In the mid-1700s a new strain of Muslim extremism began to flourish in a
small village in the Arabian desert—a strain that would have a profound
effect on Islam and the world as a whole. As Stephen Schwartz describes it
in his recent book, The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from
Tradition to Terror, little is known about the early life of the
sect's founder, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, except that as a young man he
is thought to have traveled through much of the Ottoman empire. He
returned from his travels with a belief that Islam had been corrupted and
weakened by the Ottomans, and that it needed to be brought back to its
roots. But his brand of "an original, authentic Islam," as
Schwartz writes, was both harsher and more stripped down than the religion
that the Prophet Muhammad had founded centuries before. Al-Wahhab forbade
many practices and traditions that were an established part of Muslim
culture, such as the celebration of the Prophet's birthday, the decoration
of mosques, and the use of music in worship and daily life. But most
striking was his attitude toward those people—both Muslims and
non-Muslims—who didn't share his beliefs. As Schwartz describes it,
"Shi'as, Sufis, and other Muslims he judged unorthodox were to be
exterminated, and all other faiths were to be humiliated." Al-Wahhab
soon established a political-religious alliance with a local bandit,
Muhammad ibn Sa'ud, and they agreed that any territory they conquered
could only be ruled by their descendants. The House of Sa'ud—which rules
Saudi Arabia—is directly descended from that alliance, and Wahhabism
(though Saudis don't use the term) is the religion of the regime.
Few people outside the Muslim world really focused on Wahhabism until
September 11, when the fact that fifteen out of nineteen hijackers were
Saudi Arabian, as is Osama bin Laden, brought people face to face with
this extremist ideology. Schwartz, a journalist who has been studying
Islam and extremism for more than a decade, set out to write a history and
exposé of Wahhabism, which he believes is at the root of "two and a
half centuries of Islamic fundamentalism, and ultimately terrorism, in
response to global change." Schwartz describes how over the years,
Wahhabis have infiltrated Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Balkans, the
Philippines, Western Europe, and of course America in their efforts to
attack those who don't believe as they do. Schwartz, who has spent several
years in the Balkans working with the Muslim community, argues
passionately that Islam must not be viewed as a monolith—that people
need to understand that much of Islam is based on a rich, pluralistic,
multi-ethnic, moderate tradition. But at the same time, people must
recognize the dangers of Wahhabism, and of supporting the Saudi regime.
Schwartz is caustic about those who he believes have encouraged our close
ties to Saudi Arabia and have discouraged any real examination into Saudi
involvement in terrorist attacks in the U.S. and elsewhere—his
opprobrium falls on everyone from oil-company executives to journalists to
lobbyists to the President and his cabinet. Ultimately, though, Schwartz
finds room for optimism, both in his knowledge of the true, tolerant face
of Islam, and in his belief that war in Iraq may touch off a chain of
events that will eventually lead to an end of Wahhabi influence in the
Middle East.
I spoke with Schwartz by phone last week.
—Katie Bacon
What misunderstandings about Islam do you most want to
correct with this book?
First, I want Westerners to get over their fears. Second, I want to
correct the misunderstanding that there's just one Islam, and that it's
the Saudi-extremist form. Third, I want to correct the misunderstanding
that Islam is inherently intolerant of the Christians and Jews. I want to
correct the view that Islam is inherently violent. I want to correct the
view that Islam is incompatible with democracy, prosperity, and pluralism.
And, finally, I want to correct the view that Islam as a religion is an
impediment to democracy in the Middle East.
The response to my book has been very positive from the three groups of
people I most want it to reach. Now, one of the paradoxes is that I always
wanted to reach Muslims with this book. When I first told my editor that,
he scoffed and said, "Well, they're not going to read it." But
as matter of fact, a lot of Muslims are reading my book. I wanted
to reach thoughtful people, people who were looking for factual
presentation and who were looking for a way out of prejudice, and I think
I'm reaching people like that. And I wanted to reach people who wanted the
low-down on the Saudis. And I'm reaching them. Now, there must be people
who buy my book because they think it's anti-Islamic, because when I look
at Amazon, very often I find that people who have bought my book have also
bought anti-Islamic books. But anybody who reads my book expecting dirt
about the Islamic faith will be sorely disappointed.
