of England. Consequently, we could use only relatively small forces for the war against Russia. ....

May I make a brief remark on this directive to the effect that yesterday I believe you made a mistake when you said that this directive was signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl. This was the copy of the operational staff which Hitler had signed; but Keitel and Jodl only countersigned. Thus there is no question of a signature of these two; when such directives were issued they were signed only by Hitler, and the others could merely countersign.

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: After the receipt of Directive 21, called Barbarossa, Raeder approached Hitler again with reference to the war against Russia, and also put down his thoughts in a memorandum. He tried to convince Hitler of the following: Poland had been crushed, France had been occupied, and, for military reasons, an invasion of England was out of the question. He said clearly that now the time had arrived when the further conduct of the war could not be decisive on the Continent, but in the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him that he had to concentrate all forces at his disposal on one objective: To hit the strategic points of the Empire, especially the supply lines to the British Isles in order to compel England to sue for negotiations or, if possible, to make peace. He suggested, as has been mentioned before, that the policy of peace with Norway should be pursued, peace with France, and closer cooperation with the Russian Navy, such as was provided for in the economic treaty, and the repurchase of submarine equipment or submarines. He said that the decision or the date for a decision no longer rested with us because we did not have the necessary sea power and that in case of a long duration of the war the danger of the participation of the United States had also to be considered; that therefore the war could not be decided on the European continent and least of all in the vastness of the Russian steppes. That point of view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he was in office. ....

Raeder, as a matter of principle, never criticized the political leadership in the presence of the gentlemen of the Naval Operations Staff or the front commanders. Therefore, he did not speak to me and the others about the private conversations which he had with Hitler, except when it was necessary for military reasons. .... After he (Raeder) had made his report (to Hitler) at that time, he returned and said, "I believe I have talked him out of his plan (Barbarossa)." And at first we did have that impression because in the following months there were no more conferences about it, to my knowledge, not even with the General Staff.

December 19, 1940: From the SKL War Diary:


December 20 1940: From the SKL War Diary:


December 21, 1940: From the SKL War Diary:


December 27, 1940: From official notes of the German naval war staff:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I should like to say in this connection that despite the fact that the directive had been issued on 18 December, I made a comprehensive report at the end of December, as can be seen from Document C-170, which I mentioned yesterday on several occasions, in order to convince the Fuehrer of the wrongness of this decision. This shows that I have gone very far, for when the Fuehrer had issued a directive, even if it applied only to a hypothetical case, it was generally impossible to approach him with basic considerations against this directive. Everything else I mentioned already yesterday.

December 27, 1940: From a directive signed by Jodl: On 30th December, 1939, according to a report of the Oberbefehlshaberder Marine, the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces decided that:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: At that time we had received a large number of intelligence reports from our intelligence service that Greek shipping companies apparently with the knowledge of the Greek Government were allowing Greek ships to be chartered by England under favorable conditions. Therefore, these Greek ships were in the service of England and thus were to be treated in the same way as we were treating the English merchantmen. These intelligence reports were confirmed later on to an even greater degree than had been the case in the beginning.

January 30, 1940: Hitler speaks in Berlin:


February 9, 1941: Churchill broadcasts an address to the British people:


February 24, 1941 Hitler speaks in Munich:


February 25, 1941: The Tirpitz, the last of four German battleships, is commissioned. She will never fire against an enemy ship, but spend most of WW2 in various bases in German-occupied Norway.

March 5, 1941: From a Top Secret order signed by Keitel, Chief of the O.K.W.: Basic Order No. 24 regarding Collaboration with Japan:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: First of all, the political decision by Hitler, the head of the State; then the directive of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to the Armed Forces; then the conclusions drawn by the commanders-in-chief of the separate branches of the Wehrmacht. So, after I received the directive of 5 March, I had to contemplate how Japan, after entering the war, could strategically be used with the best results. And that depended on how we could most effectively wound our main opponent, England, on the sea. In this connection I had to insist most urgently that Japan move against Singapore since there were also circles who were of the opinion that Japan should attack Vladivostok, which would have been a grave mistake. England's power center in East Asia had to be attacked. But the very fact that I believed that the capture of Singapore would cause the United States of America to shy away from the war occasioned this proposal of mine, and not the opposite.

March 7, 1941: U-47, commanded by top ace Guenther Prien, hero of Scapa Flow, is sunk by the British Destroyer HMS Wolverine.

March 9, 1941: The Italians launch a full-scale counterattack across the entire front in Greece. It fails.

March 11, 1941: Thinly slicing US 'neutrality,' the US Congress passes the Lend-Lease Bill, which enables Britain and her Allies to borrow money to buy additional food and arms. A time limit is placed on the operation of the act¡ªuntil June 1943. A motion originally passed in the House forbidding US warships to give protection to convoys of foreign ships is defeated. Also to be allowed are transfers of ships to other countries solely on Presidential authority without reference to Congress.

March 16, 1941: The Kriegsmarine loses two of its most successful U-boat commanders, Kretschmer (U-99) and Schepke (U-100) to British escorts from convoy HX112.

March 17, 1941: The HMS Vanoc utilizes Type 286 radar—able to detect surfaced U-boats—for the first time to detect and sink U-100.

March 18, 1941: Notes from a meeting between Raeder and Hitler:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: It is entirely clear that, since I was involved in a naval war with England with my small German Navy, I did not want, under any circumstances, to have America on my neck as well; and it has been discussed here repeatedly that my most urgent effort during the entire first few years of the war was to avoid, under all circumstances, being involved with the United States. Admiral Wagner described here in detail the limitations which I had imposed on the German Navy in order to prevent any clashes with the United States. I imposed limitations which actually I could hardly justify when I carried on U-boat warfare with such relatively small means.

On the other hand, the United States from the end of 1940 on, at the latest, and during the entire year of 1941, exerted pressure on us in our naval warfare wherever possible and committed actions which could be interpreted as definitely not neutral. I remind you merely of the repairing of British warships in the United States, something which up until that time was completely impossible and unheard of; and Roosevelt's orders to shoot given in July and in September 1941; attacks by the American destroyers Greer and Kearney in the Atlantic on our U-boats. In two cases U-boats were pursued with depth charges for 2 hours until finally they surfaced and fired, in one case damaging one destroyer. Despite all this, in June 1941 I reported to Hitler that we were continuing not to disturb the merchantmen of the United States in any way-with the result that United States merchantmen were crossing the Atlantic completely unmolested on sea lanes of their own choosing, were in a position to give reports about our U-boats and our sea warfare without our preventing them from doing so; because of this the British were in a position to camouflage their ships as American ships. That they did. The first time our pocket battleship Admiral Scheer, while crossing the Atlantic, searched a ship flying the American flag it turned out to be the British ship Canadian Cruiser. Despite all this I recommended to the Fuehrer, and he fully approved my suggestion, that we should take no measures against American ships. That we did not go to Halifax to lay mines Admiral Wagner has already mentioned. I need not mention that any further. ....

I should like to picture very briefly the development which led to this proposal. This was not anything that I did on my own initiative, but rather at the beginning of the year 1941 political negotiations were carried on with Japan partly by the Fuehrer and partly by the Foreign Minister. I was not even called into these negotiations, and I must say regrettably so, for at these negotiations many things were discussed which were not correct. However on the other hand this shows again that there can be no talk about a conspiracy. Contact was made, and then the visit of the Foreign Minister Matsuoka took place, I believe, in March. On the basis of this entire development the Fuehrer, on 5 March 1941, issued Directive Number 24.

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: The menace of an occupation from the sea or from the air, or the formation of a Balkan front against Germany, or the menace from the air to the oil fields, had to be eliminated under all circumstances. May I only remind you of the Salonika operation in the first World War. I believe that was a similar situation. ...

Fame requires achievements, and I do not know what the Navy could have conquered in the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a single ship down there; but Raeder, of course, for the strategic reasons I have mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction. .... We had been informed that in 1939, certain Greek political and military circles had been in the closest connection with the Allied General Staff. We knew that Greek merchantmen were in British service. Therefore we were compelled to consider the Greek merchantmen which sailed through the prohibited zone to England as enemy ships. And, I believe, in the beginning of 1940, or the middle of 1940, we received information that the Allies intended to land in Greece or to establish a Balkan front against Germany.

March 19, 1941: From official notes of the German naval war staff:


March 19, 1941: Churchill forms the 'Battle of the Atlantic' committee in order to afford the highest level of coordination against the U-boat menace.

March 19, 1941: From official notes of the German naval war staff: In case of Barbarossa, Supreme Naval Commander describes the occupation of Murmansk as an urgent request of the Navy; Chief of Supreme Command Armed Forces considers compliance very difficult.

March 27, 1941: Hitler decides to invade Yugoslavia.

March 29, 1941: From notes of a conversation between Matsuoka and Von Ribbentrop:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I can only confirm that I never discussed such questions with Herr Von Ribbentrop, for unfortunately there was no connection between the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Navy especially since the Fuehrer had forbidden that any information be given by the Foreign Office to the military authorities. I would never have made such statements since they were in direct opposition to my own opinion, and especially since in this case I had no basis for any such statements.

April 4, 1941: From the German Admiralty to all ships at sea: American neutrality zone from now on to be observed south of 20 degrees North only at a distance of 300 nautical miles from the coast (full recognition of the neutral zone). For reasons of foreign policy, the hitherto existing limitation will for the time being continue to be observed north of the above-mentioned line.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: At that time, in March 1941, and on the 1st of April and the following dates in 1941, a whole number of intensification's were introduced by the United States, which I mentioned this morning, from the document which I had before me. Therefore, it was clear that I, on behalf of the Naval Operations Staff, which was supposed to conduct the most effective naval war, urged that also with respect to the United States those steps should be taken which were permissible according to international law, and that we should start slowly. Those steps included:

First: that we should no longer respect that 300-mile limit, but go as far as the 3-mile limit, where according to existing international law, it was possible to attack. That is to say, not against international law, but it was just discontinuing certain favorable conditions which we had granted the United States. ....

