Nobody here had spoken of socialism. We talked about socialism on April 16, when we buried the combatants who fell victims of the attacks by U.S. warplanes manned by Cuban mercenaries and deceitfully carrying painted Cuban flags. They even had Stevenson say a big lie at the United Nations when he was an Ambassador, the same official explanation they gave when they said that they were rebel Cuban Air Force planes.

Actually, it served as a warning about something we were expecting. We foresaw an imminent mercenary landing in the attempt to destroy our small Air Force, which they were unable to because our fighter planes were scattered and the base was defended by anti-aircraft batteries. They destroyed part of it, but we still had more planes than pilots and the ones left operational were enough for the time the adventure lasted.

In one of its sections the lawsuit reads: "In this token, it may be illustrative for this Court that, on March 17, 1960, at a meeting attended by Vice-President Richard Nixon --an angel-- "Secretary of State Christian Herter --who was later not elected president-- Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, Under Secretary of State Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, Admiral Arleigh Burke of the Joint Chief of Staff, CIA Director Allen Dulles, the high-ranking CIA officers Richard Bissell and J.C. King and the White House officials Gordon Gray and General Andrew J. Goodpaster, the United States President approved the so-called "Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" --a number of brutal actions are mentioned before in the document-- proposed by the CIA.

Among other things, that program enabled the creation of a secret intelligence and action organization within Cuba, for which the CIA allocated the necessary funds. In a recently declassified memorandum --they declassified it because almost 40 years have gone by, and it is a standard procedure-- on that meeting, General Goodpaster noted: "'The President" --it is President Eisenhower-- "said that he knows of no better plan for dealing with this situation. The great problem is leakage and breach of security. Everyone must be prepared to swear that he [Eisenhower] has not heard of it. [...] He said our hand should not show in anything that is done."

Serious things were already taking place here. In August 1959 pirate attacks and bombings began, sugar cane fields were set on fire by planes coming from the United States and the ship La Coubre was blown up resulting in the death of 101 Cubans. The meeting had been held a few days before. Actually, that was a formal meeting, especially because the CIA had already suggested my assassination before the end of 1959, on December 11. Not even one year after the triumph of the Revolution! There are other more revolting things and they are here for those of you who have not read it.

This is another declassified document. Nixon was no longer Vice-President nor was Eisenhower President. Kennedy was President and it was after the Bay of Pigs invasion:

"On March 7, 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in a secret document: ...determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive U.S. military action."

"On March 9, 1962, under the title 'Pretexts to Justify U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba', the Office of the Secretary of Defense submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a package of harassment measures aimed at creating conditions to justify a military intervention in Cuba". See this? They were always looking for pretexts. Some of the measures considered included the following, which were taken to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Office of the Secretary of Defense:

"A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo [Naval base] to give a genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces", one of their alternatives.

"The United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements threatening the base. Commence large-scale United States military operations.

"A 'Remember the Maine' incident could be arranged in several forms.

"We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

"We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters.

"We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of a Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both.

"The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack.

"The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by U.S. fighters to 'evacuate' remaining members of the non-existent crew.

"Casualty lists in U.S. newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

"We could develop a Communist-Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington. The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States.

"We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated).

"We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.

"Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement would also be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

"A 'Cuban-based, Castro-supported' filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation.

"Use of MIG-type aircraft by U.S. pilots could provide additional provocation.

"Harassment of civil aircraft, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of U.S. military drone aircraft by MIG-type planes would be useful as complementary actions.

"An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact.

"Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba.

"It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner en route from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela.

"The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

"It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist-Cuban MIGs have destroyed a U.S.A.F. aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack".

"Five months later" --of these sinister, truly sinister variables suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff-- "in August 1962" --mark the year-- "General Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed to President Kennedy that no possibility was perceived whereby the Cuban government could be overthrown without direct U.S. military intervention, which was why the Special Group-Augmented was recommending the even more aggressive approach of Operation Mongoose. Kennedy authorized its implementation: "‘It's a matter of urgency.'"

1962: October [Missile] Crisis. Some news simply came to the Soviets's attention and to our attention. Not this document I just read, at least, we did not know about it.