What sort of comparisons would you draw between Wahhabi Islam and
puritanical branches of Christianity and Judaism? Are there any similar
motivations behind them?
Absolutely. This is an extremely complex and paradoxical issue. In
Islam, there has always been the argument that Wahhabism arose directly as
an imitation of Protestant Christianity. And there are Wahhabis who do
make this comparison. They say, "We are creating a Protestant
Islam." I used to respond to this by saying to Wahhabis, "If
you're looking for models from the Christian world, the Catholics are much
better models." If I went to Jerry Falwell and asked him how he
thinks the poetry of William Blake relates to theology, it is very
doubtful he would even know what I was talking about. If I were to go to
Pat Robertson and ask him what he thought of John Milton as a
representative of Protestant culture, it's very doubtful he would have an
intelligent comment. But I can go to a Catholic priest anywhere in the
Catholic world and talk about philosophy and poetry, literature and art,
because Catholicism is a whole civilization. If you want a
Protestant-style Islam, fine, I can't stop you from wanting that, but
Protestantism begins with John Milton and ends with Jimmy Swaggart. A
Protestant-style Islam would be stripped down, with no spirituality, no
sense of Islam as a civilization or a culture, no love of poetry, of
mysticism, of religious philosophy, no beautiful mosques. When you look at
Protestantism versus Catholicism, or Wahhabism versus traditional Islam,
these are the striking parallels. It's a big cliché in the West:
"Islam needs a Reformation." No, Islam does not need a
reformation. If Islam needs anything comparable to developments in
Christian history, it needs a Counter-Reformation. That is, what the
Catholics did. You reaffirm faith, you reaffirm tradition, but you adjust
the day-to-day functioning of the Church to the realities of a modern
society.
The bottom line is this. I always said to the Wahhabis, You think the
world is impressed when someone goes into a bus in Israel and blows up a
bunch of kids. That doesn't impress people. What impresses people about
Islam is a picture of the Taj Mahal. What impresses people who are not
Muslims is Islam as a culture, Islam as a civilization, Islam as a set of
beautiful mosques. Wahhabism wants to get rid of all that, it wants to
drain all of that out of the religion.
There is one extremely important difference, however. Protestantism did
not attempt to enforce conformity. Protestantism fostered pluralism.
Wahhabism does not foster pluralism, unlike traditional Islam, which is
pluralistic, non-conformist, and allows for a multiplicity of opinions.
And that's why, in the end, I now essentially reject the parallel.
You write about helping "the Muslim world conquer its own
destructive demons—its version of fascist and Communist
totalitarianism—and thereby help[ing] ourselves." But wouldn't a
large portion of the Muslim world reject this help, since Wahhabist
regimes, for all their faults, have been very effective at gaining power
and respect for themselves?
I wouldn't agree with that at all. First of all, there have only been
two Wahhabist regimes: Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Qatar is backing off. The
Wahhabis are continuing to struggle to take over Pakistan, and in the
final analysis, they won't be successful. They had a satellite regime in
Afghanistan, but it was not a totalistic, Wahhabi regime. In the rest of
the world they haven't been successful.
What made me think of it was the Russian reaction to the recent
anniversary of Stalin's death. Even though he presided over an era of the
most brutal repression imaginable, many in Russia think he was a good
leader, because of the influence Russia had while he was in power. To some
extent Wahhabism does seem to confer power, maybe not on the people, but
on the regimes.
I know this is going to sound very counterintuitive to a Westerner,
but I have great hope that the Muslim communities, because of their
pluralistic and intellectual tradition, will be able to avoid the trap
that the orthodox Christian nations—Russia, Serbia, and so forth—have
walked into. Russia and Serbia really accepted this totalistic view of
life, and they accepted this power ideology. Islam does not worship power.
Islam has always seen itself as a counter-force to power. Ayatollah
Khomeini's idea that the scholars should rule was considered really
heretical because of that. The Wahhabi inveiglement of the faith with
power is not considered by most Muslim scholars to be a legitimate
phenomenon.
But you're right, there are sections in the Arab world where there is a
great admiration for Saudi power. The Saudis have given the Arab nation,
which has had its own problems of unification, development,
transformation, and bourgeois revolution, a temporary sense of power and
status in the world. But real Muslims, at least the Muslims I know, have
never been admiring of this—they've never accepted that this is the way
for the Muslim ummah, or community, to go.