I only wanted to say that during the hearing of Grossadmiral Doenitz the Prosecution demanded of us that we should not treat certain neutrals better than others, but we should treat them all alike; that is to say in plain language, we must sink them all, no matter whether we wanted to do so or not, and of course we were not bound to do that. The second thing: it was a matter of course that a thoroughly justified suggestion on my part from the point of view of the Naval Operations Staff had been rejected by the Fuehrer if, with regard to the political situation, he decided that at that time he did not desire to adopt a more severe attitude towards the United States.

April 6, 1941: On Palm Sunday, Hitler invades Yugoslavia and Greece.

April 20, 1941: From official notes of the German naval war staff:


April 24, 1941: Raeder receives a 'donation' of 250,000 marks from Hitler for his 65th birthday.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I received from Hitler in the autumn of 1939 in addition to the Golden Emblem, which I have already mentioned, the Knight's Order to the Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year 1941 on the occasion of my 65th birthday I received a donation of 250,000 marks. This donation was given to me by Hitler through an adjutant and in connection with that he sent a document. When I thanked him on the very first occasion, he told me that he was giving me this donation as a means of decoration in the same manner as the former rulers of Prussia had given their generals similar donations, whether as sums of money or as a country estate; then he emphasized that Field Marshals Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen had received donations from him as well.

May 2, 1941: From a memorandum concerning the Case Barbarossa:


May 8, 1941: During an attack against convoy OB318, U-110¡ªcommanded by Julius Lemp¡ªis captured after an attack by the HMS Bulldog, HMS Broadway, and the corvette HMS Aubretia. Unfortunately for the Germans, the scuttling charges fail to detonate, allowing the British destroyer HMS Bulldog to put across a boarding party. The Enigma code machine and accompanying material is taken after the U-boats crew is taken below decks aboard HMS Bulldog. The British put U-110 under tow, but the damaged U-boat later sinks.

May 8, 1941: The German raider Penguin is sunk by HMS Cornwall off the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean.

May 17, 1941 Operation Rheinuebung: The German battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen leave Gotenhafen in the Baltic to begin operations against British convoys in the Atlantic.

May 21, 1941: The SS Robin Moor, a US merchant steamship carrying nine officers, 29 crewmen, eight passengers, and a commercial cargo from New York to Mozambique via South Africa, is sunk by U-69. Although the Robin Moor was flying the flag of a neutral country (the US is still not at war with anyone), her mate was told by the U-boat crew that they had decided to 'let us have it.' After a brief period for the ship's crew and passengers to board her four lifeboats, the U-boat fired a torpedo and then shelled the vacated ship. Once the ship sank beneath the waves, the submarine's crew pulled up to Captain W.E. Myers' lifeboat, left him with four tins of ersatz bread and two tins of butter, and explained that the ship had been sunk because she was carrying supplies to Germany's enemy.

May 24, 1941 Operation Rheinuebung: The German battleship Bismarck, supported by the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, sinks the British battle cruiser Hood after firing only three salvoes. There are only 3 survivors out of a crew of 1,421. The Prince of Wales is also damaged and forced to break off the action.

May 26, 1941 Operation Rheinuebung: British flying boat spots the Bismarck at 10:36 AM. Swordfish Torpedo-bombers from the Ark Royal score hits on the Bismarck, disabling her steering gear and rendering her un-maneuverable. This will enable the British destroyers to attack after dark.

May 26, 1941 Operation Rheinuebung: The crippled Bismarck is relentlessly bombarded by dozens of British warships, including the battleships Rodney and King George V. Once her guns are silenced, she is sunk by torpedoes from the cruiser Dorsetshire. Only 110 survive out of a crew of 2,300.

May 27, 1941: HX129 convoy becomes the first to be escorted 'end-to-end' across the Atlantic, with the help of the Canadian Navy.

May 27, 1941: FDR delivers a Fireside Chat:


June 6, 1941: Summary of a Memorandum of the Chief of Naval Operations:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: There were some questions of a loan (from the US to the USSR) without interest, or some such thing. Very probably I did speak to Hitler about it, but I cannot tell you what his attitude was. I can say only that all these measures at that time in no way deterred us from the course we had pursued until then. In June I had the conversation with Hitler at which I explained to him that up to that time we had allowed American warships to go completely unmolested, and that we would continue to do so in spite of the considerable disadvantages entailed which I mentioned recently.

June 15, 1941: From official notes of the German naval war staff:

June 15, 1941: From a letter by Keitel:


June 21, 1941: From the log book of U-boat U-71:

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: I observe that the commanding officer did what he could, in view of the weather which he described when he said that in view of the bad weather he could not rescue them. He threw provisions to them in a sack and gave them the course to the coast. I do not know what there is about that that is inhumane. If he had left without giving them food and the Course, then you might make that accusation. Only the commanding officer himself can judge that, the man in charge of the U-boat. I would have to look at the weather, because it says here "Medium swell.'' ....

I do not know the condition of the U-boat, whether the boat was in a position to take prisoners on board. I believe that you have never seen conditions on a U-boat; otherwise you would not judge it like that. Considering that the crew of a U-boat is under water for weeks and uses every last bit of space and is exposed to the greatest dangers day and night, one cannot simply say that it would have been a humane act to take these additional men aboard. Besides, the commander himself says there was hardly a chance of rescue in view of the prevailing weather.

June 21, 1941: A massive invasion force prepares for action on the Soviet border.

June 22, 1941: Operation (Unternehmen) Barbarossa (Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union), begins as 4.5 million troops of the Axis powers invade the USSR along an 1,800 mile front.

July 7, 1941: President Roosevelt addresses Congress:


July 7, 1941: An Einsatzkommando unit begins systematic killings of Lithuanian Jews.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I say clearly under oath that I had not the slightest inkling about it. I might add in explanation that on no account would Hitler have spoken about such things to a man like myself, whose opinion he knew, especially because he was afraid that on my part there would be very serious objections. I explained the other day why I used the word "Jews" in my memorial speech. In my opinion, I was obliged to do so. But that had nothing at all to do with an extermination of Jews. About the Jewish matter I have only learned...

Excuse me, please, one moment. I only learned something about the Jewish matter when Jews who were known to me, mostly friends of my old parents, approached me and told me that they were about to be evacuated from Berlin. And then I intervened for them. That was the only thing I knew. On occasions I was told in answer to my questions that they were to be evacuated to cities where ghettos had been established. I always understood that a ghetto was a district in a city where all the Jews lived together, so that they would not have to mingle with the rest of the population. ....

I must—so many questions have been asked about this very point and as every man in my position who held the same views says the same, that he does not know anything about it, I should like to explain once for all that one did not hear about these things, because civilians certainly did not talk to us about that, because they were always afraid that they would get into difficulties. The Fuehrer did not speak about it. I had no connection with Himmler nor with other agents of the Gestapo. I did not know anything about it.

Deposition under oath of Walter Kurt Dittmann: I was Naval Administration Inspector and officer in charge of the Naval Clothing Depot at Libau in Latvia. I held this position from the beginning of August 1941 to the end of March 1942. The Jewish population of Libau at that time was supposed to be about 7,000 people. Up to the end of March 1942 many thousands of them had already been 'evacuated' by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. 'Evacuated' was the local expression for the annihilation of these people.

All Jews were registered. When a new lot was to be evacuated it happened in the following way: The Latvian Police fetched the Jews out of their houses, put them on lorries and drove them to the Naval Port about six to seven kilometers outside the town. Later on these people had to march and were not taken there in lorries. In the Naval Port these people were then shot with machine guns. This was done by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. The police, of course, got their orders from the German Gestapo. I personally did not witness these incidents, but comrades told me all about them.

Some of the Jews before they were shot worked for the Navy. About 80-100 people worked in the Clothing Depot every day. About 100-150 people worked in the Garrison Administration every day. About 50 people worked in the Garrison Building Office (Navy) every day. Through these contacts and through personal visits to the houses of Jews I heard a lot regarding the terrible happenings in Libau during these months.

I personally went to my superior, Festungs-Intendant Dr. Lancelle, and before that I also went to another superior, the officer in charge of the Hospital Administration, named Mueller, both were Naval Administration Officials. I pointed out to them these abuses which have already been described. The answer I got was that they could not do anything and that things like that were best overlooked.

The Marineverwaltungsassistent Kurt Traunecker accompanied a consignment of clothing from Kiel to Libau. He stayed a few weeks in Libau and he expressed his displeasure at the conditions there regarding the annihilation of the Jews. He then went back to Kiel to the local clothing office. There again he expressed his displeasure and was ordered to appear at the Naval Administration Headquarters (Marine-Intendantur). Whom he saw there, I do not know, but it was made clear to him that these occurrences were not true, and therefore he should not talk about them any more, otherwise he would get into most serious trouble. My personal opinion is that the higher offices of the Navy in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of these terrible conditions.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I knew nothing about it. ... Of course I had only efficient officers around me. But here we are dealing with things which were not done at all by the Navy. It says here in all places that it was the police and so on. I even was in Libau once and I was told—and this is the only thing in connection with this matter—that the peculiar thing was that the Jews in Libau, contrary to their custom, were craftsmen and therefore they were doing useful work there. That was the only thing I heard about it. As regards any extermination...

I cannot say (when I was there) now. It was after it was occupied' probably immediately afterwards. .... I have to look it up somewhere. It does not say here that anything was reported, only that it was apparently discussed in the Navy Headquarters and with the Navy Quartermaster (Marine-Intendantur), who does not report to me. Of course I would have intervened if I had heard about such happenings.

