Mass. The philosophy of both General Maxwell R. Thurman, commander in chief (CINC), SOUTHCOM, and Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner, commander, Joint Task Force (JTF) South, was to emphasize the principal of mass. Time and again during the planning process, the idea of applying overwhelming combat power was espoused. The purpose of applying overwhelming combat power was to shorten the conflict. An enemy faced with vastly superior combat power is less likely to resist, and the force with superior combat power obviously enhances its force protection capability. Applying overwhelming force is likely to decrease the number of casualties on both sides of the conflict.

In Operation Just Cause, more than 12 infantry battalions, supported by an impressive army of combat support (military police, aviation and engineer) and air fire support platforms, conducted initial assaults on D-day. They were followed by an additional six infantry battalions in the days that followed. This force was pitted against a PDF force of four battalion equivalents. The majority of the PDF was organized into separate companies. Consequently, the disparate organizations and strengths of the PDF companies made direct comparison with US forces difficult. The disparate organization of the PDF force and the dispersed nature of its garrisons in fact enhanced our mass advantage and allowed the US force to attack and defeat each company in detail, maintaining a 3-1 superiority while doing so. The ability to mass combat power against each objective quickly and nearly simultaneously gave the PDF no chance to react or regroup. No one principle is decisive in war, but properly applying the principle of mass was the key factor in this victory.

Economy of Force. Economy of force is difficult to examine because, once again, Just Cause was not strictly "conventional" at the operational level. As with the offensive, it must be reexamined in a broader context, and the best example of its application at the operational level was the use of Special Forces. Before H-hour, three Special Forces teams were to provide reconnaissance and surveillance against two D-day objectives and a critical bridge. These teams had the additional task of interdicting any military forces leaving those sites. At the Pacora River Bridge, situated between Fort Cimarron and the Tocumen-Torrijos Airport, a 22-man Special Forces team executed the mission. In the course of the evening, the team prevented several mounted attempts at crossing the river toward the Rangers’ airhead at the airport. Throughout the night, six vehicles were destroyed by the team and its AC-130 fire support platform. (7)

Psychological operations (PSYOPS) and electronic warfare (EW) are also economy-of-force or force multiplier operations. The EW effort was particularly effective just before H-hour. A broad range of transmitters was effectively shut down by the effort. PYSOPS also was to have played an effective role in the initial battle. A Special Forces team temporarily disabled a television station transmission site. In its frequency, an EC-130 airborne PSYOP transmission platform broadcast prepackaged tapes.

The effectiveness of that effort was questionable, however. After the battle, reports tell of the seal of the DOD being broadcast over the channel without any accompanying message. (8) In Panama, PSYOP units scrambled to produce additional tapes. Although the television channel was denied to the Noriega forces, Radio Nacional continued to broadcast its pro-Noriega messages for several days. On the airwaves, it was a case of too little, too late.

Special Force also played an economy-of-force role in the maneuvers to disarm the remainder of the PDF in the interior of Panama. When a town was selected to be the next objective, a small Special Forces element was inserted into the airfield. Opposition was not expected, but by leading with a small team (supported by an AC-130), the larger force, which was close behind, was less likely to become decisively engaged. (9) The level of confrontation was kept low by using a small team initially and the overt threat of the large follow-on force, Ranger or infantry battalion. The demonstrated effect of employing overwhelming combat power in the opening phases of the campaign at H-hour, D-day, made smaller, less threatening moves subsequently possible. This method resulted in the remainder of Panama capitulating to US forces.

Maneuver. According to FM-100-5, Maneuver consists of "three interrelated dimension: flexibility, mobility, and maneuverability,"" Maneuver implies movement but doctrinally includes other dimensions. Maneuver includes fire and movement, the "considered application of the principles of mass and economy of force," and flexibility in "though, plans, and operations." (10) Each of these aspects of maneuver should be examined separately.

Operationally, fire and movement occurred only once on D-day. The air assaults of battalions from the Tocumen-Torrijos Airport to attack objectives at Fort Cimarron, Tinajitas and Panama Viejo are examples of fire and movement at the operational level.

Additional ground movement was hampered by the unfortunate results of the 82d Airborne Division’s heavy drop. In a bid to keep the Tocumen-Torrijos runways clear for follow-on operations, the wheeled and tracked vehicles were dropped by parachute on a neighboring drop zone. The land, however, was low, and the majority of the unit’s vehicles became stuck in the mud. The unit attempted to improvise with rental cars, but the lack of transportation had a detrimental impact on mobility. (11) The absence of those vehicles undoubtedly contributed to the inexplicable delay in moving into the city to stop the looting.

Flexibility is also an inherent component of maneuver. In many respects, the major battles of Just Cause resembled "set-piece affairs." Although Stiner had verbally outlined his thoughts on subsequent moves to his commanders and staff, no written campaign plan had been prepared for actions past the initial assaults at either the unified command level or the JTF level. Operationally, little flexibility was required during these initial operations. These were glimpses of flexibility, however.

Within the ground forces and aircrews from Continental United States (CONUS), completing the outloading process and marshaling for the assault was a gigantic exercise in flexibility as they struggled to maintain some semblance of order in the face of a severe ice storm in the Carolinas. Tactically, the reconnaissance and surveillance teams at the Pacora River Bridge were forced to extemporize as the first of six PDF vehicles neared the bridge before the team as fully settled. The mechanized task force also practiced flexibility as it encountered obstacles across its routes to isolate the Comandancia. The technique employed to pacify the interior of Panama was developed nearly on the run by the units involved. Its acceptance by the chain of command of JTF South exhibited not only flexibility but also a willingness to accept calculated risks as well.

Despite the absence of large armored forces rolling across the plains to conduct deep penetrations or slashing envelopments, the components of fire and movement, the principles of mass and economy of force, and flexibility were all applied to an appropriate degree. Consequently, when viewed in all of its components, the principle of maneuver was applied throughout Just Cause.

Unity of Command. When addressing unity of command, FM-100-5 states, "Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by vesting a single commander with the requisite authority to direct and to coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal." (12) One of the primary results of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Regorganization Act has been to place "requisite authority" in a single commander – the unified command’ CINC.

Throughout the planning process and execution, there was a clear chain of command from the president to the CINC. In fact, since Thurman gave Stiner operational control of the entire fighting force, that clearly delineated chain of command proceeded down to the tactical levels. Unlike other contingency operations, sever vice rivalries and politics were not allowed to hamstring the planning and execution of the operation. There was never any doubt in Stiner’s mind for whom he was working. As he said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "There were no problems with ambiguous relationships or units receiving guidance from multiple sources. These were direct results of the Reorganization Act and Special Operations legislation. (13)

Despite parochial comments, Just Cause was a joint operation. All four services, with a diverse array of tactical units, participated in Just Cause, as did a host of supporting CINCs and agencies. Thurman, as the supported CINC, was the warfighting CINC, and he had a great deal of latitude in how he fought the war. Despite the preponderance of one service, it was the Joint Staff in Washington that monitored and supervised the unified command. The conflict was very much a joint effort.

Tactically, throughout the operation, care was taken to ensure that the chain of command did not become muddled. Subordinate units had their higher headquarters change o them in the course of battle, but the passage of operational control was clearly delineated and stated in appropriate fragmentary orders.