I'd like to talk for a bit specifically about Saudi Arabia. Your
account and others I've read demonstrates how incredibly intertwined
America and Saudi Arabia are. Aside from our oil dependence, many former
government officials are involved with companies that do business with the
Saudis, Saudis have given money to just about every lobbyist, PR firm, and
think tank in Washington, and they have a lot of money deposited in U.S.
banks and invested in the stock market. How do we disentangle ourselves
from the Saudis when we’re connected on so many economic levels? Is it
likely that any change will happen during the Bush Administration, which
seems especially tied to the Saudis compared to past Administrations?
Well, there is a simple way to do all this—we have to let the
authorities in the Saudi Kingdom know that we will not settle for anything
less than a complete, thorough, and transparent accounting of involvement
of Saudi subjects in 9/11. The importance of this is dual. First of all,
we have to have this for our own moral health, because I'm soon going to
be a grandfather I'm told, and I do not intend to tell my grandchild that
our government covered up Saudi involvement in 9/11 because of big oil,
which is essentially what this is about. We have got to have a situation
where our President can say, "The Saudis have handed me a full report
and it has every name, no matter how high he is in the regime," and
where the Saudis make it clear that all the people involved in al Qaeda
and all the people involved in the financing of 9/11 will be brought to
justice. There is no way that the United States can repair its
relationship with Saudi Arabia without this.
At the same time, the beauty of the whole thing is that if and when the
Saudi kingdom can admit what happened on 9/11, this will be the beginning
of moral health for the Saudis. This will be the beginning of the opening
up of the Saudi Kingdom to the inquiry, scrutiny, self-examination, and
self-criticism that it needs. This is already taking place by the way,
because 9/11 was not a victory for Wahhabism—it was a devastating
defeat. A lot of people within the kingdom are asking themselves, How did
this happen? Why did it happen, what contributed to it, and what can we do
to make sure it doesn't happen again?
Would it be enough of a moral cleansing just to ask for that full
accounting?
We can't just ask. We have to press for it, we have to demand it.
But it seems like we have to go beyond a full accounting to a
disentangling of the connections we have with the Saudis in terms of oil
dependence.
If there's anything right now that's painful for me to have to say,
because I do consider myself a conservative on issues like private
property and privatization, it's that the record of big oil—Standard Oil
and its successors—has been so negative in the history of our country
for so long that maybe the only solution is to have congressional hearings
on the role of big oil in covering for and fronting for the Saudis. Maybe
the only solution is to do what people wanted to do in 1907, which is to
nationalize big oil.
Do you think we should be freeing ourselves from dependence on Saudi
Arabia?
Absolutely. If you want an immediate solution, don't buy an SUV. The
question is, How do we disentangle ourselves from Saudi oil? As long as
the American people think they have some kind of a constitutional right to
cheap gas, and as long as they view an automobile as a form of
entertainment rather than as a form of transportation, we're going to have
these problems. And it is quite striking that after the great oil shocks
of the 1970s everybody talked about change, everybody talked about new
technologies and new cars, and nothing was ever really done about it.
Also, if the United States had not dismantled its railroad system and
public-transit system as it did after World War II because of cheap gas,
then we would not be having this problem.
Our dependence on Saudi oil breeds Saudi contempt for us. The Saudi royal
family does believe that a gasoline fix is coming into our arms each day
and that we can't get off it. They do believe they have us over a barrel
with the gasoline, and they don't believe we will come back at them firmly
and demand the accounting we need.
On the other hand, obviously the Saudis are very dependent on us. You
talk in your book about the hypocrisy of that dependence. They are
dependent, yet they are also inciting this violence against us.
Well, that's always been the case. They've always depended on the
Christian powers to protect their rule on the peninsula, while at the same
time outside of the peninsula they've incited violence against other
Muslims and against other religions. Other Muslims see their hypocrisy.
They see that Wahhabis posture as the purest Muslims and as having the
sharpest swords of jihad, yet at the same time they don't make a
move without insuring that there are British or American or French troops
to protect them.
What people have to realize is that Wahhabism embodies violence, because
Wahhabism begins by saying that everybody who isn't a Wahhabi who calls
himself a Muslim isn't really a Muslim. And that is in essence a violent
proposition.