July 12, 1941: US Secretary of the Navy Knox informs the representatives of the press of Roosevelt's order to allow American warships protecting convoys to fire on German ships.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: Hitler did subsequently issue an express order that we were in no circumstances to open fire of our own accord, but only in self-defense. This situation actually did arise later in the case of the two destroyers Greer and Kearny.

July 18, 1941: From an order of the Fuehrer:


August 12, 1941: In clear violation of the US Neutrality Act, the US Navy takes over patrolling convoy routes in the North Atlantic and tracking German submarines for the Royal Navy.

August 14, 1941: Churchill and FDR release a joint declaration; the Atlantic Charter:


August 16, 1941: Joseph Stalin, acting as People's Commissar of Defense, releases Order No. 270, prohibiting any Soviet soldier from surrendering: 'There are no Russian prisoners of war, only traitors.' The order demands anyone deserting or surrendering to be killed on the spot, and subjects their families to arrest and their wives to be sent to labor camps.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I had requested Hitler when I heard that he intended in the course of the war to bombard Leningrad, that he should spare the port and dock installations because they would be useful for us later, as we had to keep moving our bases back to the East on account of the British air attacks in the Baltic. Shortly before the date which you have mentioned Admiral Fricke had been at the Fuehrer's headquarters—I do not know for what reason—and had there spoken with the Fuehrer in my absence, and the Fuehrer had explained to him that plan to bombard Leningrad, especially with aircraft, and he used those very exaggerated words which were then written down in the document.

The Navy had absolutely nothing to do with the shelling of Leningrad. We received no orders for that. We were only interested in that one thing which I mentioned before, that the shipyards and port installations should be spared. The Fuehrer had informed Fricke that unfortunately he was not in a position to do that because the attack, especially if made with aircraft, could not be directed quite so precisely. All we could do was to inform Generaladmiral Carls that Leningrad, in case it should be taken, could not be used as a base, and Generaladmiral Carls had to stop the preparations which he had already begun by allocating German workers and probably also machinery which was intended to be used in Leningrad later on. Carls had to know of that and, as the document says, the so-called Quartermaster Department of the Navy had to know about it, and that was why Admiral Fricke passed on that paper. Unfortunately he included in this paper the expressions used by Hitler, which had nothing to do with the whole affair as far as we were concerned, because we had nothing to do with the shelling. By so doing he did not assume in any way the responsibility, in the sense that he approved it. He only believed that he had to pass on Hitler's wording of the order.

The Navy had nothing to do with the matter. It would not have been necessary to pass it on, and unfortunately and very clumsily that expression used by Hitler was entered in that document. However, nothing happened and that document was not passed on from Generaladmiral Carls to our Finland Commander. That is the whole story.

August 16, 1941: German submarines sink 3 British and one Norwegian ship from the 22 ship and 9 escort Convoy OG-71.

September 4, 1941 Greer Incident: The destroyer USS Greer, while carrying mail and passengers to Argentina, is signaled by a British plane that a Nazi submarine has crash-dived some 10 miles ahead. Forty minutes later the DD's soundman picks up the sub, and Greer begins to trail the submarine. The plane, running low on fuel, drops four depth charges at 1032 and returns to base, while Greer continues to dog the U-boat. Two hours later the German ship begins a series of radical maneuvers and Greer's lookouts can see her pass about 100 yards off. An impulse bubble at 1248 warns the Greer that a torpedo has been fired. Ringing up flank speed, hard left rudder, Greer watches the torpedo pass 100 yards astern and then charges in for attack. She lays a pattern of eight depth charges, and less than two minutes later a second torpedo passes 300 yards to port. Greer loses sound contact during the maneuvers, and begins to quarter the area in search of the U-boat. After 2 hours, she reestablishes sound contact and lays down a pattern of 11 depth charges before discontinuing the engagement. Greer had held the German raider in sound contact 3 hours and 28 minutes; had evaded two torpedoes fired at her; and with her 19 depth charges had become the first American ship in World War II to attack the Germans.

September 6, 1941: On a voyage from New York to Suez, the Liberty Ship SS Steel Seafarer, clearly marked with an American flag painted on the side, is attacked and sunk by a German plane in the Red Sea. "Seaports South of Sahara" reported this vessel was carrying 5,700 tons of munitions, being one of numerous American flag freighters carrying, under lucrative charter terms, munitions for British operations in North Africa.

September 8, 1941: Keitel's OKW issues a regulation for the treatment of Soviet POW's. It states that Russian soldiers will fight by any methods for the idea of Bolshevism and that consequently they have lost any claim to treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Stern measures are to be employed against them, including the free use of weapons. The politically undesirable prisoners are to be segregated from the others and turned over to 'special purpose units' of the Security Police and the Security Service. There is to be the closest cooperation between the military commanders and these police units.

September 10, 1941>: British convoy SC-42 (64 ships), sailing from Sydney to the Britain is attacked by a wolf pack of 19 U-boats just south of Greenland between the 10th and 14th September. SC-42 loses 17 merchant ships for 69,813 tons. 2 U-boats, U-207 and U-510 are sunk in return.

September 11, 1941: FDR delivers a Fireside Chat:


September 16, 1941: Convoy HX150—from Halifax as far as Iceland—becomes the first convoy with American escorts.

September 26, 1941: The first Arctic convoy bound for Russia leaves Britain. It consists of ten merchantmen with escorts and is designated as PQ1.

September 29, 1941: From a communication from the Naval Operations Staff of to Group North, Generaladmiral Carls, of a conversation between Admiral Fricke and Hitler: "The Fuehrer is determined to make the city of St. Petersburg (Leningrad) disappear from the face of the earth."

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: Communications which were submitted to Admiral Raeder all went through my hands. They always had the notation, either "the Commander-in-Chief has taken due note," and were initialed by me personally in order to certify this notation, or "this order or this directive is to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief," and in this case too my initials were affixed. This order and this copy which you have just shown to me I have never seen before; I am not acquainted with it; and I consider it impossible that Admiral Raeder should have seen it, because on 29 September 1941 I was in good health and exercising my duties in Berlin. ....

I recall that at the so-called daily discussions regarding the general situation one of the officers of the Naval Operations Staff reported on the intentions of the Army regarding the future of Leningrad—not Petersburg. Whereupon Raeder expressed the desire that it be kept in mind during the operations that Leningrad should, under all circumstances, fall intact into our hands, for he needed shipyards and adjoining territory for naval construction; and he wished that the Army be informed of the urgency of this desire, because in view of the ever-increasing danger of air attacks, we intended to shift part of our shipyard facilities to the East.

At that time we had already begun, if I remember correctly, to move installations from Emden to the East and wanted, furthermore, as Raeder wished, to evacuate Wilhelmshaven subsequently and move the installations there as far to the East as possible. He emphasized expressly that the city should also be left as undamaged as possible because otherwise there would be no place for the workers to live. This is all I can truthfully tell you about the case of Leningrad. .... I do not recall that this case was taken up again. For the operations in the North soon came to a standstill, I believe.

October 3, 1941: Hitler opens up the charitable Winter Aid campaign with a speech at the Sportpalast:


October 6, 1941: Churchill gives a personal promise to Stalin to send a convoy every ten days to Russia's northern ports.

October 9, 1941: From President Roosevelt's message to Congress:


October 16, 1941: The United States destroyer USS Kearny, while escorting a convoy in the North Atlantic, drops depth charges after three merchant ships in her care are torpedoed. The Kearny continues to search for the elusive U-boat all night.

October 17, 1941: In the wee hours, the U-568 strikes the USS Kearny on its starboard side with a torpedo, killing 11 and wounding 22. The Kearny will struggle to recovery in Iceland by the 19th.

October 19, 1941: The SS Lehigh is sunk off the African coast by U-126.

October 20, 1941: Averell Harriman to Winston Churchill:


October 31, 1941: The US destroyer, the USS Reuben James, is torpedoed by German submarine U-552 commanded by Kapitaenleutnant Erich Topp near Iceland. Reuben James had positioned herself in harm's way between an ammunition ship in a British convoy and the known position of a 'wolfpack' (a group of submarines hunting Allied shipping). Of the 159-man crew, only 44 survive. This destroyer is the first US naval casualty in an undeclared war, between Germany and the United States, which has existed since President Roosevelt authorized the use of American naval vessels to escort Lend-Lease convoys bound for Britain.

November 1, 1941: The German government issues a statement denying the charges made by President Roosevelt that the US destroyers Greer and Kearney were attacked by German submarines without any provocation. The exact opposite is true, say the Germans, in that the U-boats fired their torpedoes only after they were tracked and depth-charged for hours by these US vessels.

November 11, 1941: From a speech by Secretary of the Navy Knox:


November 13, 1941: Friedrich Guggenberger's U-81 torpedoes the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal. The carrier sinks the next day with only one fatality.

November 22, 1941: All operational U-boats are ordered to proceed to the Mediterranean or its approaches.

November 25, 1941: Hans Diedrich Freiherr von Tiesenhausen's U-331 sinks the battleship HMS Barham.

December 3, 1941: From the war diary of the German naval attach¨¦ in Tokyo:


December 6, 1941: From the war diary of the German naval attache in Tokyo: Conversation with Fregattenkapitan Shiba.

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: I do not quite grasp it. I have already said that we had no contact with the Japanese experts or attaches in Berlin. I asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbor incident by radio, and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether on 6 December the attache in Tokyo told us his predictions, or whether he was drawing conclusions about a future conflict from information sources which we could not control. That has nothing to do with our having advised the Japanese in Berlin to attack America. ....

