Bohr argued that complementarity provides an objective description of
physical reality by retaining classical concepts for describing phenomena
but restricted them from describing an independent reality. Part of his
defense of this view is that the descriptive concepts of classical physics
are not a priori categories but are developed to communicate unambiguously
a description of an actual experience. It is this that gives complementarity
a direct reference to aspects of experience, thus providing an empirical
basis on which a theory can be accepted or rejected.
The acceptance of a theory is not only a function of its empirical information.
But, as we have seen in the case of Einstein, a theory may be rejected
because it fails to conform to an ideal stipulating the sort of description
of nature that a suitable theory provides. Since quantum theory does not
conform to descriptive ideals of the classical framework, Bohr developed
his complementarity to show how the acceptance of the quantum postulate
entails a generalization of the classical framework. The growth of science
reveals that the presuppositions of the classical framework turn out to
be true only in special cases and so must be replaced by a more
generalized framework.
The framework of complementarity only makes sense in a realistic interpretation
of the scientific description of nature. We learn empirically from the
success or failure of theories what nature permits us to presuppose about
it in order to describe it unambiguously. This is just another way of saying
that science informs epistemology; that the nature of reality molds our
description of it. The fundamental physical claim of complementarity,
the point at which it changes classical presuppositions, is the assertion
that to describe a phenomenon as an observation of a physical interaction,
theory must represent that interaction such that the interacting systems
form an individual whole, with the consequence that after the interaction,
observer and observed have changed states in an "uncontrollable" or discontinuous
manner.
There would seem to be a correlation between complementarity and the
Metaphysics of Quality, which Robert M. Pirsig proposed in his book Lila;
An Inquiry into Morals. Pirsig has explored this correlation in a paper
he presented at the Einstein Meets Magritte conference in 1995. Philosophically,
Pirsig and Bohr are linked by William James, as described in Part 6 of
this review and in my paper Pragmatism,
Precession and the Metaphysics of Quality. In Pirsig's paper, Subjects,
Objects, Data and Values, he attempts to link his own Metaphysics of Quality
with complementarity via what Pirsig calls the "Conceptually Unknown".
In any case, after the effort I have made in putting this review together,
I can find no indication whatsoever that Bohr ever implied such
a concept. In fact, if complementarity, as Bohr envisioned it, is understood
properly, the "uncontrollable" manner in which Pirsig's Dynamic Quality
operates lies completely outside the framework of complementarity as it
is impossible to communicate the observations of Dynamic Quality unambiguously.
This isn't to say we cannot experience Dynamic Quality, but rather that
we are unable to communicate such an experience in terms others can agree
with unambiguously. This certainly has a zen flavor to it, as is so well
described as the it in the wonderful book by Eugen Herrigel, Zen
in the Art of Archery, from which Pirsig drew on in his first book, Zen
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance; An Inquiry into Values.
I myself see the correlation between complementarity and the Metaphysics
of Quality as a very fundamental shift in how our perceptions of subject
and object are formed. Classically, or in what Pirsig terms Subject/Object
Metaphysics, both subject and object have distinct boundaries imposed upon
each by our preconceived notions of an underlying independent reality.
These boundaries are swept away in both the Metaphysics of Quality and
in complementarity by examining the notion of an independent reality and
finding it lacking.
Pirsig and Bohr both used Occam's Razor to make a fundamental division
in reality between what it is that we are aware of and what it is that
we are not. My interpretation of Occam's Razor says that, all things being
equal, the simple choice is the best choice. Bohr used this fundamental
division to make his complementarity a complete theory of our physical
reality by focusing upon the quantum of action as a whole. Pirsig, on the
other hand, recognized that what it is we can perceive is only a minuscule
portion of reality. Yet, both men arrive at the same conclusions by taking
different paths.
Value; Mind versus Matter
Pirsig's path begins when he asks: "When you say the world is composed
of nothing but value, what are you talking about?" [1] Bohr's lesson of
complementarity tells us that value is only found in that which can be
communicated unambiguously. And for such communication to arise, we must
use everyday concepts in order that we make our self understood to others.
For Bohr, the classical notion of subject and object was indispensable,
and yet it could only be used in complementary ways, which provided for
an expanded point of view. This required dropping the notion of any
independent reality existing behind the notion of subject and object. Pirsig
also says that our classical subject/object metaphysics is indispensable
to our way of perceiving reality, but it is only a small part of the bigger
picture his Metaphysics of Quality provides. Pirsig writes:
... if one asks what is this "man" (which is not a body and
not a mind) one doesn't come up with anything. There isn't any "man" independent
of the patterns. Man is the patterns. ...Our language is so organized around
them and they are so convenient to use it is impossible to get rid of them.
There is really no need to. Like "substance" they can be used as long as
it is remembered that they're terms for collections of patterns and not
some independent reality of their own. [2]
While Bohr steadfastly refused to speculate on where observation originates,
Pirsig uses the term Dynamic Quality to provide an answer. In fact though,
since, according to Pirsig, Dynamic Quality is an undefinable something
that defies any explanation, I can certainly see why Bohr refused to go
there. Bohr was first and foremost a scientist, and as such, he was concerned
with describing physical reality. Anything that lay "outside" physical
reality held no meaning for him whatsoever. It seems to me that neither
Pirsig or Bohr were wrong in their approach, it's just that the former
is a philosopher while the latter was a scientist, and therefore their
priorities were of a different nature to start with.