But at the same time that doesn't mean that all Wahhabis are about to
go out and kill others and then kill themselves.
Well, not all Nazis were running to Auschwitz to pull the switch at
the gas chambers. In fact, it was noticeable in both the Nazi state and
the Stalinist state that lots of people, when it came down to whether or
not they would sacrifice their conscience for their ideology, wouldn't do
it. But I don't know any Wahhabis who are like that. Of course there are
Wahhabis who are not directly involved in going off and killing people,
but they support the ideology that supports the people who are going off
and killing people. The difference is that the Wahhabis have a religious
dispensation that creates a totalistic sense of self-righteousness. Nazism
and Stalinism didn't have this.
There's another thing I'm wondering about the Saudi Arabian regime.
You've talked about how the first big step we need to take is to force the
Saudis to acknowledge all the people with terrorist connections. But how
much effect can we actually have on the regime and its beliefs?
First of all, demanding the accounting of 9/11 would be the beginning
of the emergence of civil society in Saudi. Second, success in Iraq would
be a tremendous challenge to Saudi Arabia, and this is why the Saudis
aren't happy with the whole Iraq deal. The beginning of a democracy in
Iraq would be a tremendous incentive to democratization in Iran, and this
in turn would be a tremendous incentive to the three or four healthy
groups of oppositionists in Saudi Arabia. Some of these oppositionists are
Shia Muslims who are well educated, have satellite dishes, computers, and
e-mail, and who want to live in a society that's like Malaysia—a
constitutional and parliamentary monarchy; others are underground
pluralist Sufi scholars in Mecca and Medina. I think that Saudi Arabia is
a totally normal society that's going through all the same problems that
South Korea went through—that the Philippines, and Iran, and Spain, and
Poland, and every other country that was living under some form of a
tyrannical government went through. The political transformation is
inevitable, and it's already begun. The question is, Will we impede it or
enable it?
Bush of course has said that he's hopeful that if we depose Saddam
Hussein this could start a flowering of democracy in the Muslim world. So
it seems like we'd be in a pretty awkward position if democratic movements
started springing up in Saudi Arabia and we didn't support them.
You betcha. It would be horrible. I come from the radical left, and in
many respects, I haven't changed. One way I haven't changed is that I hate
dictatorships, and I hate the fact that the United States has this
reputation for sticking by corrupt dictators. I give a lot of speeches to
Muslim audiences—I spent the last two days with Shias from Iraq. I stand
up and I say to them: "We are turning a page." The comparison I
make is with slavery. America tolerated slavery for about seventy years
after the foundation of the Republic, but America finally sacrificed a lot
of blood to get rid of slavery. My great friend Octavio Paz, the Mexican
writer and Nobel-prize winner, said that the greatness of the United
States is that it corrects its errors. We're no longer going to support
these corrupt dictators. We're no longer going to go into the Muslim world
with this patronizing attitude of let the Arabs be corrupt if they want.
We are going to help the Arab and Muslim nations find their way to
democracy, prosperity, and stability on their own terms—as we did in
South Korea. South Korea is not a completely Americanized culture. It's
still a traditional culture in many respects. It is democratic,
pluralistic, stable, and prosperous. If I'm proven wrong and in the end we
do stick by the reactionary wing of the Saudi regime, then I guess I'll
have to admit that I was wrong in trusting our leaders, and I'll have to
go back to the left. That's okay. In some ways, that might be fun.
However, let me say this: I truly and with absolute sincerity believe that
Dr. Wolfowitz is on the same page with me on this. Very few people realize
that the defining moment in his life was when he convinced President
Reagan not to support the continuation of Marcos in power. He is a
supporter of world-wide democracy. He is a sincere man. I believe that the
Administration is going to do the right thing here. Last night I said to
an Iraqi Shia imam, a very beautiful man of god, a very sincere, very
sweet man, "President Reagan said, 'Let Poland be Poland.' I want
President Bush to stand up and say, 'Let Islam be Islam.' Liberate Islam
from the grip of the corrupt rulers, from the tyrants, and the terrorists,
and Islam will correct itself."