To my knowledge there were no official conferences between the two admiralty staffs, that is, official operational conferences between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff. .... I do not know whether you are stressing Pearl Harbor, or the fact that 2 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor we received a telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conflict was to be counted on. I was asked whether we had known of the fact of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and to that I said: "No." I said that we had had no conferences in Berlin between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff.

December 6, 1941: Averell Harriman (London) to Harry Hopkins (Washington):


December 6, 1941: Germans forces are pushed back by a major Russian counter-attack near Moscow. With supply lines badly over-stretched—and temperatures of -34C (-29F) and below making German equipment nearly useless—even Adolf Hitler himself begins to realize that he has drastically underestimated Soviet strength.

Winter 1941: 2.8 million Soviet POW's perish through starvation, exposure, and summary execution in the first 8 months of Barbarossa.

December 7, 1941 Night and Fog Decree:


December 7, 1941: The Japanese attack the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: It was a complete surprise for me and the Naval Operations Staff that this attack (on Pearl Harbor) took place; and it is a complete mistake in judging the mentality of the Japanese to assume that they would have spoken of such a plan to anyone, even inside Japan, who was not directly connected with it. In 1904 they likewise attacked Russian ships "out of the blue" without anyone suspecting anything at all.

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: We never had any military discussions with Japan at all before her entry into the war. Quite on the contrary, he warned Hitler against war with America in view of England's naval superiority and her co-operation with America. ....

First of all, for the reasons which I outlined before, reasons of over-all strategy which motivated Raeder during the entire course of the war. Raeder considered the enemy on the sea primarily, and not on land. If the largest sea power in the world were added to England, which was already superior, then the war would have taken on unbearable proportions for us. Besides, through the reports of our naval attache in Washington, Vice Admiral Witthoft, Raeder was very well informed about the tremendous potential at the disposal of the United States.

I might also say with reference to the conversion of the normal economy into a war economy, that the tremendous outlay of shipyards and installations, as Witthoft stated a few months before the war, permitted the construction of a million tons of shipping each month. These figures were very eloquent and were naturally at the same time a terrible warning to us not to underestimate the armament potential of the United States. ....

In my opinion, that was an absolutely correct measure (to proposed that Japan should attack Singapore) and a correct proposal, which was in line with Raeder's reasoning. He was interested in dealing blows to England's important strategic centers. That he tried to ease our situation is understandable and self-evident. But at no time did he propose that Japan should enter into a war against America, but rather against England. .... I have already stated that before Japan's entry into the war no military discussions with Japan had ever taken place. The Japanese attitude was very reserved. .... We heard about this (Pearl Harbor) for the first time over the radio.

December 9, 1941: Two days before he declares war on the US, Hitler lifts the ban on U-boats operating in US territorial waters. This is to allow Doenitz to deploy 5 U-boats along the America's eastern seaboard in order to be ready to pounce once the declaration of war is made.

December 11, 1941: Hitler addresses the Reichstag:


December 17, 1941: Convoy HG76, escorted by the Royal Navy's first escort aircraft carrier, the HMS Audacity, secures its first kill when it sinks U-131.

December 21, 1941: The escort carrier HMS Audacity is sunk by U-751.

December 31, 1941>: World-wide from January 1941 to year's end, the number of Allied merchant ships sunk by U-boats is 503 (equaling 2,530,011 gross tons) while 35 U-boats are lost.

January 3, 1942: From a conversation between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima, in the presence of Ribbentrop:


January 3, 1942: From a Hitler Order:


January 10, 1942: From a Naval Operations Staff document:


January 11, 1942 Operation Drumbeat: German U-boats begin to sink ships along the American coast. Their first victim is the 9,000 ton British steamer Cyclops which is sunk by U-123 east of Cape Cod. Five German Type XI long-range U-boats will sink 25 ships by the end of February. In the first six months of 1942, 21 U-boats will sink 500 ships and terrorize the US East Coast.

January 12, 1942: Hitler orders Admiral Otto Ciliax, who commands the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the cruiser Prinz Eugen at Brest, to prepare to return to Germany. The new German battleship Tirpitz, sister ship of the Bismarck is ordered to Norway.

January 14, 1942: The German battleship Tirpitz arrives at Trondheim in Norway. Its mission is to threaten the Arctic convoys. The British will not became aware of this threat until the 23rd.

January 29, 1942: RAF Bomber Command mounts an unsuccessful attack on the Tirpitz, at anchor in Trondheim.

Late January, Early February 1942: Reader meets with French Admiral Darlan in Paris.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: At the end of the year 1941 he (Admiral Schultze) mentioned that he (Admiral Darlan) would like to speak to me. Admiral Schultze reported that to me and I told Hitler about it and recommended such a conversation because I thought it would do some good. ....

That it might bring some advantage. The Fuehrer approved this meeting and instructed me as to his views. The meeting took place near Paris on the occasion of an official trip which I made to the French bases at the end of January or beginning of February 1942. I had the impression that the meeting was very satisfactory, inasmuch as Darlan was of the opinion that a peace would be of advantage to both nations and he also appeared to be inclined to co-operate. He stressed, however, that the whole political situation would have to be settled before peace could be concluded. I also showed that I was prepared to meet him concerning the negotiations with the Armistice Commission with respect to heavy guns for big French ships. I reported to the Fuehrer on the results of the meeting. But in this case too the Fuehrer was again hesitant and did not want to make a decision. He said he had to see first how the war went before he could decide upon his final attitude toward France. Besides, that would be a precedent which might have an effect on other nations. So that also was a failure. I did not obtain the relief in the defense of France which I had hoped for and so, in the case of France, this failure was the second reason which contributed later to my asking for my release, because I could not carry my plans through.

February 1, 1942: All U-boats adopt a new Enigma cipher known as 'Triton.' The new cipher replaces the previous cipher, 'Hydra' and has an additional rotor in the Enigma machine. This means that the British are now unable to read U-boat coded communications traffic, seriously affecting their ability re-route their convoys around U-boat wolf packs.

February 8, 1942: While departing by plane from a meeting with Hitler at the Wolf's Lair (Wolfsschanze) at Rastenburg, builder of the Autobahn Dr Fritz Todt, director of the Organization Todt and Reichsminister of Armaments, dies as his Junker 52 aircraft mysteriously explodes.

February 10, 1942: Albert Speer succeeds Fritz Todt as Reich Minister of Armaments.

February 11, 1942: Admiral Ciliax orders his squadron, which includes the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the cruiser Prinz Eugen, to leave Brest and dash through the English Channel for the safety of Kiel in Germany.

February 12, 1942: British aircraft spot the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen as they enter the straits of Dover. They launch MTB attacks, but miss. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau both ultimately hit mines while maneuvering, but are able to continue on towards Kiel.

February 13, 1942: The Scharnhorst puts into Wilhelmshaven in the wee hours, while the Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen reach Kiel a short while later.

February 16, 1942: German U-boats, with their deck guns, bombard oil storage facilities and refineries on the Dutch islands of Aruba and Curacao in the southern Caribbean.

February 23, 1942: The German cruiser Prinz Eugen, sailing to Norway from Kiel, is torpedoed by the British submarine HMS Trident. The Prinz Eugen is forced to return to Germany for repairs.

February 24, 1942: Hitler speaks to the Reich via radio:


February 26, 1942: The RAF launches an attack against the battleship Gneisenau at Kiel's floating dock causing severe damage. The battleship will never again put to sea under her own power.

March 1, 1942: U-656 off Cape Race is sunk by a squadron of VP-82 based at Argentia, Newfoundland.

March 2, 1942: Churchill declares that the Tirpitz is 'the most important naval vessel in the situation today' and believes her destruction will 'profoundly affect the course of the war'.

March 5, 1942: British convoy PQ-12, bound for Murmansk, is spotted by German reconnaissance planes.

March 6, 1942: The Battleship Tirpitz and 3 destroyers set sail from Trondheim to intercept convoy PQ-12. They are spotted by a British submarine which relays the information to the British Admiralty. Bad weather causes Tirpitz to miss PQ-12, and, avoiding an attack by aircraft from HMS Victorious, she heads back to base at Trondheim.

March 12, 1942: Convoy PQ-12 earns the distinction of being the last PQ convoy to sail without losses when it arrives unscathed at Murmansk.

March 15, 1942: An aircraft from a US VP-82 squadron sinks U-503 near the Grand Banks, off Newfoundland.

March 21, 1942: Sauckel is appointed Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz (General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor).

April 1, 1942: The US begins a partial convoy system known as the 'Bucket Brigade,' where ships sail in convoy as close to the coast as possible during daylight hours, and anchor in protected harbors at night. Due to the shortage of escort vessels, continuous convoying is not possible and the 'Bucket Brigade' system is not extended to the Caribbean or the Gulf of Mexico.

April 13, 1942: The first success of the war by a US warship against a U-boat occurs when the destroyer USS Roper sinks U-85 south of Norfolk, Virginia.

April 13, 1942: Berlin Radio broadcasts a report that German military forces in the Katyn forest near Smolensk had uncovered 'a ditch ... 28 meters long and 16 meters wide (92 ft by 52 ft), in which the bodies of 3,000 Polish officers were piled up in 12 layers." The broadcast accuses the Soviets of carrying out the massacre in 1940.

April 18, 1942: In an attempt to reduce the success of the U-boats at night, the entire US eastern seaboard is finally ordered to black-out its lights at night.

April 21, 1942: U-459, the first U-boat tanker, known as a Milch Cow, a submarine capable of refueling and re-arming other U-boats at sea, sets sail for the Atlantic.