But Jrushov was totally convinced. For us it was something we were used to. We were always mobilized on news of a possible invasion. We were not interested in having strategic missiles here. Actually, we were more interested in the image of our country, that it would not look like a base of our Soviet friends.

The decision was made based on our sense of solidarity because before the Bay of Pigs invasion they had sent us many weapons. We had hundreds of thousands of weapons. We had already bought them from the socialist camp and the USSR since that March 4 when La Coubre was blown up. It was in 1960, she was bringing weapons from Belgium. The rest of the time until the Bay of Pigs invasion in April, that is, 1 year and 1 month later, we received dozens and dozens of ships with weapons from the USSR through Czechoslovakia: tanks and cannons, anti-aircraft artillery and rifles.

Very soon we learned how to use them because the heaviest got here during the first quarter of 1960, and when the Bay of Pigs invasion was launched we had weapons taken from Batista's army and some we had bought in Belgium --the second cargo was the one blown up. We did not want to give them any excuse, as in the case of Guatemala where they had used the pretext of a ship carrying weapons from Czechoslovakia to Arbenz's government and blown up the ship. But, by the time of the invasion, we had hundreds of thousands of men trained and armed, thousands and thousands of artillery men to operate those weapons. They were not very experienced but they could handle those weapons and had a fighting spirit.

The Soviets were very, very concerned because they got news of a possible invasion. They gave us the sources, not the most important, not to me. The information they possibly received was incomplete but they did give us the information they extracted from their talks with Kennedy and other high-ranking personalities.

By the time of Bay of Pigs invasion they had sent us not only weapons but they had also made very strong statements and even spoken of the missiles. They were irritated because at that time the Cuban Revolution was like a miracle. They could not have imagined it. It was not imported or promoted by anyone from abroad. It was truly and fully ours.

The only thing we imported, actually, were the ideas or rather the books from which we got a revolutionary political culture. To this we added some Cuban notions and tailored it to the Cuban reality. According to Engels --I must say this-- ever since the big avenues were built in Paris and a rifle firing five bullets was invented, he considered that from that moment onwards an uprising in Paris o similar places would be impossible.

We had to build our revolutionary consciousness when there were planes, tanks, cannons, communications and many things unimaginable in Engels’ days. Since we believed in a number of principles and had a tradition, we conceived the idea of an armed struggle, the strategy and tactics to be pursued.

No Russian had absolutely anything to do with it. No Soviet. Nobody. Nobody sent us guns either. Nobody gave us a dime. Later, there were revolutionary movements in this hemisphere that had tens of millions of dollars. One day I estimated the cost of the Moncada, the Granma and the Sierra Maestra warfare, perhaps I am not too wrong if I put their cost at 300,000 US dollars. So, we can score another point to our favor and say that we carried out the cheapest revolution ever. (LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE)

I am being very candid with you. Yes, we have stood in solidarity with the revolutionary movement. We have not denied it. We may not tell the enemy what we do not want for it to know but we never tell lies. That is for sure, we never tell lies to them, to journalists or to anybody. That is an invariable principle.

I was telling you about the [Missile] Crisis. We knew that the Americans had some missiles in Turkey and Italy, medium-range missiles which are faster than strategic missiles and bombers. There is no doubt that the presence of 42 missiles here gave the Soviets a certain strategic balance. So, for us, who received weapons, support and even the hope that they might fight for us, no matter how much we wanted to preserve a certain image of the Revolution, it was not fair, it was not honorable to refuse an agreement on the question of medium-range missiles. Actually, for us it would have been better to run the risk of not having them, although based on what we know today, the invasion was a sure thing.

By that time, the number of weapons and trained people we had was considerable. We would have been a Vietnam and paid a very high price.

Why did the attack not take place? The Soviet thesis proved its value. We received additional news but we did not pay attention because we were used to such hazards. We had no fear of imperialism or anything like it and we had the experience of our war which was short but intense, therefore, it was the best of schools to enrich that experience. The Soviets were fully convinced, a conviction that could not come out of the blue, without access to documents or other sensitive sources of information.

Looking back at those times, I see that the recommendations to fabricate a pretext date from March 9, 1962.