I wanted to ask something about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Saudi
Arabia was among the slowest of the Arab countries to get involved in the
conflict. But you argue that there is now a connection between the Wahhabi-Saudi
campaign for the global colonization of Islam and the suicide bombings in
Israel.
Look, Hamas is a Saudi front. There is no argument about this. The
ideology of attacking civilians is a Wahhabi ideology. In the Muslim
tradition, the Muslim soldier fights soldier to soldier, as they fought in
Bosnia. The Muslim soldier does not attack children in a school bus, or
mothers walking down the street, or old people, or the infirm and sick.
The fact is that the whole wave of suicide terrorism is directly traceable
to the influence of the Saudis and Wahhabism among the Palestinians. If
the Saudi regime ever accepts that they can no longer export Wahhabism and
can no longer give money to Wahhabism as an extremist ideology, I think
that would have a salutary effect on a resolution in the Middle East.
You know, I usually stay away from talking about this. My problem with
talking about Israel and Palestine is that I don't trust my own instincts.
Given that my father was Jewish, and that my grandfather's generation died
in the Holocaust, naturally I'm defensive about Israel. But all of my
life, whether as a leftist or a conservative, I've wanted social justice,
so I also want some kind of fair resolution for the Palestinians. And
growing up in an atmosphere of secular Judaism, I have to tell you this:
those of us who were brought up to think of the Jewish people as the
people of Einstein and Freud are not happy to see an Israeli policeman
with a club hitting an Arab woman.
I was always an advocate for some kind of peaceful, fair resolution, and I
was always an advocate for Israeli-Arab dialogue. But I do think that
Jewish-Muslim dialogue has a lot better chance in the short term than
Israeli-Arab dialogue. In my book, I call for what I term the
"believers peace," an attempt to bring the religious leaders
together to find a way to peace. I do think that if the grand rabbis, the
mufti in Jerusalem, the Arab patriarch, a Catholic patriarch, and a couple
of Sufis could all sit down, they could at least begin a dialogue. It's
never been tried. And you know, after the war in Bosnia we had a very
successful interfaith council of Jews, Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims.
If it can work in Bosnia, there should at least be the beginning of an
attempt at it in Jerusalem.
You describe the increasing influence that Wahhabis have among the
American Muslim community. How should the U.S. be reacting to them? Are
they dangerous just because they're Wahhabi? How do we keep tabs on
Wahhabis who don't appear to have done anything wrong without compromising
our ideals?
In terms of the media, we've got to stop privileging Wahhabis as the
representatives of Islam in America. We've got to have some non-Wahhabi
Muslims on TV—some Shias, Sufis, Balkan Muslims, Moroccan Muslims. We've
got to stop having a situation where every time they talk about Islam on
the television you see a picture of Saudi Arabia. I can understand that
there would be a picture of Mecca, but they've got to stop privileging
Saudis and the Wahhabis as the representatives of Islam.
Now, in terms of the government, we have a situation where the state
prisons in most states have Wahhabi imams as state employees. And these
people terrorize the non-Wahhabi Muslims in the prisons. That has got to
stop. There is right now a lawsuit in the state of New York, with which my
foundation assisted. Frankly, it's a suit to clean the Wahhabi imams out
of the prison system The Islamic chaplains in the American prison system
should be representative of the full range of Islam. And I have to say
honestly that the federal authorities should crack down absolutely on the
fake charities, or shall we say the corrupt charities. They should arrest
and indict and bring to trial those people who have used Islamic charities
to promote terrorism. Those are two things that will have a very powerful
effect on the Wahhabi conspiracy.
Beyond those two things, which are very practical and concrete issues, I
am very hesitant to bend civil liberties. I'm not entirely comfortable
with the issue of surveillance of mosques, because I don't think that's an
effective way to deal with the issue. A lot of mosques are under Wahhabi
control, but that doesn't mean the believers in the mosque are Wahhabis.
And I'll say something that will probably get me into enormous amounts of
trouble. I'm always on the side of the victims, and if there is an
innocent Arab or Muslim guy who gave some money—though I don't think
people give this money without knowing where it's going—and it went to
Hamas, I want that guy to think about what he's doing, but I don't want
that guy to have to tremble when he's walking down the street, and I don't
want him to have to be locked up, and I don't want his children to have to
not know whether their father is coming home. On the other hand, I don't
want the federal and the state government to pay Wahhabis, and I don't
want any of these people to get away with anything.