April 24, 1942: On Raeder's 66th birthday, the chief Party organ, the Volkischer Beobachter, publishes a feature article about him:


May 14, 1942: From the 'Report of the Commander of Submarines to the Fuehrer ... in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Grossadmiral Raeder):

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: They mean that it was important to us, as a consequence of the discussion with the Fuehrer at his headquarters, to find a good magnetic detonator which would lead to a more rapid sinking of the ships, and thereby achieve the results noted in this report in the war diary ... I mean that not several torpedoes would be required, as heretofore, to sink a ship by long and difficult attack; but that one torpedo, or very few, would suffice to bring about a more speedy loss of the ship and the crew .... The Fuehrer brought up the fact that, in the light of experience, a large percentage of the crews, because of the excellence of the rescue means, were reaching home and were used again and again to man new ships, and he asked whether there might not be some action taken against these rescue ships ....

At this discussion, in which Grossadmiral Raeder participated, I rejected this unequivocally and told him that the only possibility of causing losses among the crews would lie in the attack itself, in striving for a faster sinking of the ship through the intensified effect of weapons. Hence this remark in my war diary. I believe, since I received knowledge here through the prosecution of the discussion between the Fuehrer and Oshima, that this question of the Fuehrer to Grossadmiral Raeder and myself arose out of this discussion ....

If I have not got the old crews any more, I have to have new ones. It makes it more difficult. It says nothing about scaring off there, but the positive fact is stated that new crews have to be trained. ... it depends on the courage, the bravery of the people. The American Secretary Knox said that, if in peacetime—in 1941—the sinkings of German U-boats were not published, he expected it would have a deterrent effect on my U-boats. That was his opinion. I can only say that the silent disappearance through American sinkings in peacetime did not scare off my U-boats. It is a matter of taste ....

He [Hitler] asked whether we could not take action against the crew; and I have already said, after I heard of the Oshima discussion here, that I believe this question to Grossadmiral Raeder and myself was the result of that Oshima discussion. My answer to that, of course, is known: it was 'No ... ' My answer was: Taking action against shipwrecked personnel is out of the question, but it is taken for granted that in a fight, one must use the best possible weapon. Every nation does that .... And also of course, because we considered the crews of the steamers as combatants since they were fighting with weapons."

May 18, 1942: Churchill remains determined—despite increasing losses—to continue the Arctic convoys to Russia as the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm attacks and hits the German heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen off Norway. She will manage to escape to Kiel.

May 26, 1942: In appalling weather, Convoy QP-12 and Convoy PQ-16 are attacked by 260 Luftwaffe aircraft, including He 111 torpedo bombers and some U-boats. QP-12 emerges unscathed, while PQ-16 loses 6 out of 35 ships.

May 31, 1942 Operation Drumbeat: Since January, the U-boats operating along the US eastern seaboard have sunk 111 vessels.

June 5, 1942: From the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff:


June 16, 1942 Jodl's diary:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: The relations between Brazil and Germany at this time could not have been worse. The Germans were very much persecuted and treated very badly. Germany's economic interests were heavily impaired. The Brazilians were already completely on the side of the United States. They had allowed United States air bases to be established along the Brazilian coast, and also intelligence stations. They themselves confirmed that they had destroyed a German U-boat; and, on the other side, the German U-boats had also attacked Brazilian ships, for the Brazilian ships were not illuminated according to regulations and consequently could not be recognized as Brazilian ships. Germany had previously asked all of the South American countries to illuminate their ships in such a way that their nationality could be distinguished at night. Then there were air attacks on U-boats of the Axis Powers, and they could have been carried out only from Brazilian bases. At this request of the Naval Operations Staff to the Fuehrer, the Fuehrer decreed that once again we should ask the Italians what intelligence reports they had received; and Italy in turn confirmed that some weeks before Italian U-boats, which had been operating together with ours, had been attacked near the Brazilian coast. Likewise the Brazilian Air Ministry had made known the fact that Brazilian aircraft or United States aircraft coming from Brazilian air bases had attacked Axis U-boats.

On the basis of that confirmation the Fuehrer permitted the use of weapons against Brazilian ships along the Brazilian coast. A plan was worked out, according to which a certain wave of U-boats, which left the French coast in June to proceed into the Atlantic, was to go to the Brazilian coast. The Fuehrer had ordered in particular that this was not to be mere pin-pricks but rather a serious enterprise. This operation was later stopped and not carried through. I am sorry that I am not able to say for what reason. But it can be seen from our document which gives the statements made in the War Diary.

Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office declares that an aggravation of the conflict with Brazil is undesirable in view of the attitude of Argentina and Chile and that, previous to measures of war against Brazil, consultations must be held with Italy and Japan. Acting on the report of the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Fuehrer has ordered on 30 May, that the Naval Operations Staff is to ascertain, by inquiring in Rome, whether the Brazilian reports about warlike actions against Axis U-boats are correct. The inquiry by the Naval Operations Staff shows that Italian U-boats were attacked on 22 and 26 May at the northeast corner of Brazil by airplanes which beyond a doubt had started from a Brazilian air base. The Naval Operations Staff transmit, moreover, the text of the official communique of the Brazilian Air Ministry about the fighting and propose to put into action near the main Brazilian harbors during the period from 3-8 August 10 U-boats to sail from 22 June to 4 July from ports in western France, along with the tanker U-460. The order for execution must be given to the U-boats by 15 June at the latest. After the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had reported this to the Fuehrer at the Berghof on the afternoon of 15 June, the Fuehrer declared himself in agreement with the intentions of the Naval Operations Staff but ordered, however, that before any final decision is made, the political situation be examined once again by the Foreign Office.

July 1, 1942: U-456 spots PQ-17 and flashes an alarm, but is driven under almost immediately by the destroyer HMS Leamington. The convoy is locate and shadowed by U-408, U-255 and U-703, in order to provide reports on the convoy while reinforcements are sent to the area.

July 1, 1942: The advance of Axis troops on Alexandria is blunted by the Allies at the First Battle of El Alamein.

July 2, 1942: U-88 spots and reports PQ-17 and its reverse convoy QP-13 (35 freighters and 15 escorts) as they pass each other. German forces are ordered not to attack the empty convoy QP-13, but to concentrate everything on destroying PQ-17.

July 3, 1942: 11 Some U-boats in the area begin to close in on convoy PQ-17; others place themselves along its route. 6 U-boats make attack runs throughout the day, but have no success. They subsequently lose contact or fall behind the convoy.

July 4, 1942: Convoy PQ-17 and the 7 warships of the cruiser force that had come up during the night come under heavy attack from Luftwaffe dive-bombers and torpedo planes. British First Sea Lord, Dudley Pound, mistakenly concludes that the German surface force has sailed to attack the PQ-17 and will in all probability wipe out the convoy along with the covering cruiser force. He makes the catastrophic decision to withdraw the cruiser force and 'scatter' PQ-17, in the hope that this might save most of the convoy. To the glee of their crews, U-703 sinks 2 merchants, U-88 sinks 2, U-334 sinks 1 and U-456 sinks 1. The Luftwaffe, however, having difficulty in differentiating between friend and foe, damages U-334 and U-456, forcing them to return to Norway for repairs.

July 5, 1942: Admiral Raeder receives Hitler's approval to use the German surface force to finish off PQ-17. Caution is to be exercised in order not to risk the Battleship Tirpitz, pocket battleship Admiral Scheer or heavy cruiser Hipper. Escorted by 7 destroyers and 2 E-boats, the 3 big German ships get underway, and an hour later an RAF Coastal Command Catalina reports the force as at sea. Two hours later, HMS Unshaken radios in a sighting and an exact description of the force. Admiral Raeder, on receiving intelligence reports of these allied sightings, becomes nervous, cancels the sortie, and orders the surface fleet to return to port.

July 6, 1942 Operation Drumbeat: U-132 sinks 3 merchant ships after entering the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the Canadian East Coast July 15, 1942: When all the ships of convoy PQ-17 arrive in port, a tally of the losses reveals 24 ships sunk for 141,721 tons: 8 ships sunk by the Luftwaffe, 7 by U-boats, and another 9 by combined Luftwaffe/U-boat kills. In addition, 210 aircraft, 430 tanks, 3,350 trucks, and 99,316 tons of general cargo arrive at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean. The Germans suffer no U-boat losses and lose only 5 planes.

August 1, 1942: An advanced convoy system is instituted along the US Eastern Seaboard, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean.

August 2, 1942: The British Convoy 'Pedestal' gets underway from Britain on a mission to the island of Malta, in the Mediterranean. The 14 fast merchant ships, loaded with fuel, food, and ammunition, are escorted by 2 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 14 destroyers, and 3 anti-aircraft cruisers.

August 11, 1942: Helmut Rosenbaum's U-73 sinks the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle.

August 19, 1942: The Dieppe Raid, also known as The Battle of Dieppe or Operation Jubilee, begins. Six thousand infantrymen—predominantly Canadian—supported by large British naval and Allied air force contingents, invade the German-occupied port of Dieppe in France. Of the 6,086 men who make it ashore, 3,623 will either be killed, wounded, or captured.

August 20, 1942: From a Hitler speech:


August 20, 1942: Brazil declares war on Germany, in response to U-boat attacks.

September 5, 1942>: From notes of an OKW discussion:


September 5, 1942 Battle of the St. Lawrence: The carriers SS Saganaga and SS Lord Strathcona are sunk by U-513 at Bell Island, Newfoundland. Note: Bell Island is the only location in North America to be subject to direct attack by German forces in World War II.

September 8, 1942: Churchill addresses the House:



September 12, 1942 Laconia Incident: Lieutenant Commander Hartenstein and the U-156 sink the armed British liner Laconia in the South Atlantic. Mistaken for a troop ship, the Laconia carries 2,732 passengers; 136 crew, 285 British soldiers, 80 civilian passengers, including women and children, 160 Polish guards and 1,800 Italian prisoners of war. Realizing his mistake, Hartenstein radio's the following message to headquarters while assisting survivors: "Sunk by Hartenstein British 'Laconia'. Grid FF 7721 310 degrees. Unfortunately with 1500 Italian POWs. So far 90 fished. 157 cubic meters (of oil). 19 eels (torpedoes), trade wind 3, request orders." Doenitz, though in principle reluctant to expose his boat's to attack by aircraft while performing surface rescue operations, decides to order all U-boats in the area to assist.