Pirsig asks: "If the world consists only of patterns of mind and patterns
of matter, what is the relationship between the two?" [3] Bohr's complementarity
answers by stating that thereisnorelationshipbetween
mind and matter, other than our own descriptions of each, communicated
unambiguously with others. What Bohr called unambiguous descriptions, Pirsig
labels patterns of value. However, complementarity tells us that in order
for these patterns to contain value, they must be no ambiguity involved,
otherwise the value is lost.
Pirsig writes: "Mental patterns do not originate out of inorganic nature.
They originate out of society, which originates out of biology, which originates
out of inorganic nature". [4] For mental patterns to originate out of society,
they must be communicated unambiguously within that society, otherwise
those patterns contain no value. This has very deep implications as far
as our physical reality is concerned. Everything we know, everything that
we are, originates as mental patterns, and these patterns originate out
of society, or the social level of Pirsig's Metaphysics of Quality. These
patterns are not representational of an independent reality, as is customarily
supposed, but rather these mental patterns are representational of the
culture in which they arise.
Free Will versus Determinism
Pirsig uses his Metaphysics of Quality to solve what he terms the "platypus"
of free will versus determinism by saying: "... if the determinists let
go of their position (remember Einstein and his difficulty coming to terms
with complementarity) it would seem to deny the truth of science. ... In
the Metaphysics of Quality, this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent
that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of value it
is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality,
which is undefinable, one's behavior is free". [5]
As we have seen in this review, Bohr was very interested in philosophical
problems during his university days, and one aspect held special interest
for him; the controversy of free will versus determinism. Unfortunately,
Bohr never really expounded on what complementarity has to say about free
will versus determinism. However, after laboring over his writings, I feel
that the free will versus determinism platypus does not come up in complementarity
either, and so Bohr did not see a need to address the dilemma at all in
any of his writings. Henry J. Folse, however, attempts an explanation of
what he thinks Bohr's meaning might have been had he pursued it:
When a subject reports willing to do an action freely, he gives
an entirely accurate and truthful description of his experience. However,
here the awareness of the freedom in willing to do his act is considered
part of the subject's state in the experience. ...Hence, it must
regarded as belonging to the subject's side of the subject/object
distinction. ... We can of course shift this distinction and describe this
act of freely willing to do a certain action as itself an object, but in
doing so the single phrase, "the act of freely willing", including the
subject's feelings in doing the act, now refers to what falls wholly on
the object side and cannot refer to the (now different) "subject" whose
conscious awareness is the basis for describing the whole experience as
an experience of willing to do an act freely. Thus we pass from one plane
to another. [6]
(see Part 6 of this review; Bohr's analogy between multivalued
mathematical equations and experienced reality.)
Since complementarity does not subscribe to an independently existing reality,
the subject/object distinction can be shifted simply by agreeing unambiguously
to shift it. Therefore, as in the Metaphysics of Quality, the dilemma of
free will versus determinism never arises at all. This is something which
gave Einstein great difficulty in seeing and so he never agreed with Bohr's
complementarity as a framework for an expanded description of reality.
Causality and Ethics
Pirsig's Metaphysics of Quality is a value-based descriptive system
for describing our physical reality, which consists entirely of what he
calls static quality patterns of value, which are not representational
of an independently existing reality, but rather what value we unambiguously
agree those patterns hold. Complementarily is a system of descriptive concepts
referring not to an independently existing reality behind those concepts,
but rather to a description of a phenomenal reality, communicated
in an unambiguous way. How does complementarity deal with ethics? Not in
the same fashion that Pirsig does with his Metaphysics of Quality, yet
it is clear that the meaning of complementarity is also based on a value
system created by unambiguous communications resulting in our forming agreements
as to the value each descriptive term contains. This seems to be an unwritten
underlying assumption in Bohr's framework of complementarity which he never
approaches.
Bohr's use of causality as a complementary value in describing the atomic
system seems to be in line with Pirsig's usage of "value preconditions"
in the Metaphysics of Quality. In Bohr's complementarity, it is not the
observation that "causes" the result, as is a commonly held belief about
Bohr's philosophy. Instead, just as the Metaphysics of Quality states that
A does not "cause" B, but rather B values pre-condition A, complementarity
says that observing does not "cause" the results, but rather the results
must
pre-condition the observation. [7] Causality as we normally understand
it does not exist in the framework of complementarity. Again, this is an
area of complementarity that Einstein refused to agree with in any way,
and spawned his famous saying "God does not play dice with the universe!"
So just what does this mean in the framework of complementarity in terms
of ethics? Bohr's thoughts never go in this direction, yet it is clear
to me that if they did, he would have arrived at the same conclusions as
Pirsig's Metaphysics of Quality. In a sense, there is no meaning, no value,
in reality except that which we give to unambiguous agreements which we
use to form our individual realities with. This is where the notion of
Good arises. Complementarity is in agreement with the Metaphysics of Quality
in that there is no independently existing notion of "Good" in our reality.