You have spent a lot of time during the last decade as both a
journalist and an interfaith activist in the Balkans. How did your
experience there shape or inform your thoughts about Islam and Wahhabism?
It's personal, very personal, very intense for me. My parents were
leftists, and my mother was a Communist. When I was growing up, the
Spanish Civil War was everything, in a certain sense. Bosnia was my
Spanish Civil War. Bosnia, for me, was a stark, direct confrontation
between the forces of good and the forces of evil. It was a confrontation
between fascist monsters who wanted to slaughter people and rape women and
destroy people's lives and a completely innocent population that wanted
nothing but to live and prosper in safety. I will never forgive anybody
who stood in the way of rescuing Bosnia—not Colin Powell, not George H.
W. Bush, not James Baker. Imagine if you woke up tomorrow and The New
York Times headline said "Israeli Forces Rape Four Arab
Girls." Well, 40,000 women and girls were raped in Bosnia. The West
stood aside, Europe stood aside, the British and the French, in essence,
enabled the Serbs to do this. The United Nations basically became
accomplices to the Serbs. No Muslim suffered in modern times worse than
the Bosnians. But they never left the straight path. They never took up
terrorism. They never took up extremism. They look the same as the Serbs,
they speak the same language as the Serbs, they were many times
intermarried with the Serbs. Terrorism would have been the easiest thing
in the world for them. And if they'd all become Wahhabis, nobody would've
reproached them for it. But they never did. They did not fight a jihad.
They did not attack civilians. They did not attack Christian churches.
They fought honorably, even though they had gone through this unspeakably
terrible ordeal. When I saw that, that was what I wanted to tell the West,
and that is still what I want to tell the West. You have to respect these
people and you cannot have a West that says it's okay to slaughter them.
But also, you have to understand that this is the real Islam. An Islam
that gives the Bosnians the strength to try to reconstruct their lives in
peace and with respect for their Jewish and Christian neighbors after what
happened to them is a positive force in the world. When I looked into the
eyes of people, when I talked to these people, I heard unbelievably
terrible things. Things that it destroys me to talk about even now. But
the Bosnian Muslims didn't come out of this experience with hard hearts,
the desire for revenge, or the feeling that any atrocity was justified.
Their Islam saved them spiritually in the ordeal that they underwent.
Did the fact that we eventually did go into Bosnia and then Kosovo
restore your faith at all? Or was it too little too late?
It did restore my faith that we could do the right thing. We did go
into Kosovo pretty quickly. We didn't delay as we did in Bosnia. Clinton
fulfilled a Wilsonian ideal when we went into Kosovo. Right now I'm having
a lot of arguments with partisan people from the Democrat side who say we
shouldn't go into Iraq. If you were for Bill doing it in Kosovo, you have
to be for George doing it in Iraq. Look, I want America to be a powerful
rescuer of the victims. I want America to be the powerful nation that
brings democracy and freedom to those who are oppressed. I want America to
be the liberator. I know that isolationists don't want to hear this, and
realists don't like to hear this, and people think I'm inflamed by some
crazy spiritual or religious ideal. But this is the country that ended
slavery. This is the country that said that kings could not rule the
world, this is the country that said that Hitler would not be allowed to
rule Europe. This is the country that changed its whole society to bring
civil rights to the African-American. This is the country that produced
Martin Luther King. That's who we are, and that's who I want us to be.
And, yes, it's a big burden, it's asking people not just to drive home in
their SUVs at night, and lock their doors, and put their tapes in their
video players and do whatever they do. It's asking us to live to a higher
standard. But I want this country to be that country. I want America to be
the country of Martin Luther King.
9/11 posed an enormous moral challenge to America—a challenge to
understand what is happening in the Arab and Muslim world, and to do the
right thing. It was a challenge to reject Islamophobia, to turn a page in
the history of our relations with these corrupt regimes, to make a new
start in our relations with the Arab and Muslim world. If we can do those
things, then we will be worthy to stand alongside our parents and our
grandparents, and also to accept the challenge that Dr. King presented to
us. And we will be worthy to say that we accepted this moral challenge and
we fulfilled it and carried it on.
|