September 12, 1942 Laconia Incident: Lieutenant Commander Hartenstein broadcast's a message in English:


September 15, 1942 Laconia Incident: Flying the Red Cross flag, U-506, commanded by Erich Wurdeman, and Harro Schacht's U-507, arrive just around noon, and immediately begin rescue operations; U-156 remains on the scene.

September 16, 1942 Laconia Incident: At 11.25 AM, the concentration of U-boats is over-flown by an American B-24 Liberator bomber operating out of Ascension island. The survivors wave to the plane, and the U-boats, with Red Cross flags draped over their decks, signal for help. The Liberator's pilot, Lieutenant James D. Harden, radio's Ascension for instructions. Captain Robert C. Richardson III, the officer on duty, orders an attack. Harden obeys, bombing survivors and boats both. The U-boats dive and flee.

September 17, 1942 Laconia Order: From the naval war diary signed by Doenitz:


September 17, 1942 Laconia Order: From a top-secret order sent to all commanding officers of U-boats:


September 17, 1942 Laconia Incident: A message is sent from Schacht's U-507:


September 20, 1942 Laconia Incident: A message is sent by Schacht informing U-boat Command that his U-507 is towing four boats full of survivors to safety; "with British in tow."

September 24, 1942: Hitler relieves General Franz Halder from duty, placing him in the so-called 'Fuehrer Reserve.'

September 25, 1942: From the war diary of Doenitz, Commander of U-boats:


September 27, 1942: Radio signal to all U-boats:


September 28, 1942: The Antonico is torpedoed, set afire, and sunk of French Guiana. From the eye-witness account of the Antonico's second officer:


September 30, 1942: Hitler speaks in Berlin:


October 7, 1942: Hitler personally pens a note in the Wehrmacht daily communique:


October 10, 1942: Hans Ibbeken's U-178 sinks the ocean liner Duchess of Atholl.

October, 1942: In the Battle of the Atlantic, the dominance of Doenitz's U-boats begins a decline as the Allies sink more U-boats this month than the Germans can launch. Though the battle is far from over, the Germans no longer have things going all their own way. (Read)

October 14, 1942: From the minutes of a meeting of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht:


October 18, 1942: Hitler issues his infamous Commando Order. This order must not be distributed in writing by flotilla leaders, section commanders, or officers of this rank. After verbal notification to subordinate sections the above officers must hand this order over to the next higher section, which is responsible for its withdrawal and destruction.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I passed it (the Commando Order) on through the Naval Operations Staff. ....

I did not recommend the order, but I received it as drafted by the Fuehrer, and as it came into my hands, I passed it on as ordered with the same remark as to how far it has to be passed on and how it has to be returned. It was all ordered by Hitler in detail. It was decisive for me that in one of the first paragraphs the reason for this order was given, and the reasons why Hitler considered a deviation from international law justified. Moreover, a short time before I had been in Dieppe in France, and there I was informed that on the occasion of the Commando action of the British in France, the prisoners, I believe they were from the Labor Service, who were working along the coast, had been shackled with a noose around their neck and the other end of the noose around the bent-back lower leg, so that when the leg weakened, the noose tightened and the man choked. ....

I passed it on because it was an order from my Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, in one of the last paragraphs it said that that order should not be applied for the treatment of prisoners taken after a naval action or after large scale landing operations and I, as well as many others in the Navy, concentrated our attention on this point because that was our main activity. But I saw no reason to raise objections to the Fuehrer on account of this order which I thought justified in this way. And I would like to state very clearly that I, as a soldier, was not in a position to go to my Supreme Commander and Chief of State to tell him, "Show me your reasons for this order," that would have been mutiny and could not have been done under any circumstances.

From Schulte-Monting's IMT testimony: May I just say in conclusion that this postscript has been confirmed and that the Navy, in this case Raeder, had no influence on these matters. If you ask me whether I approved that order or something of the sort I would give you my personal opinion of the matters which Raeder and I discussed. The fact is that in this war, for the first time, a form of sabotage was applied, whether behind the lines by means of air landings or otherwise. ....

I have to comment on that order which was issued earlier. The preamble of that order said that, since there w as knowledge of orders to the Allied soldiers or—I do not remember the exact wording any more—since these soldiers were given orders not to bother taking German prisoners but rather to shoot them while carrying out their work in the so-called Commando raids, the following directives had to be issued.

At that time I discussed this matter with Raeder, of course, and I can merely state my personal opinion. I felt that I could believe this preamble because I am of the opinion that if I resorted to, let us say, sabotage behind the lines then of course I could not be bothered with taking prisoners, because then the element of surprise would be excluded. If, therefore, a troop of three to five men, a so-called Commando undertaking, is sent behind the lines in order to destroy enemy installations, then of course they cannot burden themselves with prisoners without running the risk of being killed themselves or of being recognized before they can carry out their undertaking. Therefore I considered this preamble quite credible and I expressly said so at that time. .... I said, here is a fact of which we were informed only by the Armed Forces communique, and that Raeder and the High Command had not been heard on this point. That is what I stated.

October 23, 1942: Raeder writes a cover letter to Admiral Boehm: "To my regret I have to send you enclosed, for your personal information, a letter from Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to Prime Minister Quisling." From the letter from Lammers to Quisling:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: This influence (on France and German relations), when there was any, was in the first place directed as much as possible towards improving the defense of the country. In the second place, there were above all humanitarian reasons. I often visited naval and submarine bases in France. During these journeys I got some knowledge of conditions in France. I saw that in 1940 and still in 1941 the population lived just as if it were at peace, completely undisturbed. Consequently I believed, since the Fuehrer had shown so much moderation on the occasion of the Armistice, that a basis could be found which would draw France—whose government was after all collaborationist—closer to us.

I was informed that Laval was really sincere in his opinion that only co-operation between France and Germany could guarantee a lasting peace in Europe for the future. Therefore I suggested to him whether he himself could not try to do something in that direction. He did not intend to do this, and I referred to it again when I heard that Admiral Darlan was trying to work more closely with our naval commander in France, Admiral Schultze. That was first achieved in the field of intelligence, where his services were very useful to us.

October 28, 1942: Hitler's notorious order Commando Order (above, October 18) is promulgated to naval commands:


October 30, 1942: HMS Petard captures U-559 in the Mediterranean. Lieutenant Anthony Fasson, Able Seaman Colin Grazier, and 16 year-old Tommy Brown (a NAAFI canteen assistant) board the U-boat and retrieve Enigma code books. Fasson and Grazier drown as the U-boat sinks, and will be posthumously awarded the George Cross.

November 2, 1942 Battle of the St. Lawrence: The SS Rosecastle and PLM 27 are sunk by U-518 with the loss of 69 lives.

STRONG>November 7, 1942: Intelligence reports from late October, of an Allied convoy that had been spotted in the Atlantic, come to Jodl's attention. He concludes that their mission is probably an invasion of Malta. (Brown)

November 8, 1942: The convoy first spotted in late October disembarks its troops and equipment in North Africa, as Operation Torch begins. Hitler and his generals are caught totally by surprise. (Brown)

November 8, 1942: Hitler speaks in Munich:


November 11, 1942: Ernst-Ulrich Bruller's U-407 sinks the ocean liner RMS Viceroy of India. Only four crew members are lost out of a total of 432 crew and 22 passengers. Survivors are picked up by the Royal Navy destroyer HMS Boadicea.

November 14, 1942: Gustav Poel's U-413 sinks the ocean liner Warwick Castle.

December 14, 1942: From an internal document:


December 17, 1942: United Nations Statement: "...those responsible for these crimes shall not escape retribution..."

December 31, 1942 The Battle of the Barents Sea: The heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper; pocket battleship Luetzow; and destroyers Friedrich Eckholdt, Richard Beitzen, Theodor Riedel, Z 29, Z 30, and Z 31 attack Convoy JW 51B comprised of fourteen merchant ships escorted by the destroyers HMS Achates, Orwell, Oribi, Onslow, Obedient, and Obdurate; the Flower class corvettes Rhododendron and Hyderabad; the minesweeper HMS Bramble; and two trawlers Vizalma and Northern Gem. In the end, the Nazis will lose one destroyer and the British one aging destroyer and a minesweeper. The attack is ultimately a humiliating failure for the Germans; all fourteen of the merchant ships will reach their destinations in Russia.

January 1, 1943: Hitler throws a major tantrum upon being informed of the humiliation on the Barents Sea. Declaring surface ships worthless, Hitler threatens to have them all decommissioned and utilized as scrap.

January 6, 1943: After a stormy interview, Raeder tenders his resignation. Hitler accepts. From a record of the meeting in Raeder's handwriting:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: At that moment I had the impression, when he (Hitler) made such serious accusations and when he considerably contradicted his previous judgments, that maybe he wanted to get rid of me, and l therefore considered that that was a particularly favorable moment to leave. .... Yes (it was possible to resign), but in this case, of course, there were two prerequisites. The first was that Hitler himself did not like me any more and I knew it, so that it would not be insubordination if I threw up my post for some reason or other.

Secondly, because it was possible, as I pointed out in that conversation, for the change to take place under peaceful conditions so that the Navy would not suffer by it. If I had left because of a quarrel, then that would have had a very bad effect on the Navy because it might have meant a certain split between the Navy and Hitler, and I had particularly to preserve unity, at that critical moment of the war. ....