It is known that the Soviets had some friends or sympathizers in many US institutions taking part in meetings with a lot of people, meetings resulting in lots of papers. They had them. At that time, as I said, we did not know of these documents. But, carefully recalling the story of the contacts, the first time they told us about it, the envoys that came to Cuba, who they were and what they talked about, what they said and how they said it, and the way in which we analyzed it, I do not have any doubts that what they knew came from very reliable sources. I discussed the problem with the revolutionary leadership. In those days Che, Raúl and other comrades were the main leaders, we analyzed it and made a decision.

The Soviets asked me a question, I should say it. They asked me: "What do you think would prevent this invasion?" I told them, and I still believe it: "A Soviet declaration stating that an attack on Cuba would be tantamount to an attack on the Soviet Union." They said: "Yes, yes. But how do we make it plausible?" That was when they suggested deploying the missiles. Then we started thinking and analyzing among ourselves, and we analyzed it from the angle I told you, in terms of honor and solidarity. The answer was "Yes". That was weeks after instructions had been given to fabricate the pretext for an invasion.

I have to reconstruct that story a bit, inquire about some facts and dates. I already told you about this --I was only going to read what I had here-- and be more precise. Because the moment we signed an agreement on that, we began working really fast. So, by August Kennedy had accepted the plan, adopted the plan and said: "It's a matter of urgency.'"

We probably prevented a direct invasion at that time. Later, there were rumors of movements of arms and ships, and so on. In July and August there were some rumors because the missiles were arriving --land-to-air missiles-- and a large amount of weapons, modern planes and many other things. The Crisis began after October 20, really. The Soviets were absolutely right. Jrushov was absolutely right. But such certainty as he had would not have been possible without access to the documents and activities in which the Unites States was engaged. And they had many more resources than we did to obtain that information.

We had some hard information, enough I think and, above all, intuition, we outguessed them. On the other hand, we had a rule: An attack should never take us by surprise. It is better to mobilize twenty times, even if nothing happens, than not mobilizing once and be attacked. We might say that a mobilized troop or country is 20-25 times stronger than when taken by surprise.

That was what happened to the Soviets in June 1941. That happened to Stalin, when he behaved like an ostrich, sticking his head into a hole while the Germans concentrated 3 million troops near the border, tens of thousands of vehicles, thousands upon thousands of tanks, thousands upon thousands of planes. They attacked on a Sunday, when many officers and soldiers were on leave and they destroyed almost every plane on the ground. That story is incredible and we know it very well because we have read a lot about that war and it has helped enrich our experience in many fields.

It was only when the Americans decided to declassify these documents that we learned the details of those sinister plans and their unbelievable lack of scruples. One of those people said: "I don't know anything. You must be prepared to swear that I don't know anything about it." Another one recommended shameful ways to fabricate pretexts to justify a war. The other one accepted. All this is useful today. Other documents will be declassified because there is this procedure, and that has been a contribution --as I was saying-- the declassified documents, in addition to all the evidence we have. Something like the Bay of Pigs is definitely easy to prove. But there is a whole story, from the first to the last man recruited, who did it, where he was sent, the weapons he was given. We took 1,200 prisoners here and swapped them for baby food and medicine. That was the compensation they paid.

Through the declassification process they have put in our hands documents, precedents and facts. Now, we are engaged in this legal battle. I hope that they do not invade us because they consider it a global threat.

I can certainly speak of another global threat, namely, ideas. Clear ideas, all that you have analyzed and adopted. We should all help globalize ideas, help them expand. We should all work the miracle of sending them everywhere, as I said the first day. Those are indeed global threats: speaking, reasoning, thinking, explaining, showing. If in your opinion I have been too extensive, in my opinion I have not.

It has been a pleasant experience to discuss all this with you, and I have told you a number of things, many of which I have exposed for the first time. I have done it with great pleasure, with great satisfaction. It is the least I can do for the honor of your visit, because you have come without any fears and under certain circumstances you need to be brave to come and visit us. I am talking to the Congress delegates. I am talking too --although it is not the same situation-- to the Ministers. Ministers are more powerful, therefore, less vulnerable than you.

For the spirit of friendship we have seen, for your honesty and solidarity it has been a great satisfaction to speak to you for I do not know how many hours --I can hardly estimate the number-- but I can assure you that if I started talking at 5:00 p.m., it is still far from the record. (LAUGHTER) I hope it can be useful!