Since there is no assumption of an independent reality, there is no absolute
truth, no absolute good, no absolutes, period.
The ideals that classical subject/object metaphysics seek after are
the result of complementary "pictures" of reality that do not represent
that reality per se, but rather a phenomenal reality we form with
our unambiguously communicated agreements between self and environment.
Complementarity says that if we wish to say the universe is composed
of value, and if we can communicate that notion in an unambiguous
fashion, then the universe is indeed composed of value.
Static Latching versus Unambiguous Communication
In Lila, Pirsig uses the term "static latching" to describe the formation
of what Bohr called unambiguous communication. He writes: "Historically
every effort to unite science and ethics has been a disaster". [8] Pirsig's
Subjects, Objects, Data and Values paper is just such an effort to unite
science and ethics, and in a way, so was Bohr's complementarity. Bohr insisted
that for science to take any meaning out of quantum physics, the observation
of the atomic system must be set up beforehand in an unambiguous
fashion, and from this fact, he realized that complementarity is the very
way in which we perceive our physical reality.
To understand just what Bohr meant by setting up the observation beforehand,
perhaps it is advantageous to study the way the rudimentary perceptions
of reality arise in animals and thus we may gain a better understanding
of that process which we so often overlook in ourselves. Wolfgang Köhler,
better known for his Gesalt Psychology, studied the mentality and intelligence
of apes from 1913 to 1917 at the Anthropoid Station in Tenerife. In "The
Mentality of Apes" he relates many instances of controlled learning experiences
by chimpanzees. One experiment was set up like this:
A piece of fruit is placed on the floor outside a cage containing
a chimpanzee. There are two openings in the cage, one about about three
feet off the floor, below which the fruit is placed outside the reach of
the chimpanzee's grasp, and the other hole at ground level at the other
end of the cage. In order to successfully retrieve the fruit, the chimpanzee
must learn to use a one meter long stick, tied by a string to the outside
of the cage, to push the fruit towards the other opening low to the floor
where he can reach it.
Köhler observed a particularly intelligent male, Sultan, first
try and reach the fruit with his arm, then pick up the stick and
pull the fruit toward himself with the stick, and try and reach it with
his hand, but the hole in the mesh was too high up for him to successfully
grab the fruit from that location. Sultan then took the stick and, pushing
the fruit sideways away from himself to the hole at the other end of the
cage, scampered around and reached through the lower hole and successfully
retrieved the fruit.
Köhler writes:
We thus have the case ... that an act in itself meaningless,
even
disadvantageous, becomes intelligent in connexion with another, but
only
then (Go later to the second place and reach objective from there).
In fact,
the whole taken together constitutes the only possible solution.
The first part of the experiment (a) pushing away from the animal to
a
second place, cannot arise intelligently alone. It is often
more
disadvantageous than useful; part (b) however, (Going to the second
place
and seizing the object) does not yet come into consideration.
Is it conceivable that (a b) spring from the situation intelligently
surveyed by the animal (or man) as one complete and unitaryplan
of action?
I see no other way, if the beginning of the procedure contains no trace
of a
solution, but seems rather to prevent one, and so cannot arise as a
isolated
part. Actually a whole is required to justify, as it were, its "parts"--
for
such procedure as described to be intelligently accomplished.
The theory of forms recognizes wholes which are something more than
the
"sum of their parts"; here a whole is required, which even stands in
a certain
opposition to one of its "parts". That seems peculiar; evidently this
state of things
would be crucial for any theoretical attempt to understand the occurrence
of
intelligent solutions physiologically. [9]
The one complete and unitary plan of action that Köhler observed
seems to be analogous to Pirsig's Quality Event and to the quantum event
of atomic physics. The entire observation must be taken as a whole, which
is more than the sum of its parts. Static latching is part of unambiguous
communication, yet the Quality Event is more than the parts that the unambiguously
communicated results imply, for Pirsig's Quality Event has a complementary
non-event
which lies outside the one complete and unitary plan of action,
which he calls Dynamic Quality. This is what Bohr refused to speculate
about in any way, and what Pirsig calls the "Conceptually Unknown" in his
Subjects, Objects, Data and Values paper.
Summary
The idea behind Bohr's complementarity is extended by Pirsig's Metaphysics
of Quality, and yet it must be realized that when the Quality Event is
focused on, the complementary non-event must be ignored completely
in order for the observation to be communicated in an unambiguous fashion.
If
we focus on static quality everyday reality, Dynamic Quality cannot be
observed and communicated unambiguously in any fashion. However, by the
same token, we may focus on Dynamic Quality should we so choose. But in
that case, static quality everyday reality must be ignored. Still, since
we are unable to communicate unambiguously the observations of Dynamic
Quality in static quality terms, for all intents and purposes that observation
is an individualistic Quality Event only, thus in no way can such an observation
be part of our everyday description of reality.
This ends the review. Thanks for reading! Any and all comments are sincerely
appreciated and you may email me here.