I had been in the service for 15 years, and I could tell him, "If that is the way you yourself judge me, then there is no sense in your continuing to work with me." That was a favorable opportunity which made it permissible for me to ask him to release me. But what one could not do was to throw up the job and give the impression of being insubordinate. That had to be avoided at all costs, I would never have done that. I was too much of a soldier for that.

January 10, 1943: From a memorandum by Raeder:

From the IMT testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner: Admiral Doenitz' activity as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy began with a very strong opposition to Hitler. It was Hitler's intention to scrap the large ships of the Navy, that is to say the remaining battleships and cruisers. Admiral Raeder had already rejected that plan ... Apart from that, Hitler's respect for Doenitz was due to the fact that every statement which the Admiral made was absolutely reliable and absolutely honest. The Admiral attached particular importance to the fact that particularly unfavorable developments, failures, and mistakes were to be reported at headquarters without digression, objectively, and simply. ... wishes of the Party were, in my opinion, only put to the Navy in three cases. One was the question of the churches, which for the most part came up during the time of Admiral Raeder. I think it is generally known that the Navy retained its original religious organization and, in fact, extended it as the Navy grew.

From Doenitz's IMT testimony: It (appointment as Kriegsmarine commander) was self-evidently a purely military position, namely, that of the first soldier at the head of the Navy. My appointment to this position also came about because of purely military reasons which motivated Grossadmiral Raeder to propose my name for this position. Purely military considerations were the decisive ones in respect to this appointment.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: The Fuehrer had ordered that I propose two admirals as successors. I suggested in writing first...Admiral Carls, who was the senior and has vast knowledge of the entire conduct of naval policy. In the event that the Fuehrer should want to manifest that he now was placing U-boat warfare in the foreground I suggested Admiral Doenitz, who was the greatest authority in that field. Political considerations of any kind were not mentioned at all; it was purely an official, technical appointment.

January 30, 1943: Raeder resigns from command of the Kriegsmarine, becoming Admiral Inspector of the Navy, an honorary position. He is replaced by Doenitz.

From The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich by William L. Shirer: Hitler had become furious with Raeder, who had commanded the German Navy since 1928, for the Navy's failure to destroy Allied convoys to Russia in the Arctic Ocean and for heavy losses suffered there. In a hysterical outburst at headquarters, on January 1, the warlord had ordered the immediate decommissioning of the German High Seas Fleet. The vessels were to be broken up for scrap. On January 6 there was a stormy showdown between Hitler and Raeder at the Wolfschanze headquarters. The Fuehrer accused the Navy of inaction and lack of will to fight and take risks. Raeder thereupon asked to be relieved of his command, and his resignation was formally and publicly accepted on January 30. Doenitz, the new Commander in Chief, had been commander of U-boats, knew little of the problems of surface vessels and henceforth concentrated on submarine warfare.

February 1, 1943: From the Manchester Guardian:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: I should like to say briefly that on several occasions before the war I asked the Fuehrer to relieve me of my post, or I presented him with an ultimatum. I should like briefly to cite two cases as examples. In November 1938 in the presence of General Keitel I made a report to the Fuehrer about the type of ships and our plans as to how the ships should be developed further. On this occasion the Fuehrer, in a manner defying explanation, began to attack everything that we had built and were building, including the plans for the Bismarck, and to declare them wrong. Later I found out that things like that happened whenever some persons of his entourage, who knew very little about such things, gave him their opinion, that he always followed it up, probably wanting—as I told myself later—to check whether the things he had been told were actually correct.

This case, however, was so extreme that I could not do anything else but simply pick up my plans, put them in my brief case, and leave the room. General Keitel was present. The Fuehrer followed me to the door, asked me to come in again, softened his accusations, and asked me not to resign now under any circumstances.

The second case was a purely personal one, but it is rather typical. His naval adjutant, who had just been appointed, wanted to marry a young girl who had a very unsavory reputation at the University of Kiel. I told him I would never consent to the marriage. The Fuehrer had the girl introduced to him and decided he had nothing against the marriage; I left the Berghof and sent the Fuehrer a letter via a staff: officer in which I told him that I would refuse my consent, that the officer would not remain in the Navy should he marry, or else I would not remain. I asked the officer who acted as my courier to bring back the answer since I wanted to reach a decision at once. The Fuehrer had the officer wait 2 days at the Berghof and then sent him back to me with a letter saying:

"Very well, the officer cannot marry and remain in the Navy and he will not be used further as a naval adjutant; someone else will be put in his place. He will become some sort of leader in my National Socialist Motor Corps and will then serve as one of my Party adjutants."

It was also typical of the Fuehrer that, to a certain degree, he wanted to see his will carried through; but this man was out of the Navy, and I could make my conviction felt in this case. Under these circumstances I declared myself ready to continue in office. That was at the beginning of 1939; in the course of the spring, however, I asked again whether I could not be relieved of my position now, since I had served for many years in the Navy and I did not believe I would be able to maintain the dignity of the office much longer. I suggested to him that perhaps in October 1939 I should leave my post. The Fuehrer refused at the time, and on 1 October we were at war, and in time of war I did not believe that I could leave the Navy under any circumstances unless it was very urgent, especially since I considered myself totally responsible for all preparations and for the training of the Navy. In the course of the war our co-operating which up until then, aside from such incidents, had been quite congenial, since the Fuehrer had always made an effort to show me respect, our connection gradually became very strained during the war. The Fuehrer became more nervous when I made reports, flared up in rage when there were divergences of opinion or if there had been any incidents, as, for instance, a technical defect or poor performance by a ship. It happened again and again that his entourage influenced him before I could actually explain matters to him, and I was called in subsequently to set him straight on these matters. In that way unpleasant scenes ensued which wore me out.

One point about which the Fuehrer was especially sensitive was the large ships. He was always uneasy when our large ships were out on the high seas and were carrying on raids against shipping. The loss of a ship, such as the Graf Spree or later the Bismarck, he considered a tremendous loss of prestige; and matters like that, therefore, excited him tremendously. That went on until the end of 1942. Then there came—and this particularly impressed me—my defeat in the consultation with the Fuehrer on questions dealing with Norway, France, and above all, Russia. In the final analysis he always listened more to the Party people as, for example, Terboven, than to an old officer. That led to a situation which could not be tolerated for any length of time. One of the basic characteristics of the Fuehrer was a tremendous suspicion toward anyone and everyone, but especially directed against old officers who had come from the old Wehrmacht and of whom he always assumed—despite all well-intentioned treatment—that in their hearts they did not share these feelings which he had to demand of them. Especially the case of Russia had led me to so many conflicts with him that our relations were strongly influenced thereby. Indeed, the man who compiled all these war diaries and minutes, Admiral Assmann, summed it up on one occasion at the conclusion of such a discussion with the words; "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, therefore, is in complete opposition to the Fuehrer in this matter."

At the end of 1942, just after I had had to put an end to the entire Norwegian question, an incident occurred which led to the end. There was to have been an attack on a convoy which was going to Murmansk or Archangel from England. It was in December at a time when in those northern regions there are just 1 or 2 hours of light and hence no favorable weather for fighting by large ships when up against large numbers of destroyers. The ships, together with the destroyers, had started on their journey and had reached the convoy while it was still light. But since daylight soon disappeared and darkness fell and since the convoy was guarded by many destroyers, the admiral considered it expedient to withdraw the big ships from the battle. That was the only correct decision for he might have lost them ad by torpedo attack. This fact, and secondly the fact that unfortunately the radio connection between this admiral and the Naval Operations Staff was made difficult and at times completely broken off by static, caused the Fuehrer to become extremely excited in his headquarters where I reported to him everything I found out myself. The whole day was spent with questions back and forth, and even in the evening I could not give him a clear picture. This excited him extremely. Through Admiral Krancke he had all sorts of insults transmitted to me and demanded that I report to him immediately; and I could see that very strong friction would result. I arranged it so that I did not need to report to him until 6 days later on 6 January so that the atmosphere could first cool off a little. On 6 January I could go to him with a complete report; and in the evening, at a discussion at which Field Marshal Keitel was also present, he made a speech of about an hour's duration in which he made derogatory remarks about everything that the Navy had done so far, in direct contrast to every judgment passed on the Navy up until this time. From this I saw that he was anxious to bring about a break.

I personally was firmly prepared to seize this opportunity to resign, especially as it became ever clearer that the war was becoming a pure U-boat war, and I could therefore feel that I could leave at this moment with a clear conscience.

After the Fuehrer had concluded his speech I asked to be permitted to speak with him alone. Field Marshal Keitel and the stenographers left and I told him that I was asking for my resignation as I could see from his words that he was entirely dissatisfied with me and therefore this was the proper moment for me to leave. As always, he tried at first to dissuade me but I remained adamant and told him that a new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy who would have complete responsibility would definitely have to be appointed. He said that it would be a great burden for him if I were to leave now since for one thing the situation was very critical—Stalingrad was impending—and secondly, since he had already been accused of dismissing so many generals. In the eyes of the outside world it would incriminate him if I were to leave at this point. I told him that I would do everything I could to prevent that happening. If he wanted to give the appearance as far as the outside world was concerned that I had not resigned because of a clash, then he could make me a general inspector with some sort of nominal title, which would create the impression that I was still with the Navy and that my name was still connected with the Navy. This appealed to him at once and I told him on 6 January that I wanted to be dismissed on 30 January. At this point I had concluded 10 years of service as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy under him. He agreed to this proposal and asked me to suggest two successors so that he could make a choice.

On 30 January he then personally dismissed me by appointing me Admiral Inspector of the Navy. He said that he would still on occasion ask me for advice; but that never happened. I was merely sent out twice, once to Bulgaria when the King of Bulgaria was buried and once to Hungary, to the Hungarian Regent Horthy to bring him a gift from the Fuehrer. .... I had no functions and received no orders. .... I do believe that he wanted to get rid of me at this time, for I was in a certain way an inconvenience for him. This one case which I described, where I had my way in the end, he had never forgotten. ...during the war I felt I could not leave the Navy, which was already in such a difficult situation, and I believed I enjoyed its confidence to a certain extent so that I could be useful.

November 1, 1943 Moscow Declaration:


January 10, 1944: Memorandum For (Naval Historian) Vice Admiral Assmann For His Own Use, Signed by Raeder:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: He (Vice Admiral Assmann) was a very able historian. I had confidence that he would write history correctly. In the most important sphere we were far behind the Versailles Treaty, as I explained to you very clearly. Possibly we infringed on it the other way round, by not doing as much as we could have done. ....

No, he (Assmann) is wrong. It (Versailles) was not violated at all in this point (10 January 1920), and the reason it started so early was because all the ex-U-boat commanders and U-boat officers and technicians were out of a job and offered their services to maintain technical developments in U-boats abroad; that is why it was so early. But that has nothing to do with me because I had no say in these matters then. At that time I was working on the Navy Archives. .... A good historian can make mistakes too if his information is wrong. I merely said I had confidence in him...what he says about the building of U-boats is wrong. ....

All these things were only preparations made outside Germany. The point under discussion is whether the Finnish U-boats were constructed with the help of German designers. That is true. German designers were not forbidden to help Finnish designers to draft designs for U-boats. We particularly restricted ourselves with regard to the construction of U-boats; and in 1938 we had still not built the 45 percent which we were entitled to build, so we made an application for permission to build up to 100 percent; and this was agreed on, and came into effect, as appears from the text of the English treaty, after a friendly discussion with the British Admiralty at the end of 1938. At the beginning of the war we still did not have 100 percent. We were always behind with the construction of submarines. Admiral Assmann, who probably had no up-to-date knowledge of these matters, is quite wrong. I can swear to that. ....

In 1939 we entered the war with 40 submarines-I do not know the exact number. This is either a misprint or quite an incredible figure. As you know, we started the war with—I think—26 U-boats capable of sailing the Atlantic, and in addition a number of smaller boats. I cannot tell you for certain now what was under construction at the beginning of the war but there was no intention of this kind. That was precisely the accusation made against me-that I did not have sufficient U-boats built in good time. ....

It is perfectly possible that in this case Admiral Assmann has taken two things together. All U-boats and ships were, of course, included in the budget and in this way sanctioned. This budget was drafted at the end of the year and published before the year to which it applied. As this large figure suddenly appears in this document, it is perfectly possible that here the Figure 118 originates on the basis of the agreement with England made on 30 or 31 December. It is perfectly natural that we should include in the budget all the other U-boats which we were allowed to build to complete the 100 percent. This does not necessarily mean that we started to build the U-boats in 1938. Incidentally I think we might have perhaps begun, because one can only build so and so many U-boats in any one year. I think that this explanation, which occurred to me when I saw the words "Naval Budget Department," is a perfectly correct one.

It is an utter exaggeration. First of all, violations—as have been proved here in detail—were mostly of a very minor nature; and only the number of deviations may have given the impression that there were many violations. Secondly, in its essential points, we never actually filled the quotas allowed by the Versailles Treaty; in fact, we remained below the figures granted. Besides, only defense measures are involved, very primitive defense measures—Assmann's representations are just a great exaggeration.

Assmann was a naval officer who was not used at the front any more. He was a very clever writer who had written a few volumes about the first World War. He wrote very well, but even the volumes on the naval warfare during the first World War were corrected a great deal by the persons concerned; but against him and his ability to write history nothing can be said. .... The only thing I am not sure about is the 900-ton type; I cannot quite explain that. I cannot remember that at that time we were building 900-ton boats. Apart from the 250-ton type, our first types were 550-tons, and only then did the 740-ton boats come. Perhaps he is thinking of those when he says 900-tons. We did not actually build 900-ton boats.

...we included these later boats in the budget and had ordered them after we had seen Admiral Cunningham and his staff in Berlin on 30 December and had reached a friendly understanding in accordance with the agreement, allowing us to build 100 percent. The remark read at the beginning, saying that we had committed most violations in this sphere, is a complete untruth. Until the beginning of the war we only built such U-boats as we were allowed to build; that is to say, first 45 percent and later 100 percent. It was a great mistake, of course, that we did it. .... May I, perhaps, add that apart from the submarine problem, the question of two heavy cruisers, which we had originally dropped, was also settled. We only wanted to build three for the time being; and now we were asking for assent to build the other two, to which, we were entitled. That was also agreed upon in accordance with the agreement.

July 12, 1944: An extract from a lecture by Flottenintendan Thiele given at the German Naval Training Center for Administrative Officers in Prague:

From Raeder's IMT testimony: Of course it was a violation, but I have explained here at length that there was no question of building new battle cruisers but of utilizing the two armored ships which had already been granted us; and I said that in 1934 Hitler had only given me permission to enlarge somewhat the plans for these ships, so that the armor might be heavier. I see from this that it was not until March 1935, when it was certain that the treaty would be concluded and also that England would allow us to build such ships through this treaty in a few months' time that the Fuehrer sanctioned the plans projected for the 26,500 ton ships which were to be the first of the battleships in the new program; and they were then begun. So that the three 28 cm turrets—that is, the offensive weapons which he had not yet approved in 1934—were thrown in. ....

We had U-boat parts manufactured abroad and only at the beginning of 1935 did we bring them in and assemble them, when the naval treaty was certain. .... It was clear that we had to train personnel in good time so that crews might be available for our increased naval forces. .... We wished in no circumstance to create the impression that we were increasing the offensive power of our ships. ....

All our evasions of the Versailles Treaty were due to our desire to be able to defend our country more efficiently than we had been allowed to. I have proved here that in the Versailles regulations the only points restricted were those unfavorable to the defense of our country and favoring aggression from without. As regards the ships, I may add that we could never complete any very great number of ships, and consequently we were interested in increasing as far as possible the power of resistance, that is, their seagoing security, et cetera. At no time did we increase the offensive power above the strength which was permitted.

Affidavit of Reich Defence Minister Dr. Otto Gessler: I, Gessler, have known the former Grand Admiral Raeder personally since about the middle of the 1920's when I was Reich Minister for Defense. Raeder was then Inspector of the Educational System in the Navy. I always knew Raeder as a man of irreproachable, chivalrous character, as a man conscious of his duty. As to the subject of the indictment, I know very little. Raeder visited me repeatedly after my release from imprisonment by the Gestapo in March, 1945, when I lay in the Hedwig Hospital in Berlin, and he also made arrangements for me to get home, as I was ill and completely exhausted. I told him then about the ill-treatment which I had suffered, especially the torture. He was obviously surprised and incensed about this. He said he would report it to the Fuehrer I asked him at once to refrain from that, for I had been told officially before that the torture, that all of this was taking place at the explicit order of Hitler. Moreover, I knew definitely that I would immediately be rearrested, since on my release I had signed the well-known declaration, and could not even obtain a confirmation of my detention in order to get a ticket for my trip home.

I heard nothing about secret rearmament in the Navy, neither during my term of office, nor later. During my term of office, until January, 1928, Grand Admiral Raeder could not have been responsible either, for at that time he was not Chief of the Naval Command. At the time of the National Socialist regime, I was both ignored and snubbed by my former department. One of the few exceptions to this was Admiral Raeder. Before 1939, he invited me a third time to visit the cruiser Nuremberg, although I had refused twice. During the visit in June, 1939, he came to Kiel personally to greet me. At that time we also discussed the political situation. I expressed the apprehension that an attack on Poland would mean a European war. Raeder declared positively that he considered it out of the question that Hitler would attack Poland. When this did happen later, I explained this to myself on the grounds that Hitler liked to place even the highest military leaders face to face with accomplished facts.

From Raeder's IMT testimony: When Dr. Gessler, who in spite of my objections had been kept for several months in a concentration camp, returned from the concentration camp and informed me that he was in extremely pitiful condition, and that in spite of my request in August, when he was sent to the concentration camp and when I had asked the Fuehrer through Admiral Wagner for Dr. Gessler to be questioned quickly because he was certainly innocent in connection with the assassination attempt, so that he could be released as soon as possible... I always made serious protests, and that I have proved here, and the adjutant, General Schmundt, told me, "You will be most successful if you try to influence the Fuehrer personally when you are alone with him and tell him quite openly what you think." This is important enough to mention and I must say it.

Well, Dr. Gessler came back from the concentration camp and told me that during his first interrogation—at that time I had not yet had a chance to intervene—he had been tortured. That was the first time that I heard that anywhere in Germany anybody was tortured. There is a letter from Dr. Gessler about that—that I told him immediately, "I am going to the Fuehrer at once to tell him about this because I cannot imagine that he knows about that." Gessler begged me—when he confirmed that letter—for goodness sake not to go to the Fuehrer then, because that would endanger his, Gessler's, life. I said I would answer for it that nothing would happen to him, and that I would still try to approach the Fuehrer.

During the whole of the ensuing period I attempted to approach the Fuehrer, who was not at headquarters. When I was informed in April that he was in Berlin, which was already under heavy attack, I tried to approach the Fuehrer day after day by calling Admiral Voss over the telephone. That was no longer possible, and after I received that information the first thing I did was that I went, together with my wife, to the lake which was behind our house and tore off my Party Emblem and threw it into the lake. I told that to Admiral Voss but unfortunately I could not tell it to the Fuehrer any more. That can be seen from the letter which Dr. Gessler wrote, and we would have liked to have him as a witness, but his state of health did not permit it.

 





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